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ABSTRACT 
The sequencing of the entire human genome has opened up unprecedented possibilities 
for healthcare, but also ethical and social dilemmas about how these can be achieved, 
particularly in developing countries. This thesis examines two of the several international 
responses these dilemmas have spawned: the suite of declarations on genetics and 
bioethics adopted between 1997 and 2005 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Global Genomics Initiative proposed by the 
Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics (TJCB). Through these initiatives, UNESCO and TJCB 
hope to promote the ethical governance of genetic and biomedical research, which is 
often conducted on an international basis. The thesis draws on interview, documentary 
and observational data, collected in Kenya and South Africa and from UNESCO, to 
assess the actual and potential efficacy of these two governance mechanisms, in terms of 
protecting individual research participants and reducing inequalities of health between 
North and South. It analyses the negotiation and subsequent implementation of the 
UNESCO declarations at international and national levels and the plans to date for the 
Global Genomics Initiative. Using as a conceptual framework particular branches of 
international relations theory concerned with global governance-namely regime theory, 
networked governance and cosmopolitan democracy-the thesis finds that determining 
where the balance of power between different actors should lie and, moreover, how this 
balance can be achieved is complex and difficult in international decision-making fora. 
Furthermore, the effective implementation of any regulations, policies or programmes 
there decided upon requires co-ordination among different sectors and organisations, 
across international and national levels. The thesis concludes that the UNESCO 
declarations on genetics and bioethics might provide a means to effect such a system of 
governance, if supported by networks of stakeholders both within and between states, 
perhaps through the proposed GGI. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The sequencing of the entire human genome has opened up unprecedented possibilities 
for healthcare, but also ethical and social dilemmas about how these can be achieved, 
particularly in developing countries. According to how competently such dilemmas are 
managed, the fruits of genetic and other biomedical research may exacerbate or reduce 
inequalities of health between North and South. The effects of these inequalities have the 
potential to spread beyond national boundaries, hence this is of global import. UNESCO, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, has over the last 
decade adopted a suite of declarations to address such issues, two in the specific field of 
human genetics and a third on bioethics more generally. As a separate entity, an 
international network for knowledge sharing and informed decision-making, a Global 
Genomics Initiative, has also been proposed. Using as a conceptual framework those 
branches of international relations theory concerned with traditional and more fluid forms 
of global governance, this thesis examines the actual and potential efficacy of these 
mechanisms, with a focus on the South. It also looks at the wider implications of genetics 
and bioethics as a case study for approaches to global governance. This chapter lays out 
the main argument and structure of the thesis, which aims to answer the following 
research question: 
What insights can international relations theory offer into the actual and potential 
efficacy of global governance mechanisms in genetics and bioethics, particularly 
with regard to developing countries? 
1.1 CONCEPTS AND ARGUMENT 
International relations theory, in its various forms, seeks to explain world affairs and 
expound how they might, if possible, be better governed. Decision-making on the 
management of collective issues and the subsequent implementation of regulations and 
policies constitute governance. At the national level these tasks are often undertaken by 
governments. At the international level, however, governance is conducted in the absence 
of a formal world government, partly through institutions such as UNESCO. 'Global 
governance' refers to how global issues or problems (those that have the potential to 
affect everyone, irrespective of national boundaries) are or could be addressed. ' The 
effective governance of human genetic and biomedical research would contribute to the 
protection of individual research participants and, more broadly, the harnessing of this 
research to tackle the health needs of the South. It would entail, firstly, high quality 
decisions on how these goals could be achieved and, secondly, comprehensive 
implementation of those decisions. This thesis argues that the UNESCO declarations on 
genetics and bioethics, if supported by networks of stakeholders both within and between 
states, might provide a means to effect such a system of governance. 
1.2 GENETICS AND BIOETHICS 
Chapter 2 considers why genetics and bioethics are global issues and why they require 
governance. Genetics is the study of genes, the molecular units which determine various 
phenotypic characteristics and influence, for example, susceptibility to disease. Genomics 
concerns the entire sequence of genes found within an organism's genome 2 The term 
'bioethics' can be used to cover ethical issues across a broad spectrum, but for the 
purposes of this thesis is defined more narrowly as the ethics of biomedical research with 
human subjects. Both genetic and biomedical research are conducted on a worldwide 
scale. Genetics presents new ethical problems, or at least new perspectives on existing 
ones. That members of families and communities may share genes poses a challenge to 
the established bioethical principles of privacy and confidentiality, for instance. Relatedly, 
1 The word 'global' is used to denote issues or entities with the potential to affect everyone. Correspondingly, 
'international' applies primarily to relations between nation-states. Note, however, that organisations in which 
these relations are typical, such as organs of the United Nations, increasingly include non-state actors in their 
deliberations and activities. The theoretical background to the term 'global governance' is discussed more fully 
in Chapter 3. 
2 Henceforth, 'genetics' will be used to denote both genetics and genomics. A more detailed explanation of the 
two terms can be found at 2.2.1. 
if the human genome is the common 'heritage of humanity', as UNESCO terms it, 3 this 
raises the question of how the benefits that might accrue from genetic research should be 
distributed. At the same time, understandings of what constitutes a bioethical concern are 
broadening. As inequalities in access to medicine and healthcare between North and 
South enlarge, what should be the focus of research becomes in itself an ethical question 
(aside from how it should be carried out). Some commentators have suggested that 
harnessing the potential of genetics to address the health needs of the South could help 
to reduce these inequalities, while others see a change in attitudes as the necessary 
catalyst, rather than advances in technology. 
1.3 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
Chapter 2 goes on to describe two initiatives that might provide governance of genetics 
and bioethics at an international level. UNESCO has spawned three declarations in this 
regard, the 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, the 
2003 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data and the 2005 Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Each embraces well-established bioethical 
principles, such as autonomy and informed consent, as well as newer ideals of knowledge 
sharing and capacity building, particularly between developed and developing countries. 
The declarations are non-binding in international law, thus the onus is on member states 
to apply them within their national laws, regulations or policies. UNESCO considers the 
declarations unique among bioethics instruments because they were agreed by 
governments. The thesis investigates the significance of this claim for effective 
governance. 
The general inefficacy of existing governance arrangements within the international 
system has prompted scholars at the Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics to suggest an 
3 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, article 1. 
3 
alternative governance structure for genetics and bioethics, a Global Genomics Initiative. 
This would take the form of a network, underpinned by governments but also 
incorporating stakeholders from academia, civil society and the private sector, with an 
emphasis on leadership from the South. Like the UNESCO declarations it would 
encourage knowledge sharing and capacity building and espouse norms for the ethical 
conduct of genetic research. The thesis considers whether the network's distinctive 
governance structure would justify its being established in the face of these similarities. It 
also contemplates whether the two initiatives might be synchronised. 
1.4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
Chapter 3 outlines several approaches to global governance within the field of 
international relations. These might help to explain the efficacy or otherwise of the 
UNESCO declarations as a governance mechanism for genetics and bioethics and 
whether the Global Genomics Initiative (GGI) might provide a viable alternative. They 
might also suggest how both initiatives could be improved upon, in terms of decision- 
making and regulatory or programmatic procedures. The chapter focuses on four specific 
approaches-regime theory, issue-based global networks, government networks and 
cosmopolitan democracy-chosen for their pertinence to the governance of global issues 
such as genetics and bioethics and to the UNESCO declarations and the GGI in 
particular. Regime theory attempts to explain why and how, in a world of sovereign states, 
collective action arises and is maintained. Regimes thus comprise understandings, formal 
or informal, between states and other actors, about how agreements on a given issue 
should be arrived at, what they should include and how they should be implemented. They 
often entail bargaining, concession and compromise in order to enable consensus. The 
UNESCO declarations can be considered a formal, non-binding regime. 
4 
Together with regime theorists, both scholars and practitioners of global governance have 
in recent years tried to find ways in which such arrangements might be strengthened or 
enhanced, in order to address global problems and issues more effectively. They 
generally advocate involving, to a greater or lesser extent, those with expertise or an 
interest in the matter at hand, alongside government representatives. Nayef Samhat, for 
example, argues for greater inclusion of non-state actors in decision-making within 
international regimes, thus formulating regimes as public spheres, or spaces for dialogue 
and deliberation. Some of the recent thinking has had a direct impact on the plans for the 
GGI, which are modelled heavily on the work of Jean-Frangois Rischard and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter. Both these authors recommend forms of networked governance, but with 
differences in the balance of influence between state and non-state actors. Rischard 
proposes partnerships between governments, industry and civil society, whilst Slaughter 
promotes governance through networks of government officials. 5 More ambitious is the 
template for cosmopolitan democracy put forward by David Held and Daniele Archibugi, 
which seeks to locate democracy beyond state borders, in an "array of fora" from the local 
to the global. 6 Whereas regimes and networked governance would concentrate on single 
issues, such as genetics and bioethics, cosmopolitan democracy would signify a holistic 
approach to global governance, situating targeted problem-solving within a broader 
programme of systemic change. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4 outlines how the research question was investigated. A case study approach 
was adopted, with the UNESCO declarations and the proposed GGI as primary cases and 
Kenya and South Africa as sub-units. Since the declarations are non-binding, they must 
be adopted by member states if they are to be implemented effectively. Whether this is 
4 See Samhat, "International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy, " among his other papers 
cited in the thesis. 
5 See Rischard, High Noon and Slaughter, A New World Order. e Held, Global Covenant, 115. See also his several papers cited in the thesis, as well as those of Archibugi, 
such as "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics. " 
5 
likely will perhaps depend not only on the usefulness of UNESCO's support programmes 
and on particular national circumstances, but also on whether states (and individual 
stakeholders within them) believe they had sufficient input into the content of the 
declarations. Such questions are also pertinent to the proposed GGI, as if established it 
would rely partly on its multisectoral membership for legitimacy. Within regime theory, 
there have been frequent calls for empirical research at national level, in response to the 
question, "Do regimes matter? " As yet relatively few studies have been conducted, 
however. With regard to the UNESCO declarations, most analyses have emerged from 
the discipline of bioethics rather than international relations, but here too the focus has 
been on their negotiation and content rather than their impact on national ethics policies 
and systems. Thus the thesis addresses gaps in both the international relations and 
bioethics literatures. 
The empirical research traced relations between actors both vertically and horizontally, in 
terms of how decisions made internationally translate downwards and how far these 
processes involve different stakeholders, be they governmental, academic, civic or 
private. To this end, fieldwork among policy-makers, geneticists, ethicists, civil society 
representatives and industry professionals was conducted. This produced qualitative data 
in interview, documentary and observational formats, which were subsequently coded and 
analysed in function of the approaches to global governance outlined above. Kenya and 
South Africa were chosen as the major fieldwork destinations because of their significant 
activities and involvement in genetics and bioethics at local, national, regional and 
international levels, with a small number of interviews also being carried out in France and 
the United Kingdom. 7 Chapter 4 outlines the methodology in more detail, including how 
challenges such as gaining access to participants and meeting ethical requirements were 
overcome. 
UNESCO headquarters are based in Paris, France. The interviews in the United Kingdom were with people 
who had attended negotiations for the 2005 UNESCO bioethics declaration. 
6 
1.6 FINDINGS 
The findings are presented thematically, in two chapters. Chapter 5 discusses legitimacy, 
representation and accountability within the decision-making process for the UNESCO 
declarations, Chapter 6 the nature of the norms contained therein and how they are being 
implemented and enforced. Each chapter also explores what might be the prospects for 
the GGI, if established, based partly on the UNESCO data and partly on responses to 
interview questions directly concerning the proposed network. In terms of the UNESCO 
negotiations, relations between states were found to be ostensibly equal, but power 
differentials between North and South surfaced in spite of formal procedures aimed at 
containing these. Non-state actors, particularly experts in genetics and bioethics, were 
involved in the negotiation process to a certain extent, but the hierarchical approach that 
saw state representatives making the ultimate decisions precipitated a dichotomous 
tension between these two groups. The tension was mirrored at national level, where in 
both Kenya and South Africa geneticists and ethicists felt they had not been satisfactorily 
included in consultations around the draft declarations and that those who had attended 
the international negotiations were not sufficiently expert in the issues at hand. This 
affected their perceptions of the declarations' legitimacy, particularly in comparison to that 
of similar instruments produced by other international bodies. Government officials from 
those departments and units not directly connected with UNESCO headquarters in Paris, 
but nevertheless staking a claim in genetics and bioethics, also felt excluded from the 
negotiation process. Perhaps unsurprisingly given these results, interviewees generally 
welcomed the GGI proposals, particularly the multisectoral membership and southern 
leadership aspects. As most of these people had not actually been asked to join the GGI, 
however, nor indeed had even heard of it, whether it could succeed in fulfilling these plans 
is open to question. 
In terms of implementation and enforcement, the UNESCO declarations exhibit many 
typical aspects of non-binding regimes. Their non-binding status ensured consensus 
7 
among member states was possible, the pay-off being that adherence is consequently 
harder to ensure. UNESCO is encouraging rather than enforcing compliance, through 
various activities aimed primarily at building national capacities for implementation of the 
declarations, including information dissemination and ethics education. Those states that 
have already adopted some of the principles enshrined in the declarations have not 
necessarily done so directly. In Kenya and South Africa, for example, recently published 
national guidelines on bioethics reflect the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights (2005) in several respects, but were drafted with reference to earlier texts 
produced by other international bodies rather than the UNESCO declaration. This 
highlights the duplication of functions and mandates that can occur in the currently ad hoc 
international system. Since the proposed GGI's activities would be similar again, like its 
intergovernmental counterpart it would have to find a niche in order to make a distinctive 
impact on the governance of genetics and bioethics. Chapter 6 outlines some of the 
issues that UNESCO or the GGI might try to address. These issues are particularly 
pertinent to Kenya and South Africa (and perhaps, by inference, other developing 
countries) and include the protection of potentially vulnerable research participants and 
the need for more training in ethical review. 
1.7 IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of these findings in relation to international relations theory around global 
governance are discussed in Chapter 7. The discussion is twofold: it considers, firstly, 
how the governance of genetics and bioethics might be improved through the 
implementation of aspects of normative regime theory, networked governance or 
cosmopolitan democracy and, secondly, what governance issues these approaches might 
fail to address, as revealed by the UNESCO and GGI case studies. In this regard it 
examines how relations between developed and developing countries can be made more 
equal; who should be involved in global level decision-making and how this should 
proceed; how overlap between initiatives can be avoided; what can be done to improve 
the implementation of international norms by sovereign states; how far universal norms 
can be contextualised; and what the impact of national level governance is on the efficacy 
of that at international level. Chapter 8 draws some conclusions from this discussion, on 
the implications for global governance in general and for genetics and bioethics in 
particular. With regard to decision-making, whether and how stakeholders in a given issue 
and the public at large can be democratically included at international level demand 
further thought in terms of what make for constructive, fair and incentive procedures. In 
terms of effective implementation, coordination within and between international and 
national layers of governance is required. As institutions do not suddenly disappear, any 
new governance structures would have to be integrated with older ones. For genetics and 
bioethics, a network built around the UNESCO declarations rather than as an alternative 
to them might provide a means to combine the positive aspects of both traditional and 
innovative forms of governance. This would require better communications among actors 
and a large injection of funding. 
This chapter has provided an overview of the thesis. In summary, Chapters 3 and 4 
outline the theoretical framework and methodology by which the research question was 
investigated. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the empirical data collected. Chapter 7 discusses 
these findings in function of the theoretical framework and Chapter 8 draws some 
conclusions based on this discussion. First, though, Chapter 2 introduces genetics and 
bioethics and particular mechanisms for their governance. 
CHAPTER 2 GENETICS AND BIOETHICS 
Every scientific revolution brings with it a host of ethical and social questions. 
The so-called genetics revolution is no exception, giving rise to a broad 
international debate on how the undoubted benefits of progress in this area can be 
reconciled with certain core human values. ' 
This thesis comprises an analysis of existing and potential mechanisms for the 
governance of human genetic and biomedical research, from an international relations 
perspective. Governance in this context refers to attempts to ensure that research is 
conducted ethically, through the formulation and implementation of regulations, policies 
and programmes. The UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics and the 
proposed Global Genomics Initiative (GGI) have stemmed from the tremendous increase 
in the profile of genetics in the light of the sequencing of the human genome and the 
extension of biomedical research beyond national borders. This chapter introduces the 
two initiatives and outlines how they seek to facilitate the reconciliation the quote above 
purports necessary. It begins with a discussion of what is understood by the terms 
'bioethics', 'genomics' and 'genetics' and why it is that the issues they cover require 
governance at local to international levels, particularly with regard to developing countries. 
It then explores how UNESCO's three declarations and the proposed GGI might provide 
such governance. A brief introduction to genetics and bioethics in Kenya and South Africa 
follows, as a prelude to the empirical analyses of Chapters 5 and 6. Drawing together all 
these strands, the chapter closes with a portrait of what the effective governance of 
genetic and biomedical research would look like in global terms. 
1 UNESCO, "Human Genetic Data: Preliminary Study of the IBC, " 1. 2 For a fuller discussion, particularly in terms of 'global governance', see 3.2. 
10 
2.1 BIOETHICS 
2.1.1 Background 
Bioethics as a field has evolved from two separate disciplines: medical ethics and moral 
philosophy. Concern for ethics in terms of patient welfare first appeared in the form of the 
Hippocratic oath, while moral philosophers have come to reflect on dilemmas faced by 
modern society alongside more abstract meta-ethics. 3 Bioethics is now seen to cover a 
wide range of issues, including genetics, reproductive technologies and biomedical 
research. John Harris gives a succinct definition in his introduction to Bioethics, part of the 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy series: "In short, bioethics investigates ethical issues 
arising in the life sciences (medicine, health care, genetics, biology, research, etc) by 
applying the principles and methods of moral philosophy to these problems. " 
While the term 'bioethics' can incorporate issues ranging from environmental ethics to 
animal welfare, this thesis is primarily concerned with the ethics of biomedical research 
with human subjects. At international level, research ethics were first laid down in 
regulatory form in 1947, in the Nuremberg Code. This codification was a response to the 
human rights abuses that had taken place through experimentation on human subjects 
under the Nazi regime of World War II and enshrined a key principle in bioethics, that of 
informed consent: a person agreeing to take part in research should do so voluntarily and 
with sufficient knowledge and understanding of what is involved. 5 The Code also 
encompasses what have come to be known as the 'four principles' or 'Georgetown 
principles' formulated by philosophers Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in the 
1970s, namely respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice. Although 
3 Harris, "The Scope and Importance of Bioethics, " 1-2. 4 Ibid, 4. 
5 Fluss, "The Evolution of Research Ethics, " 596-597; National Institutes of Health, "Regulations and Ethical 
Guidelines, " httpJ/ohsr. od. nih. gov/guidelines/nuremberg. html (accessed 19 August 2006). 
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contested, these principles provide a normative framework that is widely used by 
researchers (and medical practitioners). ' 
There have been several further attempts to codify good research practice, to ensure, as 
far as possible, that the rights of those who take part in research are protected. In 1964, 
the World Medical Association produced the Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for 
Medical Research involving Human Subjects, which reflects the four principles. Updated 
regularly, most recently in 2000, ' this is generally considered the foremost document 
globally on medical research ethics. 8 The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects of the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) are intended to complement the Helsinki declaration. They 
give guidance on how its principles can be applied, particularly in developing countries .9 
At other levels, many countries and research institutions have their own legal or regulatory 
instruments on bioethics, albeit usually based to a large extent on one or more of the 
international documents. The UNESCO declarations are the latest additions to this array. 
One of the main requirements of these various instruments will usually be that proposed 
research projects should be reviewed by a research ethics committee (REC). 
2.1.2 Governance issues in bioethics 
To ensure that a research project will be conducted ethically, RECs must determine 
whether the procedures for obtaining informed consent and the predicted risk/benefit ratio 
will be conducive to the protection of research participants, in terms of privacy, 
confidentiality, autonomy and safety-'O How such concerns should be met has warranted 
renewed reflection in recent years, in the context of the growing frequency of research 
projects involving more than one country, including developing ones. The need to build 
e Beauchamp, "Principlism and its Alleged Competitors, " 479-480; Holm, "Not Just Autonomy, " 494-495. 
World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, 1. 
Carlson, Boyd and Webb, "The Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki, " 695. 9 CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 
10 Benatar, "Reflections and Recommendations on Research Ethics in Developing Countries, " 1134. 
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capacity for ethical review in developing countries has also been noted. This section 
explores these issues. 
2.1.2.1 Universalism versus pluralism 
The extension of biomedical research beyond national borders renders international 
standards on bioethics necessary, so that research participants are treated equally and 
fairly whichever country they are from. " Sjef Gevers, Giovanni Berlinguer and Solomon 
Benatar all endorse the establishment of universal ethical norms to encapsulate these 
standards (see 3.4.1 for more on what is understood by the word 'norm'). 1 2 Since such 
norms are likely to be realised in different cultures, it is important that their application be 
contextualised. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics' report on the ethics of healthcare 
research in developing countries highlights the difficulties that ensue if sponsors fail to 
familiarise themselves with the cultural traditions of the countries in which they undertake 
research. 13 Benatar, with Peter Singer, recommends that international researchers should 
be sensitive to local social, economic and political contexts, 14 while Zulfigar Bhutta 
suggests that communities should be involved in decision-making about research to be 
conducted in their locales. 15 
In a separate article, Benatar stipulates that contextualisation should only go so far: 
"Respect for democracy should take precedence over the preservation of cultural 
traditions that undermine democracy and human rights. "16 Others would disagree, 
believing the idea that universal norms exist at all to be erroneous. "Agreement at the 
level of general norms has no inherent practical significance since it is possible to derive 
" Gevers, "Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, " 293. 
12 Ibid; Berlinguer, "Bioethics, Health, and Inequality, " 1087; Benatar, "Reflections and Recommendations, " 
1135. 
13 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, "The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries: A 
Guide to the Report, " 2. " Benatar and Singer, "A New Look at International Research Ethics, " 826. 15 Bhutta, "Ethics in International Health Research, " 116. 
"s Benatar, "Towards Progress in Resolving Dilemmas in International Research Ethics, " 576. 
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markedly divergent policies and practices from the 'same' principle, maxim, or moral 
intuition, " writes Leigh Turner. She argues that historical and anthropological evidence for 
a common morality (including the notion of universal human rights) is scarce. " Similarly, 
modern bioethics has been criticised for deeming universal what some consider to be 
merely Western notions of ethics. 18 The tension between universalism and pluralism in 
bioethics reflects a wider philosophical debate that is also manifest in international 
relations theory (see 3.5.4). 
2.1.2.2 Vulnerability of research subjects 
Medical research is largely market driven, to the detriment of those in poor parts of the 
world where infectious diseases are rife. A well-known study by M6decins Sans Frontibres 
and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative showed that of the 1,556 drugs marketed 
between 1975 and 2004, only 21 are for diseases mainly affecting the South. 19 While 
those in developing countries have seen relatively little benefit from medical research, 
they may well have participated in it: open access to patients, lower costs and fewer 
regulations have produced what Benatar terms a "research sweat shop. "20 Some people 
in countries with poor healthcare provision may become research participants in order to 
receive treatment to which they would not normally have access? ' Berlinguer has warned 
against medical research becoming a new form of exploitation. 22 
If all research in developing countries was to stop, for fear of exploiting vulnerable 
populations, the corollary would be that even fewer resources would be devoted to 
'I Turner, "Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict, " 194,195 and 197. 1s Benatar, "Towards Progress in Resolving Dilemmas, " 575. 
1e Chirac and Torreele, "Global Framework on Essential Health R&D, " 1560. 20 Benatar, "Commentary: Justice and Medical Research, " 337; Emanuel et al, "What Makes Clinical Research 
in Developing Countries Ethical? " 930. Ruth Macklin provides an illustrative example of how vulnerable groups 
have been exploited in biomedical research. She details the circumstances under which a large 
pharmaceutical company chose to trial a drug during a meningitis epidemic in an African country, including its failure to follow industry guidelines or informed consent procedures. (Macklin, "Bioethics, Vulnerability and 
Protection, " 475-477. ) 
21 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries, 4. 22 Berlinguer, op cit, 1087. 
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addressing their health concerns than is currently the case. 23 Thus the challenge is to 
develop means by which ethical research in developing countries can continue and grow. 
Benatar and Singer have suggested as criteria that any proposed research should be 
relevant to the host country and likely to be of long-term benefit. 24 'Benefit sharing' 
agreements may be one way to meet these criteria, by which funders and researchers 
commit to sharing any gains from scientific or technological research with participants or 
the wider community, whether directly in terms of profit or product or indirectly through 
capacity building and healthcare provision. 25 Berlinguer summarises the need for such 
measures as follows: "Benefit-sharing and equal access to advances in biomedical 
science are now urgent and universal issuesi26 (italics added). 
Z1.23 Capacity for ethical review 
Ruth Macklin highlights the need for effective oversight of research: "If a country lacks a 
mechanism for identifying and sanctioning researchers who violate laws, regulations, or 
fundamental ethical standards in carrying out the research, then all research subjects are 
potentially vulnerable. s-27 Benatar and Singer, in an article on the World Medical 
Association's Declaration of Helsinki, contend that building capacity in research ethics will 
have far more impact on ethical standards than "revisions of this or any other research 
ethics code. s28 Similarly, Bhutta argues that strengthening local capacity in bioethics is key 
to promoting ethical health research in developing countries' Benatar also stresses the 
need for research to be effectively monitored once it has been approved. 30 Insufficient 
funding and training for RECs are often the biggest barriers to such endeavours, as 
identified by Nancy Kass et al in a recent study across several African countries (including 
23 Macklin, op cit, 478. 24 Benatar and Singer, "A New Look at International Research Ethics, " 826. 25 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, article 15. 28 Berlinguer, op cit, 1088. 27 Macklin, op cit, 475. 28 Singer and Benatar, "Beyond Helsinki, " 747. 29 Bhutta, op cit, 117-118. 30 Benatar, "Reflections and Recommendations, " 1136 and 1137-1138. 
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Kenya and South Africa). 31 Capacity within RECs is not the only issue, however; both 
Sylvester Chima and Kass et a! aver that committees need national level guidelines and 
policies to steer them, which do not always exist in developing countries 32 In the context 
of genomics research, Dave Chokshi and Dominic Kwiatkowski link the need for local 
capacity with the need to contextualise universal principles: "Improving local capacity in 
bioethics in developing countries is essential to ensure that the philosophical principles of 
genomics ethics are informed by a practical understanding of what will work at the local 
level. s33 With regard to developing capacity for research itself, as well as its review, Bhutta 
suggests that developing countries should be enabled to carry out research relevant to 
their needs. Petros Isaakidis et a! assert that local researchers should play a substantial 
role in defining what these needs are, rather than have research priorities dictated to them 
by the North. 34 
2.1.3 Wider concerns 
Debates in research ethics spill over from regulatory concerns to the broader issue of how 
inequalities of health between North and South should be addressed. Bhutta deems these 
"vital components of the same equation, "35 as does Benatar: 
Medical research, health care, conditions of life around the world and how humans 
flourish may seem separate, but they are all interdependent. Taking such a 
comprehensive global perspective adds complexity to the task of crafting universal 
research ethics guidelines. 36 
The "conditions of life" Benatar refers to include such basic needs as food, clean water 
and shelter, which have traditionally been considered outside the remit of bioethics 37 As 
31 Kass et al, "The Structure and Function of Research Ethics Committees in Africa, " 28. 32 Ibid, 29; Chima, "Regulation of Biomedical Research in Africa, " 849. 33 Chokshi and Kwiatkowski, "Ethical Challenges of Genomic Epidemiology in Developing Countries, " 12. 34 Bhutta, op cit, 114; Isaakidis eta/, "Relation Between Burden of Disease and Randomised Evidence in sub- 
Saharan Africa, " 4. 35 Bhutta, op cit, 118. 36 Benatar, "Justice and Medical Research, " 337. 37 Turner, "Bioethics Needs to Rethink Its Agenda, " 175. 
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poverty is a direct factor in nearly one third of the worldwide disease load38 (with disease 
also contributing to poverty, in a vicious circle), Benatar and Singer call for "a new, 
proactive research ethics" to address the global health inequities they see as being the 
greatest ethical challenge. 39 Several commentators, including Benatar and Singer, refer to 
the '10/90 gap'. This is a statistic that, although dating back to 1990, has become a kind of 
shorthand to describe disparities in healthcare: ninety per cent of the USD 56 billion spent 
annually on medical research is devoted to mitigating only ten per cent of the global 
disease burden. 4° Benatar frames global health in terms of a new concept of security that 
concentrates on improving life chances for everyone. 41 New infectious diseases have 
"shrunk distances and differences, and created common global risks. " The global nature 
of these risks, Benatar argues, means that it is in everyone's "rational self-interest" to 
address them. 42 Harold Varmus, former director of the US National Institutes of Health, is 
of the same view. He calls for a "concerted effort to build health-related sciences in poor 
countries" as part of the solution 43 
One way to promote the rational self-interest ethos may be through the concept of 'global 
public goods' (GPGs); that is, goods that are non-excludable (available to all) and non- 
rivalrous (consumption by one person does not prevent consumption by another), that can 
be found in the public domain and whose benefits are available worldwide. (Benatar 
attributes inequalities between rich and poor partly to under-attention to public goods. 4) 
Inge Kaul and Michael Faust, of the United Nations Development Programme, see 
international cooperation on health as a GPG issue. Their rationale highlights the link 
between GPGs and self-interest: since national borders are porous to disease (and 
38 Benatar, "Reflections and Recommendations, " 1132. 39 Benatar and Singer, "A New Look at International Research Ethics, " 826. 40 Benatar, "Justice and Medical Research, " 335 and Singer and Daar, "Harnessing Genomics and 
Biotechnology to Improve Global Health Equity, " 89; see also Benatar, "Reflections and Recommendations, " 
1132 and 1138; Benatar, "Human Rights in the Biotechnology Era I"; Benatar and Singer, "A New Look at 
International Research Ethics, " 824; Singer and Benatar, "Beyond Helsinki, " 748; Berlinguer, op cit, 1088; 
Dowdeswell, Daar and Singer, "Bridging the Genomics Divide, " 3. 41 About one fifth of research scientists and engineers work exclusively on military research and development. 
Benatar, "Global Disparities in Health and Human Rights, " 296. 42 Benatar, "Bioethics: Power and Injustice, " 391. 43 Varmus, "Building a Global Culture of Science, " s2. 44 Benatar, "Moral Imagination, " 1208. 
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increasingly so as people travel more45), health conditions are globalised and thus 
"international cooperation in health has become a matter of self-interest and mutual 
concern. "" (Whether this is a viable use of the GPG concept is discussed more fully at 
2.3.2.3. ) 
This section has introduced various principles that determine how research can be 
conducted ethically and how these might be applied in developing countries. It has also 
considered bioethics more broadly, in terms of the moral challenge of inequalities of 
health. The next section turns to genetics and genomics. It begins by outlining how these 
terms are understood. It then examines how ethical principles can be applied in the 
particular context of genetic and genomic research and how the outputs of this research 
might be harnessed to address the health concerns of the South. 
2.2 GENETICS AND GENOMICS 
2.2.1 Background 
The term 'genomics' derives from the word 'genome'. A genome is the sum total of all the 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) in any given individual or organism 47 DNA is made partly 
from four chemicals or bases, adenine, guanine, cytosine and thymine (abbreviated to A, 
G, C and T), which are sequenced in pairs along a genome. The human genome, for 
example, contains approximately three billion base pairs 48 Genes are particular 
sequences of DNA within the genome that determine certain characteristics of an 
45 Chen and Berlinguer, "Health Inequity in a Globalizing World, " 7. 46 Kau[ and Faust, "Global Public Goods and Health, " 869 and 870. 47 WHO, Genomics and World Health, 4; US Department of Energy Office of Science, 'What's a Genome? 
And Why is it Important? " www. ornl. gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about. shtml (accessed 6 
July 2007). 
°B US Department of Energy Office of Science, "What's a Genome? And Why is it Important? "; Metcalfe, Hirst 
and Saunders, An Introduction to the Human Genome, 71. 
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organism, such as eye colour and contribute to others, such as health and behaviour. "' 
Humans have approximately 99.9 per cent of their genome in common with each other, 
with differences in the remaining 0.1 per cent being responsible for genetic variation 
between individuals. 50 Estimates of the number of genes within the human genome range 
from 20 to 30 thousand; 51 whatever the number, genes account for only about three per 
cent of the genome's DNA. Some of the remaining DNA supports genes by, for example, 
activating them at the correct time, but much of it has no known function. 52 
Geneticists can determine the order in which base pairs appear in a genome through a 
process called DNA sequencing. The end result is a'map' of where each gene is 
positioned, as well as the supporting and non-functioning DNA. The most famous example 
of DNA sequencing is the Human Genome Project, which published drafts and a 
completed version of the human genome sequence in 2000,2003 and 2006 
respectively. 53 Some are keen to draw a clear distinction between genomics and genetics 
(including those behind the GGI), as follows: 
Genomics is the comprehensive examination of an organism's entire set of genes 
and their interactions (as distinct from genetics, which is the study of a single gene 
or a small number of genes to determine specific gene roles in diseases or 
physical characteristics of an individual). ' 
Since, however, a genome contains genes (as well as the other types of DNA) the terms 
are often used somewhat interchangeably. In 2004, for example, the World Health 
Assembly, the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO), adopted by 
resolution WHA57.13 the following definition: "Genomics is the study of genes and their 
functions, and related techniques. "55 Similarly, the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) 
49 Metcalfe, Hirst and Saunders, op cit, 8. 50 Schmidt, "Charting the Map of Life, " A 26. 
51 US Department of Energy Office of Science, "How Many Genes Are in the Human Genome? " 
www. arnl. gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/genenumber. shtml (accessed 6 July 2007). 
52 Metcalfe, Hirst and Saunders, op cit, 105-106. 
53 US Department of Energy Office of Science, "Facts About Genome Sequencing, " 
www. oml. gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/segfacts. shtml#whose (accessed 6 July 2007). 64 Smith, R et al, "Genomics Knowledge and Equity, " 385. This definition appeared in a joint paper between 
scholars from the University of East Anglia, McGill University and the Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics, which 
has proposed the GGI. 
55 WHO, "Fifty-Seventh World Assembly, Geneva, 17-22 May 2004: Resolutions and Decisions, Annexes, " 
WHA57/2004/REC/1 (Geneva: 2004), 21. 
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describes itself as comprising "scientists involved in human genetics. "56 Furthermore, in a 
separate paper to the one quoted above, those proposing the GGI define genomics very 
broadly, as "the powerful new wave of health-related life sciences energized by the human 
genome project and the knowledge and tools it is spawning. i57 For the purposes of this 
thesis, 'genetics' will be used as a collective term for both genetics and genomics (the 
phrase "the governance of genetics and bioethics" is used frequently in the chapters that 
follow, for example). Hence the term 'genomics' appears only rarely, mainly in the context 
of the GGI. 
2.2.2 Genetics in developing countries 
Genetics has the potential to transform health and healthcare, in both developed and 
developing countries. As knowledge of both the nature and functions of the human 
genome increases, genetic influences on human disease patterns will be identified. 58 
While the principal cause of many diseases may be environmental, a "growing body of 
molecular data" has led to the belief that there is a genetic component to almost all human 
diseases. 59 Kwiatkowski writes, 
For example, genetic variation may partly explain why one child develops fatal 
cerebral malaria, or kwashiorkor, while other children living in the same compound 
are equally exposed to malaria parasites and to poor diet but do not develop these 
severe clinical syndromes. A huge amount of scientific effort is now being put into 
investigating the many different genetic factors that influence susceptibility to 
common diseases, in the hope that this will provide fundamental insights into 
molecular pathogenesis and ultimately lead to better methods of disease 
prevention. 60 
Infectious diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis may involve several 
hundred genes, interacting both with each other and environmental risk factors. Genome- 
wide research enables the study of these complex diseases, affording valuable 
0 HUGO, "Home, " www. hugo-international. org/ (accessed 4 July 2007). 57 Acharya et al, Genomics and Global Health, xi. 58 Giallourakis et a/, "Disease Gene Discovery Through Integrative Genomics, " 399. 59 Kwiatkowski, "Genetics, " 1. 
60 Ibid. 
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information concerning the molecular and cellular basis of disease in the search for 
effective vaccines and treatments. 61 
In 2002, WHO published a report entitled Genomics and World Health. The report, which 
received considerable attention worldwide, 62 states that "the science of genomics holds 
tremendous potential for improving health globally. " It advocates a holistic approach, 
stressing the importance of "fundamental overarching strategies to improve health, " such 
as poverty alleviation, health systems development and education, alongside genetic 
science. 63 Thus the value of any investment in genetics must be assessed relative to 
current approaches to healthcare and medical research, such that these more 
conventional mechanisms are not neglected. ` The report also cautions that it will take 
time for the possible health benefits of genetic research to come to fruition and that, 
because these are likely to be expensive, they have the potential to increase disparities in 
health. This is all the more concerning because most developing countries "do not at 
present possess either the technological capacity or skill base to reap the potential 
benefits of genomics research and apply them to their health care needs. " Hence the 
report recommends that these developing countries should develop clinical genetic 
services, which would be the simplest means of building the necessary capacity, as they 
use well-established DNA technologies. They would also enable the control of diseases 
such as the common inherited haemoglobin disorders; sickle-cell anaemia affects 300,000 
65 newborns in sub-Saharan Africa every year. 
Like WHO, the African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST) sees 
great potential in genetics (and the life sciences in general66) to fight diseases such as 
malaria and contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth. It has also similarly 
8' Ibid, 2; Kwiatkowski, "Science, Medicine, and the Future, " 1062. 62 The report generated commentaries in the journals Science and Nature Genetics. It was also announced in 
newspapers around the world, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Toronto Star, 
Financial Times, Agence France Presse, New Straits Times (Malaysia), The Independent (The Gambia) and 
Africa News (as revealed by a search of the database Nexis UK, 23 February 2007). 63 WHO, Genomics and World Health, Foreword and 3. 64 WHO, "Genomics and World Health: Report by the Secretariat, " 1-2. 65 WHO, Genomics and World Health, Foreword, 6,83,187 and 189. 66 That is, all branches of science that concern living organisms. 
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identified factors that could constrain the development potential of genetics and 
biotechnology, including insufficient scientific and technical capacity, infrastructure and 
funding. The Council aims to address these inadequacies through its 'flagship' research 
and development programme, Safe Development and Application of Biotechnology, by 
building a critical mass of scientific expertise, research facilities and financial resources. 67 
In August 2007, a High-Level African Panel on Modern Biotechnology (set up, like 
AMCOST, under the auspices of the African Union and NEPAD, the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development), produced a report on biotechnology in Africa. The report 
recommends that each African region should implement "long-term 'biotechnology 
missions"' around particular themes, with southern Africa to host a health biotechnology 
cluster. 68 
2.2.3 Why genetics needs governance 
Human genetic research, like biomedical research in general, stretches beyond national 
borders: 
An orders-of-magnitude increase in scale of genetic data collection has created 
the need for establishing diffuse international partnerships, sometimes across 
developed- and developing-world countries, with ramifications for assigning 
research ownership, distributing intellectual property rights, and encouraging 
capacity-buildings 
While genetics holds great promise, then, it also carries new ethical dilemmas, concerning 
both individuals and communities, which require international governance. Governance at 
national level is also an issue. The WHO report Genomics and World Health found that 
87 NEPAD, "Flagship R&D Programmes, " www. nepadst. org/platforms/biotech. shtml (accessed 20 June 2007). 
AMCOST was established in November 2003 to coordinate and implement the science and technology 
programmes of NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa's Development) and the African Union, under "Africa's 
Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action, " which can be downloaded at 
www. nepadst. org/doclibrary/pdfs/ast_plan_of action. pdf (accessed 25 June 2007). 
69 
68 High-Level African Panel on Modern Biotechnology, Freedom to Innovate, iii and xvii. 89 Chokshi and Kwiatkowski, op cit, 1. 
22 
many developing countries do not have regulatory, ethical or policy frameworks in place to 
deal with genetics. 7° 
2.2.3.1 Concerns for individual rights 
One general concern in genetics is to balance freedom of research with individual rights. 
AM Duguet expresses this concern thus: 
An acknowledged principle in our democratic societies, freedom in research, is 
viewed as inherent to freedom of thinking and it is therefore accepted that its 
finalities be unrestricted. However, genetic research explores a very sensible 
domain. Indeed, what is under investigation is a person's intimate inheritance, 
origins, future and progeny. " 
Fears of discrimination on the basis of the information their genome contains may render 
some people reluctant to participate in genetic research. Thus confidentiality must be 
protected. 72 A complicating factor is that, while each person's genome is unique, it also 
carries information about their families (and possibly communities). 73 This has 
consequences for how far someone's right to autonomy should allow them to control 
personal genetic information. 74 Other issues requiring guidance include the transfer of 
samples and data across national borders, particularly given the increase in international 
research projects. Standardisation of procedures would enable both better protection of 
individual rights and further transnational research cooperation. 75 
70 WHO, Genornics and World Health, 187-188. 71 Duguet, "Genetic Research, " 203. 
72 Reilly, "Public Concern About Genetics, " 489; Anderlik and Rothstein, "Privacy and Confidentiality of 
Genetic Information" 404 and 405. 73 Knoppers, "Genetic Information and the Family, " 86. 74 Laurie, "Challenging Medical-Legal Norms, " 1. 
75 Godard et al, "Data Storage and DNA Banking for Biomedical Research, " S104. 
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2.23.2 Benefit sharing 
Chokshi and Kwiatkowski capture a major dilemma in genetic research with the question, 
'What is the structure of an equitable and fair system for distributing the financial and 
scientific rewards of research? "76 Some scientists are concerned that the patenting of 
gene sequences, including human ones, could be detrimental to both scientific 
advancement and healthcare provision. " Researchers may be reluctant to share findings 
for fear of precluding possible patents, while the cost of licence fees for gene-based 
products could render some treatments unaffordable. Others argue that, without the legal 
protection of intellectual property, there will be little incentive for companies to invest in 
research. 78 The human genome itself is in the public domain, but data on the products 
derived from the information therein may not be. Richard Dahl writes, "The mapping of the 
human genome opens huge potential markets for pharmaceutical and biotechnologic 
product developments, which take time and money. The question is, how much patent 
protection should those efforts enjoy? "79 
Some are concerned with the idea of gene sequencing at a more fundamental level. Eike- 
Henner Kluge argues that the patenting of human genes is "ethically indefensible and 
amounts to an unjustified appropriation of a general human heritage. , 80 The 
characterisation of the human genome as the "common heritage of humanity"81 promotes 
the idea of benefit sharing. 82 Who exactly deserves to benefit is complicated, however, 
given that several parties will have contributed to the process of deriving a gene-based 
health product, from those who have given genetic samples through to those who take it 
7e Chokshi and Kwiatkowski, op cit, 1. n Andrews, "Genes and Patent Policy, " 803. 78 Schmidt, op cit, A 29. 79 Dahl, "Pending Resolution, " A 32. 
0 Kluge, "Patenting Human Genes, " Health Care Analysis, 119. 
81 HUGO Ethics Committee, Statement on Human Genomic Databases. 
82 Knoppers and Chadwick, "Human Genetic Research, " 77. 
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to market. 83 Using a similar rationale to Benatar's self-interest argument, Chokshi and 
Kwiatkowski advocate a broad approach to benefit sharing in genetics: 
If we assert first that the reference human genome sequence belongs to mankind 
and second that, given the positive-externality effects of vaccines and therapies for 
infectious diseases, research is of potential benefit to all, it follows that the aims of 
benefit-sharing should shift from purely local interests to broader interests . 
84 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 have outlined some of the dilemmas and issues in bioethics and 
genetics, particularly those concerning developing countries. Section 2.3 introduces two 
governance mechanisms that might provide means to address these issues. 
2.3 THE UNESCO DECLARATIONS AND THE GLOBAL GENOMICS INITIATIVE 
2.3.1 Contrasting mechanisms 
UNESCO is a long-standing agency of the United Nations (UN), comprising 192 member 
states. It was founded in 1945, aiming to "build peace in the minds of men" through 
education, science, culture and communication 85 It attempts to fulfil this aim through 
various activities and programmes, including the adoption and implementation of 
international declarations on genetics and bioethics. The Joint Centre for Bioethics at the 
University of Toronto sees such organisations as "unwieldy, sometimes inflexible, and 
largely inadequate. " It thus suggests what it believes will be a faster, more efficient 
alternative: the Global Genomics Initiative. 86 
83 Chokshi and Kwiatkowski, op cit, 10-11. Chokshi and Kwiatkowski give the following example: it is... 
unclear who deserves to gain financially from, for instance, the discovery of a novel anti-malarial molecule 
from studies of national genetic diversity. Any of at least five groups can make a claim: the subjects 
themselves, the health professionals who diagnosed and treated them, the epidemiologists who managed the 
study, the geneticists who produced the result, and the company that makes the end product. As Chadwick 
and Berg have pointed out, while our moral intuitions may sympathize most with the subjects' claim, it is the 
scientists who have actually made the subjects' samples 'valuable. "' s4 Ibid, 11. 
e5 UNESCO, 'What is it? What does it do? About UNESCO, " httpJ/portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php- 
URL ID=3328&URL_DO=DO 
_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. 
html (accessed 22 June 2007). 
es Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 4-5. 
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Z3.1.1 Background to the UNESCO declarations 
In recent years UNESCO has produced a series of declarations on genetics and bioethics: 
the 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, the 2003 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data and the 2005 Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights. The three declarations are to be treated integrally and 
indeed there is much common ground between them 87 As a set, they prescribe how 
human genetic and biomedical research can be conducted ethically and encourage 
capacity building and knowledge sharing in science and ethics, particularly between North 
and South. 
According to its website, UNESCO actively pursues the Millennium Development Goals88 
and `functions as a laboratory of ideas and a standard-setter to forge universal 
agreements on emerging ethical issues. "89 It has a mandate to advise member states on 
developing national capacities 90 The ethics of science and technology (and particularly 
bioethics) is a priority within Social and Human Sciences, one of UNESCO's five 
specialised sectors. 91 UNESCO aims to consolidate the universal values of justice, 
freedom and dignity, while acknowledging pluralism: "Scientific and technological progress 
must be placed in a context of ethical reflection rooted in the cultural, legal, philosophical 
-and religious heritage of all our communities. P92 
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme, part of the Division of the Ethics of Science and 
Technology, began in 1993 with the formation of the International Bioethics Committee 
87 UNESCO, "Address by Mr KoTchiro Matsuura, Director General of UNESCO, " twelfth session of the IBC, 
Tokyo, Japan, 15-17 December 2005, DG/2005/201,3. 
88 The Millennium Development Goals are an initiative of the UN. The eight goals cover issues such as 
education, health and poverty and have a target date of 2015. For more information see 
www. un. org/millenniumgoals/. 69 UNESCO, "What is it? What does it do? About UNESCO. " 
so UNESCO, "Social and Human Sciences, " http: /portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL ID=1830&URLDO=DO TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html (accessed 22 June 2007). 
91 UNESCO, "Major Fields of Action and Priorities, " http: //portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php- 
URL ID=6406&URL DO=D0 TOPIC&URLSECTION=201. html (accessed 22 June 2007). 
92 UNESCO, "Social and Human Sciences. "- 
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(IBC). An Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC) followed in 1999.93 Each 
committee has 36 members, the former made up of independent experts and the latter of 
representatives from selected member states (see 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.2.1 for more details). "' 
Beyond UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, many of UNESCO's activities are administered 
through the National Commissions in each member state. 95 UNESCO also provides the 
secretariat for the UN Inter-Agency Committee on Bioethics, established in 2001 96 
2.3.1.2 Background to the Global Genomics Initiative 
In parallel to the UNESCO declarations, a second international initiative around genetics 
and bioethics has been proposed. Academics at the Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics 
(TJCB) have laid out plans for a global network, the Global Genomics Initiative (GGI). The 
network would have a multisectoral membership, with leadership from the South. Among 
other activities, it would (like UNESCO) design norms for the ethical governance of 
genomic research and encourage capacity building and knowledge sharing. 7 
Although TJCB has suggested this initiative partly because it views more traditional 
international organisations as ineffective, some of its members are closely connected with 
UN-based institutions. Firstly, Peter Singer and Abdallah Daar, who direct the McLaughlin- 
Rotman Centre for Global Health (the mission of which is to "harness the advances of 
93 UNESCO, "Bloothics, "www. unesco. org/bioethics (accessed 7 October 2004); UNESCO, "International 
Bioethics Committee (IBC), "hftpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL_ID=1 879&URL DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201. html (accessed 7 October 2004); 
UNESCO, "First Session of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC), " 
httpV/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL_I D=7062&U RL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. htmi 
(accessed 18 July 2005). The first Committee was elected by the Executive Board in 1998, but did not meet 
until October 1999. (UNESCO, "Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 155th Session, " 155 
EX/Decisions, Paris, 3 December 1998,67. ) 
94 UNESCO, "Bioethics, "www. unesco. org/bioethics (accessed 22 June 2007). When first established in 1993, 
the IBC had around fifty members. It was reconstituted in 1998, when the limit of 36 members was specified in 
its statutes. (UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1; 
Andorno, "Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues, " 120. ) 95 UNESCO, "Social and Human Sciences: Guide to Partnerships, " 6. 96 UNESCO, "Ethics, " www. unesco. org/ethics (accessed 22 June 2007). 97 The GGI would be concerned with both human and non-human genomics, as well as other forms of 
biotechnology that fall under biomedicine and thus are analogous to the types of research and technology 
covered by UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. 
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innovative technology for global health equity"98) within TJCB, are special advisors to the 
WHO Genomics Resource Centre. Secondly, the Genomics and Nanotechnology Working 
Group of the Science, Technology and Innovation Task Force of the UN Millennium 
Project (Task Force 10) was comprised entirely of members of TJCB (and suggested the 
GGI as a means to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in its report Genomics and 
Global Health). 99 Abdallah Daar also sat on the High-Level African Panel on Modern 
Biotechnology and was a member of the HUGO Ethics Committee when it drafted its 2002 
statement on human genetic databases-10' 
2.3.2 Why the mechanisms are deemed necessary 
Just as the two mechanisms have contrasting backgrounds, so do their proponents give 
contrasting rationales for why they are necessary. Whereas TJCB has proposed the GGI 
because of what it perceives to be the failure of existing governance systems to act with 
sufficient urgency to harness the potential of genomics, UNESCO justifies its activities in 
genetics and bioethics precisely on the grounds that these require governance at the 
intergovernmental level. 
2.3.2.1 UNESCO's rationale 
As explained above, one of UNESCO's key activities is the setting of international 
standards, which member states can subsequently draw on to establish regulatory or legal 
frameworks at national level. KoTchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, expresses 
ae The Centre was formerly the Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health. It is financed by a diverse 
range of actors, including WHO, the Grand Challenges in Global Health initiative, Canadian governmental 
programmes, private foundations and universities. (McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health, "Welcome 
to Our Site, " www. utoronto. ca/cb/genomics/index. html, accessed 20 June 2007 and "Funding, " 
www. utoronto. ca/jcb/genomics/htmVfunding. htm, accessed 3 July 2007. ) as UN Millennium Project 2005, Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development, xii and xix; Acharya et al, Genomics and Global Health, viii, xi-xii and 43. 100 High-Level African Panel on Modern Biotechnology, op cit, vii; HUGO Ethics Committee, op cit. 
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the need for standards within science and technology in terms of transnational practices 
and benefit sharing: 
Present-day scientific practices cross national borders. Hence the imperative need 
to take action together at the international level-not to erect barriers against these 
practices, but to provide the necessary oversight so that the benefits of science 
may be enjoyed by all humanity ... 
1.. 
UNESCO sees itself as particularly well-suited to standard-setting in bioethics, as the only 
UN organisation with competencies in both human and social sciences. As science and 
technology advances, its "ethical watch mandate" becomes more and more pertinent., 02 
Publications, speech transcripts and the UNESCO website all emphasise its unique or 
leading role in this field. 103 Roberto Andorno, a former member of the IBC, additionally 
argues that international organisations such as UNESCO provide the "ideal arena" for the 
discovery of universal norms, because they enable open dialogue between 
representatives of different cultural traditions and values. 104 (How far this is in fact the 
case will be assessed in Chapter 5. ) 
UNESCO's intergovernmental status is a key factor in its justification for its bioethics 
activities. After the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
(UDHGHR) was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998, for example, 
it was described as "the only international instrument in the field of bioethics. "105 This 
would imply that bioethics guidelines produced by other organisations, such as the World 
Medical Association and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, 
are not truly 'inter-national', because they have not been agreed by nation-states. (To 
101 UNESCO, "Social and Human Sciences: Strategies and Actions, " 10 and 13. 102 UNESCO, "13ioethics, "www. unesco. org/bloethics (accessed 7 October 2004). 103 UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " 
hftp: //portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL _ID=1883&URL 
DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html 
(accessed 7 October 2004). See also: UNESCO, 'Bioethics, " www. unesco. org/bioethics (accessed 22 June 
2007); UNESCO, "Bioethics: International Implications, " 1; UNESCO, "Address by Mr KoTchiro Matsuura, 
Director General of UNESCO, " twelfth session of the IBC, 4; UNESCO, "Report of the Second Session of the 
Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC), " 1; UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Work of 
the IBC and of the IGBC, " 1 and 5; UNESCO, "Social and Human Sciences: Strategies and Actions, " 10 and 
13. 
104 Andorno, "Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law, " 959. , os UNESCO, "Bioethics, "www. unesco. org/bioethics (accessed 22 June 2007). 
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what extent the declarations' intergovernmental origins confer authority will be discussed 
further in Chapters 5 and 6. ) 
The UDHGHR (1997) was adopted in order to facilitate a balance between progress in 
genetics and protection of human rights. The Preamble states: 
The General Conference,... recognizing that research on the human genome and 
the resulting applications open up vast prospects for progress in improving the 
health of individuals and of humankind as a whole, but emphasizing that such 
research should fully respect human dignity, freedom and human rights, as well as 
the prohibition of all forms of discrimination based on genetic characteristics, 
proclaims the principles that follow and adopts the present Declaration. t06 
Although the declaration covers human genetic data in a general sense, it was felt that 
their collection, processing, storage and use needed to be addressed more specifically. 
Growth in the number of human genetic databases and international research 
programmes, increasing private sector involvement and the need to protect vulnerable 
populations were all contributing factors to this decision. 107 UNESCO duly adopted the 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (IDHGD) in 2003, as "an extension and 
means of implementing" the UDHGHR (1997). 108 
While the negotiations for the IDHGD were still ongoing, UNESCO was already looking 
towards a third bioethics instrument, one that would address the field as a whole rather 
genetics specifically. This was considered necessary because "a growing number of 
scientific practices have extended beyond national borders. "t°9 The UNESCO website 
defines bioethics as follows: 
Stem cell research, genetic testing, cloning: progress in the life sciences is giving 
human beings new power to improve our health and control the development 
processes of all living species. Concerns about the social, cultural, legal and 
ethical implications of such progress have led to one of the most significant 
debates of the past century. A new word has been coined to encompass these 
concerns: bioethics. 110 
106 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Preamble. 107 UNESCO, "Human Genetic Data: Preliminary Study of the IBC, " 2 and 3. 108 UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration 
on Human Genetic Data: Final Report, " 1. 
109 UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics. " 10 UNESCO, "[3ioethics, "www. unesco. org/bioethics (accessed 22 June 2007). 
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That bioethics, under this definition, extends beyond medical ethics and thus beyond 
existing professional codes of ethics (such as the World Medical Association's Declaration 
of Helsinki) was one of the reasons given by UNESCO for the elaboration of the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR), adopted late in 2005. It was 
decided that universal guidelines on "all issues" in bioethics were needed. 1 , The text 
contains no reference to issues such as stem cells, however, because they proved too 
controversial to enable consensus between member states. Thus the original aim proved 
over-ambitious. Illustrating a complete reversal, a 2005 report describes the IBC's final 
draft text as "far from attempting to resolve all the existing bioethics issues. "' 12 
Where the declaration does encompass a broad understanding of what should be 
considered as bioethics is in regard to social and environmental issues. These were 
considered important elements of the proposed declaration from an early stage. The 2003 
"Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics" 
reads: "Our global society must face the responsibility to use science and technology to 
promote public health and to equalize access to healthcare and medicines" (Berlinguer 
was rapporteur to the working group that compiled the report). 113 Henk ten Have, Head of 
UNESCO's Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology, explains, "Research into 
stem cells and cloning does not for now affect the lives of most people. They remain a 
hope for the future, but right now, people are dying because of poor health conditions. We 
must concentrate on this problem. "' 14 
"' UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics. " "Z UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Drawing Up of a Declaration on Universal Norms for 
Bioethics, " 7. 
113 UNESCO, "Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics, " 4 and 
Annex. 
114 Samir Tounsi, "Giving Science a Conscience, " 
httpl/portal. unesco. org/unesco/ev. php? URL_ID=30524&URL_DO=DO TOPIC&URL_SECTION=20 
(accessed 25 May 2007). 
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2.3.2.2 TJCB's rationale 
Academics at TJCB frame the likely increase in disparities in health between North and 
South during the biotechnology era (as predicted by the WHO Genomics and World 
Health report) as a potential "genomics divide. "15 Like AMCOST, they argue that lack of 
investment, infrastructure and expertise is constraining the ability of developing countries 
to capitalise on the promise of genomics. TJCB sees genomics as a global public good 
(see below), because it is represented by knowledge in the public domain and across 
national boundaries. Where countries are excluded from using publicly available genomic 
knowledge to address their health needs by lack of scientific capacity, it becomes in 
essence a 'club good' (see below). ' 16 The failure to use genomics to combat health 
inequities is why TJCB deems governance at the global level necessary: "The global 
public-goods lens magnifies the failures of the global community to realise the full 
potential of genomics, and shines a light on needed collective actions to harness 
genomics to improve global health-equity. ""' 
TJCB describes the promotion of genomics as "all-important" to global health equity. 18 
Temidayo Ogundiran, in an article entitled "Africa Must Come on Board the Genomics 
Bandwagon, " agrees. He sees genomics as a potential tool to narrow health inequalities, 
one that might "hold the ace for improving the standards of living of the African people" 
(although he describes the continent as occupying the "spectator's seat" at present). "9 
Theirs is a contested viewpoint. Benatar, who with Daar and Singer has called for global 
action on inequalities of health, is sceptical of genetics as the way forward. He questions 
whether biotechnology will really help the poor, if drugs that have already been developed 
115 Singer and Daar, op cit, 87. It is interesting to note that in early discussions on the possibility of elaborating 
an international instrument on bioethics UNESCO also referred to a genomics divide (without explicitly using 
the term). Part of a 2001 resolution of the UNESCO Executive Board reads, "Recognizing the supreme 
importance of preventing the widening of the international divide as a result of the latest technological 
revolution in the field of the human genome and affirming UNESCO's crucial role in building global solidarity 
for this purpose... " (UNESCO, "Bioethics Programme, " 31 C/55,1. ) 1e Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 3; Smith, R et al, op cit, 
386 and 387. 
117 Thorsteinsd6ttir et al, "Genomics-A Global Public Good? " 892. 18 Dowdeswell et at, "Realising the Promise of Genomics, " 134. 19 Ogundiran, "Africa Must Come on Board the Genomics Bandwagon, " 66 and 67. Ogundiran cites Daar and 
Singer in making his argument. 
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for diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS have not been made available to 
the very many people in the South that need them. 120 With Gopal Sreenivasan, he 
advocates a more holistic approach, predicting that scientific advances in biotechnology 
will have little impact if broad disparities in wealth and health are not addressed with equal 
enthusiasm. 12' 
TJCB hopes to ensure that genomics succeeds where other biomedical advances have 
failed through setting up a new governance framework for its promotion and management. 
As it sees traditional international organisations as ill-equipped to deal with urgent and 
rapidly changing issues such as genomics, this framework will have to take on an 
innovative form. 122 The several evolutionary stages the plans have gone through since the 
idea was first mooted in 2001 are chronicled in 2.3.3. 
2.3.2.3 Global public goods 
The'global public goods' concept is a contested one. It is therefore necessary to explicate 
the context in which it is applied by TJCB and how it is used in this thesis. The term 'public 
good' originated in economics, where it has a precise meaning: non-rivalrous and non- 
excludable. 123 A global public good (GPG) is a public good with cross-border benefits on a 
global level. Where public goods are often supplied by governments because their non- 
rivalrous and non-excludable natures subject them to market failure, the issue for GPGs 
becomes how they can be supplied in the absence of a global government. 124 Private 
goods ('access goods') may be required to enable access to some public goods. Non- 
rivalrous but excludable goods are called 'club goods'. 125 
120 Benatar, "Human Rights in the Biotechnology Era I. " 
121 Sreenivasan and Benatar, "Challenges for Global Health in the 21 ' Century, " 3. See also Benatar, 
"Bioethics: Power and Injustice, " 397. 122 Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 1. 123 Robson, "A'Public Good' is Not Just Something Which is'Good for the Public', " 39. 
724 Smith, "Global Public Goods and Health, " 475. 125 Smith and MacKellar, "Global Public Goods and the Global Health Agenda. " 
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The broader GPG literature appears to understand the word'good' in two ways: firstly, in 
the economic sense of a good or service (that is, a material or non-material product); 
secondly, as denoting an intrinsic quality. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has sponsored two studies on GPGs (published in 1999 and 2003 and both co- 
edited by Inge Kaul). The second of these describes public goods as "the public's goods- 
goods that are in the public domain and may concern all people. "126 It develops a two-level 
classification, distinguishing between a good's potential for 'publicness' and its de facto 
non-exclusivity and availability and thus highlighting that whether or not a good is public 
can depend on policy choice or technological capacity. 127 A further book on GPGs was 
also published in 2003, entitled Global Public Goods for Health, in which David Woodward 
and Richard Smith offer a functional definition: "A good which it is rational, from the 
perspective of a group of nations collectively, to produce for universal consumption, and 
for which it is irrational to exclude an individual nation from consuming, irrespective of 
whether that nation contributes to its financing. "128 Wherein lies the contestation over the 
GPG concept is whether it should be understood broadly or as per its original economic 
formulation. UNDP's intention was to introduce public goods to a wider audience as a 
policy tool, 12' but some believe this has weakened the utility of the concept. 130 Economist 
Alex Robson laments the "abuse" of the term in public debate and, in direct contrast to 
UNDP, states, "The fact that something is consumed by many people and provides each 
of them with significant benefits does not make it a public good. "131 
There are two aspects to genomics as a GPG. Firstly, much genetic information is in the 
public domain and hence is non-excludable and non-rivalrous for those who have the 
means to access it. Secondly, more normatively, it could be argued that nobody should be 
126 Kaul etal, Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today? " 14. 127Kaul et al, "How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods, " 23. 128 Woodward and Smith, "Global Public Goods for Health, " 9, quoted in Smith and MacKellar, "Global Public 
Goods and the Global Health Agenda. " 129 Kaul et al, Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today? " 6. 130 Richard Smith and Landis MacKellar, for example, argue that "GPG" is in danger of becoming a label for 
anything promoting development. (Smith and MacKellar, op cit. ) Maurizio Carbone reviews opinions on GPGs 
in his paper "Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? The Policy Dimension of a Contested Concept" 
(185). He notes that several scholars have questioned the fusing of four diverse theories-public and private 
nods, positive and negative externalities, basic needs and collective goods-into one catch-all concept. 
Robson, op cit, 40. 
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excluded from benefits arising from the use of the human genome sequence, because it is 
the 'heritage of humanity'. TJCB is concerned with how the GPG characteristics of 
genomic knowledge can be harnessed to help address the health needs of developing 
countries, through research capacity building and the provision of access goods, for 
example. It foresees that collective action on an international scale will be necessary to 
achieve this and has thus proposed the GGI. 132 With regard to genetics, this is also the 
context in which the GPG concept is understood in this thesis; that is, in terms of what 
might be an effective governance mechanism to ensure developing countries are able to 
take advantage of genetic data in the public domain. Related concepts of rational self- 
interest and benefit sharing are also considered. 
2.3.3 History of the two mechanisms 
2.3.3.1 The UNESCO declarations 
In 1993, the then Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, decided that the 
organisation should set up an International Bioethics Committee (IBC), so that it "could 
play its full role in the world of the future. " The Committee's first task was to prepare an 
international instrument on the human genome (the eventual UDHGHR). It appointed a 
Legal Commission to propose what form and substance the instrument should take, which 
met regularly between April 1994 and December 1996. An international consultation was 
launched in May 1995. After receiving a progress report in November 1995, the twenty- 
eighth UNESCO General Conference requested that a draft declaration be developed, to 
be finalised by a committee of government experts appointed by member states (as per 
established protocol within the UN). The resultant draft was adopted "unanimously and by 
132 Thorsteinsdöttir et al, op cit, 892. 
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acclamation" at the twenty-ninth General Conference, in November 1997. A year later the 
UDHGHR was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. '33 
As alluded to previously, UNESCO felt that rapid developments in the field of human 
genetic data required urgent and specific action. 134 The IBC had already produced two 
reports on this subject when the Director-General of UNESCO requested in May 2001 that 
it look into drafting an international instrument thereupon. 135 The thirty-first General 
Conference endorsed the initiative the following November and the IBC duly set up a 
drafting group. After widespread written and verbal consultations and further scrutiny by 
the IBC, the Executive Board, 136 an intergovernmental meeting of experts and a working 
group, the draft IDHGD was adopted "unanimously and by acclamation" on 16 October 
2003, at the thirty-second General Conference. 137 
In 2001 the General Conference had invited the Director-General to look into the 
possibility of elaborating a universal instrument on bioethics. 138 On the basis of the IBC's 
subsequent report, the 2003 General Conference declared the setting of universal 
standards in bioethics to be "imperative and desirable . "139 The drafting process for the 
UDBHR was launched in January 2004.140 As with the previous two declarations, a 
drafting group was appointed and an extensive consultation process initiated, involving 
member states and other stakeholders. The outline text of the declaration was also 
133 UNESCO Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, IV, 1-2 and 67. 134 UNESCO, "UNESCO Adopts International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, " 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php-URL-ID=l 6742&URL-DO-DOTOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html 
accessed 21 June 2007). 
35 See UNESCO, "Report on Confidentiality and Genetic Data, " BIO-503/99/CIB-6/GT-2/3 (Paris: 30 June 
2000) and "Human Genetic Data: Preliminary Study of the IBC. " 136 The Executive Board is elected by the biennial General Conference and constitutes 58 member states. Its 
mandate is to ensure the effective and rational execution of the organisation's programme of work. (UNESCO, 
"UNESCO's Executive Board, " httpJ/portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php- 
URLID_25566&URL_DO=DO TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html, accessed 23 November 2007. ) 137 UNESCO_ 
, "International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data, " httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL ID-1882&URL_DO=DO 
_TOPIC&URLSECTION=201. 
html (accessed 21 June 2007); UNESCO, 
"Me(Ting of Government Experts: Final Report, " 3. Fifty-seven member states, among which Kenya and South 
Africa did not feature, took part in the intergovernmental meeting of experts. (Ibid, 1. ) Ise UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics. " 139 UNESCO, "Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics, " 10; 
Berlinguer, op cit, 1088. 140 UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Progress Report January 2005, " 
PowerPoint presentation available at 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/file download. php/50523d754289e00aad6d16990d576e22Bioethics+Declarati 
onoan. 2005). ppt (accessed 9 July 2007). 
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discussed by the IBC and IGBC, the Executive Board and the UN Inter-Agency 
Committee on Bioethics. The draft was finalised by two meetings of government experts in 
April and June 2005 and, like its predecessors, adopted "by acclamation" by the General 
Conference, on 19 October 2005 at its thirty-third session. "" 
2.3.3.2 The Global Genomics Initiative 
The roots of the GGI go back to 2001, when Daar and Singer, writing in Science, 
suggested that a commission on genomics and global health might aggregate 
stakeholders and raise awareness and resources to fight health inequalities. 142 Two years 
later, with Elizabeth Dowdeswell, they made a similar recommendation in the journal 
Global Governance: 
An appropriate response by the world community-governments, 
citizens, and experts from industry and academia-would be to foster 
global dialogue and provide a forum for shaping the necessary 
governance framework through a commission on genomics and global 
health. 143 
By 2004 the vision had progressed. A paper produced by TJCB entitled "Better Global 
Governance to Promote Genomics for Development" put forward a model for a "new 
global network for governance, " as a means to balance the risks and benefits of 
genomics. 1 The initial plans for this network, published in both "Better Global 
Governance" and the Task Force 10 report Genomics and Global Health, followed Jean- 
Frangois Rischard's 'global issues networks' model (see Chapter 3), with its membership 
141 UNESCO, "Different Stages in the Elaboration of the Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URLID=3850&URL_DO=DQ_TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html 
(accessed 9 July 2007); UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " PowerPoint 
presentation. The declaration was also discussed at an international conference in February 2005 in Paris. 
This was organised by the French National Commission for UNESCO and an external organisation, the 
International Association for Law, Ethics and Science and thus was not officially part of the elaboration 
? rocess. ("Bioethics & International Law: Programme, " 25-26 February 2005. ) 
142 
Singer and Daar, op cit, 89. 
143 
Dowdeswell, Daar and Singer, op cit, 1. 
Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 1,2 and 4. Note, 
however, that many of the stipulations for the network, such as the need for urgency, creative thinking, new 
financial models and champions from government, industry and civil society, remained the same as for the 
commission. (Ibid, 6-7; Dowdeswell, Daar and Singer, op cit, 5-6. ) 
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to include representatives from governments, industry, academia, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society. The Rischard model was apposite, TJCB argued, 
because it would be quick to set up, inclusive rather than club-like, responsive, flexible 
and equitable, encouraging initiation and leadership from the South. '45 
Early 2006 saw a further change. Writing in the International Journal of Biotechnology and 
this time citing Anne-Marie Slaughter's work on government networks (again, see Chapter 
3), TJCB stated that although the proposed network should still include actors from 
international organisations, NGOs, businesses and other sectors (academia is not listed), it 
would be "underpinned by governments" in order to garner legitimacy and accountability. 
Collaboration between actors, to be facilitated through strong leadership and inclusive 
membership, would provide a second key to legitimacy. This article, the last publication on 
the GGI, described the project as "still on the drawing board. "146 Despite TJCB's emphasis 
on urgency and speed, then, it seems that the setting up period has been rather 
protracted. This is further illustrated by a claim TJCB made back in 2004: 
We are now in the process of bringing together some of the best creative minds from 
these fields [industry, academia, civil society, government] to begin the dialogue and 
to learn from their experiences so that any decision-making will come from the 
bottom up. 147 
The latest indications (via personal communication'48) are that the GGI has not yet been 
officially formed and perhaps never will be. 
145 Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 5. In its publications on 
the GGI, TJCB cites Rischard's paper "High Noon: We Need New Approaches to Global Problem-solving, 
Fast, " Journal of International Economic Law 4 (September 2001): 507-525. TJCB seems to borrow directly 
from Rischard in its arguments concerning the inefficacy and unwieldiness of existing global governance 
mechanisms. As illustrated at 2.3.1.2, however, it is connected with more than one agency of the UN. In 
Genomics and Global Health it suggests the UN system could play a role in promoting genomics as a GPG. 
fAcharya et al, Genomics and Global Health, 45. ) ae Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138 and 140. 147 Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 6. 
Email, 15 January 2007. 
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2.3.4 Content and implementation 
This section examines how the UNESCO declarations and associated implementation 
programmes, as well as the proposed activities of the GGI, might address the genetics 
and bioethics issues highlighted in 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.3 4.1 Content of the UNESCO declarations14' 
All three declarations aim to promote human dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the context of genetics and bioethics, while at the same time embracing 
principles of responsibility, solidarity, equality and justice. 150 They cover both medical and 
research ethics; article 5 of the UDHGHR (1997) refers to "research, treatment or 
diagnosis affecting an individual's genome, " for example. 151 (Note, however, that this 
thesis focuses mainly on their provisions regarding research ethics. ) 
There are commonalities between all three UNESCO declarations. Each contains articles 
on informed consent, risks and benefits, confidentiality, freedom of research, ethics 
committees and bioethics education and training. The IDHGD (2003) and the UDBHR 
(2005) also cover transnational practices and the monitoring and management of 
research. As well as these general provisions, the two genetics declarations include 
principles specific to their context; both, for example, condemn discrimination on the basis 
of genetic characteristics and genetic reductionism. The UDHGHR (1997) also disallows 
reproductive cloning and states that the human genome, the 'heritage of humanity', in its 
natural state should not enable financial gain. 152 
149 The articles of the declarations relevant to this thesis are reproduced in Appendix I. , so This is affirmed in the preamble of each declaration. 15' UDHGHR, article 5. 152 Ibid, articles 1 and 4. 
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The declarations contain several principles that are particularly pertinent to developing 
countries. The UDHGHR (1997) promotes research on genetically influenced endemic 
diseases, whilst the UDBHR (2005) endorses community engagement, the protection of 
individuals and groups of special vulnerability and due regard for cultural diversity and 
pluralism. ' All three declarations display a strong commitment to benefit sharing, 
knowledge exchange and capacity building. Article 18 of the UDHGHR (1997), for 
example, reads: 
States should make every effort.. . to continue fostering the international dissemination of scientific knowledge concerning the human genome, 
human diversity and genetic research and, in that regard, to foster 
scientific and cultural co-operation, particularly between industrialized 
and developing countries. " 
The UDBHR (2005) also directly addresses inequalities of health. Article 14, on social 
responsibility, pertains to social and economic rights as bioethical issues. Citing the 
promotion of health and social development as "a central purpose of government, " it 
states that progress in science and technology should advance access to healthcare, 
nutrition, water and improved environmental and living conditions and reductions in 
marginalisation, illiteracy and poverty. 155 
2.3.4.2 Implementation of the UNESCO declarations 
When the UNESCO General Conference adopted the UDHGHR in November 1997, it 
also requested that appropriate measures be taken to ensure follow-up and 
implementation of the declaration. 156 Implementation guidelines specifying how the 
declaration's stipulations with regard to dissemination, awareness raising, education and 
153 Ibid, article 17; UDBHR, articles 6 (3), 8 and 12. 154 UDHGHR, article 18. Article 18 of the IDHGD (2003) is very similar. The only difference is that where the 
UDHGHR reads "human genome, human diversity and genetic research, " the IDHGD reads "human genetic 
data and human proteomic data. " The UDBHR (2005) is different again, as follows: "Within the framework of 
international cooperation, States should promote cultural and scientific cooperation and enter into bilateral and 
multilateral agreements enabling developing countries to build up their capacity to participate in generating 
and sharing scientific knowledge, the related know-how and the benefits thereof. " (Article 24 (2). ) 155 UDBHR, article 14. 158 UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 17. 
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training should be enacted by states, UNESCO and other organisations and individuals 
involved in human genetics were consequently endorsed at the next General Conference 
in November 1999.157 Similar implementation guidelines have been drafted for the IDHGD 
(2003), but have not yet been adopted. 
UNESCO's Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology runs four main projects 
designed to enable member states to develop their capacity in bioethics. Firstly, it hosts a 
database of ethics information, the Global Ethics Observatory (GEObs). Secondly, it 
promotes bioethics education, through teacher training and curriculum development. 
Thirdly, it supports the setting up of ethics committees and their subsequent operations. 
Fourthly, it raises awareness and stimulates public debate on ethical issues in science 
and technology. " Also intended to be of use to member states are the IBC's reports on a 
wide range of topics in bioethics, such as pre-implantation diagnosis, embryonic stem 
cells, genetic counselling and cooperation between developed and developing 
countries. 159 (More details on all these activities can be found in Chapter 6. ) At a broader 
level, UNESCO has been involved in the programmes around African science and 
technology introduced in 2.2.2. UNESCO was instrumental in the November 2003 African 
Ministerial Conference that initiated the Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of 
Action for the African Union and NEPAD. 160 It also drew attention to the importance of 
ethics in science and technology, particularly bioethics, at preparatory meetings for the 
January 2007 African Union Heads of State and Government Summit. 161 
157 UNESCO, "The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: From Theory to 
Practice, " 9-10. 
158 ten Have, "The Activities of UNESCO in the Area of Ethics, " 343-348. Professor ten Have directs the 
UNESCO Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology. 159 For a full list of IBC reports see UNESCO, "Reports of the IBC, " httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL_ID=2038&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html (accessed 21 June 2007). 
160 African Union, "Extraordinary Conference of AMCOST, 20-24 November 2006, Cairo, Egypt: Report of the 
Meeting of the Ministers, " 3; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "What's New? " 
httpJ/bcsia. ksg. harvard. edu/whatsnew. cfm? program=STPP&nt=top&pb_id=615 (accessed 25 June 2007). 161 UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Execution of the Programme Adopted by the General 
Conference, " 2,3 and Annex 1. 
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2.3.4.3 Proposed activities of the GGI 
TJCB states that the overall mission of the GGI would be to "promote and facilitate broad- 
based, informed and ethical decision-making about the use of genomic technologies to 
contribute to global health equity. "' 62 To this end, the network would further public 
knowledge on genomics and provide a forum for dialogue between the public and experts. 
TJCB sees the GGI as a potential coordinator of the disparate bodies involved in 
genomics, from public-private partnerships and bilateral alliances, to regional entities such 
as NEPAD, to higher level international organisations: a "network of networks. " Specific 
activities of the GGI could include conducting foresight exercises, promoting knowledge 
sharing and capacity building, designing alternative funding and intellectual property 
mechanisms and drafting regulatory norms and principles. These norms and principles 
would harmonise ethical standards for genomic technology research at a global level, 
incorporating benefit sharing and risk minimisation. On capacity building, TJCB echoes 
very closely the UDHGHR (1997) provisions (see 2.3.4.1): 
Participation in the GGI would promote international and intersectoral exchange of 
knowledge and encourage partnerships between countries (especially developing 
ones) to build their genomics research and development capacity and to undertake 
rigorous assessment of policies in the research and development investment and 
human resources. '63 
Although the GGI has never been officially established, some of TJCB's past activities 
have taken on this mantle. In March 2002 TJCB ran a joint course with the African Centre 
for Technology Studies in Nairobi, Kenya. The course was designed to enable a diverse 
range of stakeholders, from academia, the media, government and civil society, to engage 
in discussions around genomics policy (similar courses were also held in India, Venezuela 
and Oman). One of the outcomes was a web- and e-mail-based Africa Genome Policy 
Forum for course participants. It was hoped that the forum would foster ongoing debate, 
but it has not really done so (see 5.2.3). '64 
162 Acharya et al, Genomics and Global Health, 43. 1B3 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138-139. 's4 Smith, A et al, "'Harnessing Genomics to improve Health in Africa' -An Executive Course to Support 
Genomics Policy. " What is slightly confusing about the AGPF is that, although from TJCB's publications it is 
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2.4 KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
In the preface to UNESCO's volume on how the UDHGHR (1997) came into being, 
Federico Mayor, then Director-General of UNESCO, wrote: "It is now the responsibility of 
States to breathe life into the Declaration, inter a/ia, by reflecting it in their domestic 
legislation. "165 Since all three declarations are non-binding, the onus is on member states 
to effect them within their national laws, regulations or policies. The thesis examines to 
what extent this has taken place in two countries, Kenya and South Africa. They were 
chosen because of their significant involvement in human genetics and bioethics, as 
outlined below. (For more details on case selection see Chapter 4. ) 
2.4.1 Types of research 
There is a significant level of human genetic and biomedical research taking place in 
Kenya, mainly under the auspices of the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI). 
KEMRI has research centres in various parts of the country, including the Centre for 
Biotechnology Research and Development and the Centre for Clinical Research in 
Nairobi, the Centre for Geographic Medicine Research-Coast in Kilifi and the Centre for 
Vector Biology and Control Research in Kisumu. Types of research include vaccine and 
drug trials for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, leishmaniasis, schistosomiasis and 
leprosy. KEMRI collaborates with the US-based Centres for Diseases Control and 
Prevention and Walter Reed Army Institute of Medical Research and with the Wellcome 
clear that the GGI has never been officially established, TJCB's website has in the past said something rather 
different. As early as November 2005, it was describing the GGI as if it was already in operation: "The GGI 
established networks of industry leaders, academics, concerned citizens, representatives from NGOs, and 
government officials worldwide, with particular emphasis on developing world representation" (italics added). 
Through these networks (of which the AGPF was one), TJCB intended to develop "impact initiatives" in the South. The website text was the same in July 2007; in both November 2005 and July 2007 the GGI was listed 
under "Past Projects". (TJCB, "Canadian Program on Genomics and Public Health, " 
httpJ/web. archive. org/web/20051122102338/httpi/www. utoronto. cafjcb/genomics/html/projects. htm and 
www. utoronto. cajcb/genomics/htmVprojects. htm, both accessed 5 July 2007. ) 165 UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Ill. 
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Trust. 166 Its partnership with the Trust dates back many years. As well as aiming to 
produce internationally competitive, locally applicable research, the programme is 
committed to scientific capacity building in Kenya (see 6.3.2.3). 76' 
South Africa, like Kenya, is engaging in different forms of human genetic and biomedical 
research. A 2006 Department of Science and Technology publication claimed that the 
country was Africa's "biotechnology research powerhouse. "168 Research takes place at 
various universities, as well as in government-sponsored research centres and initiatives. 
Universities producing genetic and medical research include those of the Western Cape, 
the Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Stellenbosch, KwaZulu-Natal and Pretoria. At the 
University of the Witswatersrand in Johannesburg, for example, geneticists are conducting 
research of both medical and evolutionary interest. 169 The South African Medical 
Research Council also runs or supports various research projects, including a cancer 
genetics biobank. 10 It has six national collaborative research programmes, on topics 
including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and indigenous knowledge systems. "' The 
National Health Laboratory Services and the National Research Foundation also fund 
research. 172 
A key strength in South Africa's research profile is its work in bioinformatics. 17' The 
University of the Western Cape houses two initiatives in this area, the South African 
166 KEMRI, "Research Centres & Programmes, " 
www. kemri. org/RESEARCH%20CENTRES%20AND%20PROGRAMS. html (accessed 9 July 2007). 's' KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Research Programme, "About us: Alms, "www. kemd- 
wellcome. org/aims. php and "About Us: History, " www. kemri-wellcome. org/history. php (accessed 9 July 2007). 168 To illustrate this claim the Department of Science and Technology gives the following example: "In the 
period 1996 to 2000, South Africa produced 222 scientific articles in genetics and 459 scientific articles in 
microbiology. Compared with other African countries, Kenya came closest to this level of research output with 
53 and 173 scientific articles respectively. " (Department of Science and Technology, "Biotechnology 
Innovation, " 5. ) 
'69 See www. wits. ac. za, www. uwc. ac. za, www. uct. ac. za, www. sun. ac. za, www. ukzn. ac. za and www. up. ac. za, 
particularly the webpages of the health and medical faculties and departments (accessed 23 November 2007). ro Medical Research Council, "Annual Report: 2004, "www. mrc. ac. za/annualreport/noncommunicable. htm 
accessed 15 February 2005). 
71 Medical Research Council, "Our Research, " www. mrc. ae. za/research/ourresearch. htm (accessed 9 July 
2007). 
172 National Health Laboratory Services, 'Welcome to NHLS, " www. nhls. ac. za/; National Research 
Foundation, "NRF Profile, " www. nrf. ac. za/profile/ (both accessed 9 July 2007). 173 Bioinformatics can be defined as: "The discipline encompassing the development and utilization of 
computational facilities to store, analyse and interpret biological data. " (WHO, Genomics and World Health, 
201. ) 
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National Bioinformatics Institute and the National Bioinformatics Network. 174 The latter is 
one of six Biotechnology Regional Innovation Centres (BRICs), which fall under the South 
African government's 2001 National Biotechnology Strategy. Two other BRICs of 
particular relevance are the Public Understanding of Biotechnology programme and 
LIFEIab, which aims to improve human health by providing venture capital to human 
genetic and biomedical research projects focusing on infectious diseases. "5 South Africa 
can also boast some private sector activity in genetics. DNAbiotec offers expertise in 
molecular human genetics, while Genecare runs a gene-based diagnostic service. 1' 
2.4.2 Genetics and bioethics regulation 
Regulation of research in Kenya dates back to the 1970s. The Science and Technology 
Act was passed in 1977, establishing the National Council for Science and Technology 
(NCST). The Act was amended in 1979 to enable the creation of various research 
institutes, including KEMRI. NCST falls under the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology, '77whilst the institutes are administered by whichever parent ministry is most 
relevant. "$ In 2004 NCST published national guidelines on bioethics, the Guidelines for 
Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya. Under the 
Science and Technology Act it has ultimate control over all research in Kenya. In practice, 
however, most of its ethical review duties have been delegated to KEMRI and other 
institutions. 19 Confusingly, the Ministry of Health has also laid claim to jurisdiction over 
174 See www. sanbi. ac. za and www. nbn. ac. za for more information. 175 Department of Science and Technology, "op cit, 1,2 and 4. 176 See www. dnabiotec. com and www. genecare. co. za (accessed 23 February 2006). in In December 2005 the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology split into two ministries, the Ministry 
for Education and the Ministry of Science and Technology. To reflect the situation during the data collection 
period (October to November 2005), this thesis keeps to the single moniker. NCST is a 'semi-autonomous 
government agency'. 8 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, "National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Development in Kenya, " 15. 179 NCST, Guidelines for Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya, 2. 
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research ethics in recent years, with seemingly little coordination with NCST or KEMRI. 180 
These ambiguities and their consequences are discussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Like Kenya, South Africa has a history of bioethics regulation that spans several decades. 
The Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Witswatersrand, 
established in 1966, is one of the oldest in the world. 18' There are now 34 RECs in South 
Africa, mostly in universities and research institutions. ' 82 Bioethics training is provided 
through the regional initiatives IRENSA and SARETI and university degree 
programmes. 183In 2004 the Department of Health published a document entitled Ethics in 
Health Research: Principles, Structures and Processes. This represents national policy on 
research ethics and thus supersedes the ethical guidelines of the Medical Research 
Council, which were first published in 1977 and brought out in their fourth and latest 
edition as a series of five booklets between 2000 and 2005. The Council's guidelines 
apply officially only to its own researchers, but in practice had become "standard 
reference works. °184 
2.5 EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE 
This chapter has shown how human genetic and biomedical research have the potential 
to contribute towards addressing the pressing global problem of inequalities of health 
between North and South. If this potential is to be realised ethically, adequate protection 
of individual research subjects must be ensured. On a grander scale, sufficient resources 
180 Ministry of Health, "Second National Congress on Quality Improvement in Health Care, Medical Research 
and Traditional Medicine. " 
181 Wits Health Consortium, "Institutional Review Board, " www. witshealth. co. za/Ethics/tabid/144/Default. aspx 
(accessed 11 July 2007). 
82 Department of Health, Ethics in Health Research, 10. 183 IRENSA is the International Research Ethics Network for Southern Africa, SARETI the South African 
Research Ethics Training Initiative. For more details see 6.3.2.3. 184 Department of Health, op cit, Preamble and Contributors; Medical Research Council, "Guidelines on Ethics 
for Medical Research: Reproductive Biology and Genetic Research" (Book 2), ii and "Ethics in Health 
Research, " www. mrc. ac. za/mrcnews/uly2005/ethics. htm (accessed 23 November 2007); SA Health/nib, 
"MRC Ethics Guidelines, " www. sahealthinfo. org/ethicsfindex. htm (accessed 22 October 2006). Note that the 
Department of Health document does not go into detail on HIV vaccine research, as the Interim National 
Health Research Ethics Committee, which compiled it, decided to approve the Medical Research Council 
booklet on this subject rather than duplicate the material contained therein. (Department of Health, op cit, 48. ) 
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will be needed to fund research directed towards the health needs of developing countries 
and the provision of any interventions consequently developed. Both UNESCO and TJCB 
have put forward governance mechanisms to this end. Aside from external factors, their 
efficacy will depend partly on their systems of decision-making and implementation. The 
next chapter asks what insights international relations theory might provide into how 
successful these endeavours are likely to be in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The field of international relations, in simple terms, explores why, how and to what degree 
states and other actors engage with each other at international level. This chapter outlines 
various approaches to international relations within the broad context of global 
governance, namely regime theory, networked governance and cosmopolitan democracy. 
These approaches have been selected for their potential to offer insights into the efficacy 
of the UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics and the proposed Global 
Genomics Initiative as governance mechanisms. Regime theory looks at the origins, 
significance and future development of international cooperation. Traditionally state- 
centric, it is particularly pertinent to intergovernmental organisations such as UNESCO. 
Networked governance, as promoted in different ways by Jean-Frangois Rischard and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, has been used as a template for the GG1. Cosmopolitan 
democracy explores how some of the broader issues introduced in Chapter 2, such as 
inequalities between North and South, might be dealt with at global level. 
The four approaches are all both descriptive and normative, to varying degrees. Regime 
theory has grown out of attempts to explain how international cooperation and 
collaboration arise in a world of sovereign states, ' with some branches seeking to 
discover how current arrangements might be improved. Rischard, Slaughter and 
cosmopolitan democracy theorists David Held and Daniele Archibugi have explicitly 
normative agendas, but in expounding why the international system needs to change they 
describe what they perceive to be its current faults. The driving force behind the 
normativity of all the approaches is a recognition that certain issues, such as genetics and 
bioethics, extend beyond national borders. Marc Lynch articulates some of the questions 
around democracy this throws up: 
State sovereignty means that states are equal in legal terms. A state is a territorially defined unit, within 
which external actors are denied authoritative powers. 
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If important processes affecting the lives of citizens transcend state borders and 
escape state power, then is national democracy reduced to a formality? How can 
citizens act politically to affect substantive outcomes whose causes lie outside 
state borders in the absence of effective supranational political institutions? If 
international institutions do develop, how can they be made responsive to the 
concerns of national citizens? To the extent that international institutions make and 
enforce authoritative decisions, can national citizens democratically participate in 
their processes? 2 
Drawing insights from regime theory, networked governance and cosmopolitan 
democracy, this chapter scrutinises how these challenges are currently being met and 
how they might be met better, in the context of the overarching research question: 
What insights can international relations theory offer into the actual and potential 
efficacy of global governance mechanisms in genetics and bioethics, particularly 
with regard to developing countries? 
Implicit within this question is the possibility that there may be gaps in both the 
explanatory and normative power of international relations theory with regard to genetics 
and bioethics. These theoretical gaps will be explored further in the empirical and 
discussion chapters, particularly with regard to how they might be addressed. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, the particular approaches selected will be 
situated relative to international relations theory as a whole. Secondly, the concept of 
'global governance', as both a present phenomenon and a normative aim, will be 
explored. Thirdly, the main tenets of regime theory, networked governance (as proposed 
separately by Rischard and Slaughter) and cosmopolitan democracy will be introduced 
and some conceptual clarifications made. Fourthly, the common threads and points of 
divergence among and between these different approaches will be discussed 
thematically, enabling an integrated comparison of their various strengths, weaknesses 
and viability in relation to global governance. Finally, how this body of theory might be 
applied to the UNESCO declarations and the GGI will be considered. 
2 Lynch, "Globalization and International Democracy, " 92. 
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3.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
International relations theory falls into several schools, realism and liberalism being two of 
the longest standing. The realist paradigm, which purports that nation-states are the key 
actors in the international arena, was dominant until the end of the Cold War. It is chiefly 
concerned with the quest for power. 3 Realists view the international system as one of 
anarchy, with conflicts between states inevitable as each seeks to defend its national 
interest (defined in terms of "survival, security, power, and relative capabilities'), primarily 
through military power. 5 States must exercise self-sufficiency, as dependence on another 
actor would leave them open to exploitation. International organisations and international 
law are thus seen to be of limited use. 6 Realism has a descendant in neorealism or 
structural realism, of which Kenneth Waltz is most commonly recognised as the architect. 
Neorealism differs from its parent theory by examining the international system as a 
whole. Waltz argues that although the system's structure is derived from interactions 
between states, it comprises more than the sum of its parts, as it drives them towards 
certain actions and restricts them from others. 7 
The main opposition to realist theory within international relations has come from 
liberalism. Generally, liberals argue that realists place too much emphasis on conflict and 
too little on cooperation .3 Security is often defined more broadly than under realism, to 
include elements such as health and education. 9 In a post-Cold War and globalising world, 
liberalism has gained ground as an alternative explanation of world affairs, as scholars 
have paid increasing attention to influences beyond or below that of the state. Like 
realism, it has a 'neo-' successor, which synthesises these two traditionally antithetical 
3 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 58. 
Holsti, `Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy, " 37. ° Kegley, `The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics, " 4-5. The concept of an anarchical international society was introduced by Hedley Bull in 1966: "Whereas men within each state are subject to a 
common government, sovereign states in their mutual relations are not. This anarchy it is possible to regard 
as the central fact of international life and the starting point of theorizing about it. " (Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations, " 77. ) ° Genest, "Realism and the Problem of Peaceful Change, " 71; Kegley, op cit, 4-5. 
Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, " 74. ° Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, " 151. ° Holsti, op cit, 43. 
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approaches. 1° Neoliberal institutionalists assume that self-interested states are the 
principal international actors and that power differentials are important. While 
acknowledging the existence of anarchy, however, they hold that international institutions 
can "transcend the basic structural characteristics of the anarchic international system. "" 
Constructivism, another school of international relations, has grown greatly in prominence 
in recent years. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink see constructivism as "a different 
kind of theory" to realism and liberalism, as it makes no claims about the nature of agents 
or the content of structures. Rather, as a social theory, it investigates social life and social 
change. 12 Finnemore and Sikkink summarise this approach as follows: "Constructivists 
focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing 
in particular the role of collectively held or 'intersubjective' ideas and understandings on 
social life. "13 Thus constructivism sees rules and practices as being created and sustained 
by mutual agreement. The institution of state sovereignty provides an example. Reflecting 
common understandings about the characteristics of states, it allows these actors to 
recognise one another. 14 
Regime theory, in its different forms, draws on all three of these schools, while networked 
governance and cosmopolitan democracy encompass elements of both neoliberalism and 
constructivism, in terms of the relative importance of interests and ideas. Although they 
differ in the significance they attach to state and non-state actors, sovereignty and power, 
each of these approaches has collaboration and cooperation at an international level as a 
central theme. Thus they can all be seen to fall within the concept of global governance. 
10 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge, " 196. " Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op cit, 62. 12 Finnemore and Sikkink, "Taking Stock, " 391 and 393. 13 Ibid, 392. 
14 Ellis, "International Regimes and the Legitimacy of Rules, " 273 and 274. 
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3.2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
Governance comprises decision-making on rules and activities for the management of 
collective issues and the subsequent implementation of those decisions. The term `global 
governance' derives from the Commission on Global Governance, which met in 1995 to 
report on the future of the United Nations. 15 Within international relations theory, it refers 
to governance within and as an output of the international system, aimed at addressing 
those issues that have the potential to affect everyone, irrespective of national borders. As 
Robert Goodin puts it, "Cross-boundary spillovers-political and moral, as well as 
economic and environmental-are now absolutely endemic. "1e Alongside states, 
transnational actors such as large corporations and civil society organisations are playing 
a part in attempts to manage these spiilovers. '7 The approaches to global governance 
examined in this chapter look at how these different actors can and do come together In 
various institutional forms, at local, national, regional and international levels. 
'Global governance' has both descriptive and normative connotations. Robert Keohane 
describes it as rule making and the exercise of power on a global scale, by entities not 
necessarily authorised to act by general consensus (with ensuing implications for 
legitimacy). 18 James Rosenau uses the same premise, but from a different angle: because 
governance systems lack the traditional legitimacy conferred by democratic election, for 
example, they can only be effective if the great majority of those they cover agree to them. 
In his view, then, governance has an inherent normative purpose; It is derived from shared 
goals rather than formal authority. 19 Similarly, Ernst-Otto Czempiel sees governance as 
15 See Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc, 1995). 
Goodin, "Globalizing Justice, ' 80. 
" Keohane, "Global Governance and Democratic Accountability", 130-132; Ruggie, "Taking Embedded 
Liberalism Global, " 117. Global civil society Is "the domain that exists above the Individual and below the state 
but also across state boundaries, where people voluntarily organize themselves to pursue various aims' 
rapner, "Governance in Global Civil Society, " 66). 
Keohane, "Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, " 132. 19 Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, " 4. 
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the capability to meet goals or needs without the legal backing or coercive threats that 
render traditional forms of government effective. 20 
These definitions articulate in different ways what Rosenau and Czempiel term 
"governance without government. , 21 Rosenau writes, 
To presume the presence of governance without government is to conceive of 
functions that have to be performed in any viable human system irrespective of 
whether the system has evolved organizations and institutions explicitly charged 
with performing them . 
22 
Thus the distinction between government and governance lies in the existence or 
otherwise of formal authority. 'Governance without government' describes the present 
international system; states are sovereign and there is no higher authority to coordinate 
actions and enforce rules. How global problems are or could be addressed within or 
without these limitations (external factors allowing23) is of central concern to the 
approaches to governance outlined in this chapter. 
3.3 PARTICULAR THEORIES AND APPROACHES 
3.3.1 Regime theory 
Pierre de Senarclens has commented that the notion of governance has emerged in 
international relations theory "in the aftermath of the debate about'regimes'. n24 Whether or 
not that debate has subsided, regime theory (or, more accurately, theories of regimes25) 
still has much to offer in terms of describing how international bodies or groups work and 
Z° 
Czempiel, "Governance and Democratization, " 95. Rosenau and Czempiel co-edited the book, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics. 
22 Rosenau, op cit, 3. 23 Jim Whitman has highlighted that the extent to which global governance mechanisms can address their 
designated problems may be dependent on external factors, such as levels of political, economic and 
environmental stability. (See Whitman, "Global Dynamics and the Limits of Global Governance. ") 24 de Senarclens, "Governance and the Crisis in the International Mechanisms of Regulation, " 92. 25 John Vogler points out that while 'regime theory' is a commonly used term, there is in fact not one theory of 
regimes but several. (Vogler, The Global Commons, 25. ) For simplicity, the term 'regime theory' is used 
generically in this thesis. 
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how they might do so more effectively, particularly intergovernmental ones such as 
UNESCO. International regimes encompass varying levels of institutional development. 
They arise from efforts to develop collaborative arrangements, formally or informally, 
within the international system. 6 Where global governance refers to a broad system or 
world order, regimes are perceived as coalescing around fairly well-defined issues, such 
as world trade, environmental concerns or indeed genetics and bioethics 27 Thus regimes 
fulfil "particular governance functions. i28 Stephen Krasner and colleagues, in his 1983 
edited volume on the subject, defined regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations. "2' UNESCO has designed such 
norms30 and procedures to effect genetics and bioethics governance and the Global 
Genomics Initiative, if established, will do so. 
Within a regime, the principal or official members are traditionally considered to be 
states. 31 One incentive for states to join such arrangements is the potential to enjoy 
"political economies of scale, " whereby problems can be addressed more efficiently from 
within institutions. In an international system devoid of centralised power, many potentially 
beneficial agreements could not be negotiated or subsequently enforced (albeit often 
inadequately, through proxies for power such as sanctions or shunning) if it were not for 
regimes. 32 They represent, then, a form of governance without government. Andreas 
Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, in a review essay on regime theory, 
describe how different theorists put forward power, interests or knowledge as defining 
variables in regimes. They classify these approaches as realist, neoliberal and cognitivist 
ZB Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op cit, 436. 27 de Senarclens, "Regime Theory and the Study of International Organizations, " 456. 28 Vogler, op cit, 19. 29 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, " 2. This definition has been described as vague 
and imprecise by Friedrich Kratochwil and Oran Young respectively, while Susan Strange deemed the whole 
concept of regimes "woolly. " Attempted improvements have been marginal, however, according to Beth 
Simmons and Lisa Martin. (Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions, " 685; Young, International Cooperation, 
195; Strange, "Cavel Hic Dragones, " 342; Simmons and Martin, "International Organizations and Institutions, " 
193. ) 
30 Norms, rules or principles are common to each of the theories or approaches described in 3.3. See 3.4.1 for 
a discussion of what is understood by these terms for the purposes of this thesis. 31 Young, "Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, " 6. 32 Caporaso, "Toward a Sociology of International Institutions, " 482. 
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respectively (cognitivism mirroring constructivism, see 3.1). 33 Realist regime theory sees 
regimes as formed around and influenced by the power and interests of a dominant state 
or group of states. International cooperation is believed to occur infrequently, states being 
concerned about relative gains, the potential for defection and the vulnerability that comes 
with interdependence. 34 Neoliberal regime theory, according to Hasenclever et al, has 
become the mainstream approach to regimes. While not disregarding power differentials, 
it portrays states as "rational egoists" who pursue absolute gains. States will therefore 
cooperate to realise mutual or common interests. 35 The "core insight" of cognitive regime 
theory, as explained by Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, is that cooperation is 
affected not only by power and interests but also values, beliefs and knowledge. As 
regimes are based on shared principles and understandings, they are intersubjective; the 
issue areas around which they converge are not pre-ordained. Thus cognitive approaches 
help to explain the evolution and content of regimes. 36 
This thesis incorporates elements of all three approaches to regime theory. Respecting 
power, the relative influence of developed and developing countries on the UNESCO 
declarations will be investigated. This will be primarily in function of the negotiation 
process, in terms of how member states worked to secure their interests. As will be shown 
in Chapters 5 and 6, states had a mutual interest in designing declarations, but disagreed 
on what norms these were to promulgate. This is where knowledge and values will 
become relevant, with regard to how some ideas in genetics and bioethics may have 
33 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge, " 178. This paper was published in 1996 
and formed the basis of their 1997 book, Theories of International Relations. Their typology is one of several. 
Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons (1987) grouped the regime literature into four "families": 'structural' 
(power-based), 'game-theoretic' and 'functional' (both interest-based) and 'cognitive'. The approaches 
Hasenclever et al term neoliberal and cognitivist have the most varied classification. Keohane (2006) 
describes these as 'functional' and 'constructivist' (although in a 1988 paper he used 'rationalistic' and 
'reflective'), while Young distinguishes between 'contractarian' and 'constitutive' perspectives. (Haggard and 
Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes, " 498; Keohane, "Accountability in World Politics, " 76; Keohane, 
"International Institutions, " 379; Young, Governance in World Affairs, 4. ) 
34 Zacher (with Sutton), Governing Global Networks, 2-3. 
35 Ibid, 2; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge, " 183-184. 36 Haggard and Simmons, op cit, 509-510; Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization, " 764 (this 
paper is oft-cited on cognitivism). The neoliberal and cognitivist approaches do not have to be mutually 
exclusive. In his seminal work After Hegemony, Keohane wrote, "But regimes can also affect state interests, for the notion of self-interest is itself elastic and largely subjective. Perceptions of self-interest depend on 
actors' expectations of the likely consequences that will follow from particular actions and on their fundamental 
values. Regimes can certainly affect expectations and may affect values as well. " (63) Similarly, Young states, 
"lt is perfectly possible to adopt the view that actors and institutions are mutually constitutive. " (Young, Governance in World Affairs, 4. ) 
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shaped the formation of the declarations and vice versa, such as the human genome as 
the heritage of humanity and social responsibility as a bloethical principle. Central to the 
analysis will be a question posed by Haggard and Simmons: "Do regimes 'matter'? " That 
is, do regimes independently influence state behaviour? Along with several other 
theorists, Haggard and Simmons see empirical research at national level as crucial in 
answering this question. 37 
3.3.2 Global issues networks 
As shown in Chapter 2, Peter Singer, Abdallah Daar and others at TJCB have used Jean- 
Frangois Rischard's ideas about networked governance in their plans for the GGI. In his 
book High Noon, 38 published in 2002, Rischard juxtaposes rapid global changes with what 
he perceives to be the slow, linear evolution of international institutions striving to cope 
with them and the struggle of nation-states to maintain sovereignty as a plethora of 
(environmental and economic) issues extend beyond borders. This dichotomy produces a 
"dangerous governance gap, " which Rischard proposes to address through networked 
governance 39 He identifies twenty issues, including infectious diseases and 
biotechnology, that he considers both global in nature and in need of urgent action and 
lays out a framework for addressing these, with each issue to engender a separate 'global 
issues network' (GIN). The networks would create new public space. Each would evolve 
through three phases: a constitutional (that is, setting up) phase, a norm-producing phase 
and an implementation phase. Made up of experts from governments, NGOs and 
37 Haggard and Simmons, op cit, 492 and 513. A decade on Simmons, with Lisa Martin, reformulated the 
question to ask not just whether but also how regimes matter, but again lamented the lack of research at 
domestic level. (Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of international Institutions, " 747 and 
756. ) Others who have highlighted the paucity of research in this area include Vogler (op cit, 161) Kal 
Raustiala ("Governance in World Affairs, " 805), Helen Milner ("International Theories of Cooperation Among 
Nations, " 496) and, in the particular context of non-binding instruments such as the UNESCO declarations, 
Dinah Shelton ("Editor's Concluding Note, " 556). 
3e Rischard's book is far from a theoretical examination of international relations. The World Bank's vice- 
president for Europe at the time of writing, Rischard describes himself as a "practitioner and generalist" and believes these attributes may give him an advantage over "specialized research types" in seeing the "big 
picture. " (Rischard, High Noon, x. ) While TJCB cites an earlier paper of Rischard's in its publications on the 
GGI (see Chapter 2, note 145), his book has been chosen as the primary source for this theoretical chapter as 
it expounds the ideas articulated in the paper more fully. 39 Rischard, op cit, 38,41,45-46 and 57. 
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businesses and facilitated chiefly by intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), the networks 
would produce norms and standards and then rate compliance among both state and non- 
state actors. In the norm-producing and implementation phases they would seek the wider 
participation of anyone with an interest in their given issue through internet polling 40 
If established, GINs would be a highly specified example of a wider and already existing 
phenomenon, global public policy networks, as theorised by Wolfgang Reinicke and 
colleagues. Rischard himself describes GINs as a "subclass of GPPNs. "4' Reinicke charts 
the emergence of these networks from the 1990s onwards, defining them as: 
Loose alliances of government agencies, international organizations, corporations, 
and elements of civil society such as nongovernmental organizations, professional 
associations, or religious groups that join together to achieve what none can 
accomplish on its own. 42 
The thesis focuses on GINs rather than GPPNs more generally because the proposed 
GGI is explicitly modelled on the former, although many of the potential attributes and 
activities of GINs, as suggested by Rischard, are similar to those observed by Reinicke 
and colleagues in existing GPPNs, such as the Global Environment Facility and the Roll 
Back Malaria initiative. These include non-hierarchical and flexible structures, decision- 
making by consensus, developing norms and standards (but not legislation) and working 
with IGOs. 43 
°° Ibid, 66 and 171-179. The membership of a GIN might resemble that of an 'epistemic community', defined 
by Peter Haas as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain or issue-area. " Although these professionals may come from various backgrounds, they share the 
same norms, principles and practices. Thus the difference between epistemic communities and the proposed 
GINs would seem to be that, whilst the former emerge organically around already shared norms and beliefs, 
as decision-makers solicit knowledge and advice from recognised experts in particular fields, the latter would be explicitly constituted to negotiate norms among those with different areas of expertise in specific issues, 
with the express purpose of influencing the behaviour of both state and non-state actors. (See Haas, 
"Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, " 3-4. ) 41 Rischard, op cit, 224-225. 42 Reinicke, "The Other World Wide Web, " 44. 
43 Ibid, 46,50-51 and 54; Benner, Reinicke and Witte, "Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance, " 196. 
57 
3.3.3 Government networks 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, in her book A New World Order (2004), 44 proposes a form of 
networked governance that, like Rischard's, has been taken up by the proponents of the 
GGI. (Indeed, in one publication they describe themselves as "building on the work of 
Slaughter. s4) The book is part descriptive, part prescriptive: Slaughter analyses how 
government officials network on a global level at present and how they might do this more 
effectively. Officials from all branches of government form networks on a global scale, 
exchanging information and coordinating activities. These government networks are, 
Slaughter writes, "a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century, but they are 
underappreciated, undersupported, and underused to address the central problems of 
global governance. "46 
Slaughter's premise is that in the international arena the state, contrary to the model 
assumed by many international relations theorists and multilateral negotiators alike, is not 
a unitary actor. 47 Rather, the state is disaggregated, primarily along legislative, regulatory 
and judicial lines; members of distinct domestic government institutions are increasingly 
involved in activities beyond national borders, interacting with their counterparts in other 
countries and at supranational level. 4" Slaughter defines a government network broadly, 
as "a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working 
across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the 
44 Slaughter describes 'world order' as follows: "A system of global governance that institutionalizes 
cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all nations and their peoples may achieve greater 
peace and prosperity, improve their stewardship of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human 
dignity. " (Slaughter, A New World Order, 15. ) 
45 Dowdeswell et al, "Realising the Promise of Genomics, " 138. 46 Slaughter, op cit, 1. " Ibid, 12-13. This assumption is common in studies of international relations and lies behind the prompts of 
various commentators towards more research on the effects of regimes at national level and vice versa (see 
note 37). Exceptions are the volume edited by David Victor, Kai Raustiala and Eugene Skolnikoff on 
environmental regimes and Andrew Moravcsik's work on the origins of international human rights law. (See 
Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments; Moravcsik, "Explaining International Human Rights: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, " 
European Journal of International Relations 1 (2) (1995): 157-189; and Moravcsik, "The Origins of Human 
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, " International Organization 54 (2) (2000): 217- 
252. ) 
48 Slaughter, op cit, 5-6,12-13 and 31. 
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'domestic' from the 'international' sphere. "49 Networks involving only domestic government 
officials are horizontal; those that include officials from supranational institutions to which 
sovereignty has been delegated (such that relevant national bodies are directly 
answerable to them) are vertical. 50 At present, government networks "contribute" to world 
order by stimulating policy convergence among states, perhaps leading to a more formal 
international regime over time; by encouraging adherence to international treaties and 
customary law; and by promoting international cooperation. 51 
Slaughter suggests that the current remit of government networks could be expanded if 
they were to be recognised as "prime mechanisms of global governance. 9952 Like Rischard, 
Slaughter envisages a form of networked governance that would include non-state actors 
such as international organisations, corporations and civil society organisations. 
Significantly, however, Slaughter's networks would have government networks as their 
centrepieces. Slaughter claims that viewing the world as one of disaggregated states 
enables the imagining of "a genuinely new set of possibilities for a future world order, " the 
"building blocks" of which would not be states but parts of states. 53 She describes what 
shape this conceptual framework might take thus: 
A disaggregated world order would be a world latticed by countless government 
networks. These would include horizontal networks and vertical networks; 
networks for collecting and sharing information of all kinds, for policy coordination, 
for enforcement cooperation, for technical assistance and training, perhaps 
ultimately for rule making. They would be bilateral, plurilateral, regional, or global. 
Taken together, they would provide the skeleton or infrastructure for global 
governance " 
Slaughter proposes a set of what she terms 'constitutional norms' to govern this system, 
comprising global deliberative equality, positive comity, legitimate difference, checks and 
balances and subsidiarity. 55 Each network would also be governed by its own set of more 
49 Ibid, 14. 
50 Ibid, 13 and 163. Note that IGOs can also act as horizontal network hosts. (Ibid, 22. ) 51 Ibid, 24. 
52 Ibid, 25. 
53 Ibid, 6. 
54 [bid, 15-16. 
55 Ibid, 29-30. 
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specific norms. Both types will be explored more fully in the thematic discussion (and in 
3.4.1 below). 
3.3.4 Cosmopolitan democracy16 
The purpose of cosmopolitan democracy is captured pithily by Daniele Archibugi: "To 
globalize democracy while, at the same time, democratizing globalization. i57 
Cosmopolitan democracy thus embraces fully the idea of transboundary problems; 
indeed, David Held uses genetic engineering as an example of an issue that is inherently 
borderless and therefore needs global governance. There are also synergies with the 
arguments for a broad security agenda based on rational self-interest introduced at 
2.1.3.59 These synergies between the bioethics and global governance literatures have 
not yet been recognised, however. 
Cosmopolitan democracy hinges on the premise that the world is made up of "overlapping 
networks of power" and "overlapping communities of fate" that do not fit neatly within state 
boundaries, causing strain in the current global system 60 The fates of distant communities 
are interwoven, thus local level economic, social or environmental issues and events can 
have global ramifications and vice versa 6' "The intimate connection between `physical 
56 In his 2004 book Global Covenant, Held refers to the project of 'global social democracy'. For purposes of 
clarity, however, the term 'cosmopolitan democracy' will be used throughout this thesis, as Held returns to it in 
a 2006 paper. (Held, Global Covenant, 16; Held, "Reframing Global Governance, " 173. ) The main chapter of 
Global Covenant expounding the global social democracy project is a developed version of Held's 2004 paper 
"Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective. " (Held, Global 
Covenant, xvii. ) 57 Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 438. 5e Held, Global Covenant, x. 59 Held calls for the global security and human rights agendas to be connected within a "coherent international 
framework, " contending that any action against terrorism should be undertaken as part of a wider process of 
reform addressing "the insecurity of life" in developing countries. This is reminiscent of Solomon Benatar's 
arguments for expanding the ethics discourse to take account of "global security" against "common global 
risks. " Benatar writes, "In this context, and with a deeper understanding of the impact of adverse forces 
shaping the wealth and health of nations, we need to appreciate how we are all deeply implicated in the lives 
of others, and cannot hide with moral credibility behind the barrier of physical distance while billions live impoverished lives. " (Held, "Reframing Global Governance, " 168-169; Benatar, "Bioethics: Power and 
Injustice, " 391. ) 
6° Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 161 and 167; Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy 
and its Critics, " 443-444. 
61 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 162. 
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setting', 'social situation' and politics, which distinguished most political associations from 
pre-modern to modern times, has been ruptured. "62 The ensuing risk that national level 
democracy will be "hollowed out, " as Archibugi puts it, has engendered a questioning of 
the assumption that democracy must be contained within domestic borders; why, indeed, 
should it not extend beyond borders, thereby becoming 'cosmopolitan'? ' Despite much 
scepticism, 64 the concept of cosmopolitan democracy has grown rapidly within 
international relations theory since its relatively recent inception. As noted by William 
Scheuerman, °a series of path-breaking publications ... have garnered a remarkable 
amount of scholarly attention in a brief span of time. "65 
Cosmopolitan democracy is described by Archibugi as a "political project, " a term 
that denotes both its normative aspirations (he also uses the phrase "cosmopolitan 
dreams") and its potential to bear tangible fruit. The project would aim to regulate 
the dynamics of globalisation at the transnational level, particularly in those areas 
where regulation through democratic means would be difficult, if not impossible, at 
the state level. 66 This would include the provision of those public goods that "have 
to be provided regionally and globally if they are to be provided at all. 47 
Representative democracy would not be replicated directly; a global government 
per se is not envisaged. 68 Rather, the project "attempts to specify the principles and 
the institutional arrangements for making accountable those sites and forms of 
power which presently operate beyond the scope of democratic control. "69 Held 
articulates the three fundamental principles of cosmopolitanism as follows: 
individuals, as opposed to states or other entities, are "the ultimate units of moral 
concern"; everyone's equal worth must be acknowledged; and rules and principles 
62 Held, "Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness, " 365. 63 Archibugi, "Demos and Cosmopolis, " 28. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi uses the same "hollowed out" 
terminology in "Globalization and the Challenge to Governance, " 4. 'Cosmopolitan' carries similar connotations 
to 'global', in the sense of being applicable to everyone, irrespective of national borders. 
65 
64 Archibugi, "Demos and Cosmopolis, " 29-30,33-34 and 36. 65 Scheuerman, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Rule of Law, " 439. 66 Archibugi, "Demos and Cosmopolis, " 28 and 34. 67 Held, Global Covenant; 16. 68 Archibugi, "Demos and Cosmopolis, " 29. 69 Held et al, Global Transformations, 449. 
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must be impartial and thus universally shared. 70 Governance at the international 
level would not always be the most appropriate means to fulfil these, nor would the 
requisite level for any given issue be obvious or natural. " Democracy would in fact 
be promoted at several mutually supportive levels-inside nations, among states 
and transnationally-and involve both state and non-state actors. 72 
3.4 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
Some concepts cut across some or all of the approaches outlined above and thus 
need to be clarified theoretically before the discussion proceeds. These are norms, 
efficacy or effectiveness and global public goods. 
3.4.1 Norms 
Norms, rules and principles are central features of each of the approaches 
described above, as they are of the UNESCO declarations and the proposed GGI. 
Thus what exactly is meant by these terms needs elucidating. Norms can be 
thought of as either regular or prescribed patterns of behaviour, which generate 
expectations as to what will or ought to be done in a given situation. 73 Finnemore 
and Sikkink identify three categories of norms: regulative, constitutive and 
evaluative or prescriptive. Regulative norms constrain or order behaviour, 
constitutive norms create new actors, interests and types of action and evaluative or 
70 Held "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 169. Christian van den Anker similarly articulates 
individualism, universalism and generality as the three principles commonly recognised as cosmopolitan. (van 
den Anker, "Institutional Implications of Global Justice as Impartiality, " 270. ) In other publications on 
cosmopolitan democracy, Held expands these to a set of eight more specific principles that would fulfil the 
third cosmopolitan principle of impartiality and universalism, namely equal worth and dignity, active agency, 
personal responsibility and accountability, consent, decision-making through voting, inclusiveness and 
subsidiarity, avoidance of serious harm and sustainability. (Held, Global Covenant, 171; Held, "Democratic 
Accountability and Political Effectiveness, " 389; Held, "Law of State, Law of Peoples, " 25. ) " Held, Global Covenant, 108. 72 Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, " 209. 73 Hurrell, "Norms and Ethics in International Relations, " 143. 
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prescriptive norms encapsulate the `oughtness' that distinguishes norms from "other 
kinds of rules. "74 This thesis is mainly concerned with regulative and prescriptive 
norms, both within governance mechanisms and as outputs of them. 
In the context of the "regime architecture" of cooperative security, Abram and 
Antonia Chayes define norms generically, as "a broad class of generalized 
prescriptive statements-rules, standards, principles, and so forth-both procedural 
and substantive. s975 Under Krasner's classic definition of regimes (stated above), 
however, a careful distinction is drawn between the norms and principles that 
dictate a regime's overall ethos and the rules and decision-making procedures that 
prescribe or proscribe specific actions and practices. " Friedrich Kratochwil criticises 
this hierarchy as overly simplistic, having observed some overlap between the four 
categories in actual examples of regimes. " In the context of the non-binding 
governance mechanisms under discussion, all four categories encapsulate a 
degree of 'oughtness'. Furthermore, UNESCO appears to equate norms and 
principles with rules, as does TJCB in its plans for the GGl. Hence the thesis does 
not make sharp delineations between these terms. 
Krasner holds that "diffuse" principles and norms such as sovereignty underpin 
many international regimes, irrespective of the issue at hand. 78 These principles 
govern activities within an organisation, as opposed to those emanating from it. 
Analogous schemata are found within the normative networked governance and 
cosmopolitan democracy approaches. Each global issues network (GIN) would 
draw up a code of conduct in its 'constitutional phase', based on shared best 
practices in organisation, communication and operationalisation and principles such 
as 'global citizenship'. This code of conduct would then govern the 'norm-producing 
74 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, " 891. 75 Chayes and Chayes, "Regime Architecture, " 68. 76 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, " 2-3. T' Kratochwil, Rules Norms, and Decisions, 59. 78 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, " 17-18. Finnemore and Sikkink deem sovereignty 
a collection of norms rather than a single norm, encapsulated in a variety of rules and practices over time. 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, " 891. ) 
63 
phase'. 79 Similarly, global 'constitutional norms' would ordain how members of 
government networks should treat one another, as "fellow participants in, and 
constituents of, a world order. "80 Cosmopolitan democracy would articulate 
universal or organising principles to "disclose the proper framework for the pursuit 
of argument, discussion and negotiation about particular spheres of value. " No one, 
whether a state or non-state actor and whether operating at national or international 
level, would be immune from these "cosmopolitan values and standards. ""' 
The norms considered above deal with internal governance. A second order of 
norm, namely those prescribing actions or rules in function of the particular issues 
around which actors have converged, is equally pertinent to the four global 
governance approaches. In this context, Kratochwil writes on regimes, "If the 
members of the international community decide that a particular issue is supposed 
to be governed by particular norms, a regime emerges. 9982 A GIN would devise a 
regime-like "package" of norms, standards or policy recommendations in its 'norm- 
producing phase', while government networks would formulate 'network norms' 
targeted expressly at government officials. 83 The cosmopolitan democracy 
blueprints do not lay out plans for norm development per se, although a global 
assembly would lay down standards around urgent global problems, to embed "the 
minimum conditions for human agency to flourish. i84 
How norms have been constructed and promoted, where they are situated and at 
whom they are aimed affects the extent to which they are accepted and applied. 
Finnemore and Sikkink describe the "life cycle" of norms as comprising three 
stages: emergence, acceptance and internalisation. Which stage has been reached 
79 Rischard, op cit, 173-174. 80 Slaughter, op cit, 29 and 259. a' Held, Global Covenant, 170-171 and 178. 82 Kratchowil, "Contract and Regimes, " 82. 
84 
Rischard, op cit, 173 and 176; Slaughter, op cit, 25 and 195-196. ea Held, Global Covenant, 109. 
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dictates the relative influence of the norm 85 This can be observed in the UNESCO 
declarations, in that the well-established bioethical principles they uphold (informed 
consent, for example) are already found in national systems, whereas newer ideas, 
such as progress in science and technology as a bloethical construct, have thus far 
emerged and been accepted internationally, but have yet to be internalised (see 
Chapter 6 for more details). The structure of an organisation will influence the 
content, force and application of the norms it embodies; institutionalisation of norms 
usually precedes acceptance, as prospective and current members become 
socialised as to expected behaviour. 86 The reasons why states or other actors might 
choose to comply with norms, rules or principles fall into two categories: self- 
interest and rightful obligation. These do not have to be mutually exclusive; 
enforcement may engender consistent compliance such that a norm becomes 
internalised, or equally the desire to do what is right may gradually dissipate if norm 
infringements by others go unpunished. 7 
Sceptics would argue that "powerful actors can always find a norm to support their 
consequentially based choice. " Hence which norms are dominant often reflects 
the distribution of power among states. '-' As Slaughter points out, however, norms 
also constrain power: "Power without norms is both dangerous and useless. It is 
dangerous because of the risk of abuse. It is useless because it lacks purpose. The 
answer in both cases is to harness power and to constrain it through norms. i90 
Although at a basic level norms limit choices, they can also empower collective 
action and enable new forms of activity. 91 This would be the case should the articles 
on capacity building and knowledge sharing in the UNESCO declarations be 
fulfilled, for example. Furthermore, norm development continues after formal 
negotiations have ended, as the institutions in which the norms are housed (such as 
85 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, " 895. 86 Ibid, 899-900; Hurrell, op cit, 128. 87 Fearon and Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism; 61-62. 88 Hurrell, op cit, 143. 89 lbid, 146; Schmitz and Sikkink, "International Human Rights, " 522. 90 Slaughter, op cit. 215. 91 Hurrell, op cit, 142-143. 
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the UNESCO Bioethics Programme) encourage application and grapple with new 
problems. 92 
Some view ethical and human rights-based norms as fundamental and thus 
timeless and immutable, rather than as negotiated and evolving values or rules 93 In 
this vein, Rischard states that GINs would make a "constant appeal to universal 
values" in the governance of their decision-making procedures, without specifying 
from where these values would derive. In direct contrast, Finnemore and Sikkink 
argue that "norms do not appear out of thin air, " but are actively constructed 94 To 
what extent norms can or should be universal is also contested. At international 
level, there is a tension between norms that mediate between different values and 
those that enforce universal ones 95 UNESCO illustrates this tension in its 
declarations, in that it claims to promulgate universal norms, but acknowledges that 
these will be applied differently, according to socioeconomic and cultural 
circumstances. To what extent international norms are internalised, by being 
incorporated into national systems, is a key question in this thesis. As Finnemore 
and Sikkink argue, "International norms must always work their influence through 
the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms. " This process can result in 
variations in compliance and interpretation, particularly if norms are ambiguously 
worded. 96 
To summarise, based on the various understandings articulated in different 
approaches to international relations, as well as by UNESCO and TJCB, this thesis 
considers two types of norms. Firstly, it examines those that govern procedures at 
international level, both explicitly and implicitly (including how these norms are 
92 Ibid, 147. 
e3 O'Neill, 'The Dark Side of Human Rights, " 434; Konrad, "Norms, Values and Trans-Cultural Medical Ethics, " 
14. One commentator on the 1997 UNESCO declaration on the human genome seems to take this view: "The 
Declaration is timeless... We can expect that the Declaration will, in due time, be modified. But as the text is 
drafted the principles are as true today as they always were and as they always will be in the future. " (Byk, "A 
Map to a New Treasure Island, " 236. ) 
94 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, " 896. 95 Hurrell, op cit, 149. 96 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, " 893; Hurrell, op cit, 143. 
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themselves decided upon). Secondly, it analyses the outputs of these decision- 
making procedures, in terms of negotiated standards of behaviour related to 
specific issues (which may invite censure or sanction if violated). How influential 
both types of norms are will depend on whether they are considered legitimate in 
content and origin and on the relative power of the actors at which they are aimed. 
3.4.2 Efficacy 
Jon Vogler writes in The Global Commons, "The question of effectiveness should 
be at the heart of any discussion of regimes. "97 Although much of the literature on 
effectiveness sits within analyses of environmental regimes, it can be extrapolated 
to apply to global governance more generally. It may seem intuitive to measure 
efficacy according to whether a governance mechanism appears to solve the 
problem it is intended to address, but there are problems with this approach. " 
Whether or not issues are resolved may have more to do with their nature, 
complexity and extent or with external factors such as natural disasters than with a 
regime's strength. Spurious correlations may thus falsely accredit regimes with 
success or failure. Alternative measures include how far mechanisms are 
implemented and complied with or shape the behaviour of those targeted. These 
must also be used cautiously, however; an efficiently working mechanism may not 
be effective in addressing the problem at hand and, while behavioural analysis has 
the advantage of a clear link with problem solving, false causality is again a 
danger. "' 
87 Vogler, op cit, 152. 98 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger provide an example of this intuitive approach: "Regime effectiveness 
comprises two overlapping ideas. First, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms 
and rules. Second, a regime is effective to the extent that it achieves the objectives or purposes for which it 
was intended. " (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge, " 178. ) 99 Young, Governance of World Affairs, 109-111; Vogler, op cit, 154,167 and 176-177; Victor, Raustiala and 
Skolnikoff, "Introduction and Overview, " 12; Raustiala and Victor, "Conclusions, " 698-699. 
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Taking these considerations into account, the thesis examines efficacy in terms of 
decision-making and implementation. Within the limitations of governance, whether 
the regulations and policies decided upon are the right ones will condition how far 
they can influence behaviour if implemented as intended. The thesis asks whether 
the UNESCO declarations and the GGI are or could be effective mechanisms for 
the governance of genetic and biomedical research, in terms of protecting research 
participants and addressing the health needs of developing countries. In answering 
these questions, care will be taken to avoid false causality. Where national level 
regulations and policies on genetics and bioethics are analysed, for instance, the 
extent to which these have been inspired by the UNESCO declarations, if at all, is 
critically assessed. 
3.4.3 Global public goods 
As explained at 2.3.2.3, global public goods (GPGs) provide non-rivalrous and non- 
exclusive benefits across national borders. In the face of market failure, they must be 
supplied through collective action, with ensuing implications for international relations. 
Within the realist school of regime theory, hegemonic stability theory considers a regime 
to be a public good established by a dominant power, for which the net gains will outweigh 
the cost of provision. 100 The UNDP studies of GPGs by Kaul et al also see regimes as 
public goods: 'intermediate public goods' that will help to supply 'final public goods', such 
as clean air or environmental sustainability. This seems problematic on two levels. Firstly, 
international agreements are generally intergovernmental rather than global. Secondly, if 
collective action (through regimes) is deemed a public good, then the argument that 
GPGs require collective action for their supply becomes circular. 
loo Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge, " 197-198 and 204; Haggard and 
Simmons, op cit, 502-503. Both sets of authors offer summaries of various critiques of hegemonic stability 
theory. (See Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 95-100 and Haggard and 
Simmons, 503. ) 
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2.3.2.3 showed that some commentators have lamented the broadening of the GPG 
concept to represent essentially any good enjoyed by the global public. UNDP's 2003 
volume acknowledges that a common response to its 1999 study was that what it terms 
GPGs were often previously simply considered 'global concerns' or'global challenges'. 101 
Rischard finds the concept generally unhelpful and Slaughter does not use it. 102 Held, in 
his work on the reform of global governance, uses the term GPG in function of the 2003 
UNDP study, but more usually refers to 'global problems' or 'global issues'. 103 This thesis 
takes a similar approach, drawing on several of UNDP's recommendations, but in the 
context of addressing global issues through global governance, rather than GPG supply. 
3.5 THEMATIC DISCUSSION 
The approaches to global governance outlined above-regime theory, networked 
governance through issue-based and government networks and cosmopolitan 
democracy-have points of convergence and divergence on key themes that will prove 
pertinent to the analysis of the actual and potential efficacy of the UNESCO declarations 
and the proposed GGI. These themes are: (1) relations between actors and issues; 
(2) representation, legitimacy and accountability; (3) norms, implementation and 
enforcement; (4) the location of governance; and (5) time and speed. Themes 2 and 3 
form the basis for the empirical chapters, whilst themes 1,4 and 5 are cross-cutting. In 
what follows, the actual or potential strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches 
to global governance are explored according to these themes, in function of the overall 
research question of this thesis. 
'o' Kaul et al, "Why Do Public Goods Matter Today? " 7. 103 Rischard, op cit, 222. '03 See, for example, "The Reform of Global Governance" in Global Covenant, 94-116. 
69 
3.5.1 Relations between actors and Issues 
As issues spread beyond borders, states and non-state actors are becoming increasingly 
interdependent. 104 Genetics and bioethics, for example, could potentially involve national 
and international policy-making bodies, academic institutions, the private sector and non- 
governmental and civil society organisations (as reflected in the data collection, see 4.2). 
Perspectives vary on how relations between different sectors of society work at present 
and how they should work. Regime theory is traditionally state-centric, often being used to 
analyse arrangements within intergovernmental organisations such as UNESCO. 105 As 
noted by Oran Young, however, there is "nothing out of the ordinary" about the 
emergence of regimes in which NGOs rather than states are the key members. 106 
Rischard claims that tri-sector partnerships between governments, corporations and civil 
society are needed to address seemingly irresolvable global problems. Although the word 
`partnership' implies equality of consequence, however, GINs would have no coercive 
power and would thus be ultimately dependent on states. 107 Slaughter, by contrast, while 
not explicitly taking the line that civil society organisations and businesses are given too 
much space relative to states, gives voice to those who do. '08 She argues that 
government networks have an advantage over the "global policy networks" advocated by 
Kofi Annan, Reinicke, Rischard and others, in that, being composed of democratically 
appointed or elected officials, it is clear who is exercising power and on whose behalf. The 
broader policy networks of Slaughter's version of networked governance would thus enjoy 
legitimacy through having these accountable government networks, responsible for final 
decisions, at their core. 109 
, 04 Keohane, "Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, " 131. los Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op cit, 439. 106 Young, "Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, " 6. 107 Rischard, op cit, 47-51 and 185. toe Slaughter, op cit, 9-10,224-225,240 and 262. Slaughter writes of a group of scholars criticising the 
involvement of non-state actors in global governance, but names only Martin Shapiro, citing his work on 
"experts and enthusiasts. " (See Shapiro, "Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and 
Governance, " Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 8 (2) (2001): 369-378. ) 109 Slaughter, op cit, 4,9,28-29,224 and 231. 
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Held emphasises that cosmopolitan democracy is based on a recognition of the enduring 
significance of democratic nation-states. 10 While granting their key role in contemporary 
global governance, however, he questions their efficacy in dealing with issues that extend 
beyond national borders. Cosmopolitan democracy thus calls for a multilayered approach 
to governance, to incorporate both subnational and supranational actors. Archibugi 
describes these relationships in cosmopolitan democracy thus: "It is a project that invokes 
voluntary and revocable alliances between governmental and meta-governmental 
institutions, where the availability of coercive power, in ultima ratio, is shared between 
players. ""' As a first step towards cosmopolitan democracy, Held and Archibugi suggest 
that the UN should be rejuvenated through, interalia, stricter adherence to the Charter 
and a more fairly structured Security Council. ' 1' Beyond these measures, Held also 
proposes setting up regional parliaments and governance structures and an assembly of 
democratic states and agencies to handle global problems, legitimised to intervene 
directly where necessary. "' 
The structures of UNESCO and the proposed GGI may differ in terms of flexibility and 
hierarchy, as do the various approaches to global governance. Regimes can be formal or 
informal. In the former, non-binding instruments such as the UNESCO declarations are 
generally quicker to negotiate and more adaptable in terms of application and future 
adjustments than binding ones. 14 Rischard criticises what he sees as rigidity in traditional 
IGOs and concludes that they need to become flatter, leaner and faster at decision- 
making. Under his framework, each global problem would give rise to a specific network, 
membership of which would be based on knowledge, thereby curtailing "excessive layers 
of incompetence and ritual. "15 
110 Held, Global Covenant, 113. 
"' Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 454. 72 Held, Global Covenant, 108 and "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 174-175; Archibugi, 
"Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, " 221. 113 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 176-179 and Global Covenant, 110-113. These 
are two of a total of seven innovations Held proposes. Archibugi, citing previous collaborative work with Held 
and also some of Held's earlier solo writings, also suggests roles for regional organisations and an elected 
assembly to include civil society representatives, within the context of UN reform. (Archibugi, "Principles of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy, " 221 and 228. ) 114 Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, "Introduction and Overview, " 8 and 18. 15 Rischard, op cit, 42-44 and 170. 
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Slaughter, like Rischard, sees her networks as having the potential to represent a flexible 
means of global governance. She presents a check to this vision, however, in that some 
of the advantages of flexibility might need to be compromised to ensure respect for 
`constitutional norms'. ' 16 Slaughter also highlights that networks are sometimes criticised 
on the grounds that their informality can allow more powerful states to dominate, because 
the constraints found in traditional IGOs are absent. The potential solutions proposed by 
Slaughter to this and other dilemmas include ensuring wider participation through broader 
policy networks, recognising government officials' international functions, making 
networks more visible, increasing the number of legislative networks and enhancing 
accountability at domestic level, although how these would address unequal power 
relations engendered by informality is far from obvious. '" Held provides a final potential 
restraint on the call for flexibility. He makes the observation that current trends towards 
more fluid governing mechanisms are neither inevitable nor irreversible. ' 18 This implies 
that movement towards faster, less hierarchical governance does not necessarily follow 
the linear progression portrayed by Rischard. 
Whether issues are best dealt with separately or holistically is a point of divergence 
among the different approaches and is relevant to whether genetics and bioethics would 
be best addressed as single issues or in the broader contexts of inequalities of health and 
development. Rischard envisages GINs acting quickly and efficiently, in contrast to 
traditional IGOs, because each would tackle a separate problem, thus minimising 
complexity through specificity. ' 19 While regimes usually coalesce around fairly well- 
defined issues, ambiguity concerning ownership of and responsibility for problems can 
result in overlapping or contradictory norms, functions and mandates among different 
international bodies. Lack of coherence can also lead to issues falling between agencies, 
or uncertainty as to whether action should be taken at global or national levels. 120 
Bioethics provides an example. As outlined in Chapter 2, several international 
1e Slaughter, op cit, 29,31 and 264. 
Ibid, 28-29. 
18 Held, "Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness, " 366. 19 Rischard, op cit, 170. 120 Held, Global Covenant, 94 and 97; Hurrell, op cit, 143; Reinicke, "Global Public Policy, " 136-137. 
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organisations, UN-based and otherwise, have produced guidelines or standards for ethical 
biomedical research. Sjef Gevers is critical of this proliferation: 
Before elaborating and publishing their 'own' standards, international organisations 
should really ask themselves what the 'added value' is of their contribution in terms 
of further convergence and better protection. A mere proliferation of standards is of 
no use to anybody, but may only lead to confusion or even "shopping" between 
different international documents. 121 
From a different perspective, Young notes that as much as organisations having similar 
mandates raises the possibility of overlap and congestion, it also enables positive 
connections and mutual reinforcement. 1 A too strictly delineated remit may also deny 
linkages with those working on related issues. 123 Rischard acknowledges a potential 
drawback to his fast-moving, issue-specific framework in that it would not take account of 
such linkages, but argues that it is precisely because international negotiations recognise 
these that they "trade laxity on one issue against laxity on another" and thus come up with 
less than optimal solutions. He suggests that the constraints of pigeon-holing issues could 
be negated with a further network devoted to fostering exchanges between GINs, 
although he does not stipulate who should be involved in this. 124 
Slaughter, like Rischard, believes that networks would work most effectively if they were 
targeted: "Government networks should be explicitly designed to engage, enmesh, and 
assist specific government institutions. 025 Unlike Rischard, however, she does not 
acknowledge that this may prove an oversimplified model. A cross-cutting problem or 
issue may be best addressed by several government departments working together. 
Bioethics, for example, could involve ministries of health, science and technology, industry 
and education, to name a few (as will be shown in the cases of Kenya and South Africa in 
Chapters 5 and 6). Cosmopolitan democracy, in contrast to both forms of networked 
governance, aims to respond to global concerns in an integrated manner. Archibugi 
121 Levers, "Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, " 297. 
122 Young, Governance in World Affairs, 122. 
123 Haggard and Simmons, op cit, 497. 124 Rischard, op cit, 190-191. 125 Slaughter, op cit, 247. 
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detects a strong call for global regulation of issues such as immigration, human rights, the 
environment, financial flows and development aid, but observes that at present each of 
these areas is serviced to a greater or lesser extent by its own regime. Cosmopolitan 
democracy offers "a working frame within which the diversity of areas which citizens and 
global movements are working on can be connected. "126 Whether it thus has the potential 
to address the various governance issues in genetics and bioethics outlined in Chapter 2 
as a coherent whole can therefore be explored. 
3.5.2 Representation, legitimacy and accountability 
Issues of representation, legitimacy and accountability are key to any discussion of global 
governance. On legitimacy Allan Buchanan and Keohane write: 
It is important not only that global governance institutions be legitimate, but that 
they are perceived to be legitimate. The perception of legitimacy matters, because, 
in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as 
legitimate by democratic publics. 127 
Whether institutions such as UNESCO and the proposed GGI are perceived as legitimate 
will depend partly on whether they are seen as representative of and accountable to 
stakeholders and experts in the issue at hand. Regime theorists Nayef Samhat and Jaye 
Ellis, Rischard, Slaughter and Held and Archibugi have all discerned deficiencies in 
current international relations in this regard and have thus suggested improvements, 
including new forms of democracy. The different approaches to relations between sectors 
and layers described above are played out in these assorted visions for representation, 
legitimacy and accountability. 
t26 Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 451. 127 Buchanan and Keohane, "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, " 407. Buchanan and Keohane 
differentiate between legitimacy in the normative and sociological senses. The former denotes the right to rule, 
whilst the latter applies to those "widely believed to have the right to rule. " (Ibid, 405. ) This thesis asks whether 
UNESCO and the proposed GGI, as formal and informal organisations respectively, might be able to gamer 
both normative and sociological legitimacy (albeit through non-binding norms). 
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As the governance of genetics and bioethics could potentially involve a diverse array of 
actors, from the North and South and across sectors, whether all stakeholders are or will 
be adequately represented must be addressed. This reflects wider concerns within 
international relations about representation in global governance mechanisms. Held 
describes IGOs as facing a "crisis of legitimacy" on two counts: relations between strong 
and weak states are unequal and "chains of delegation" from the international to the 
national are too long. On the first issue, Held writes, "Increasingly, these institutions 
appear to speak for the powerful, or to be cast aside by these very same forces if they fail 
to fall into line with their will. "128 Drawing on UNDP's work on GPGs, he points to the 
power imbalances between states during international negotiations by way of example. " 
These can be both qualitative and quantitative; some countries can afford to make 
available large delegations of experts to back up their official representative, whilst others 
may only be able to send one person, who may not be a specialist in the field. 130 
Slaughter makes a similar observation with regard to less formalised relations between 
states, highlighting concerns with inequalities in power between rich and poor countries as 
government officials become increasingly involved in global governance: "Shifting 
authority to technocrats means privileging the views of those nations that have 
technocrats-inevitably the most developed nations. "131 
In their chapter in the 2003 UNDP volume, Pamela Chasek and Lavanya Rajamani outline 
specific difficulties faced by developing countries during international negotiations and 
ways in which these might be resolved. To what extent their observations apply to how the 
UNESCO declarations were drawn up will be explored in Chapter 5. Further to the 
problems concerning the size and expertise of delegations highlighted by Held, Chasek 
and Rajamani describe how some delegates will arrive at meetings with "hollow 
mandates, " having not received clear instructions as to what their countries' negotiating 
128 Held, Global Covenant, xiii. 129 That Held draws on the UNDP volume is unsurprising, given that he and Anthony McGrew wrote one of its 
chapters, on political globalization. 130 Held, Global Covenant, 95-96. Held cites Kaul et al, "How to Improve the Provision of Global Public 
Goods, " 30-31, a summary chapter of the study's findings. 131 Slaughter, op cit, 221. 
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positions should be. Moreover, if they attend only later sessions, they will not only have 
missed out on agenda setting, but will also lack "institutional memory" and the 
corresponding leverage to influence proceedings. This can be compounded for those 
countries without easy access to background documentation through high-speed internet 
connections. 132 The two analysts make several practical suggestions on how developing 
countries could be better represented at international meetings and thus have stronger 
mandates and bargaining positions. Firstly, countries could hold national policy debates 
and strategic consultations. Greater coordination between relevant ministries might also 
"make for more effective delegations. "133 Secondly, regional preparatory meetings would 
aid networking among developing countries. Broad coalitions can be powerful, but given 
the diversity of national concerns and priorities, Chasek and Rajamani recommend that 
these should be complemented by smaller groups focusing on special issues. Finally, fast 
and reliable internet access would help improve both coordination among countries and 
availability of information. All these measures might be realised through a "participation 
fund, " as suggested in the first UNDP study by Kaul and associates. 134 
To what extent the UNESCO declarations (and the GGI norms, if formulated) are 
perceived as having been negotiated and subsequently implemented democratically will 
have implications for their legitimacy. 135 The second crisis of legitimacy that Held 
identifies, the "chains of delegation" between IGOs and states, he attributes to weak and 
obscure mechanisms of accountability, particularly with regard to international 
negotiations. 136 Samhat, Ellis, Rischard, Slaughter and Held each lay out a framework for 
132 Chasek and Rajamani, "Steps Toward Enhanced Parity, " 246,248-249 and 258-259. 133 Robert Putnam has characterised negotiations about international agreements as 'two-level games', 
recognising that bargaining over an agreement's content will take place at domestic as well as international 
levels. Different factions within states will have divergent opinions on what would be in the'national' interest. 
jPutnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, " 433 and 460. ) 34 Chasek and Rajamani, op cit, 246,255 and 258-259. 135 Harlan Cleveland, in a review of Rischard's book, comments that norms that have been "arrived at by a 
process that's well understood and respected" can be a powerful force for change. (Cleveland, "Solving World 
Problems in 20 Years, " 62. ) 
'36 Held, Global Covenant 141-142. Raffaele Marchetti makes a similar observation, describing the system of 
"double representation" in international organisations, whereby individuals are represented by national 
parliaments, which in turn elect an international representative, as producing "an almost insurmountable 
barrier to engaging in public international life. " (Marchetti, "Global Governance or World Federalism? " 291. ) 
Slaughter's government networks would avoid these long chains of delegation because those negotiating 
agreements would also be responsible for their implementation. (Slaughter, op cit, 263. ) This seeming 
efficiency may in fact constitute a dearth of checks and balances in terms of the separation of power, however. 
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how representation could be improved on a global scale. Both Samhat and Ellis argue 
from a constructivist or cognitivist perspective for increased civil society involvement in 
international regimes. Rischard advocates representation through experts from specific 
sectors combined with forms of wide participation. Slaughter, as would be expected, 
concentrates on government officials, but suggests they could operate from a global as 
well as a national mandate. Held identifies multiple potential constituencies, to be defined 
by who is significantly affected by a given issue rather than geographical borders. 
Samhat and Ellis argue separately for international regimes to be considered as public 
spheres, characterised as frameworks within which interests and identities are constituted 
and actors engage in discussion and deliberation. Samhat believes the "democratic 
potential" of international regimes is growing as they involve a broadening range of actors, 
thus forming "transboundary political communities" around specific issues. 137 For Ellis, 
discourse within regimes enables "the articulation of international rules and norms 
grounded in consensus and therefore enjoying legitimacy. n138 Both writers see the 
inclusion of civil society as the key element of regimes as public spheres. Ellis echoes 
Held in recommending that negotiations be made more open and thus "more permeable 
to influence from civil society. "139 Samhat, however, contends that this is already 
happening, with documentation of international meetings becoming increasingly public 
and civil society actors now participating "across the gamut of regime and norm-building 
processes, " from agenda setting to compliance monitoring. He sees these actors as 
representative agents and thus the means by which a rudimentary form of global 
democracy or global citizenship is practised. 140 Chapters 5 and 6 will explore how far this 
favourable assessment might be applied to UNESCO or the proposed GGI. 
137 Samhat, "International Regimes and the prospects for Democracy, " 180 and 186. 138 Ellis, op cit, 274. 139 Ibid, 288. 
140 Samhat, "International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy, " 182-183 and 186. With Rodger 
Payne, Samhat acknowledges the criticisms sometimes levelled at NGOs-that they themselves are not 
democratically accountable and therefore lack popular legitimation-but avers that such problems are being 
addressed through measures such as codes of conduct. (Samhat and Payne, "Regimes, Public Spheres and 
Global Democracy, " 285-286. ) 
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Rischard's GINs would incorporate civil society actors alongside representatives from 
governments and businesses. The membership of the networks would increase 
progressively throughout their three phases. During the `constitutional phase', IGOs would 
facilitate the selection of a small number of experts, with input from the civic and private 
sectors. 141 IGOs would in fact take part in GINs as facilitators only, not as problem-solving 
members. One of their prime roles would be to secure the involvement of poorer states. 
Rischard believes IGOs would ensure fair representation and global thinking, because as 
technocratic organisations they would have "less of an axe to grind" than the sectorally- 
appointed members (although elsewhere Rischard deems IGOs unable to avoid the 
disharmony of international politics, because they are owned and overseen by nation- 
states). '42 This logic ignores the power relations between strong and weak states 
identified by Held and UNDP in IGOs. 
Rischard suggests a broadening of the network membership in the 'norm-producing 
phase', to include "all interested parties. " He also puts forward what he terms a "peculiar 
methodology" for norm generation, to be enshrined in the code of conduct. Firstly, 
representatives would have to act as "global citizens" rather than ambassadors for their 
own sectors per se, at risk of exclusion should they fail to do so. 143 Secondly, rather than 
voting, networks would operate by "rough consensus, " defined as a sufficient level of 
agreement on fundamentals to enable norm production. To achieve this consensus, 
interested parties would take part in 'electronic town meetings' held via the internet, on a 
"potentially vast" scale (by the 'implementation phase', according to Rischard, the 
membership could perhaps run to tens of thousands; Arnd Juergensen questions this 
141 Rischard, op cit, 172-173 and 179. Benner, Reinicke and Witte emphasise the importance of a transparent 
selection process, with clear criteria, to the accountability of networks. (Benner, Reinicke and Witte, op cit, 
203. ) The membership selection process that Rischard lays out seems rather circular, however. He writes, 
"Each network would start with three facilitators: the global multilateral [IGO] in the lead, one representative 
selected from the network's civil-society membership, and one representative selected from the business 
membership. Together they would be in charge of selecting and roping in the first members (a tricky task). * 
(Rischard, op cit, 172. ) Thus the facilitators would be selected (by whom is not clear) from among an already 
existing membership. Note that the GINs might also decide to set up an independent panel of experts, 
presumably to work in an advisory capacity. Given that Rischard deems it necessary for these experts to 
remain outside the networks in order to safeguard scientific independence, he must consider that their 
expertise would be of a different order to that of the network members. (Ibid, 175. ) 14 Ibid, 163,172 and 188-189. 143 Ibid, 174 and 192. Cleveland observes, from experience, that the transition to an ethos of global citizenship 
is one that existing committees and commissions have to make if they are to be successful. (Cleveland, op cit, 
62. ) 
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"inflated" view). 144 The electronic meetings concept is problematic, given that some people 
have better access to communications technologies than others, as highlighted by Chasek 
and Rajamani. Despite Rischard's emphasis on urgency, it might take a significant part of 
the twenty years he allows for global problem-solving for the internet to become equally 
available everywhere. Rischard foresees large numbers of knowledgeable, qualified 
people "chiming in" through the meetings, but does not articulate how their qualifications 
or interests would be verified, or how all their contributions would be taken on board. '45 
Held has questioned the potential legitimacy of Rischard's GINs, on the grounds that they 
would provide no means to effectively arbitrate the range of actors involved. 14" This has 
implications for the GGI, which would be explicitly based on Rischard's multisectoral 
model. Rischard admits that questions of legitimacy and democratic representation within 
his proposed networks are the "hardest by far. " His first response is simply, 'What's the 
alternative? " This hardly seems adequate. He goes on to argue that as GINs would not 
enact legislation and thus act only as "a kind of governance tool" rather than a 
government, issues of democratic representation would lose cogency. Even so, Rischard 
envisages the 'electronic town meetings' bringing "a greater element of democratic 
participation than the traditional local-to-global pyramid of electoral processes. "147 For 
Rischard, GINs would encapsulate a novel form of legitimacy-"horizontal legitimacy"- 
because they would cut across borders and sectors. They would complement rather than 
replace the traditional "vertical legitimacy" of nation-states, pressuring states and their 
"short-term oriented, territorially minded traditional politicians" into acting accountably and 
with a longer-term and more global perspective. In this way they would work in a similar 
fashion to advocacy NGOs, as Rischard acknowledges: "The more the global issues 
network looks like an activist NGO in that phase, the better. """ 
144 Rischard, 174 and 179. Juergensen deems Rischard's expectations of the effectiveness of the electronic 
town meetings somewhat overblown. (Juergensen, "Looking Ahead, " 204. ) 145 Rischard, op cit, 189. 146 Held, Global Covenant, 107. 
147 Rischard, op cit, 189. 148 Ibid, 177,182-183 and 186. 
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Slaughter, like Rischard, is concerned with democratic participation. She purports that 
`global deliberative equality' should be the foundational norm of global governance. By this 
she means that all those individuals affected by common problems should be able to 
participate in collective deliberation about how to solve them . 
t49 Their participation would 
be through representatives, but not the civil society agents identified by Samhat, for 
Slaughter goes on to articulate this principle exclusively in terms of government networks. 
Under a "presumption of inclusion, " all those government institutions wanting to join a 
network would be allowed to do so, subject to their meeting certain criteria. (Slaughter 
suggests that these criteria could include certain levels of economic and political 
development, which might prove difficult for some states in the South to achieve. )15o 
Slaughter endorses representation through government officials because she believes 
that, unlike actors from the private sector or civil society, they can be held accountable 
through political mechanisms. She acknowledges that these officials are often seen as 
unelected technocrats acting on behalf of vested interests, but suggests ways in which 
such perceptions could be mitigated; namely, government networks could host common 
websites, engage systematically with counterpart networks of corporations and civil 
society organisations and promote enhanced accountability at domestic levels. 15' Whether 
government officials in genetics and bioethics are seen as legitimate representatives of 
national interests and to what extent they can be held accountable will be investigated in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
149 Slaughter, op cit, 29 and 245-247. 150 Ibid, 246-247. Slaughter's model seems somewhat inconsistent in this regard. She argues that an 
advantage of 'network norms' would be that they would stipulate criteria for membership specific to the issue 
at hand, thus avoiding what she sees as a pernicious problem in current international relations, the labelling of 
whole countries as pariahs on account of the misdemeanours of particular elements within them. Under the 
constitutional norm of global deliberative equality, any government official or unit able to meet these criteria 
could not be excluded from the network. Whether or not they could be seen to meet the economic or political 
development criteria outlined above, however, would depend on several factors and so would not fall within 
the remit of any one government official or unit. It would also be difficult for the networks to offer "targeted 
technical assistance" towards the achievement of such broad standards to single government institutions. clbid, 25 and 246-247. ) 
51 Ibid, 10,28-29,220-221,235,259 and 266. Slaughter suggests a "grab-bag" of domestic political solutions, 
which should augment the accountability of government networks, decided upon by each national polity in 
response to their perceptions of potential transnational problems. What exactly a "grab-bag" is or would entail 
is unclear, however, except in the context of the United States. (Ibid, 28-29,241 and 259. ) 
80 
Slaughter envisages a system in which government officials would be explicitly recognised 
as having both domestic and international duties: t52 
National officials are responsible to national constituencies for their domestic 
and.. . their transgovernmental activities. At the same time... government networks 
constitute a global governance system, which must somehow be accountable to 
the global community as a whole, comprising both states and individuals whose 
collective interests stem from a common humanity. '53 
This stance seems somewhat confused. Slaughter stresses that officials would have two 
faces, but one audience; that is, they would be accountable for their actions both within 
and across borders, but only to the national populace: "Dual function thus does not imply 
dual accountability. °'M Slaughter believes it would be too great a leap for government 
representatives to see themselves as representing a larger transnational or global 
constituency (unlike Rischard, who stipulates they must put national interests aside and 
act as global citizens155). She also avows, however, that government officials would need 
to pay attention to global interests, the priority of which relative to national interests would 
have to be calculated on a case-by-case basis. Each state would devise guidelines on 
how this calculation should be made, but these would be subordinate to general (or 
'constitutional') norms governing transnational networks, which all nations would come 
together to form. 156 Peter Berkowitz is highly critical of Slaughter's model on this front, on 
the grounds that it pays insufficient attention to self-interest as a salient feature of 
networking. ' 57 
152 Ibid, 28-29. 
153 Ibid, 218. 
154 Ibid, 232. Kenneth Anderson makes a similar point concerning Slaughter's confusing vision. On her 
statement that dual function does not imply dual accountability, he comments that this does not chime with her 
assertions that government officials should have global responsibilities and be subject to international 
agreements on an individual basis. On her solution (namely that officials should think in terms of both national 
and global interests and prioritise between these according to the issue at hand, as outlined above), he writes, 
"How this is not an explicit statement of dual allegiance, dual loyalty, and dual accountability is, frankly, 
unfathomable. " Anderson also doubts that "ordinary voters" (Slaughter, op cit, 259) could adequately monitor 
Rovernment networks. (Anderson, "Squaring the Circle? " 1295 and 1296. ) 5 Rischard, op cit, 174. 156 Slaughter, op cit, 233-235 and 243-244. 157 Berkowitz writes, "So little attention does she [Slaughter] give to self-interest in politics that she seems 
never to factor into her account of the new world order certain salient features, comical as well as unlovely, of her central concept. In fact, 'networking' also includes the posturing, posing, and preening for position; the 
creation of rigid hierarchies and exclusive cliques; and the lust for power that hides behind high-minded 
formulations and manipulates sound principles for personal and party advantage. " (Berkowitz, "Laws of Nations, " 79. ) Vlad Perju also comments that Slaughter's vision may not be enough to ensure the just world 
order for which she is aiming. (Perju, "Comparative Constitutionalism and the Making of A New World Order, " 
466. ) 
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Held and Archibugi advocate that individuals should be entitled to take part in policy 
formation at the global level, as fully-fledged cosmopolitan citizens rather than through 
government representatives. Which individuals and groups might come together to hold to 
account relevant parties over a certain issue would be dictated less by geographical 
proximity than by whether they fell within, to use one of Held's recurring phrases, 
"overlapping communities of fate. "' -58 Borrowing again from UNDP's work on GPGs, Held 
determines that "those who are significantly affected by a global good or bad should have 
a say in its provision. n15' Archibugi similarly states that "cross-border issues" should be 
dealt with under a democratic principle that "everyone affected is able to take part in the 
decision-making "160 Held defines three categories of impact: strong, where vital needs or 
interests are affected, with consequences for life expectancy; moderate, where people's 
abilities to participate in economic, cultural and political activities are affected, with 
consequences for life chances; and weak, where lifestyle or consumption choices are 
affected, which could lead to frustration, tension and conflict. Being weakly affected by a 
good or bad would not be enough to place someone in the relevant community of fate, 
because this would make the community so large as to render cosmopolitan citizenship 
impracticable. Held concludes that those who are strongly and moderately affected by an 
issue should be involved in the decision-making and regulation surrounding it, either 
directly or indirectly. Where this does not happen there is an accountability gap. t61 
158 Held, Global Covenant, 173-174; Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, " 204-205 and 211- 
112. On a note of caution, Held observes that globalisation has not been mirrored by a growing sense of 
global citizenship and that people's loyalties and identities are still rooted first and foremost at local, 
subregional or national levels. (Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 166. ) Nadia Urbinati 
criticises the cosmopolitan democracy project on the grounds that it is unclear how national citizens would 
overcome their nation-based interests when voting at global level. (Urbinati, "Can Cosmopolitical Democracy 
Be Democratic? " 79. ) Similarly, Slaughter and Thomas Hale predict that nationalism is not going to disappear 
in the near future, thus it must be harnessed to contribute to cosmopolitan ideals. Unsurprisingly, they suggest 
that trans-governmental networks may offer a means to do this. (Slaughter and Hale, "A Covenant to Make 
Global Governance Work, ' 129-131. This commentary forms a chapter in the book Debating Globalization, 
which comprises an essay by David Held ("Globalisation: The Dangers and the Answers, " itself a shortened 
version of Global Covenant) and a series of responses, most of which originally appeared on 
www. openDemocracy. net. ) 159 Held, Global Covenant 97. UNDP resurrects the "forgotten principle of equivalence, " which suggests that 
"it is desirable to align as much as possible the structure of political decisionmaking (particularly different levels of geographic jurisdiction) with the range and type of a good's spillover effects. " (Kaul et al, "How to 
Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods, " 27-28. ) Aso Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 443-444. 's' Held, Global Covenant, 99-100 and "Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness, " 383. 
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Under cosmopolitan democracy new forms of accountability would complement those 
afforded by democratic elections. 162 A full-blown cosmopolitan polity would involve an 
"overarching network of democratic public fora, "' 63 whereby people would be members of 
several different communities according to the issues affecting them and would be able to 
engage politically in those issues in a variety of ways. These would include forms of both 
direct (local) and representative (global) democracy, but also novel democratic arenas 
such as stakeholder consultations (that is, direct involvement of representatives of major 
groupings) and collective views arrived at through impartial deliberative examination of 
opinion and informed participation (if indeed impartiality of opinion and information can 
ever be guaranteed). ' 64 With genomics designated the 'heritage of humanity' and a global 
public good, who should take part in such fora, if established for genetics and bioethics, 
would have to be determined. 
3.5.3 Norms, implementation and enforcement 
Both UNESCO and those at TJCB have a stated purpose to set out universal norms on 
genetics and bioethics. The nature and content of these norms will affect how they are 
implemented and enforced and thus are key to the efficacy of the UNESCO declarations 
and the proposed GGI. In a world of sovereign states, governance mechanisms are 
ultimately self-regulatory, relying heavily on the perceived threat of reciprocal action and 
national concerns with status and reputation. 165 Ellis describes this state of affairs 
succinctly: "States are both subjects and instruments of international law, being both the 
addressees of international norms and the agents responsible for their domestic 
implementation and enforcement. " 66 The different approaches to governance-regimes, 
networked governance and cosmopolitan democracy-seek to address this conundrum in 
162 Keohane, "Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, " 137 and 140. 163 Held, Global Covenant, 109. 164 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 175-176. 
165 Vogler, op cit, 41. 166 Ellis, op cit, 292. 
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various ways, accommodating sovereignty through soft and hard forms of power or, more 
radically, challenging its very essence. 
Young describes the conception and revision of regimes as "messy processes. " Norms 
are often drafted ambiguously rather than to "coherent institutional designs, " representing 
compromise positions reached through hard bargaining combined with decision-making 
by consensus. 167 Negotiations aimed at binding accords, in particular, sometimes suffer a 
'lowest common denominator' effect. Non-binding instruments, which allow for fluctuating 
levels of compliance and are thus less threatening to reluctant states, may therefore be 
preferred. 1 The corresponding disadvantage lies in their modest enforcement power, 
which is seen to render them weaker than binding agreements. This "conventional 
wisdom" is challenged by David Victor et al in their study of international environmental 
regimes. 169 Binding instruments that set low standards, even if fully complied with, may 
have negligible impact on a given problem. By contrast, non-binding agreements 
enshrining high standards, even if only aimed towards, may effect significant behavioural 
change. 170 Among states, peer pressure may induce conformity over time. In a review of 
different approaches to regime theory, Baldev Nayar describes this process: 
In an interdependent world where elites are compelled to interact repeatedly, the 
institutionalists (neoliberalsj maintain, social practices or regularized patterns of 
behavior develop. As these persist, they acquire a normative aura and come to act 
as constraints on the behavior of leaders. As Oran Young puts it, "In the typical 
case, international institutions are extremely difficult to get rid of. ""' 
One way to encourage adoption of regimes at national level may be through systems of 
implementation review (SIRs). According to Victor et al, SIRs enhance transparency and 
accountability and lessen the chance of non-binding commitments being ignored. ' 72 
'67 Young, Governance in World Affairs, 47 and 103. Ise Stokke, "Regimes as Governance Systems, " 50. , sa Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff introduce fourteen case studies, conducted through the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, in their edited volume, The Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments. 
170 Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, "Introduction and Overview, " 7; Raustiala and Victor, "Conclusions, " 685 
and 705. 
171 Nayar, "Regimes, Power, and International Aviation, " 142-143. (Nayar quotes Young, International Cooperation, 64. ) 
172 Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, "Introduction and Overview, " 18. 
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Young similarly remarks, 'Well-constructed SIRs are important in almost every case as 
methods of retaining the attention of policymakers and avoiding the onset of 'out of sight, 
out of mind' syndrome. n13 Victor et al note that poor data reporting is a chronic problem, 
however, in terms of both quantity and quality. They also identify two further trends. 
Firstly, active and effective implementation review often evolves informally, after an 
agreement has entered into force. Secondly, states are becoming more open even to 
external review, in the interests of international cooperation. Whether the UNESCO 
declarations follow any of these trends will be explored in Chapter 6.174 
Where norms are not being upheld by member states, IGOs have two approaches to 
encouraging implementation: enforcement and management. 175 Which is deemed 
appropriate will depend on whether non-compliance is attributed to self-interested choice 
or incapacity. 176 Vogler writes, "They [governments] may simply lack the technical 
personnel and data gathering facilities to fulfil their obligations under a regime. "'77 Young 
judges IGOs to be "notoriously weak" in applying enforcement measures such as 
sanctions and thus considers initiatives like UNESCO's capacity building activities, aimed 
at strengthening those desiring to comply, a better option in many cases. 178 Victor et al 
found that a combined approach can prove effective; the threatened withdrawal of 
managerial assistance, for example, might be a powerful enforcement tool. The likely 
success of either or both methods will depend partly on a system's capacity to apply 
them. 19 Young notes that organisations administering regimes often struggle for sufficient 
material resources, especially for programmes aimed at developing countries. 18' 
13 Young, Governance in World Affairs, 119. 
"` Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, "Introduction and Overview, " 18; Raustiala and Victor, "Conclusions, " 677- 
678,680 and 695. 15 An oft-cited work on the management approach (and, according to Young, the most comprehensive) is that 
of Abram and Antonia Chayes: The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995). (Young, Governance in World Affairs, 96. ) 
Raustiala and Victor, "Conclusions, " 681. 'n Vogler, op cit, 169-170. 178 Young, Governance in World Affairs, 81,95-96 and 100. 
80 
79 
1 
Raustiala and Victor, "Conclusions, " 683-684. t8" Young, Governance in World Affairs, 119. 
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Whether a regime is adopted at national level and, if so, how successfully, may be as 
dependent on internal dynamics and pressures as on IGO enforcement or management 
mechanisms. Where international arrangements disrupt or are incompatible with local 
procedures, their efficacy may be impaired. '81 This is particularly pertinent to bioethics, 
given the debate between universalism and pluralism highlighted at 2.1.2.1. Which 
government agency takes on responsibility for implementing a regime may also be a key 
factor. Echoing Slaughter's disaggregated state, Young observes, "Regimes ordinarily 
become the property of specific public agencies within governments rather than of the 
government as a whole. " Thus it is essential for IGOs to identify and liaise with the most 
appropriate national bodies. 182 Young sees unofficial groups as of "even greater 
importance, " however. Where regimes trigger active communities willing to give time and 
energy to their fulfilment, they cannot be shunted aside through "benign neglect . "183 It 
might be expected that involving relevant constituencies in negotiations would harness 
their subsequent support, but this does not necessarily follow. Victor et a/ found that 
including "implementation expertise" in decision-making led to better-crafted agreements, 
but had little impact in terms of encouraging participation in their realisation. 184 
Sceptical of current systems for inducing adherence to international norms and principles, 
Rischard, Slaughter and Held suggest alternatives. These range from variations on the 
enforcement and management approaches to regimes to new understandings of 
sovereignty. Rischard's networks would engender "reputational effects" in their 
implementation phase. In conjunction with the adjoined 'electronic town meeting', each 
GIN would become a "rating vehicle, " monitoring the compliance of states and other 
stakeholders with the norms and standards developed in the previous phase. The norms 
might be general, applying to all stakeholders in the issue at hand, or sector specific. 
Some would be intended to guide nation-states as to what legislation they should pass, 
perhaps encompassing existing treaties; others would address IGOs, with regard to 
1e' Ibid, 122-123. 
182 Ibid, 48 and 94. 183 Ibid, 94-95 and 105. /84 Raustiala and Victor, "Conclusions, " 665. 
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financing or "even sometimes telling them how to get their act together with respect to the 
issue at hand. "185 Whether IGOs would be inclined to listen to GINs acting in this rather 
dictatorial fashion is questionable, especially considering that they would have been 
deliberately left out of the `norm-producing phase'. The GGI might face a similar problem 
in setting itself up as overall coordinator of all existing genetics initiatives. 18' 
Rischard recognises that norms are often referred to as 'soft lawi187 and that the networks 
would have neither legislative power nor regulatory authority, but nevertheless deems the 
proposed networks "anything but soft, " as they would have the moral authority to name 
and shame "rogue players. "'88 He writes, "Global issues networks... are hard in that they 
will use the sledgehammer of ratings and reputational effects-much more potent devices 
than even rules or sanctions. "'89 Whether reputational effects are in fact this potent and, if 
so, under what circumstances will be explored in Chapter 7. One possible limitation is 
their dependence on renegade actors being susceptible to a burden of shame. Held has 
drawn attention to this weakness in regard to Rischard's proposals, stating that GINs 
would "contribute little to the question of norm and rule enforcement in the face of a 
reluctant actor. ""' Malcolm Scully has likewise commented that 'naming-and-shaming' 
would be unlikely to have much effect on unilateralist states. 19' 
Despite predicting that GINs would wield a'hard' power more effective than that of IGOs, 
Rischard acknowledges that they would be ultimately reliant on these more traditional 
lee Rischard, op cit, 176-177. 1e6 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 139. 187 Soft law' essentially refers to legally non-binding norms, although where the formal distinction between 
hard and soft law lies (or indeed whether it is possible to distinguish one) is contested among scholars of 
international law. (See Shelton, "Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of 'Soft Law"' and Chinkin, 
"Normative Development in the International Legal System. ") 
168 Rischard, op cit, 177-178. Rischard suggests that GINs could co-opt the media in this endeavour and gives 
the Indonesian government's five-tier ranking system of the environmental credentials of businesses as an 
example of a successful 'naming-and-shaming' mechanism. This system applauds those at the top, while 
19iving those at the bottom six months to improve before being publicly named. (Ibid, 178. ) 9 Ibid, 185. 
190 Held, Global Covenant 107. 
191 Scully, "A Network of Global Solutions, " 813. Benner, Reinicke and Witte use similar terminology to 
Rischard in writing about "naming and shaming" and "public reputational accountability" in the context of global 
policy networks. They are concerned with the reputations and accountability of the networks themselves, 
however, rather than those at whom the networks would target their norms. They also acknowledge that 
naming and shaming would have little effect on "rogue actors, " but aver that such actors would be unlikely to 
join the networks in the first place. (Benner, Reinicke and Witte, op cit, 199-200. ) 
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bodies and on nation-states, because "governance needs government. " The reasons for 
this are threefold: firstly, GINs would be materially dependent on IGOs for their launch 
events and subsequent funding; secondly, the norms would need to be effected in 
national law; and thirdly, there would be no time to set up new institutions. ' 92 Slaughter's 
government networks, both horizontal and vertical, would mirror Rischard's GINs in that 
the norms developed would have no legal force unless implemented at domestic level. 
Horizontal networks would employ soft power on a continuum, running from information to 
socialisation to persuasion to discussion and debate, to foster national level adherence. '93 
Vertical networks would see international organisations directly marshalling the legislative, 
regulatory or judicial power of their domestic counterparts in order to achieve maximum 
efficacy. "Absent a world government, " writes Slaughter, "it is impossible to grant 
supranational officials genuine coercive power. "194 
To promote implementation, costs and prestige would be attached to failing or meeting 
respectively a network's norms and standards. To this end, Slaughter introduces a new 
conception of sovereignty: disaggregated sovereignty. At present, she avers, there is a 
"conceptual blind spot" in international law and politics, whereby separate government 
institutions are not formally recognised independently of the unitary state. To address the 
myopia, Slaughter suggests that these institutions should individually bear the rights and 
responsibilities of sovereignty. Each would have a discrete mandate to meet international 
legal obligations (which would perhaps lead to duplication and confusion should 
institutions with overlapping responsibilities apply these instruments contradictorily at 
national level). Sovereignty would be newly understood in terms of capacity to take part in 
transgovernmental networks. 195 Like those of the management school of regime theory, 
92 Rischard, op cit, 185. 93 Slaughter, op cit, 27,215 and 263. Soft power is a term coined by Joseph Nye, Jr. He writes, 'What is soft 
power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from 
the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our [the United States'] policies 
are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced... When you can get others to admire 
your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. " (Nye, Soft Power, x. ) 94 Slaughter, op cit, 13-14 and 20. 195 Ibid, 25,33-34,266 and 268-269. This new notion of sovereignty has been criticised by Berkowitz and 
Anderson. Berkowitz writes, "One should not underestimate the radicalism of Slaughter's proposal, 
encapsulated in her casual exercise in redefinition-as if one could disguise the rejection of a fundamental 
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Slaughter sees compliance with international norms as being as much about capacity as 
willingness. She particularly cites developing countries as lacking this capacity and 
suggests that government networks could provide technical assistance in helping them to 
build it. This would represent power employed in a positive form, unlike Rischard's largely 
negative 'naming-and-shaming'. 196 
Like Slaughter's government networks, cosmopolitan democracy would entail a new 
understanding of sovereignty. Where traditionally states have been protected from 
external accountability by the national sovereignty principle, 197 Held and Archibugi argue 
that allowing them to act with impunity simply because they sit within certain borders is 
incompatible with democracy. Hence states should not be considered to be "ontologically 
privileged. "' 98 The two theorists frame their proposed alternatives differently. Held 
perceives a "liberal international sovereignty" to be already emerging in the international 
arena. Under cosmopolitan democracy, this would entrench powers and constraints, rights 
and duties that might sometimes conflict with national laws. States would thus forfeit their 
right to sovereignty if they violated standards of international order, understood in terms of 
human rights and democracy. '99 Archibugi endorses a similar ethos, but argues that the 
canon of sovereignty should be supplanted by that of "global constitutionalism. n20° 
principle by keeping the name while changing the meaning. " (Berkowitz, op cit, 75. ) Anderson likewise 
comments that Slaughter's argument "operates by pure definitional fiat, " such that she has "redefined 
sovereignty to mean engaging in activities characteristic of giving up traditional sovereignty. " He believes she 
has confused sovereign power with the international benefits it can be used to secure. (Anderson, op cit, 
1299-1300. ) 
196 Slaughter, op cit, 4,26 and 261. Slaughter draws on the work of Chayes and Chayes, as does Allyn Taylor in a 1999 article suggesting that the UNESCO declaration on the human genome (UDHGHR) requires a 
stronger supervisory mechanism to encourage compliance. Taylor notes that any such mechanism would have to be administered in a positive manner: "Procedures must be instituted to ensure that a truly 
constructive dialogue is established rather than a combative and coercive confrontation. " (lbid, 185; Taylor, 
"Globalization and Biotechnology, " 535-536. Slaughter and Taylor refer to "On Compliance, " International 
Organization 47 (2) (1993), 175-205 and The New Sovereignty. ) Rischard does suggest a positive function for 
the 'electronic town meetings', in that they could become vehicles for best practice and knowledge exchange, 
but by far the greater part of his description of the 'implementation phase' is devoted to the 'naming-and- 
shaming' concept. concept. (Rischard, op cit, 178. ) 
Keohane, "Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, " 147 and 149. '9e Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 452; Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan 
Multilateralism, " 168. 
199 Held, Global Covenant, 119 and 131. 200 Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 452 and "Demos and Cosmopolis, " 35. 
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Held stresses that cosmopolitan democracy would not necessitate a diminution of state 
power and capacity per se. 201 It is difficult to envisage how it would be possible to have 
effective supranational levels of governance without affecting state sovereignty, however. 
For regional and global bodies to have any authority, states would have to concede a 
degree of autonomy. At present, states can assert that international norms to which they 
would rather not adhere lack democratic legitimisation, a claim that would be invalid under 
cosmopolitan democracy 202 Held does not specify how powerful states would be won 
over to innovations such as regional parliaments or an assembly legitimised for direct 
intervention. In its present form, the UN struggles to persuade states to uphold 
international law, both in spite and because of their ultimate sovereignty. To convince 
states to give up this sovereignty would be a task more difficult by an order of 
magnitude. 203 Such considerations are essential to effective genetics and bioethics 
governance. The combination of non-binding agreements and state sovereignty does not 
augur well for the implementation of the norms and principles of the UNESCO 
declarations and the proposed GGI. At issue is whether efficacy would be more 
realistically achieved by changing the nature of sovereignty or by finding ways to govern in 
spite of it. 
3.5.4 The location of governance 
Intrinsic to the issues explored in 3.5.2 and 3.5.3-representation, legitimacy, 
accountability, norms, implementation and enforcement-is the location of governance. 
This informs how constituencies are defined, who represents them and at what levels 
norms are upheld. With regard to genetics and bioethics, whether governance is best 
201 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 179-180. 2°2 Ibid. 
203 Several theorists have made similar critiques of cosmopolitan democracy. Adam Lupel writes, "States, as 
the major actors in the international arena, have a strong interest in maintaining their de jure sovereignty; 
sovereign status remains the foundation of state identity and agency in the international arena. This is never to be given up lightly. " (Lupel, "Tasks of a Global Civil Society, " 122. ) David Chandler and Slaughter and Hale 
are sceptical about how realistic Held's proposals are and Martin Wolf and Meghnad Desai, two of the 
contributors to Debating Globalization, criticise what they see as Held's benign view of sovereignty. (Chandler, 
"New Rights for Old? " 339 and 343; Slaughter and Hale, op cit, 128; Wolf, "The Case for Optimism, " 41; Desai, "Social Democracy as World Panacea? " 68-69. ) 
90 
located at local, national, regional, international or multiple layers and how far norms 
should be applied universally must therefore be interrogated. The traditionally state-centric 
approach of regime theory is broadened in the normative work of Young, Samhat and 
Ellis. As seen in the previous section, Young detects a vital role for both state and non- 
state actors at national level in the implementation of regimes. Samhat appears to 
separate the decision-making and implementation sides of governance in terms of 
location. He writes, "The international regime, characterized as a global public sphere, 
provides a space for the practice of democracy above the state. " Both he and Ellis 
recognise, however, that "strong states" are needed to administer whatever rules and 
norms are agreed upon. 04 
Rischard, Slaughter and Archibugi reject global government as an option, on the grounds 
that a single centralised institution would be too distant from too diverse a populace and 
would hold a dangerously concentrated form of power. 205 They differ in where they locate 
the optimum level of governance within their models, however. Rischard's networks, by 
definition, would operate at global level, but would circumvent actual and metaphorical 
distances between people by creating "virtual public space" (through the 'electronic town 
meetings') around specific issues-206 In contrast, Slaughter's government networks would 
employ a 'constitutional norm' of subsidiarity and thus locate governance at the lowest 
level possible, defined as "that closest to the individuals and groups affected by the rules 
and decisions adopted and enforced. " What this level might be-from local to national to 
regional to global-would depend on "practicability. "207 Cosmopolitan democracy would 
also enshrine subsidiarity, under the single principle of 'inclusiveness and subsidiarity'. 
This dictates that decision-making should as far as possible be decentralised, to afford 
204 Samhat, "International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy, " 179-180 and 189; Ellis, op cit, 
280. 
205 Rischard, op cit, 165-167; Slaughter, op cit, 8; Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 454. Marchetti, in advocating his vision of world federalism or "cosmo-federalism" (that is, a democratic union of 
states, consisting of a directly elected law-making assembly and federal government), argues that the dangers 
of homogeneity and tyranny would actually be higher without a federal authority, which would respect local differences and allow citizens to express dissent through elections. (Marchetti, op cit, 287 and 300-301. ) van den Anker, although an advocate of global governance over global government, makes a similar comment in 
terms of the danger of the former if procedures of influence are not transparent and there are no formal rules 
for including the powerless in decision-making. (van den Anker, op cit, 283. ) 206 Rischard, op cit, 182. 207 Slaughter, op cit. 30. 
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people maximum opportunity to influence the social conditions that shape their lives. 
Democracy should therefore be centralised solely for those issues where life expectancies 
and life chances can be effectively safeguarded only at transnational levels. 208 
The principle of subsidiarity notwithstanding, Slaughter, Held and Archibugi embrace 
multilayered governance, but in different ways. Slaughter envisages a global lattice of 
horizontal and vertical government networks. Horizontal networks would be the more 
common: "Even on a global scale, the vast majority of governance tasks should still be 
taken by national government officials. " According to Slaughter, this would ensure "bottom 
up" global governance209; whether government officials are truly representative of the 
grassroots is highly questionable, however. Held and Archibugi recommend the 
involvement of a greater diversity of actors and types of association (as shown in 3.5.1 
and 3.5.2. ) Under cosmopolitan democracy, regional and global fora would complement 
those at local and national levels. 210 Held outlines the need for a multilayered approach as 
follows: 
Today, if people are to be free and equal in the determination of the conditions that 
shape their lives, there must be an array of fora, from the city to global 
associations, in which they can hold decision-makers to account. If many 
contemporary forms of power are to become accountable and if many of the 
complex issues that affect us all-locally, nationally, regionally and globally-are 
to be democratically regulated, people will have to have access to, and 
membership in, diverse political communities? " 
208 Held, Global Covenant, 100 and 107-108. van den Anker criticises Held for failing to articulate the 
mechanisms by which democracy at the local level would be ensured: 'The model of cosmopolitan democracy 
includes local participation in its aims but does this at the level of specification of the principles of levels of 
governing instead of taking it into account in the model for global democracy. " He cites alternative models 
such as deliberative democracy and the civil society networking approach as promising in this regard. (van den Anker, op cit, 282-284. ) zog Slaughter, op cit, 15-16 and 256-257. 210 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 176-179; Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan 
Democracy, " 199 and 209. 21 Held, Global Covenant, 115. As stated earlier, Held acknowledges that the particular layer of governance 
most appropriate for a given issue will not be obvious or natural. Several commentators reflect on this. James Bohman labels the potential conflicts between different democratic units the "demoi problem" and raises the 
question of how the general framework for cosmopolitan democracy will be decided upon democratically. (Bohman, "From Demos to Demoi, " 298 and 303-304. ) In similar fashion, Lupel describes the cosmopolitan democratic order as "complex and burdensome. " Lupel, op cit, 119. ) Marchetti sees world federalism as the 
answer to the problems of this "fuzzy net of global governance, " which would provide through increased 
political participation a central authority to "determine the allocation of competencies and responsibilities in 
any specified issue area. " (Marchetti, op cit. 296-297. ) Urbinati reaches an opposite conclusion. Identifying a 
"spaceless democracy" as carrying an "anti-democratic risk, " she objects to decision-making procedures that 
are "actually the province of states" being assigned to the global level. (Urbinati, op cit, 67 and 68. ) 
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As on the location of governance, so do Samhat, Rischard, Slaughter and Held and 
Archibugi differ in their views on universalism versus pluralism. Rischard endorses 
universal values for his inherently global model, albeit of a particular kind: "The network 
must make a constant appeal to universal values, not just in the broad sense in which the 
philosopher Kant meant it but in terms of the more specific values that are a prerequisite 
to the solution of the global issue at hand. n212 Where Rischard appeals to universal values, 
Slaughter endorses pluralism, under the constitutional norms of 'legitimate difference' and 
'checks and balances'. Legitimate difference would restrain government networks from 
attempting to cover over differences in fundamental values. Instead, they would draw up 
compilations of best practices, for regulators to adapt to local circumstances. Similarly, 
checks and balances-between the different disaggregated units horizontally and 
vertically-would enshrine "an affirmative norm of friction and constructive ambiguity. i2'3 
These pluralistic norms would contrast directly with the third principle of cosmopolitanism, 
which states that rules and principles must be universally and impartially shared; those 
that cannot be must be rejected. Held gives broad examples of what such rules might 
comprise, in terms of avoiding harm and meeting urgent needs. He acknowledges, 
however, that how these should be interpreted could not be specified "once and for all, " 
but would depend on temporally determined cultures and traditions. 214 Samhat takes a 
balanced approach, seeing regimes as a means to resolve tension between universalism 
(or solidarism215) and pluralism within the international system, on an issue by issue basis. 
Within regimes, progress is generally incremental in this regard, as norms and principles 
stemming from initially different perspectives are scrutinised and revised. 16 As reiterated 
above, bioethics is one area in which the dichotomy between universalism and pluralism 
is hotly contested. To what degree the UNESCO declarations bridge this divide is thus 
worthy of consideration. 
212 Rischard, op cit, 174. 213 Slaughter, op cit. 31-32,249-250,254 and 255. Whether ambiguity is in fact constructive can be 
questioned. It might lead to confusion and hence either overlaps or gaps in governance. it may be, however, 
that a debate over the relative authority of different sets of norms would constitute a check (if not a standstill). Slaughter hints at this pay-off, opining that relations among members of government networks should reflect "a system of shared and separated powers designed more for liberty than efficiency. " (Ibid, 254. ) 21 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 169 and 170-171. 215 Samhat uses the term 'solidarism', defined as consensus on the moral standards states must uphold. (Samhat, "International Regimes and the Prospects for Democracy, " 187. ) 18 [bid, 188. 
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3.5.5 Time and speed 
As Chapter 2 elucidated, the UNESCO declarations and the GGI plans have transpired 
partly because their parent bodies identified an urgent need for governance at a global 
level in the fast-developing arenas of genetics and bioethics. Any potential improvements 
to these governance mechanisms, actual or proposed, must be balanced with the time it 
would take to introduce them. Samhat, Rischard, Slaughter and Held and Archibugi differ 
in how long they see it taking their choice of governance system to become effective. For 
Rischard, time is of the essence. He rejects the traditional tools of global problem-solving 
on the grounds that international agreements such as treaties and conventions are 
negotiated through "ritualistic methods" and at a "glacial pace. " He believes GINs would 
foster "political energy and urgency" and thus pressure existing mechanisms of global 
governance into faster action? " This emphasis on rapidity does not take into account that 
some of the advantages of international cooperation take time to be realised. 
Intergovernmental regimes, for example, confer a degree of stability in international 
relations by allowing reciprocal expectations and mutual information networks to develop. 
Liberal regime theorists hold that states will enter into multilateral agreements on the 
understanding that it will be to their long-term advantage. 218 The longer parties remain in a 
regime, the more interconnected they become and the harder it is to withdraw. "Even 
though it might formally seem as if treaty regimes have no real power over member 
states, " writes Goodin, "the informal reality is that they typically provide an awful lot of 
leverage. "219 
Rischard's networks would maximise speed by employing norms and reputational effects, 
which could operate in a "faster space" than more traditional treaties and conventions. 
Rischard allows one year to set up a network, followed by two to three years for norm 
production and ten years or more for implementation. 20 It should be noted, however, that 
217 Rischard, op cit, 157 and 181. 218 Smouts, "Some Thoughts on International Organizations and Theories of Regulation, " 445 and 447. 219 Goodin, op cit, 82. 220 Rischard, op cit, 170,172,173 and 177. 
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his suggestions were first published in 2001221; although the GINs may act quickly once 
established, reaching this stage appears to be a relatively slow process, as seven of the 
twenty years allocated for the solving of global problems have already passed. 
Furthermore, paying heed to the tens of thousands of predicted participants in the 
'electronic town meetings' would surely demand an extraordinary amount of time and 
resources. 
As shown in 3.5.1, Slaughter views government networks as potentially flexible and fast 
instruments of global governance. 222 She recognises, however, that network effects take 
time to develop. She believes discussion and argument are the key to creative, legitimate 
and high quality solutions to complex problems and that if the positive nature of conflict 
could be harnessed in this way the result would be long-term, trusting relationships. 223 
Whether UNESCO and the GGI have been party to such discussions will be examined in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Slaughter also acknowledges that it would take time for the zeitgeist to 
change such that government officials would learn to honour both their national and global 
constituencies. 224 
Both Nadia Urbinati and Molly Cochran describe the cosmopolitan democracy project as a 
"top-down" strategy225; Slaughter refers to those with a top-down view of global 
governance as "global dreamers. "226 The project is indeed considered somewhat utopian 
by certain theorists, including Samhat. Noting that "the long run is a long time, " he sees 
representation through civil society within international regimes as "vital to the realization 
of global democracy in the present. " Thus regimes are a "practical or pragmatic means" by 
221 See note 38. 222 Slaughter, op cit, 11,161 and 264. 223 Ibid. 27 and 214. This view is criticised by Perju, who describes Slaughter's plans for high quality dialogue 
as "romanticized. ' In reality, he avers, power relations do not get "filtered out. " He also objects to the dialogue 
and discussion approach on the grounds that it can represent a subtle means for strong states to dominate 
weak ones: "The current global conversation is far less global than we should expect it to be. " (Perju, op cit, 
475 and 480. ) 
224 Slaughter, op cit, 270. 225 Urbinati, op cit. 74-75; Cochran, "A Democratic Critique of Cosmopolitan Democracy, " 543. 226 Slaughter, op cit, 256-257. 
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which cosmopolitan democracy may be realised. 27 Held and Archibugi recognise that the 
project is not immediately implementable as a fait accompli. It would likely be achieved 
through many "little steps forward, " writes Archibugi, rather than a one-off, momentous 
shift, with campaigns pursuing limited objectives eventually leading to the desired world 
order. 128 
Where Slaughter, Held and Archibugi accept, then, that their visions for global governance 
would take time to be enacted, Rischard views this as time the world does not have. 
Perhaps his GINs, like Samhat's regimes as public spheres, could be an interim stage on 
the path to effective global governance, going some way towards mitigating urgent global 
needs. Indeed, Held writes of Rischard's networks, "it is helpful to think of GINs as a 
useful short-term mechanism in the creation and extension of an enlightened 
multilateralism, but as an insufficient mechanism alone to reshape global governance. "229 
Slaughter's government networks might also find a place in a fully realised cosmopolitan 
democracy, as Held includes "global networks" within his vision of political order, 
alongside cities, nations and regions. 230 
3.6 APPLICATION TO UNESCO AND THE GGI 
The previous sections have presented a broad theoretical framework-four approaches 
across five themes-for thinking about global governance. In Chapters 5 to 7 the analysis 
turns to the governance of genetics and bioethics and, more precisely, the actual and 
potential efficacy or otherwise of the UNESCO declarations and the proposed GGI, 
particularly in developing countries. This analysis will be anchored in the questions laid 
out here, which ask how far the two mechanisms correlate with explanatory approaches to 
227 Samhat, "International Regimes as a Pragmatic Institutional Form, " 2,3 and 31 and "International Regimes 
and the Prospects for Global Democracy, " 186. 228 Held, Global Covenant, 107; Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 465-466. 229 Held, Global Covenant, 107. 230 Ibid, 113. 
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global governance and normative suggestions for its improvement, in terms of decision- 
making and implementation. 
The UNESCO declarations, as a set of principles and norms on genetics and bioethics 
decided upon according to certain rules and procedures, constitute an international 
regime. It can therefore be asked, to what extent do they reflect or shape the power, 
interests and values of states and other stakeholders? Like many international 
agreements, the declarations are housed in an IGO. Held has identified two crises of 
legitimacy currently faced by these organisations: unequal power between developed and 
developing countries and long chains of delegation from international to national levels. 
Chapter 5 will explore whether his assessment can be applied to UNESCO in the context 
of the genetics and bioethics declarations, in terms of how far power differentials were 
mitigated by procedural norms on the right to speak, for example, if negotiation sessions 
bore out UNDP's findings about disparities in delegation size, expertise and 
preparedness. It will also consider whether TJCB's efforts to date to establish the GGI 
augur well for its planned leadership from the South. 
On chains of delegation, Chapter 5 will investigate whether these exist, in perception or 
fact, between UNESCO, member states and other stakeholders in genetics and bioethics. 
Has UNESCO fulfilled the democratic potential of IGOs by including civil society actors, as 
Samhat might expect? Has it been able to engage with the appropriate national bodies? 
Have government appointed officials adequately represented their constituents, thus 
garnering the legitimacy Slaughter believes them to carry? Or have geneticists, ethicists 
and relevant interest groups in Kenya and South Africa had little opportunity to contribute 
to the negotiating positions taken by their countries at international level? Since public 
engagement is endorsed in both the UNESCO declarations and the GGI proposals, the 
chapter will also trace the degree to which consultation takes place in Kenya and South 
Africa between government departments, experts and the general public on domestic 
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policy on genetics and bioethics. It will end by considering the implications of these 
various findings for the proposed membership of the GGI. 
Chapter 6 will examine the content and implementation of the UNESCO declarations. To 
begin, it will ask how far the declarations are characterised by the ambiguity and 
compromise common to many regimes. Did their non-binding nature render them 
relatively quick to negotiate and amenable to future adaptation? Are they weaker than 
binding instruments, as per conventional regime interpretations, or do they enable states 
to strive for higher standards, as Victor et al might predict? Concerning implementation, 
the chapter will first analyse UNESCO's efforts to realise the declarations' norms. On the 
management side, how effective is the Bioethics Programme in encouraging states to take 
up the declarations? Are its capacity building activities hampered by constrained finances, 
in line with Young's observations? On the enforcement side, the reporting mechanisms 
attached to the declarations, where active, will be appraised as a system of 
implementation review (SIR), in terms of the responses they have incurred from member 
states. Turning then to the national level, the chapter will probe whether the declarations 
have made an impact on states' laws, regulations or policies, to the extent that this can be 
measured. It will explore in depth how far the declarations' norms have been adopted, 
directly or indirectly, into the bioethics systems of Kenya and South Africa, in what ways 
they have been tailored to local contexts and in which areas their implementation may 
depend on further support. It will also consider whether the GGI, if established, would 
duplicate or supplement the declarations' norms and associated activities. 
Where the empirical data highlight that the governance of genetics and bioethics might be 
improved, Chapter 7 will discuss whether this could be achieved by changing elements of 
the regime that is the UNESCO declarations or whether a new form of governance, such 
as the proposed GGI, is also needed. In terms of power differentials, might measures 
similar to those recommended by Chasek and Rajamani for increasing the participation of 
developing countries in international negotiations be applied to UNESCO? If so, this could 
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have positive implications for the GG I, should it rely on UNESCO to facilitate the 
involvement of poorer states, as proposed by Rischard on the grounds that IGOs can 
ensure fair representation. On the question of representation and accountability, would 
any of the suggestions put forward by Samhat and Ellis, Rischard, Slaughter or Held and 
Archibugi be practicable in genetics and bioethics governance, for either UNESCO or the 
GGI? If greater input from experts could enhance the quality and legitimacy of decision- 
making, for example, from which sectors and by what criteria should they be selected? If 
all those interested in or potentially affected by genetic and biomedical research must be 
given the opportunity to participate, should this be through government representatives, 
civil society organisations, internet polling or multilayered public fora? 
Not only an organisation's membership but also the nature and number of its rules and 
procedures will affect the type and content of any norms it elaborates. The approaches to 
governance of the writers named above each include means by which interest-based 
bargaining could be avoided. Rischard and Held promote an ethos of impartiality, whilst 
Slaughter, Samhat and Ellis emphasise the value of discussion and deliberation. Would 
such measures and activities help the GGI simultaneously maintain its rubrics of 
informality and southern leadership? Where agreement except on the lowest common 
denominator proves impossible, Slaughter endorses the principle of 'legitimate difference'. 
The need for a universal approach to genetics and bioethics, albeit applied as appropriate 
in different cultural settings, is the raison d'etre of the three UNESCO declarations and a 
key justification for the GGI proposals. Thus whether this is the right approach will be 
crucial to the efficacy of either mechanism as a governance tool. 
The question of what would be the most effective means of securing the implementation 
of the UNESCO declarations revolves around the issue of state sovereignty. If this is to 
remain sacrosanct, how might any states which have not yet adopted the declarations be 
persuaded or encouraged to do so? In the context of issue-based global networks, 
Rischard endorses the use of reputational effects to shame renegade actors into 
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complying with issue-specific norms. Whether the UNESCO declarations yet garner 
sufficient leverage that such tactics could be employed will thus be explored. Spun more 
positively, it might be that a Slaughter-like network (such as the GGI if it is indeed to be 
underpinned by governments) could foster inter-state peer pressure, the declarations' 
norms becoming gradually socialised through ongoing discussions among officials. At 
another level of abstraction, what would happen if states were to relinquish a part or the 
whole of their sovereignty? This would see UNESCO as the hub of a vertical network in a 
disaggregated world order or as an institution empowered to enforce human rights under 
cosmopolitan democracy. Chapter 7 will consider what evidence the powers, interests and 
values of the member states of UNESCO provide as to whether either scenario could be 
credited as in any way likely. 
At a more practical level, it could be that the governance of genetic and biomedical 
research would be more effective if the international system was less ad hoc in nature. 
UNESCO and the proposed GGI are just two initiatives among several in the genetics and 
bioethics field. As government networks and cosmopolitan democracy would, according to 
Slaughter and Held, form a lattice or array of fora, could these provide viable systems for 
coordinated governance? How feasible are Rischard's and Slaughter's similar 
suggestions for the facilitative role that IGOs might play in GINs and horizontal 
government networks respectively, in the context of the relationship between UNESCO 
and the GGI? More broadly, it is pertinent to ask whether genetics and bioethics are best 
dealt with as single issues or as part of a more holistic approach to governance. Samhat 
and Ellis' civil society infused regimes, Slaughter's disaggregated networks and 
Rischard's GINs would each focus on a particular problem. Such mechanisms could prove 
poorly equipped to deal with genetics and bioethics, which are interwoven with other 
global issues such as inequalities of health and human rights. Cosmopolitan democracy, 
with its wide-ranging vision, might present a better alternative, able to address these 
issues in an integrated manner. 
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3.7 MOVING FORWARD 
This chapter has focused on theories of international relations. It has introduced particular 
explanatory and normative approaches to global governance and drawn out some of their 
possible strengths and weaknesses, forming a theoretical framework for the remainder of 
the thesis. The next chapter, as the complement to this one, outlines the methodology by 
which the research question was investigated empirically. 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
Stephen Hopgood, an international relations scholar, laments the lack of empiricism within 
his chosen field. That the discipline is mainly concerned with theory has, Hopgood claims, 
"deterred scholars from doing the primary empirical work about the institutions of world 
politics that would enable us to understand more of what is actually going on at the 
international level. "' The institutions he has in mind include both state and non-state 
actors-government elites, international organisations and NGOs-as well as less defined 
phenomena such as shared norms and beliefs. He concludes that paying more attention 
to the practice of international politics would carry certain methodological implications: 
It may involve more openness to anthropological methods such as participant 
observation, archive work, interviews and questionnaires. This raises further 
questions about access, ethics, the volume of material, multi-sitedness (in 
transnational organisations), cultural and linguistic challenges. 2 
These few sentences encompass the processes by which this thesis has been 
researched. Methods included observation (albeit direct rather than participative), 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviewing. In employing these, issues of 
access, ethics, transnational fields and cultural differences all had to be overcome. How 
this was achieved forms the substance of this chapter. 
4.1 CASE STUDIES 
The UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics and the proposed Global Genomics 
Initiative form two cases for the study of global governance, with a focus on their impact in 
Kenya and South Africa. This section outlines how and why they were selected. 
1 Hopgood, "Socialising IR, " 1. 2 Ibid, 2 and 7. 
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4.1.1 What is a case study? 
John Langrish defines a case study as "a research method, a way of finding out more 
about some aspect of reality through a very detailed analysis. "3 Similarly, Robert Stake 
emphasises that case studies generate particular knowledge, but that they can also help 
increase understanding of a certain problem, issue or concept. 4 The "aspect of reality" of 
Langrish's definition comprises the research focus; a case study is a device to enable 
discussion of this focus, with results expressed in function of it. Thus case studies are 
examples of recognised phenomena, in this case mechanisms for global governance. ' 
Robert Yin, in his seminal work on the case study method, describes three instances in 
which case studies might be a preferred means of research: "How? " or 'Why? " questions 
are being investigated; the researcher has little control over events; and the focus is 
contemporary and 'real-life .6 These conditions are mirrored by Alan Thomas: "In choosing 
a case study the researcher cannot control the conditions precisely but can still try to find 
a case which will provide evidence for or against a particular theoretical idea. "' For this 
research project, therefore, it was appropriate to choose a case study approach, because 
"How? " and 'Why? " questions were being asked (in terms of why the UNESCO 
declarations and the proposed GG! might or might not be adequate mechanisms for the 
governance of genetics and bioethics and how this situation might, if necessary, be 
improved), the formulation of the UNESCO declarations or the GGI could not be controlled 
and the focus was contemporary, both theoretically and in 'real-life'. 
4 Langrish, "Case Studies as a Biological Research Process, " 357. 
Yanacopulos, "Researching Transnational Advocacy Networks, " 44, citing Stake, The Art of Case Study 
Research. 
Langrish, op cit, 360 and 362. Yin, Case Study Research, 1. 
Thomas, "Challenging Cases, " 308. 
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4.1.2 Case study selection 
As stated above, case studies are examples. In order to select appropriate cases for 
research, the question "Examples of what? " has to be addressed. A first stage in the 
process of answering this question is to review the relevant literature! Citing Yin (1994 
edition), Thomas asserts that case studies must be theory-led: "Ideas have to be worked 
out before you can decide which cases to study. " Evidence, once analysed, will then 
validate these ideas or challenge them, perhaps initiating a reconceptualisation of theory. 9 
The units of analysis in a case study may be clearly designated, such as individual 
persons or members-only groups, or more esoteric, in the form of events, processes or 
networks, for example. In either scenario, their definition is tentative and hence may be 
revisited during data collection as new discoveries are made, as was the case in this 
research project. 1° The units of analysis-governance mechanisms in genetics and 
bioethics and, within these, particular states-were defined and analysed with reference 
to a tentative theoretical framework and in function of the overarching research question. 
When new information came to light concerning the GGI and Slaughter's work on 
networks, the framework changed and thus so did the conceptualisation of the cases, as 
outlined below. Kathleen Eisenhardt's definition of theoretical sampling would seem to be 
a natural fit for this approach to case selection: "The cases may be chosen to replicate 
previous cases or extend emergent theory, or they may be chosen to fill theoretical 
categories and provide examples of polar types"" (italics added). More usually, however, 
'theoretical sampling' is a term used in particular reference to grounded theory (see 
4.3.1.1) and thus is not generally applicable to theory-led research. 12 
e Langrish, op cit, 360,362-363. a Thomas, op cit, 313,324 and 327. 10 Yin, op cit, 23-24 and 55. " Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research, " 537. Note, however, that Yin strenuously 
asserts that case studies are in no way samples. (Yin, op cit, 32. ) 12 Harding, "Grounded Theory, " 132; Hammersley, "Theoretical Sampling, " 298-299. 
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Yin states that every case should have a specific purpose within an investigation. 13 
Similarly, Stake holds that if more than one case is used, each must be instrumental in 
addressing the particular issue or problem identified in the research questions, thus 
forming a "collective case study. s14 Langrish's 'taxonomic' case study selection, under 
which cases are "examples of different parts of a taxonomy, i. e. the subgroups of the 
class being investigated, " is perhaps most closely aligned with the selection process 
employed in this project, particularly as the taxonomy can develop after research has 
started. 15 Yin's "embedded case studies" are also relevant, which comprise more than one 
unit of analysis, or sub-units. 16 
Within this project, each case was chosen with a view to demonstrating particular aspects 
of the research focus (or "'the class being investigated"), global governance. The higher 
order units of analysis were governance mechanisms for genetics and bioethics, the 
UNESCO declarations and the proposed GGI, while Kenya and South Africa were sub- 
units. The initial research plan was to examine the 1997 and 2003 declarations only, the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights and the International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data, thus concentrating on human genetics. When it was 
discovered at the beginning of doctoral study that a declaration on bioethics was under 
negotiation, however, the remit was broadened, to take advantage of the opportunity to 
study an international instrument as it evolved. Furthermore, in the initial proposal the 
UNESCO declarations were the whole raison d'etre of the research, with case studies to 
be done at country level. It was only when it was decided to investigate the GGI as well 
(which came to light through background research) that this changed. The focus 
expanded into global governance systems, the declarations and the GGI became the 
cases and the country studies turned into sub-units. At country level, also, the taxonomy 
developed as the project progressed; a final decision was made on South Africa as a 
fieldwork destination only after data collection in Kenya had been completed. 
13 Yin, op cit, 47. " Schwandt, Qualitative inquiry, 26, citing and quoting Stake, op cit, 3-6. 1e Langrish, op cit, 362. 
Yin, op cit, 42. 
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4.1.3 Rationale for the UNESCO declarations and the GGI 
The UNESCO declarations and the proposed GGI were chosen as case studies because 
of their potential to illustrate and inform different approaches to global governance, both 
descriptive and normative. UNESCO and TJCB, in its plans for the GGI, have similar aims 
in terms of knowledge sharing, capacity building and the promotion of universal ethical 
norms for genetic research, as shown in 2.3. The systems of governance by which each 
hopes to achieve these aims differ in important aspects, however, such as their place or 
otherwise within the UN system. UNESCO is an intergovernmental organisation and 
hence is of direct relevance to regime theory; the proposed GGI is explicitly modelled on 
contemporary international relations theory around networked governance. The two 
mechanisms may also have implications for cosmopolitan democracy, as they touch on 
human rights, inequalities of health (and how these might be addressed through a broad 
security agenda based on rational self-interest) and multilayered governance. The GGI, 
especially, helped to shape an evolving review of global governance, as it brought to light 
the particular approaches to networks espoused by Rischard and Slaughter. Thus case 
and theory selection were iterative processes, as described above. 
4.1.4 Rationale for Kenya and South Africa 
Given that the international relations discipline was providing the theoretical framework, it 
was decided that fieldwork should be undertaken in more than one country. Rather than 
facilitating a strict comparison between states, this has enabled relationships between 
international and national levels of governance to be examined in different contexts. 3.3.1 
highlighted that regime theorists have consistently called for more studies on the impact of 
regimes at national level. With regard to the UNESCO declarations, whether and how they 
are actually applied by states has so far been under-researched. Of the several 
publications on the declarations (many of which are cited in this thesis), the few that 
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consider implementation focus on UNESCO's capacity building programmes rather than 
the efforts of individual countries. The Kenyan and South African case study sub-units 
help to address this analytical oversight. 
Within the boundaries of theory-led decision-making, pragmatism came into play in the 
selection of Kenya and South Africa as fieldwork destinations. (Several writers on case 
study methodology, including Yin, Langrish and Thomas, highlight that certain cases may 
be opted for, at least in part, for practical or pragmatic reasons") Reflecting personal 
interests, knowledge and linguistic limitations, Africa proved the continent of choice. A 
matrix of potential countries18 and contacts was drawn up, using information gleaned from 
the internet, the human genetics literature and the department of Development Policy and 
Practice at the Open University. From these Kenya and South Africa were singled out, 
because they each engage in a significant amount of human genetic research and provide 
a base for relevant regional and international organisations. Furthermore, contact with key 
actors within them had previously been established. 
A notable contact in Kenya was the National Commission for UNESCO, established 
through a conversation at a meeting in Paris in January 2005. Not only would the 
Commission prove invaluable in facilitating important interviews, it was also able to offer 
practical assistance in terms of transportation and communications in the field. Kenya 
provided a broad cross-section of potential participants, comprising policy-makers, 
academics and civil society representatives operating at local, national, regional and 
international levels. It has a plethora of institutions dealing with genetics and bioethics 
policy, ranging from UNESCO and the World Health Organization, to government 
departments such as the National Council for Science and Technology and the Ministry of 
Health, to university ethics committees and community advisory boards. As outlined in 
2.4, substantial levels of genetic research are being conducted in Kenya, with scientists 
working within international collaborations to investigate the genetic basis for variable 
17 lbid, 78; Langrish, op cit, 362; Thomas, op cit, 321. 1e The other countries were Egypt, Malawi, Nigeria and The Gambia. 
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human susceptibility to diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. Also, regional 
organisations such as the African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum, African Technology 
Policy Studies and the Africa Centre for Technology Studies have headquarters there. 
These last two organisations try to enhance capacity for policy-making in science and 
technology. 
A practical reason for choosing South Africa as a fieldwork destination was that there are 
strong links between the Open University and the Africa Genome Education Institute, 
which became the host institution. The very fact that such an organisation exists in South 
Africa is indicative of the level of genetics activity being carried out there. The country also 
boasts an active bioethics scene (again, see 2.4). South Africa, then, like Kenya, could 
offer a diverse array of potential participants. A further reason for its selection was that it 
differs from Kenya in certain dimensions. Firstly, whilst Kenya has held a seat on the 
Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee of UNESCO since 1999, the year the committee 
first met, South Africa was a member only in the inaugural year (1998-1999). Thus South 
Africa's experience of the negotiation process for the 2003 and 2005 declarations and Its 
relationship with the UNESCO Bioethics Programme will have been different from those of 
Kenya. Secondly, despite comprehensive effort, it was not possible to locate any 
corporate activity in human genetics in Kenya. Given that the GGI, if established, would 
be led from the South and include experts from the private sector among its membership, 
this was a disappointing outcome (one that perhaps mirrored TJCB's own failed efforts to 
recruit private sector actors to its 2002 genomics policy course in Nairobi1°). South Africa 
houses a number of businesses involved in genetics and, through the National 
Biotechnology Strategy, promotes innovation and commercialisation in this field. This 
added dimension to the cross-section of potential participants was a key factor in 
choosing South Africa. 
19 Smith, A et al, "'Harnessing Genomics to Improve Health in Africa' - An Executive Course to Support Genomics Policy. " 
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4.2 FIELDWORK AND METHODS 
The previous section outlined why a case study methodology was employed and how 
Kenya and South Africa were chosen as sub-units. This section describes how data were 
collected in the field. Observations, documents and interviews-three forms of evidence 
common to many case studies-have been accrued from a broad range of sources 20 Its 
breadth derives not only from the several methods of enquiry, but also from diversity 
within these, as advised by Thomas; documents of different types were obtained from a 
variety of organisations and interviewees represented a cross-section of society. 21 Using 
multiple sources of evidence can reveal a swathe of different historical, attitudinal and 
behavioural themes and help to establish validity and reliability when these converge 
towards the same findings. When reviewing interview data alongside a strategy 
document, for example, a researcher can test "'stated interests' and the 'agreed history', " 
or opinion against purported fact. 23 This technique is termed 'triangulation' and is 
demonstrated in the data analysis of Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.2.1 Observations 
Observer status was granted by UNESCO at a week of meetings in January 2005 of the 
Intergovernmental and International Bioethics Committees (IGBC and (BC), held In Paris 
and devoted mainly to discussions of the draft Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (UDBHR). This entailed only peripheral involvement in the proceedings and 
then only during unofficial moments such as coffee breaks 24 Direct observation as a 
20 Eisenhardt, op cit, 534 and 537; Yin, op cit, 8. 21 Thomas, op cit, 330. 22 Yin, op cit, 98. 
Yanacopulos, op cit, 48. Where participants give different accounts of the same event or phenomenon, 
comparison with official records may help piece the story together. It must not be assumed, however, that 
executive documents are unbiased or value free. They were written for a purpose and audience different to 
that of a case study and its investigators and do not represent unmitigated truth. (Yin, op cit, 87 and 159. ) 24 This is in line with what Thomas Schwandt describes as the "traditional concept" of observation as a 
research method, whereby the "participant as observer... is peripherally involved or only marginally 
participates in the scene he or she studies. " (Schwandt, op cit, 107. ) 
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research method is characterised by attention to detail. 25 In an attempt to capture as much 
information as possible, who said what was meticulously noted, as were overall 
impressions of the negotiation process. Unfortunately, the meetings of intergovernmental 
experts in April and June 2005 charged with finalising the declaration were closed 
sessions, so for data on these it was necessary to rely on official reports and firsthand 
accounts from interviewees. 
The opportunity to observe the January negotiations constituted preliminary fieldwork. 
Seeing how UNESCO worked `in the flesh', within both the official sessions and the 
breaks between them, gave a rich sense of the germane issues and enabled comparisons 
of theories about IGOs with practice. As Thomas Schwandt writes, "Direct firsthand eye- 
witness accounts of everyday social action have always been regarded as essential to 
answering the classic fieldwork question `what is going on here? "" Observations were 
augmented through informal conversations with members of both the IGBC and the IBC, 
as well as those representing other UN bodies or NGOs or attending in a personal 
capacity. It was partly through a preliminary interview with a delegate during a coffee 
break that Kenya became a clear choice as a fieldwork destination. Thus observation as a 
research method proved fruitful beyond data collection per se. 
4.2.2 Documents 
Yin lists several advantages to using documents in research. Firstly, they are stable and 
can be referred to repeatedly; secondly, they can be used to verify names and details of 
events; and finally, they can provide broad coverage in terms of time and place. "For case 
studies, " writes Yin, "the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources. "27 In this project, UNESCO reports, rules of procedure and 
25 Ibid, 106. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Yin, op cit, 86-87. 
110 
delegate registers have complemented observational and interview data concerning 
international negotiations. Documents from other sources, such as the Guidelines for 
Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research involving Human Subjects in Kenya and the 
South African Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Structures and Processes (both 
2004), as well as information from websites and academic publications, have also been 
used to substantiate interview material. Moreover, at a practical level, websites and 
publications proved indispensable in identifying potential participants and drawing up 
interview schedules (see 4.2.3). 
Several different types of document were collected from a wide range of sources, before, 
during and after interviews. These included NGO newsletters, brochures from government 
departments and national laws, as well as those highlighted above. As far as was possible 
documents were gathered systematically, which Yin stresses is important if selective bias 
is to be avoided. 28 UNESCO reports and papers were collated through a comprehensive 
trawl of the Bioethics Programme website; relevant Acts of Parliament for Kenya and 
South Africa were similarly obtained. 2' For each potential participant or their organisation, 
thorough internet searches were carried out, often throwing up reports and publications in 
addition to the web-based information itself. Other documents were only brought to light 
during interviews, another example of the integration between the three research 
methods. 
4.2.3 Interviews 
Interviews were carried out in France, the United Kingdom, Kenya and South Africa, 
between August 2005 and May 2006.30 All the European interviews were with people 
connected with UNESCO in some way, one being a senior member of the Bioethics 
28 Ibid. 
29 From www. unesco. org/bioethics, www. kenyalaw. org and www. info. gov. za/documents respectively. 30 With the addition of one telephone interview with a South African participant in July 2006. 
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Programme and the others delegates to the April and June 2005 intergovernmental 
meetings. The bulk of fieldwork was conducted in Kenya in Autumn 2005 and South Africa 
in Spring 2006, each trip lasting six weeks 31 In Kenya, all the interviews apart from six 
took place in Nairobi, the remainder at a research institute in Kilifi. In South Africa, 
potential participants were more diversely situated, entailing stays in Cape Town, Durban, 
Johannesburg and Pretoria and day trips to Stellenbosch and Pietermaritzburg. 
4.2.3.1 Ethical review 
The research project has been approved by the Open University Human Participants and 
Materials Ethics Committee, 32 the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology In 
Kenya33 and the Ethics Committee of the Human Sciences Research Council of South 
Africa34 and registered in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. The Information 
requested by each body differed in detail, but in essentials was very similar. In short, it 
was necessary to show that participants would be fully informed about the nature and 
purpose of the research and, having given their consent freely, would be entitled to 
withdraw it at any time; that data would be anonymised (unless a participant chose 
otherwise) and stored securely; and that research findings would be fed back on 
completion of the project. Gaining ethical approval from Kenya and South Africa followed 
the guidance of the Wellcome Trust, the project funders, under its policy document 
Research Involving People Living in Developing Countries: Position Statement and 
Guidance Notes for Applicants. 35 
31 28 September to 9 November 2005 and 21 March to 2 May 2006 respectively. 32 Ethical approval references HPMEC/06/#188/1, HPMEC/06/#170/1 and HPMEC/06/#236/1. 33 Research permit number WEST 13/001/35C 502/2. 34 HSRC Research Ethics Committee Protocol REC 3/08/03/06. 
35 The position statement can be viewed at www. welicome. ac. uk/doq. _wtdOl 
5295. html#Pl 5217101 
(accessed 12 January 2006). 
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4.23 .2 Participant selection and recruitment 
As the research project is concerned with how actors from different levels and sectors 
(local to global and state and non-state) contribute to the governance of genetics and 
bioethics, it was important to recruit participants from international organisations, 
governments, civil society organisations, academia and the commercial sector. Potential 
interviewees were identified through various means: internet searches, literature reviews 
and snowball sampling (that is, recommendations from other participants) or a 
combination of all three. Snowball sampling happened both prior to travel and in the field. 
With each request for an interview, potential participants were asked whether they could 
recommend any other suitable contacts. Saturation was soon reached in this process, the 
same names recurring in each sector, which was a useful confirmation that the relevant 
experts in each country had been identified. Snowballing was particularly important in 
Kenya, where much planning had to be done in situ, owing to the limited availability of 
information and relatively low response rate to emails prior to travel. Several afternoons 
were spent making seemingly endless telephone calls to set up interviews. Unfortunately, 
despite persistence tempered with politeness, some potential participants were simply 
unavailable, a common and perhaps inevitable difficulty faced by qualitative researchers, 
which has to be taken into account when drawing conclusions 36 
In the context of research on networks, Helen Yanacopulos suggests that a researcher 
might begin by interviewing key people within important hubs or nodes 37 The host 
institution in Kenya, the National Commission for UNESCO, arranged several very helpful 
meetings at the beginning of the fieldwork period, with some of its advisors and 
representatives and an official at the National Council for Science and Technology. 
Similarly, by attending a conference organised by the Africa Genome Education Initiative 
at the start of the South African fieldwork, it was possible to meet face to face several 
potential participants who had previously been corresponded with by email. Thus some 
36 Thomas, op cit, 315. 37 Yanacopulos, op cit, 46. 
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introductions had been made before the interviews proper, which helped put people at 
their ease. 
4,2,3.3 Interview process 
In total 70 semi-structured interviews were conducted: 3 in Paris, 3 in the United Kingdom, 
30 in Kenya and 34 in South Africa (for a full list see Appendix 1138). Twelve of these would 
more properly be termed informal conversations, but nevertheless yielded useful 
information. Audio recording followed by transcription was the preferred method of data 
collection; where this was not possible notes were taken. Interviews lasted anything 
between twenty minutes and two and a half hours, depending on the time a participant 
had available and the information required. Question schedules were written with 
reference to background information and therefore tailored to each Individual participant, 
as recommended by Herbert and Irene Rubin 39 Nevertheless, each reflected common 
themes, with several questions appearing in most or all of the schedules. The semi- 
structured nature of the interviews meant that, despite the generic questions, participants 
could be allowed to explore interesting tangents as they arose. Eisenhardt describes this 
kind of systematic flexibility as "controlled opportunism. n40 Combinations of organisation- 
specific and open-ended questions were asked, an example of the former being, "What 
type of genetics does your company do? " and of the latter, 'What Is your opinion on 
community consent? " 41 Depending on the participant's profile, the nuance or emphasis of 
a question was adjusted; where a geneticist would have been asked about ethical 
practice, for example, a member of an ethics committee was asked about the processes 
by which ethical approvals are granted. 
38 The data from four interviews or informal conversations have not been used in the thesis and thus the 
details of these are not included in the appendix. 39 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative interviewing, 363. ao Eisenhardt, op cit, 539. 41 Langrish, op cit, 363. 
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The thematic areas for the interviews were drawn from the embryonic theoretical 
framework and were designed to elucidate people's perspectives on the following: the 
profile of the UNESCO declarations; the adequacy of representation at international 
negotiations; the translation of international level guidelines to the national level; the 
legitimacy of state and non-state based international organisations; overlapping 
institutional remits; networking between different organisations and sectors; the relevance 
of purportedly universal ethical guidelines to developing countries; inequalities of health; 
and genetics and development. The emphasis of the planned questions shifted slightly as 
it became clear that few participants were aware of the declarations or the proposed GGI 
(see Chapter 5). Questions thus centred on the utility of international bioethics guidelines 
in general, the processes by which they are drawn up and some of the ethical principles 
common to many of them, such as benefit sharing and community consent. The need for 
this adjustment is well illustrated by the following anecdote from an early Kenyan 
encounter. On hearing that the interview would be mainly about the UNESCO 
declarations, one member of a research institution engaged in human genetics joked, it 
may be quite brief. i42 
4.2.4 Considerations 
Yin writes that a case should have a specific beginning and end. 43 Whilst in this instance 
the limits of the cases have been broad in temporal terms (discussion of the first 
declaration began in 1993 and implementation of all three is ongoing) and were certainly 
not delineated from the beginning of the study (investigation of the proposed GGI 
developing as new publications emerged), timing has had a significant bearing on the 
research. The UDBHR (2005) was adopted only during the Kenyan fieldwork period but 
several months prior to that in South Africa, which affected how questions were worded in 
each country and perhaps also awareness of the declaration among participants. 
42 Interview with K_07. 43 Yin, op cit, 26. 
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Similarly, the journal article on the GGI that introduced Slaughter's work became available 
only a few days prior to departure for South Africa, thus a deeper understanding of her 
arguments was only possible once the majority of data had been collected. It is also worth 
noting that, through asking certain questions, information was disseminated by default. 
Several participants vowed to find out more about the declarations and the GGI and to link 
up with the relevant persons or organisations. Even if only a few actually did this, the 
findings of any future research in a similar area will have been affected. 
4.3 ANALYSIS AND THEORY BUILDING 
So far the chapter has described why a case study approach was chosen and how data 
on the selected cases were collected. The following section turns to data analysis and 
extrapolation. 
4.3.1 Case study analysis 
As highlighted in 4.1, since there are clear similarities between the aims of the UNESCO 
declarations and the proposed GGI, but fundamental differences In their structural 
philosophies, it made sense to study both rather than either in Isolation. At sub-unit level, 
it was hoped that conducting fieldwork In more than one country would strengthen any 
findings pertaining to the relationship between national and international level governance. 
These decisions mirror Thomas' advice to consider examining "logical alternatives. "' The 
analytical benefits of conducting a multiple-case study are likely to be substantial, 
according to Yin, as convergent conclusions will be more powerful than those arising from 
a single case, thus extending the external generalisability "immeasurably. "45 
44 Thomas, op cit, 319-320. 45 Yin, op cit, 53. 
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Employing a contrastive approach can increase credibility, because it "guards you against 
the common danger of merely collecting evidence in favour of your pet idea under the 
pretence that you are subjecting your hypothesis to severe testing. "" Comparing different 
theoretical possibilities may lead to useful insights, even if none are found to entirely 
account for the data, as the final explanation may incorporate elements of each. Cases 
selected because they differ in theoretically significant ways can provide distinctive 
answers to "How? " and "Why? " questions. " In this instance, the cases are not only 
explanatory but also exploratory. The approaches to global governance outlined in 
Chapter 3-international regimes, issue-based and government networks and 
cosmopolitan democracy-represent rival explanations of why effective governance of 
genetics and bioethics may not yet have been attained and possible models for how this 
might be achieved in future. 
4.3.1.1 Inductive and deductive reasoning 
In the contrastive approach outlined above, there is a continuous cycle between ideas and 
data. Data enable the testing of ideas or theories, but may also point in a different 
direction or to the need for further research 48 As stated in 4.1.2, Yin and Thomas believe 
case studies should be theory-led. Yin states, The case study inquiry... benefits from the 
prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. "49 An 
alternative approach is that of grounded theory, whereby existing theories are turned to 
only once data analysis has been completed, to determine which best matches the 
'grounded theory' generated. 5° The method used in this project falls somewhere in 
between, forming a deductive-inductive-deductive cycle. As shown in 4.1.3, the theoretical 
framework was preliminarily developed prior to data collection and was revised in line with 
discoveries as they arose. A theoretical framework does not equate to theoretical 
48 Mukherjee and Wuyts, 'Thinking with Quantitative Data, " 240. 47 Thomas, op cit, 319,323,324,331 and 332. `' Mukherjee and Wuyts, op cit, 243. 49 Yin, op cit, 14. so Harding, op cit, 132. 
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propositions, however. The framework provided the parameters for data collection and 
preliminary coding (see below), but within these the process was inductive: the aim was to 
see what the data revealed, rather than to search for evidence in support of particular 
propositions. This is a modification of Yin's model, in order to allow fluidity and avoid bias. 
Only once coding was completed, which in turn shaped the refining of the theoretical 
framework, was the extent to which the data fitted any of the four approaches to global 
governance examined. 
The method described above-the cycle between inductive and deductive reasoning- 
could perhaps be described as 'semi-structured'. Semi-structured interviews give some 
direction, but allow flexibility to explore tangents and thus prevent contextual depth or 
important issues or ideas that had not previously been considered being missed. This 
same approach was taken to the analysis as a whole: the theoretical framework gave 
some boundaries and context, to avoid unwieldiness, but did not equate to overly 
prescriptive predictions. In their work on case studies, Thomas and Eisenhardt 
recommend similar techniques. Thomas advocates developing theoretical Ideas in 
advance in order to know what to expect, but also being open to these expectations 
proving wrong or needing to be changed. 51 Eisenhardt writes: 
Preordained theoretical perspectives or propositions may bias and limit the 
findings. Thus, investigators should formulate a research problem and possibly 
specify some potentially important variables, with some reference to extant 
literature. However, they should avoid thinking about specific relationships 
between variables and theories as much as possible, especially at the outset of 
the process 52 
4.3.1.2 Coding 
Yin emphasises that no original evidence should be lost through carelessness or bias, but 
should receive proper attention and be examined exhaustively. Applying such prudence 
51 Thomas, op cit, 325 and 329. 52 Eisenhardt, op cit, 536. 
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guards against the temptation to report only data that support a particular theory. 53 With 
this in mind, all interviews were fully transcribed and systematically coded. Coding can be 
done either a priori, when codes are developed and data then sorted into them, or a 
posteriori, so that codes are derived from data and are thus context-sensitive., For this 
project both methods were used, the latter first. 
The software Nvivo7, produced by QSR International, was used to code the interview 
transcripts a posteriori. An order for analysis was drawn up, by sector and by country. 
Where some participants could be placed into two or more sectors (for example, a 
scientist who also acted as a government or IGO advisor), the sector which had the most 
bearing on why they had been selected was chosen. Codes can be descriptive, thematic, 
nominal or categorical. Where mostly descriptive codes are used theorising may prove 
problematic, thus Schwandt (drawing on Anselm Strauss) recommends coding for 
"conditions, interaction among actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences. »55 Given 
that this research project is mainly concerned with relationships between actors and 
organisations from different levels and sectors, the codes developed reflect this advice. 
Some of those used most frequently include "Linkages between sectors", "Overlap- 
between layers", "Local considerations", "Representation" and "Expertise". 
With the initial coding in mind, the theoretical framework was revisited and refined. A priorl 
coding was used when it came to writing up the empirical data in function of the 
framework. The transcripts were gone through a second time, in the same order as 
previously, but with a new set of codes already developed. Many of these codes were 
similar to those used before, such as "Negotiations - relations between states", "Delegate 
selection/expertise" and "Social responsibility". This second set of codes was also used to 
analyse the observational data from the IGBC and IBC meetings of January 2005. 
53 Yin, op cit, 51,105 and 137. 54 Schwandt, op cit, 16. 55 Ibid, 17. 
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4.3.2 Theory building 
As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, case studies are inextricably linked to 
theory. Langrish's question "Examples of what? " is analogous to the one James Rosenau 
deems essential for any budding theoretician, "Of what is it an instance? ": 
Of all the habits one must develop to think theoretically, perhaps none is more 
central than the inclination to ask this question at every opportunity. It must be a 
constant refrain, a melody that haunts every lurch forward in the process of moving 
from observations to conclusions. For to see every event as an instance of a more 
encompassing class of phenomena is to sustain the search for patterns and to 
avoid treating any phenomenon as inherently unique. To think theoretically is to be 
at home with abstractions, to generalize, to discern the underlying order that links 
otherwise discrete incidents, and such a mode of thinking cannot be achieved and 
maintained unless every observed phenomenon is approached as merely one 
instance of a recurring sequence. 56 
The answer to "Examples of what? ", according to Langrish, will determine what is looked 
for. 57 In this research project, relationships between levels and sectors that might shed 
light on the efficacy or otherwise of existing and potential systems for the governance of 
genetics and bioethics have been investigated, with a view to testing and building 
international relations theories around regimes, networks and cosmopolitan democracy. 
This involved searching for patterns and thus not treating any phenomenon as unique, so 
as to "discern the underlying order. "' The outcomes of such a process can run two ways. 
Firstly, theory may suggest ways in which policy might be improved and secondly, the 
cases may highlight previously unrecognised theoretical gaps or errors 59 These 
possibilities are explored in the remainder of the thesis. 
58 Rosenau, "Thinking Theory Thoroughly, " 28. 
57 Langrish, op cit, 362. 58 Rosenau, op cit, 28. 59 Thomas, op cit, 331. 
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4.4 FROM METHODS TO RESULTS 
Langrish asserts that bringing together all the analytical threads from multiple case studies 
takes "skill, imagination, lateral thinking and perseverance. i6° Their subsequent 
interpretation involves a certain amount of subjective judgement. 61 In the chapters that 
follow the data collected from observations, documents and interviews are presented and 
analysed, in function of the theoretical framework. It is hoped that the conclusions drawn, 
though subjective, will be judged valid. 
60 Langrish, op cit, 364. 61 Thomas, op cit, 331. 
121 
CHAPTER 5 REPRESENTATION, LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
This chapter explores issues of representation, legitimacy and accountability In the 
governance of genetic and biomedical research. It examines relationships between 
various actors during the drafting of the three UNESCO declarations and what this might 
mean for the proposed Global Genomics Initiative. The first section looks at the relative 
influence of developed and developing countries and state and non-state actors on the 
negotiation process at international level and how this might have affected the content of 
the declarations. Whether the structure of the proposed GGI might offer an Improved 
balance between these sets of actors is also considered. The second section then probes 
how delegates from Kenya and South Africa were selected to attend the UNESCO 
negotiations and to what extent they truly represented their constituents. It will be shown 
that whether the declarations are perceived as legitimate tools for the governance of 
genetics and bioethics depends as much on whether people believe they were elaborated 
in an open, accountable and expert manner as on their status as non-binding instruments 
of international law. The Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics has high hopes for the 
legitimacy of the proposed GGI, as follows: `The GGI could establish legitimacy on a 
global level. The key to this is strong leadership and inclusive membership. "' The chapter 
ends with an assessment of whether the network could indeed garner legitimacy on these 
grounds. 
5.1 INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
UNESCO is a traditional intergovernmental organisation in that it is comprised of member 
states. It is these states that make final decisions on the organisation's activities, Including 
the elaboration and adoption of international declarations. In this sense, then, the 
UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics form a state-centric regime. Non-state 
Dowdeswell et al, "Realising the Promise of Genomics " 140. 
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actors were involved in their drafting, however, notably UNESCO's International Bioethics 
Committee (IBC). The following sections explore relations between member states of 
UNESCO within the organisation's Bioethics Programme, particularly developed and 
developing countries, as well as the roles played by other actors, such as the IBC, 
UNESCO's sister UN agencies and NGOs. Whether the proposed GGI might present a 
more equitable model is also examined. 
5.1.1 Relations between states 
This section examines how far the observations of 3.5.2 with regard to the relative 
influence of rich and poor states on negotiation proceedings are borne out by UNESCO. 
Noelle Lenoir, first President of the IBC, said in 1996 that "to involve the developing 
countries in the debate [on bioethics] is itself an ethical Imperative. "2 To this end, 
substantial efforts have been made to ensure the inclusion of these countries In decision- 
making, in terms of committee membership and the declaration drafting process. 
Developing countries appear to have made significant contributions to all three 
declarations, the UDBHR (2005) most especially. 
5.1.1.1 The Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC) 
The UNESCO Bioethics Programme houses two committees, the Intergovernmental 
Bioethics Committee and the International Bioethics Committee, each of which has 36 
members. The IGBC's mandate, as agreed by the Executive Board in 1998, is to 
"examine the advice and recommendations of the IBC, including those concerned with the 
follow-up of the Universal Declaration [UDHGHR, 1997]' The Committee Is to inform the 
IBC and the Director-General of its opinions, which the Director-General may then submit 
2 Lenoir, "Bioethics and UNESCO, " 12-22. 
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to member states, the Executive Board and the General Conference. It may also suggest 
proposals for following up advice and recommendations from the IBC 3 More informally, at 
the Committee's second session in 2001, then chairperson Najib Ouariti suggested that 
"the IGBC must act as an essential relay between the IBC and all the Member States on 
the one hand and between the IBC and civil societies on the other. "' (Whether it Is doing 
the latter is open to question, as this chapter will show. ) The IGBC converges every two 
years, with meetings open to the public unless it decides otherwise. 5 States hold seats for 
four years, half the membership being elected at each biennial General Conference (for 
example, eighteen members are serving terms from 2005-2009 and eighteen from 2007- 
2011). 
The curtailed number of seats means that less than a fifth of states are directly 
represented on the IGBC. Kenya was a member during the elaboration of the 2003 and 
2005 declarations but South Africa was not, for example. South Africa's first real Input Into 
the negotiation process for the UDBHR was at an Intergovernmental meeting of experts In 
June 2005 (see next sub-section), by which time, In line with Chasek and Rajamani's 
observations, it seemed to one of its delegates too late to bring anything new to the table, 
"when we hadn't had a voice a priori. "6 Note, however, that other countries without an 
IGBC seat attended the Committee's meetings in January 2005 and made contributions 
as observers. Moreover, the IGBC's reduced representation is mitigated somewhat by 
the seats being allocated according to regional groupings, In accordance with 155 
EX/Decision 9.2 of the Executive Board. Thus the composition of the Committee Is as 
follows: 
" Western European states and others, including the US (Group I), 7 seats; 
" Eastern European states (Group II), 4 seats; 
3 UNESCO, "Statutes of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC), " adopted 7 May 1998,3. 4 UNESCO, "Report of the Second Session of the IGBC, " 1. $ UNESCO, "Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee: Rules of Procedure, " adopted 14 May 2001,2; 
UNESCO, "Committees and Organs Elected by the General Conference (33C), " ERC-2006, WS/2 (Paris: 
UNESCO, 2006), 53. 
6 Interview with SA 23. The letters in the codes indicate where the Interviews took place. Thus "SA' indicates 
South Africa, "F" France, "K" Kenya and "UK" the United Kingdom. For more details of interviews, Including 
place and time and participant affiliation or background, see Appendix II. 
Member states were also consulted from the outset through a written consultation (see 5.1.1.2). 
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" Latin American and Caribbean states (Group III), 6 seats; 
" Asian and Pacific states (Group IV), 7 seats; 
" African and Arab states (Group V), 12 seats .8 
The officers of the IGBC's Bureau represent a similar geographical dispersion, the 
chairperson coming from Italy, the vice-chairpersons from Saudi Arabia, Latvia, Uruguay 
and China and the rapporteur from Kenya .9 Within the regional groupings, bigger states 
such as France, Russia, China and the United States of America tend to expect a 
permanent seat on the Committee, whilst smaller states rotate their memberships. This 
was described as "political wheeling and dealing" by a member of the Bioethics 
Programme's secretariat-10 
5.1.1.2 Declaration drafting and negotiations" 
UDHGHR (1997) 
As expressed by Lenoir, UNESCO has a long-standing commitment to involve developing 
countries in ethical debates. At its second meeting, the Legal Commission of the IBC 
appointed to draw up the declaration on the human genome discussed how it would 
proceed with its assigned task. It concluded, "One of the major objectives of the IBC Is to 
set back the debate on ethics into a planetary context, by giving the opportunity to 
representatives of countries from the South to voice their concerns, often neglected in 
8 UNESCO, "Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 155th Session, " 155 EX/Decisions (Paris: 3 
December 1998), 67; UNESCO, "What is an Electoral Group? " http: /portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php- 
URL_ID=31523&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html (accessed 16 August 2007). In 2004 
UNESCO had 190 member states, divided between the five electoral groups as follows: Group I, 27; Group II, 
24; Group III, 33; Group IV, 42; and Group V, 64. UNESCO, Basic Texts (Paris: 2004), 67-69. 9 UNESCO, "Committees and Organs Elected by the General Conference (33C), " ERC-2006/WS/2 (Paris: 
2006), 53. The Bureau is "responsible for coordinating the work of the Intergovernmental Committee, setting 
the date, time and agenda of meetings and in general for assisting the Chairperson in carrying out his/her 
duties. " (UNESCO, "IGBC: Rules of Procedure, " 2. ) The officers listed were elected at the IGBC's January 
2005 meeting, according to the electoral groups. (IGBC meeting, Paris, 24 January 2005, personal 
observation. ) 
10 Interview with F_01. " The bulk of the data in this section necessarily relate to the UDBHR (2005), for three reasons: firstly, it was 
possible to observe some of the relevant meetings; secondly, more documentation is available concerning the 
roles played by individual states in the drafting; and thirdly, some of those involved in the negotiations were 
interviewed during fieldwork. 
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such discussions. "12 How the Commission ensured that this objective was fulfilled In the 
elaboration of the UDHGHR cannot be corroborated, however, as UNESCO's book on the 
declaration's history, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights, does not specify the input of individual states, nor does it include an 
account of the intergovernmental meeting of experts held in July 1997, which finalised the 
draft. 13 
IDHGD (2003) 
Although the IGBC appears to have played no role in the drafting of the declaration on 
human genetic data, states were able to contribute to the elaboration process on various 
occasions. 14 The first opportunity came in January 2003, when an "international 
consultation" was launched. An outline of the draft declaration and a questionnaire were 
sent to states and other stakeholders (see also 5.1.2.2). At first, very few replies were 
received, so the deadline for submission was extended; 42 member states eventually 
responded, 10 from Group I (out of 27 members), 8 from Group (I (24), 6 from Group III 
(33), 6 from Group IV (42) and 12 from Group V (64). Thus there were proportionally more 
replies from developed countries than developing ones. The draft declaration was refined 
in light of the returned questionnaires, in preparation for an Intergovernmental meeting of 
experts (IGE meeting) in June 2003, with greater emphasis placed on issues pertinent to 
developing countries, such as benefit sharing and international cooperation. (Whether It 
was states or non-state actors, or both, calling for this greater emphasis is not specified in 
the consultation report. )15 
The IGE meeting was poorly attended. Only 57 member states sent delegates, of whom 
34 took part in the meeting's general debate. The reason for this low attendance is not 
clear. It is possible that some states did not consider the draft declaration of particular 
12 UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 37. 13 Roberto Andorno, in a book chapter on the declaration, notes that there were 81 member states at the IGE 
meeting. (Andorno, "Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues, " 106. ) 14 In a timetable of the drafting process no mention is made of the IGBC. (UNESCO, 'Newsletter: Social and 
Human Sciences, " October-December 2003,19. ) 
15 UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data: Summary of the International Consultation, " 1,2 and 11. 
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relevance to their national needs or interests. Group I was more strongly represented than 
the other four, despite its being one of the smaller regional groupings-16 Furthermore, 
consonant with the findings of the 2003 UNDP study on global public goods, the larger 
delegations were chiefly from Group I states. Whilst most states sent one or two 
representatives, the United States (at the time not even a member of UNESCO) sent six, 
Germany five, France six and Tunisia five. " The meeting supported the revised provisions 
on benefit sharing and international cooperation, particularly those concerning donor 
communities and scientific researchers in developing countries. Some delegates wanted 
to see these provisions strengthened further, but others objected, foreseeing clashes with 
the patent system and national standards for sample donation and research. As is often 
the case in regime negotiations, then, a compromise was reached: the original 
formulations were retained, with the addition of a clause stressing the need to build the 
capacity of developing countries to collect and process human genetic data. 18 
UDBHR (2005) 
As for the IDHGD (2003), the first contributions by states to the drafting of the bioethics 
declaration were made through a written consultation. A questionnaire on what the 
declaration's aims, structure and content should be was sent to all member states, 
associate member states and permanent observer missions. 19 Of the sixty-seven 
questionnaires returned, 21 were from Group I, 10 from Group II, 6 from Group III, 8 from 
Group IV, 21 from Group V and one from a permanent observer. The greater number of 
responses to this questionnaire in comparison to that for the IDHGD is thus mainly 
attributable to states in Groups I and V (Western European states and others and African 
and Arab states). A second written consultation was launched in October 2004, to which 
only 31 member states and permanent observers responded (although other bodies also 
76 There were 16 delegates from Group I, 9 from Group II, 10 from Group III, 7 from Group IV and 15 from 
Group V. (UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data: Final Report, " 1. ) 17 UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data: List of Participants, " SHS/EST/03/CONF. 203/INF. 2 (Paris: 30 June 2003), 1-9. 18 UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data: Final Report, " 6 and 7. 's UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Drawing Up of a Declaration on Universal Norms on 
Bioethics, " 1. 
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contributed; see 5.1.2.2). 20 This second consultation prompted the addition of an article 
specifically devoted to social responsibility (see below). 
In terms of participation at meetings concerning the draft UDBHR, this was ostensibly fair 
and equal among member states. The chairpersons of the IGBC and IBC meetings in 
January 200521 went to great pains to ensure that members had equal opportunities to 
contribute, as enjoined by the IGBC rules of procedure: "The Chairperson shall call upon 
participants in the order in which they signify their wish to speak. "22 This practice was also 
stipulated for the IGE meetings held in April and June 2005 and an attendee confirmed 
these were conducted in said fashion: "From my own observations everybody had a right 
to say whatever he or she wanted to say. After all, they were representing their states . "23 
Nevertheless, some participants played a greater part in these sessions than others. At 
the January 2005 IGBC and IBC meetings, representatives from Germany, the United 
States, the Russian Federation, Brazil and Egypt each made fifteen or more comments, 
whereas those of Malawi, Mozambique and Togo made none at all 24 Furthermore, some 
attendees at the IGE negotiations commented in interviews that the coffee breaks were 
when things were really decided, which also seemed to be the case at the January 
meetings. 25 
A Kenyan participant at the IGE meetings felt that those countries that had a long history 
in bioethics had an advantage over those just starting in the field 26 This perhaps mirrors 
20 UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Progress Report January 2005, " 
PowerPoint presentation available at 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/file download. php/50523d754289e00aad6d1699Od576e22Bioethics+Declarati 
on(jan. 2005). ppt (accessed 9 July 2007). 21 The IGBC met to discuss the draft declaration on 24 and 25 January 2005. On 26 and 27 January it 
continued this discussion at a joint meeting with the IBC. On 28 January the IBC held a further meeting, 
attended by several IGBC representatives, to revise the draft In light of the week's discussions. ZZ IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, personal observations; UNESCO, "IGBC: Rules of 
Procedure, " 2. 
23 Interview with K 01; UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Provisional Rules of Procedure, " SHS/EST/05/CONF. 203/2 
(Prov. ) (Paris: 4 February 2005), 3. The rules of procedure for the IDHGD (2003) IGE meeting were very 
similar; those for the UDHGHR (1997) meeting are not available. (UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts 
Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on Human Genetic Data: Provisional Rules of 
Procedure, " SHS/EST/03/CONF. 203/2 (Prov. ) (Paris: 28 May 2003), 3. ) 
24 IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, personal observations. 25 Ibid; interviews with UK 01 and UK_02. 26 Interview with K-01. 
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the concerns of UNDP and Held about differences between countries in levels of expertise 
at international negotiations. In terms of numbers, also, an examination of the lists of 
delegates reveals that some countries were able to send bigger entourages than others to 
both the January IGBC and IBC sessions and the two IGE meetings. A conference on 
biodiversity was being held in the same week as the former, with at least one African 
delegate obliged to cover both at once; representatives of other African countries were not 
present for significant periods in the meetings? ' Of the 75 and 90 states that attended the 
April and June IGE meetings, 59 and 68 respectively sent only one or two delegates. By 
contrast, Canada, France and the United States sent between five and nine 28 The chief 
South African representative at the June meeting commented, "I was left as the sole 
representative from South Africa (unlike other countries who were much more organised 
and had a panel of experts representing them). " She went on to say, "The bigger boys 
came with a whole network of people that spoke and contributed to each thing... I felt 
uniquely alienated.., without that intensive support. "29 
Some countries sent no representative at all. Of UNESCO's 190 member states at the 
time, exactly half attended the April or June meetings. As at the IGE meeting for the 
IDHGD (2003), there were proportionately more countries from Group I than from the 
other four groups 30 It is possible to speculate about why this should have been the case. 
Firstly, some developing countries may have considered bioethics to be a First World 
issue and therefore of little importance to them. One African delegate at the January 2005 
IGBC and IBC meetings commented anecdotally that bioethics was not of general 
27 Interview with F 02; IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, personal observations. See 
also UNESCO, "Fourth Session, Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC): Provisional List of 
Participants, " SHS/EST/CIGB-4/INF. 2 (Paris: 25 January 2005). 
28 UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics: List of Participants, " SHS/EST/05/CONF. 203JINF. 1 (Paris: 6 April 2005), 1-14 
and UNESCO, "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft of a 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: List of Participants, " SHS/EST/05/CONF. 204. /INF. 1 (Paris: 25 
June 2005), 1-16. Canada, France and the United States sent six, seven and eight delegates respectively to 
the April meeting and five, eight and nine to the June meeting. 29 Interview with SA 23. 30 At the April IGE meeting there were 20 states from Group 1,8 from Group 11,17 from Group 111,9 from 
Group IV and 21 from Group V; at the June meeting there were 22 from Group I, 13 from Group II, 20 from 
Group 111,12 from Group IV and 23 from Group V. (UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List 
of Participants, " 1-14 and "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of Participants, " 1-16. ) 
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concern in his country, as people had more immediate problems to deal with. 1 Secondly, 
representatives from developed countries would likely have had the double bonus of 
greater funding for travel combined with a shorter distance to cover, compared to their 
developing country counterparts. A member of the Kenya National Commission for 
UNESCO, who had attended several meetings in Paris, noted that "the participation from 
the developing countries is quite low. " This can be problematic, he said, because if 
countries do not participate in negotiations their interests cannot be addressed. 32 His 
colleague, the Kenyan UNESCO Chair in Bioethics, who attended the April and June IGE 
meetings, made a similar observation, citing lack of resources as the reason why several 
African countries could not send representatives. (For both the IGBC and IGE meetings, 
states had to cover their attendance costs. 33) He thought it would be harder for these 
states to visualise how to implement the declaration, because they had not been involved 
in its elaboration 34 As only cosmetic changes were made to the declaration's final draft at 
the General Conference at which it was adopted, it would seem that those states which 
did not attend the IGE meetings had little input into the UDBHR. 
Although developing countries may have been disproportionately few in number at 
negotiations, the UDBHR represents a significant effort to address their needs and 
concerns. This had been the intention from the outset. The IBC, in its initial report on the 
possibility of a bioethics declaration, suggested that the priorities of such an instrument 
should be meeting vital needs and increasing access to drugs and the drafting group, at 
its first meeting, decided that the UDBHR should "above all respond to the concerns of 
developing countries. 15 By forming common regional fronts on some issues, these 
countries were able to voice their concerns relatively loudly, in line with Chasek and 
Rajamani's observations on the power of coalitions. This represented a compromise on 
3' IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, informal conversation. 32 Interview with K 16. 33 UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics, " CLJ3746 (undated letter of invitation from the Director-General, sent to 
National Commissions and permanent delegations), 1. 34 Interview with K 01. 35 UNESCO, "Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics, " 4; 
UNESCO, "First meeting of the ISC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal Norms on 
Bioethics, " 3. 
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states' individual views on certain points, in order to strengthen their negotiating positions 
overall. Describing the difficulties in balancing the national interest with broader concerns, 
the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO representative said, "It's a challenge, 
because you as a country may be having certain inclinations, but we are also bound by 
what they call the 'African Unity'. i36 Another African participant also noted that people from 
the same region would speak with a common voice. She remarked that on issues such as 
women and vulnerable communities, the Latin American countries, together with India, 
were the most vocal, "so it seemed as if the world dynamics are still based on the 
developed and the developing worlds and it's the fact of life. "37 
The issue for which the regional groupings were most visible was that of social 
responsibility and health. This was initially introduced by the Latin American states and 
later also backed by the Asian and African groups 38 It was during the second written 
consultation and a series of regional meetings towards the end of 2004 (see 5.1.2.2) that 
the issue gained real prominence. Brazil and Paraguay argued strongly for a greater 
emphasis on a "social agenda. " The former wrote, "The draft text... is too narrow in scope 
in relation to the development of aspects connected to economic, social and cultural 
rights, which represent the 'social agenda' of the draft declaration. "39 Paraguay's response 
was in a similar vein: 
The Declaration has left out or has yet to include themes closely tied to bioethics, 
such as access to health care and drugs and the right to a life of dignity and a 
healthy environment... A declaration cannot be universal if it leaves out these and 
other problems which affect perhaps the majority of the world's population, who 
are faced with poverty, hunger, illness, social exclusion and, in many cases, 
violence. 4o 
36 Interview with K 16. 3' Interview with SA 23. 38 Interview with F_01. 39 UNESCO, "Results of the Written Consultation on the Third Outline of the Text of a Declaration on Universal 
Norms on Bioethics (27 August 2004), " 2. 40 Ibid, 7. 
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In the light of such comments, the IBC drafting group added an article on social 
responsibility to the draft text, the concept having previously featured in the preamble 
only. 41 
The formulation of the article came in for much discussion at the January 2005 IGBC and 
IBC meetings, where it was described by Justice Kirby, chairperson of the IBC drafting 
group, as softer than the 'right to health', but innovative. 2 Several Latin American 
delegates emphasised the importance of the article and argued that it should go further. 
Other participants thought that developmental goals were beyond the scope of the 
declaration. The dichotomous opinions did not represent a straightforward split between 
North and South, however; Chile expressed the view that issues such as poverty and 
illiteracy were not bioethical issues, whilst Finland supported the inclusion of access to 
nutrition and water, seeing these as important in preventing ill-health 43 At the final IGE 
session in June 2005, developing countries are reported to have declared the article on 
social responsibility to be of "paramount importance. " It was approved by consensus by 
the meeting, a somewhat unexpected outcome given the previous opposition of some 
member states. " Moreover, the final article is more strongly worded than its original 
formulation, pronouncing "the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health" a 
human right. This aspect of the declaration may help to dispel the belief, highlighted in 
Chapter 2, that 'universal' bioethics is in fact simply western bioethics 45 
While the Latin American countries were successful in keeping social responsibility on the 
agenda during the drafting of the UDBHR, this was not the case for every issue. Members 
41 UNESCO, "Sixth Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal Norms 
on Bioethics, " 3. 
42 IGBC meeting, Paris, 24 January 2005, personal observation. 43 IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, personal observations. 44 UNESCO, "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Final Report, " 6; Interviews with F_01 and F_02. Germany and 
the United States, for example, opposed the inclusion of articles dealing with social and economic 
development, not because they considered these issues unimportant, but rather as beyond the scope of 
bioethics and being dealt with in other fora. (UNESCO, "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of 
Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Compilation of Proposed 
Amendments Submitted by Member States, " 3,4 and 38. ) 45 Interview with F 01; comment by Justice Kirby, IGBC meeting, Paris, 24 January 2005 (personal 
observation). 
132 
of the Executive Board from Group III (Latin American and Caribbean states) had wanted 
the declaration to cover reproductive human cloning, sex selection, pharmacogenetics, 
germ-line interventions and beginning and end of life, but these were deemed too 
controversial to enable consensus. 46 Developing countries as a whole were very 
concerned with intellectual property rights, but agreement on this subject was also 
considered impossible. 47 (One participant at the IGE meetings commented that It was left 
out because it would "bring a lot of politics, " although the explanation given in the report of 
the June meeting was that it falls within the competence of other IGOs `8) Overall, 
however, the declaration is seen to cover several themes particularly pertinent to 
developing countries. Indeed, those from Kenya involved in the drafting process declared 
themselves mostly satisfied with the final outcome. 49 Thus the IBC's foremost aim, as 
expressed by Lenoir, appears to have been met in the case of the UDBHR. 
5.1.2 Non-state actors 
The previous section discussed the role of states in UNESCO's Bioethics Programme as 
a whole and in the drafting of its three declarations on genetics and bioethics specifically. 
This section looks at non-state actors in a similar vein, firstly the IBC and secondly other 
stakeholders. 
5.1.2.1 International Bioethics Committee (IBC) 
The IBC was the prime actor in the elaboration of the text of all three declarations. 
Although one of the Committee's defining characteristics is that it is made up of 
46 UNESCO, "Fifth meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal Norms 
on Bioethics, " 2; UNESCO, "Elaboration of the Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Second Outline 
of a Text, " SHS/EST/04/CIB-Gred-2/4 Rev. 1 (Paris: 27 July 2004), 4. 
" Interview with UK 01. 48 Interview with K01; UNESCO, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 3. 49 Interviews with K_01 and K_1 6. 
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independent experts, its authority is seen to derive from the fact that it sits within an 
intergovernmental body. Hence during the drawing up of the UDHGHR (1997) it was 
considered to be "the only international body working in the field of bioethics. n50 The IBC 
has various functions, including the promotion of reflection and education around ethical 
issues, cooperation with IGOs, NGOs and bioethics committees and follow-up on the 
three declarations 51 Its system of appointment is perhaps less political than that of the 
IGBC. Members are selected by the Director-General according to recommendations by 
member states, but as independent advisors: 
The Director-General appoints the IBC's 36 members to serve in their personal 
capacities for four-year terms. The selection is made taking into account cultural 
diversity, balanced geographical representation and nominations from some 
States of qualified specialists in the life sciences and in the social and human 
sciences, including law, human rights, philosophy, education and 
communication. 52 
Achieving this cultural, geographical and disciplinary diversity can be a challenge when 
some parts of the world, such as Africa, are seen to have relatively few of the required 
specialists. 53 Whether a nominee is appointed will depend partly on whether they meet the 
necessary profile to secure a balanced membership. For the two-year period during which 
the UDBHR (2005) was elaborated, the Committee had several medical experts but would 
have welcomed more bioethicists. To facilitate selection in recent years, the Bioethics 
Programme has offered to help member states identify suitable candidates. A country 
offering a range of possible members, each with different areas of expertise, also works 
well. -54 
50 UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1. 51 UNESCO, "Statutes of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC), " 1; IDHGD, article 25; UDBHR, article 
25. 
52 UNESCO, "International Bioethics Committee (IBC), " http: /portat. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL ID=1879&URL D0=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html#3 (accessed 17 August 2007). 
53 Interview with F_01. In 2004-05, for example, the Committee had 35 members, split across the electoral 
groups as follows: Group 1,11; Group II, 3; Group III, 6; Group IV, 7; and Group V, 8. Thus there were fewer 
experts from African and Arab states and more from Western European and other states than would have 
been the case if the IBC had followed the ratios stipulated for the IGBC. (UNESCO, "Composition of the 
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC) (2004-2005), " CIB/04-05/INF 1 (Rev. 3) (Paris: 20 
December 2004. )) The smaller groups that are formed to write reports or draw up declarations also aim for a 
geographical mix, including a substantial membership from developing countries. The drafting group for the 
IDHGD (2003), for example, included IBC experts from Argentina, the Philippines, Nigeria and India. 
JUNESCO, "Public Hearings Day on Human Genetic Data, " 2. ) 4 Interview with F 01. In the year 2004-05, the composition of the Committee was as follows: members of 
national bioethics committees, 12 (of which 8 were Chair or President); present or former members of other 
bioethics or ethics committees, 9; academics in bioethics or philosophy, 9; academics in medical or genetic 
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IBC meetings are held in public. The ninth session of the IBC, for example, held in 
Canada in 2002, attracted around 250 participants from 60 countries 55 At the thirteenth 
session (held in Paris and attended by 200 participants from 40 countries), the 
chairperson of the IBC, Nouzha Guessous Idrissi, remarked that the meeting would 
continue the debate on social responsibility and health initiated at the previous session, 
"to give the Committee an opportunity to pursue its work openly and transparently. e58 
Although these numbers and intentions are impressive, it remains the case that the work 
of UNESCO in bioethics is not particularly well-known (see 5.2). 
5.1. Z2 Other non-state actors 
Non-state actors were given the opportunity to share their opinions on the drafts of all 
three UNESCO declarations, through written and verbal consultations and as observers at 
meetings. The written consultations, in the form of questionnaires, were extensive. For the 
UDHGHR (1997), in a "vast and informal" consultation, the draft declaration was sent to 
around 300 institutions and individuals, including other UN agencies, national bodies, 
NGOs, ethics committees, universities and prominent intellectuals, in line with then 
Director-General Federico Mayor's wish that it should be used as "an instrument of 
intercultural dialogue. " Responses to the questionnaire were discussed in detail by the 
Legal Commission and the IBC and formed the basis of a new version of the declaration. 
At the Commission's final meeting, members were urged to disseminate the revised draft 
as widely as possible. 57 The results of the questionnaire for the IDHGD (2003) similarly 
led to changes in the draft (see 5.1.1.2), on which organisations at international, regional 
and national levels and more than 100 bioethics experts had been invited to share their 
opinions. Replies were received from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
sciences, 16 (plus 1 physician); academics in law, judges or those involved in human rights, 10 (some 
members are in 2 or 3 categories). (UNESCO, "Composition of the IBC (2004-2005). ") 55 UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Work of the IBC and the IGBC, " 1. 56 UNESCO, "Thirteenth Session of the IBC, " 1. 57 Lenoir, "Bioethics and UNESCO, " 12-22; UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human 
Geriatrie and Human Rights, 57-58,61,67 and 110. 
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for Human Rights, 12 NGOs (including CIOMS, HUGO and the Joint Programme 
Commission on Science and Ethics58), 22 ethics bodies, 6 data protection agencies and 
21 "eminent personalities" or former IBC members 59 
For the UDBHR (2005), UNESCO considered the involvement of actors other than 
member states to be crucial to the drafting of the declaration. Its website read, "Only the 
participation of all the actors concerned could ensure that all the different perceptions of 
ethical and legal issues are taken into account. "60 In October 2004 the third outline of the 
text was sent for comment to IGOs, NGOs, relevant national bodies and around 40 
independent experts. Responses were duly received from 4 IGOs, 14 NGOs, 14 national 
bioethics committees and 12 individuals. These replies, together with those of member 
states, were discussed at the sixth and final meeting of the IBC drafting group, which drew 
up the draft version of the declaration that was subsequently debated at the IGBC and 
IBC meetings in January 2005.61 
The verbal consultations on the 2003 and 2005 declarations were also comprehensive 62 
For the IDHGD, a Public Hearings Day63 was held in Monaco in February 2003, at which 
Pierre Sane, Assistant Director-General for the Social and Human Sciences sector, 
stressed "the importance that should be attached to the involvement of civil society in the 
bioethical debate and the transparency of the IBC's work. "" The statements of speakers, 
representing international bodies such as the World Medical Association, developing 
58 HUGO is the Human Genome Organisation, CIOMS the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences. The Joint Programme Commission on Science and Ethics comprises 32 member organisations. sa UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data: Summary of the International Consultation, " 1 and 12-15. so UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL_ID=1883&URL DO=DO_TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html 
accessed 7 October 2004). 
' UNESCO, 'owards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " PowerPoint presentation; UNESCO, 
"Report by the Director-General on the Drawing up of a Declaration on Universal Norms for Bioethics, " 1. 62 The Co-ordinator of the Bioethics Commission of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies and 
the President of the International Court of Justice gave presentations to the Legal Commission of the IBC 
responsible for drafting the UDHGHR (1997). The bulk of the consultation on this declaration was written, 
however. (UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 54 and 
98. ) 
63 The cost of participating in such meetings is borne by UNESCO, as per the statutes of the IBC: "UNESCO 
shall bear the expenses of the participation of specialists in connection with hearings requested by the IBC. " 
(UNESCO, "Statutes of the IBC; 3. ) 4 UNESCO, "Public Hearings Day on Human Genetic Data, " 1. 
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country researchers, interest groups and insurance and pharmaceutical companies, were 
discussed by a broad audience, comprising the drafting group and some thirty observers 
attending in a personal capacity or on behalf of member states or other IGOs (including 
WHO). The drafting group duly took these discussions into consideration at its subsequent 
meeting. 65 
Various hearings took place during the drafting of the UDBHR (2005). Before even the 
first meeting of the drafting group, the IBC held an extraordinary session in order to gauge 
the opinions of "the actors concerned" on the scope and structure of the proposed 
declaration (namely other IGOs, organisations such as the World Medical Association and 
HUGO and national bioethics committees) 66 At its eleventh session in August 2004 
representatives of different "religious and spiritual perspectives" gave presentations. This 
meeting also hosted a public discussion and was attended by more than 250 participants 
from 80 countries. 7 In 2005, national and regional expert consultations were held in 
several states, including Argentina, Mexico and Indonesia, as part of the "Ethics Around 
the World" project (see 6.2.1). 68 Pharmaceutical companies were invited to make 
contributions at various sessions, but were "quite quiet. "69 
In terms of formal negotiations, non-state actors took part to a limited degree. Only eleven 
NGOs attended the UDBHR IGE meetings. 70 The Provisional Rules of Procedure, 
published in February 2005, stated, "All plenary sessions shall be held in public, unless 
the Meeting decides otherwise. "" The meetings were classified as category II, however, 
meaning that all observers had to be approved by the Executive Board. The Board 
65 Ibid, 1 and Annex II, 3-5. 66 UNESCO, "Extraordinary Session of the IBC: 'Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics', " 1, 
34 and 6. s' UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " PowerPoint presentation; UNESCO, 
"Eleventh Session: IBC, " 1. 
68 UNESCO, "Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " PowerPoint presentation; UNESCO, 
"Report by the Director-General on the Drawing Up of a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, " 4. It 
was hoped that meetings would also be held in the African and Arab region, but this did not prove possible 
within the time available. (Interview with F_01. ) ss Interview with F 01. 70 UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of Participants, " 15 and "Second 
Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of Participants, " 17-18. 71 UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Provisional Rules of Procedure, " 3. 
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approved the list of invitations in September 2004, fully five months before the rules of 
procedure were made public. 72 The only UN agencies (other than UNESCO) to attend the 
meetings were the World Trade and World Health Organizations, 73 although IGOs had 
other opportunities to feed into the UDBHR, through the UN Inter-agency Committee on 
Bioethics. At the Committee's third meeting in June 2004, participants "reiterated their full 
support for the drawing up of a declaration providing a universal ethical framework in the 
field of science and technology, " but wished to clarify the scope of the declaration. 7' Their 
concerns on this front were carried through to the fourth meeting, in December 2004, 
when some committee members commented that the declaration "should not go beyond 
the field of competence of UNESCO" (see also 6.3.2). 75 
The low attendance of non-state actors at formal negotiations notwithstanding, the 
Director-General highlighted at the first UDBHR IGE meeting in April 2005 the 
"transparent and participatory nature of the elaboration process. "76 Similarly, at the 2005 
General Conference, member states expressed satisfaction that the drafting process had 
been open, involving a wide range of actors . 
77 Despite all the written and verbal 
consultations, however, these opinions were not necessarily shared outside UNESCO. In 
a September 2005 special issue of Developing World Bioethics devoted to the draft 
UDBHR, John Williams (then Director of Ethics at the World Medical Association) was 
critical of the fact that the version of the declaration approved by the June IGE meeting 
72 Personal e-mail, 16 March 2005. Thus it was not possible for the IGE meetings to be observed in person. 73 UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of Participants, " 14 and "Second 
Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of Participants, " 16. 74 UNESCO, "Information Meeting with IGBC on the Progress of the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal 
Norms on Bioethics, " 2. 75 UNESCO, "Sixth Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal Norms 
on Bioethics, " 1. 
7e UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal 
Norms on Bioethics: Final Report, " 1. " UNESCO, "Address by Mr KoTchiro Matsuura, Director General of UNESCO, " twelfth session of the IBC, 
Tokyo, Japan, 15-17 December 2005, DG/2005/201,2. In a separate report, the Director-General attributed 
this transparency partly to the availability of relevant documents on the UNESCO website, which he said made 
the drafting process open to "the greatest possible number. " (UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on 
the Drawing Up of a Declaration on Universal Norms for Bioethics, " 1 and 7. ) Similarly, at the January 2005 
IBC meeting, the chair of the UDBHR drafting group, Justice Kirby, declared that all documentation concerning 
the draft declaration would be put on the UNESCO website, under a principle of transparency. (IBC meeting, 
Paris, 28 January 2005, personal observation. ) Whilst the Director-General's statement might be true, it does 
not necessarily follow that consultation through the website was sufficient. Aside from the bias this might have 
entailed towards those with easy access to the internet (discussed further at 6.2.1), several stakeholders in 
Kenya and South Africa had simply not thought, or had not had time, to look at the UNESCO website in 
connection with genetics and bioethics. (Interviews with SA 03 and SA_27 and informal conversations with 
staff at the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme in Kilifi, Kenya. ) 
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had not been through the same broad consultation procedures as earlier drafts. 78 Some 
South African interviewees expressed concern about the entire process. One ethicist 
commented: 
You don't just want a faceless committee designing this. Maybe some of them do 
have experience, but why not make it an open process? What would be the 
problem with that? Why have they not involved individuals with expertise and wide 
recognition or standing in the international bioethics community? 7 
Another said that the initial draft of a document such as the declaration should be drawn 
up by experienced committees, but then made open for public scrutiny "in such a way that 
people know about it and it's readily accessible. "80 For some interviewees, these people 
would necessarily include those potentially vulnerable research subjects that the 
declaration seeks to protect. One asked: 
The declarations have made decisions for the international public, but which 
international public? I mean, for me, the research participants in South Africa are 
the rural research participants on the ground. How much have they had a say in 
terms of the declaration? Have we had our tribal leaders being involved in these 
discussions? 81 
As discussed further in the second part of this chapter, many potential contributors from 
Kenya and South Africa (bioethicists, scientists, policy-makers and civil society 
representatives, as well as research subjects) were not among those invited by the IBC, 
through its various international consultations, to comment on the draft texts. This has 
implications for the legitimacy of the declarations, in that people are less likely to pay them 
due attention if they believe them to have been drawn up covertly. 
5.1.3 Relative influence of state and non-state actors 
Although the texts of the UNESCO declarations were drawn up by the IBC and 
commented on by several non-state actors, decisions on the final drafts and whether they 
78 Williams, "UNESCO's Proposed Declaration -A Bland Compromise, " 211. 79 Interview with SA 25. 80 Interview with SA19. 81 Interview with SAJ7 (quoted). K_07 and SA 25 made similar comments. 
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should be adopted ultimately lay with member states. 82 This was not without its problems. 
For the UDBHR (2005), for example, some countries sent civil servants or embassy 
representatives to the IGE meetings rather than bioethicists (delegate expertise is 
discussed further in 5.2.1). A member of the Bioethics Programme said that this meant 
that what had been put together logically and rationally by a body of non-state experts, the 
IBC, was then overridden in a political process by inexpert state representatives. He 
described the relationship between experts and states as "always a tension, " giving the 
following example of how it can lead to weak compromises: 
We had an article on risk management, which was in fact arguing the 
precautionary principle without mentioning it. And then some of the delegations, 
they took the whole text out and they changed it for a very general text, which has 
been accepted. So now the text there is an open door, it's just a generality 84 
Another illustration of this tension is provided by the debate at the January 2005 joint 
IGBC and IBC meetings over whether the UDBHR (2005) and implementation guidelines 
for the IDHGD (2003) were to include reporting mechanisms, under which states would 
have to periodically inform UNESCO about measures taken to realise the declarations. In 
an informal conversation, a member of the IBC remarked that the Committee would try to 
include more concrete obligations than in the past, but that this was a "shot in the dark, " 
as these would probably get watered down by states 85 Describing the room as having a 
82 Similarly, it was states that determined whether they should be drafted in the first place. When the IBC 
presented its report on the possibility of elaborating an instrument on bioethics to the IGBC, the latter was 
reminded that this was merely a "feasibility study" and that it was for states to decide, at the General 
Conference, whether the elaboration should go ahead. (UNESCO, "Report of the Third Session of the IGBC, " 
8. ) 
83 Interviews with F 01 and UK 02. Howard Wolinsky captures this process pithily, describing the UDBHR 
negotiations as "a dance between government and bioethics groups. * (Wolinsky, "Bioethics for the World, " 
355. ) One attendee at the April and June IGE meetings observed that, although there were several non-state 
actors present, they had fewer opportunities to speak than the state representatives, even though they 
perhaps knew more about the subject matter. (Interview with UK_02. ) By contrast, in an Informal conversation 
at the January 2005 meetings, a former member of the IBC, who had helped to draft the 1997 and 2003 
declarations, voiced ambivalence with regard to observers, particularly those representing interest groups. 
Some had useful things to say, he said, but others were determined to get their point across, whether or not it 
was relevant to the discussion at hand. 84 Interview with F 01. An attendee at the April and June meeting corroborated the tension that F 01 
identified. (Interview with UK_01. ) The following anecdote offers a further illustration of this tension. During the 
January 2005 IGBC meeting in Paris, a member of the IBC wanted to make a comment. Before he could do 
so, however, a member of the IGBC complained that this would be inappropriate and that any such comments 
should be voiced only within the joint meeting between the two committees later in the week. He rounded off 
his objection with the words, "In my opinion, governance is about government. " (IGBC meeting, Paris, 24 
January 2005, personal observation. ) 85 Informal conversation, 26 January 2005. 
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metaphorical Red Sea down its middle that the meeting would have to try to bridge, 
Justice Kirby (chair of the UDBHR drafting group) told those assembled that there would 
be some issues, such as the reporting mechanism, on which the two committees would 
take different views. The IBC members were independents whilst the IGBC 
representatives were not, he said; each should fulfil their function, but it would be the 
states that would make the final decisions on such matters, through the political processes 
of UNESCO. The states duly decided that it would be inappropriate to include any such 
mechanism in the UDBHR. 86 (The implications of the reporting debate for the effective 
implementation of the declaration are discussed at 6.2.3. ) 
5.1.4 Relations between international and national levels 
3.5.2 considered Held's claim that 'chains of delegation' have rendered IGOs 
inaccessible. The secretariat of the Bioethics Programme, despite having a small staff, 
takes great pains to act transparently. To this end, a plethora of information on the 
Programme's activities is freely available on the UNESCO website (to those with internet 
access). When it comes to actively distributing materials to member states, however, 
there can be problems. A member of the Programme explained that it cannot be sure 
whether information is always getting to the most appropriate government departments, 
because UNESCO deals primarily with ministries of education, even though these might 
not perhaps be the most natural ports of call with regard to bioethics and genetics 87 In 
both Kenya and South Africa, some government officials working in these areas were 
unaware of the declarations at the time of fieldwork 88 One of them, from South Africa's 
Department of Science and Technology, corroborated the difficulties described by the 
Bioethics Programme representative: 
86 UNESCO, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 7-8. 
87 Interview with F_ 01. ee Interviews with K_20, K-21, SA 28 and SA 31. 
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Basically we don't track the UNESCO processes directly from the department, 
which is something that made me think that we should do more, because the 
UNESCO relationship is owned by our Department of Education and they hadn't 
briefed us or asked us for assistance in this particular declaration. 89 
It seems that these difficulties stem from incoherencies between international and national 
levels rather than lack of willing. UNESCO hopes that as more national bioethics 
committees are established chains of communication will become clearer (see 6.2.1). 
5.1.5 Global Genomics Initiative: an Improvement? 
The sections above have described systems of representation and accountability within 
UNESCO, a traditional IGO, for the elaboration of declarations on genetics and bioethics. 
This section examines whether the multisectoral GGI, if established, might prove a more 
equitable governance model, in terms of relations between North and South and between 
state and non-state actors. Although news to many of them, the plans for the GGI 
generated a considerable amount of enthusiasm among interviewees. 
5.1.5.1 Leadership from the South 
Like Held and UNDP, those at the Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics who have proposed 
the GGI argue that the capacity of developing countries to participate effectively in 
international negotiations needs to be enhanced 9° TJCB envisions that the GGI would 
enable these countries to assume leadership in "driving the agenda for health equity. "" in 
a 2001 article in which they proposed their early, commission-based version of the GGI, 
Abdallah Daar and Peter Singer wrote, 
e9 Interview with SA 31. 90 Dowdeswell, Daar and Singer, "Bridging the Genomics Divide; 3. 9' Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 139. 
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The voices of those in developing countries must be heard as the health 
biotechnology revolution unfolds. Those protesting in Genoa are not the ones who 
are sick in Africa. We need to develop a mechanism to tap the views of opinion 
leaders in developing countries on important policy questions and in real time 92 
In its various publications, TJCB does not actually articulate how it would recruit such 
leaders. Of the 45 people in Kenya and South Africa asked about the GGI, including 
geneticists, bioethicists, policy-makers, civil society representatives and those involved in 
the commercialisation of biotechnology, only half were aware of the proposed network and 
none had definitely been asked to join 93 Given that TJCB locates legitimacy in including 
those affected by a given issue (if indeed opinion leaders truly represent the sick), that it 
has involved in its planning few of those with a stake in the "health biotechnology 
revolution" does not bode well. Thus were the GGI to be established, more effective 
recruitment from the South would be necessary. How this might be achieved is discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
Some South African interviewees saw the goal of leadership from the South as central to 
the proposed network's legitimacy. They described how norms have in the past been 
imposed on developing countries as faits accomplis, thus the engagement of the South in 
"true interaction" would be highly significant 9.4 Others foresaw difficulties, however. 
According to one Kenyan scientist, because of the lack of technical capacity in developing 
countries, potential leaders are scarce and have often moved to northern institutions. On 
the plan to garner southern leadership he said, "I think in some ways that has to go hand 
in hand with building the capacity for people to actually be able to work within their own 
environments in the South" (which would be one of the proposed GGI's aims, as it is of 
the UNESCO declarations) 95 Another participant would want to see wider participation 
from activist groups from the North, which he thought needed to find better ways of 
82 Singer and Daar, "Harnessing Genomics and Biotechnology to Improve Global Health Equity, " 89. 93 Only bioethicists who serve on national committees or who contribute to policy or training at national or 
regional level are included in this sample. Of the 45,22 were aware of the GGI, 22 were not and one was 
unsure. Two had been on the 2002 executive course in Nairobi and were still In contact with TJCB and two 
were unsure whether they or their institution had been asked to become involved with the proposed GGI. 
Unfortunately it was not possible to interview two people who, from perusals of websites and literature, it 
seems would almost certainly have been involved. 94 Interviews with SA 30 (quoted), SA_21 and SA 24. 95 Interview with K_08-. 
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engaging with the South. Although he saw the proposed GGI as "critical in moving the 
agenda for capacity building, " he predicted that ensuring equitable relationships would be 
challenging and that 'the South' would not speak with a unified voice: "Internally there 
would be multiple sectoral interests with diverse agendas. n9B 
5.1.5.2 Relations between state and non-state actors 
The GGI, should it come to fruition, would be a multisectoral network, involving experts 
from governments, civil society, the private sector and research institutions. When asked if 
they would be interested in joining such a network, people from all these sectors in Kenya 
and South Africa voiced enthusiasm (both those who had come across the GGI previously 
and those who had not). 97 Key figures in the implementation of the South African National 
Biotechnology Strategy were particularly eager. One said, "Great, wow... That would be 
really interesting to find out more about, " while another thought that the network sounded 
"extremely useful" for both South Africa and Africa in general, thus sensing an almost 
"moral obligation" to participate in or support it. 98 Several scientists were also keen. One 
commented, "It seems a very sensible way to go to make a real difference" and another 
wanted to visit the TJCB website to find out more. A third thought the GGI might provide 
some much needed direction on issues such as gene patenting. " 
Many participants particularly welcomed the proposed mixed membership of the GGI. One 
said, "The more interested parties contribute to the work and the more multisectoral it is, 
the more likely it is to happen. "'00 Some saw the network as potentially a good way to 
96 Interview with SA 13. ®' Of the 45 participants in Kenya and South Africa asked about the GGI, 37 were supportive, three were 
ambivalent and two did not indicate a position. Three were unsupportive, on the grounds that it was in fact an 
industrialised world rather than global initiative, that it was unlikely to end in tangible goals and that it would 
probably become too bureaucratic to deal with urgent issues. (Interviews with SA 20, SA 07 and K-1 1 
respectively. ) 
ae Interviews with SA_26 and SA 28 respectively. At the other extreme, some might consider it almost a moral 
obligation not to support the GGI, seeing the proposed network as a potentially fatal distraction from more 
urgent needs. as Interviews with SA 21 (quoted), SA_27 and K-03. 1 oo Interview with SA 15. 
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exchange information and ideas. A private genetics research company in South Africa, for 
example, would join the GGI in order to share its products and technologies with 
companies in other countries facing the types of barriers it had already overcome. '0' Just 
as some interviewees believed the GGI would derive legitimacy from its planned southern 
leadership, others saw the multisector approach as a fundamental component. Hence it 
would need buy-in from people from all walks of life. ' 02 A Kenyan scientist thought that 
involving civil society would be essential, whilst a civil society representative hoped the 
network might encourage scientists to be more vocal in policy-making. 103 One person 
sounded a note of caution. A combination of public and private partners was a good idea, 
she said, but the network would have to be above the individual interests of its 
members. 104 In other words, they would have to behave as Rischard's 'global citizens' 
(see 3.5.2). 
This analysis has shown that there would be a demand for a GGI-like network among 
stakeholders in genetics and bioethics in Kenya and South Africa, should they be made 
more aware of the possibility. One interviewee captured this sentiment as follows: "It is a 
great initiative. They should bring this to us, disseminate it here so that we know. "'os 
A network structure might represent an improvement on the IGO model of participation, 
with state and non-state actors collaborating as equals, unlike in the two stage process at 
UNESCO that sees states making final decisions on the work of non-state experts. Should 
this structure also be 'flatter' than traditional IGOs, as Rischard claims such networks 
would be, it might also avoid some of the problems faced by UNESCO in terms of chains 
of communication. 
101 Interviews with K 13 and SA 06. 102 Interview with SA 32. 103 Interviews with K 08 and K 14. 104 Interview with K26. 105 Interview with K_19. 
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5.1.5.3 Institutional legitimacy 
The GG I, if constituted, would be an independent body. This raises the question of what 
rights it would have to represent the global populace, particularly with regard to the 
formulation of universal norms and principles. UNESCO claims legitimacy for its 
declarations by virtue of their falling under the UN system. One interviewee concurred with 
UNESCO on this point and another said, 'Well the UN has staying power, I'll say that for 
it... I think the UN's a good place to start if you want such an initiative to last "106 Several 
participants did not see the UN as offering inherent legitimacy or effectiveness, however; 
thus they did not think the proposed network's independence would be a problem per se. 
Rather, its legitimacy would depend on what it did and whether it involved the right people, 
those "at the sharp end of doing things. nt07 One ethics committee member made the 
following comment, based on his perceptions of international meetings: "You can invite 
people from Africa who might not be the right people, you just have faces. As I say that 
always worries me. s108 TJCB also envisages the GGI garnering legitimacy through being 
underpinned by governments. A South African participant described why this might be 
important in an African context: "In many African countries I certainly get the impression 
that if things don't have the stamp of approval from government then they don't go 
anywhere... A lot of individual initiatives just fall off the table because people don't follow 
the right channels and so forth. "109 As shown in the second part of this chapter, however, 
just as legitimacy through the UN cannot be assumed, nor can legitimacy through the 
state. 
106 Interviews with SA 37 and K 17 (quoted) respectively. 707 Interviews with SA 19 (quoted), K-1 8, SA_10 and SA-1 6. toe Interview with SA 10. los Interview with SA 27. 
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5.2 NATIONAL LEVEL1° 
5.1 explored how decisions are made at international level. The chapter now turns to the 
national level, in terms of how those representing states at international level are selected 
and on what their negotiating positions are based. 53 interviewees in Kenya and South 
Africa unconnected with UNESCO were asked to what extent they knew the three 
genetics and bioethics declarations. Thirty had come across them, of whom eighteen only 
peripherally. "' This would imply that a majority of potential stakeholders were not 
included in the elaboration process at national level. 
5.2.1 Delegate selection and expertise 
The Director-General of UNESCO reported in 2002, "Despite the ever greater importance 
of bioethics worldwide, this discipline is still too often the preserve of a handful of 
specialists. "' 12 As shown by the make-up of the IBC (see 5.1.2.1), UNESCO considers 
people from various backgrounds to have expertise in bioethics. Reflecting this, the 
UDBHR was drafted as a "practical application" document rather than an academic one. 113 
At the June 2005 IGE session charged with finalising this declaration, the Director- 
General thanked member states for sending "strong, quality delegations. "' 14 The chief 
Kenyan and South African delegates to this meeting were both scientists with experience 
of applying bioethical principles in their work. The Kenyan expert was selected as his 
'10 The data analysed below relate almost entirely to the 2005 UDBHR, reflecting the timing of fieldwork, which 
took place just before and after the declaration was adopted. ' There were 64 participants in total from Kenya and South Africa, six of whom had UNESCO connections. Of these six, three were unaware of the declarations before being invited to become involved with UNESCO 
activities, including two IGE representatives. Five participants were not asked about the declarations, because 
the interviews were on specific topics, such as public awareness and community engagement programmes. 
UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on Action to be Taken in the Light of the Round Table of 
Ministers of Science on Bioethics (22-23 October 2001), "5. The editors of the 2005 Developing World 
Bioeth/cs special issue on the declaration had an entirely different view: "Perhaps worthy of debate within 
UNESCO at this stage, is its very approach to bioethics. Bioethics, as we understand it, is an academic 
discipline and not a playground for government appointed politician-experts to muse in an inconsequential and 
arguably not very sophisticated manner about ethics. " (Landman and Schüklenk, 'From the Editors, " vi. ) " UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 3-4. 114 UNESCO, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " Annex II, 1. Again, a different 
view is expressed in Developing World Bioethics. John Williams sardonically refers to those who attended this 
meeting as 'experts' throughout his paper. (Williams, op cit. ) 
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country's UNESCO Chair in Bioethics. He was accompanied to the June meeting by the 
Kenyan deputy permanent delegate to UNESCO (based in Paris) and to the previous 
session in April by a member of Kenya's National Council for Science and Technology. 
His South African counterpart, a geneticist, was appointed by the Minister of Education. 
She attended only the June meeting, although the South African deputy permanent 
delegate was at both sessions. The Kenyan IGBC representatives at the January 2005 
meetings were both from the National Commission for UNESCO. ' 15 
Although the majority of interviewees in Kenya and South Africa were unfamiliar with the 
declarations, several had strong opinions about who should be representing them at 
international negotiations in general. Two Kenyan participants did not believe delegation 
was well managed. The first, a civil society actor, could find no consistency from one 
meeting to the next: "The people who represent the government-today it's this person, 
another month it's somebody completely different from another ministry. ""' The second 
also saw the appointment process as capricious, such that ill-informed government 
officials attend international meetings at short notice, with little time to absorb the relevant 
facts and statistics. She asked, "Who is representing my views as a geneticist? ""' That 
such perceptions exist, even if false, could be damaging to the legitimacy of the 
declarations. 1" If people are concerned that those who did the drafting were not 
sufficiently expert to do so, they may have little respect for the declarations as valid 
normative instruments. 
As in Kenya, South African participants were of the opinion that representatives at 
international negotiations need to have a certain level of expertise. Particularly with regard 
to the bioethics declaration (UDBHR, 2005), however, they differed on where the requisite 
115 Interviews with K 01 and SA 23; UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of 
Participants, " 1 and 9, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: List of Participants, " 1 and 10 and 
UNESCO, "Fourth Session, IGBC: Provisional List of Participants, " 5. "'interview interview with K 14. 
Interview with K726. 
There was in fact consistency of representation in the case of the UNESCO declarations in that the 
UNESCO Chair in Bioethics attended both meetings. Moreover, he had plenty of communication with those 
from the National Commission who had attended the January 2005 meetings and were coordinating input into 
the Kenyan negotiating position (see 5.2.2). (Interviews with K_01 and K_16. ) 
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expertise lay. Some of those who conduct genetic research involving human subjects felt 
that experience 'at the coalface' was important. This would furnish an understanding of 
the intricacies of obtaining informed consent, for example. 19 One commented, "I think it's 
very dangerous to have a group of academics putting it [the UDBHR] together when they 
don't understand what the issues are on the ground, because they can dream up things 
that are wonderfully ethically sound, but are totally impractical. 020 A long-standing 
member of a research ethics committee also thought that practical experience was 
important, but in terms of ethical review rather than research. Having seen some registers 
of those involved in UNESCO's bioethics activities, he expressed concern that very few of 
the people listed had sat on an ethics committee, remarking, I found one South African 
representative that I know has no bioethics research experience on any committee in this 
country, but is regarded as an expert. And that worries me "121 Others thought that those 
with a background in the philosophy of bioethics had a vital role to play, because they 
have been trained in the logical construction of arguments. " One said of the UDBHR, "I 
can't see that there were bioethicists involved in the drafting of that thing... I think it's 
unusable. "123 The tensions between these different positions were articulated by a 
prominent actor in South African bioethics: 
So what does it mean to be 'a bioethicist'? Should everybody who calls him or 
herself a bioethicist be consulted? Bioethics is a contentious field populated by 
scholars, professionals and others from many disciplines, not all of whom have 
had an adequate training or experience. So whose voices should be heard? 124 
In reality, on being asked who should have put the declarations together, most 
participants thought a range of people essential, including scientists, ethics committee 
members and philosophically trained bloethicists, but also government representatives, 
legal experts, civil society actors and those with previous experience of international 
119 Interviews with SA 12, SA 20 and SA 21. 120 Interview with SA 21. 121 Interview with SA 19. 122 Interviews with SA 08 and SA 16. 123 Interview with SA 16. 124 Interview with SA 09. 
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negotiations. 125 One government official who has attended many such negotiations 
commented, 'The people who are prepared to explore the art of the possible are the 
people we should have in the room, " the 'art of the possible' signifying compromise. 126 
5.2.2 Wider Input 
While to include at international meetings a range of stakeholders from each state as 
diverse as that listed above might prove impractical, governments could seek the advice 
and opinions of such actors in deciding what views their representatives should take to the 
negotiating table. For one interviewee, whether there had been wide consultation on the 
draft UDBHR (2005) was more important than who actually made the final decisions: "I 
think the process is key, rather than just the people. "'Z' Kenya's role in the negotiation of 
this declaration was coordinated by the National Commission for UNESCO. In formulating 
its position, the Commission garnered opinions from various people it considered experts, 
namely members of its own Natural Sciences and Human and Social Sciences 
Committees and officials from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Kenya 
Medical Research Institute and the National Council for Science and Technology. 128 
These expert views were sometimes overruled by the permanent delegates to UNESCO 
in Paris (who are members of the African Group), in consultation with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, as to what the official negotiating position should have been. '9 
Nevertheless, the chief Kenyan IGE representative carried out a similar process to that of 
the National Commission, in order to be able to present a "Kenyan position" at the 
meetings. 130 Thus the tension between experts and states identified at international level 
seems to have been mirrored somewhat at national level. There were no broader 
125 Interviews with SA 08, SA 10, SA 14, SA 15, SA 21, SA 24, SA 30, SA 31, SA 32, SA 33 and SA 35. 
This question was only asked in South Africa. 'ZB Interview with SA 31. 127 Interview with SA 15. 128 Interviews with K 02, K 13 and K 16. 129 Interviews with K71 6 and K 30. 130 Interview with K 16. K 02 corroborated that the chief IGE delegate had been active in formulating Kenya's 
negotiating position 
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consultations with scientists, civil society groups or the general public in Kenya. On this 
point, the UNESCO Chair of Bioethics said: 
No, there is not such a thing. Actually that's an issue which myself and another 
colleague who also attended the April meeting raised when we came back, in our 
report: that before any of those meetings take place, there must be meetings to 
agree on our stand and formulate our agenda. And that one has not taken place. 13' 
There was less discussion of the draft declaration in South Africa than in Kenya. The only 
input, albeit of a limited fashion, came from the South African Medical Association's 
Human Rights Law and Ethics Committee. 132 A quote from a senior member of a 
university bioethics department serves to illustrate the paucity of consultation: "You know, 
UNESCO has never contacted me with anything, so it's basically finding out from our 
bioethics circles as to what's happening in UNESCO and then looking up things on our 
own. But I have never been contacted by UNESCO. 033 The chief IGE delegate was thus 
left with what Chasek and Rajamani would term a 'hollow mandate' as to how she was to 
represent South Africa. She commented, "In hindsight, I attended the meeting poorly 
equipped to voice the opinions of the country. it3' 
In both Kenya and South Africa, input into the negotiating positions for the UDBHR (2005) 
on the part of government officials appears to have been curtailed by lack of 
communication within and between departments. At the time of fieldwork, both the Kenyan 
National Commission for UNESCO and the National Council for Science and Technology 
(NCST) fell under the Ministry for Education, Science and Technology. A member of the 
Commission described those at NCST as "very close partners" and, indeed, as mentioned 
in the previous section, an NCST representative attended the April IGE meeting. 135 
Nevertheless, two members of NCST, who deal with biotechnology and bioethics 
respectively, did not know of the declarations. The former said that the connection with 
131 Interview with K_01. '32 Interviews with SA 16 and SA 23. ' 
133 
Interview with SA 17. 
135 
'34 Interview with SA_23. 
Interview with K 16. 
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UNESCO had never been clear, the latter that he had never heard of UNESCO engaging 
in any kind of bioethics activities. 13' Equally, the chief delegate to the IGE meetings 
appeared to be unaware of the ethical guidelines NCST had recently produced (see 
6-3.2). 137 Despite the various connections, then, it seems that key information was not 
shared within and between the National Commission for UNESCO and NCST. South 
Africa faced a similar problem, but between government units rather than within them, as 
it has separate departments for education and for science and technology. As explained 
at 5.1.4, UNESCO headquarters deals directly with the Department of Education (where 
the South African National Commission for UNESCO is housed), which did not consult 
with the Department of Science and Technology with regard to the UDBHR. A member of 
the latter complained, "Different government departments are not interacting enough, so 
that there is kind of an information gap between the different ones and not enough 
collaboration. "'38 
The lack of input into the declarations among non-state actors in Kenya and South Africa 
may be partly attributable to a low level of engagement in genetics and bioethics policy- 
making generally, among both scientists and the general public. Although several 
geneticists were sceptical of the declarations' legitimacy because they felt their views had 
not been adequately represented during negotiations, they were hesitant to involve 
themselves in policy-making. Their priorities are research and teaching, hence they have 
little time to spare for other endeavours, particularly given the small size of the scientific 
community in each country. 139 With regard to public involvement in policy-making, the 
picture is somewhat mixed in both Kenya and South Africa. In the former, Ministry of 
Health guidelines for research into HIV/AIDS vaccines, published in 2005, were developed 
in consultation with NGOs, community representatives, faith-based organisations and 
professional societies (as well as government officials, researchers and healthcare 
136 Interviews with K-20 and K-21 respectively. K-21 knew about the proposed regional centre at Egerton 
University, however (see 6.3.2.3), but had not realised it was a UNESCO initiative. 137 Interview with K_01. 38 Interview with SA 26. '39 Interviews with K_03, K_05, SA 03, SA 04, SA 07, SA 21, SA 30 and SA 35. 
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workers). 14° These guidelines notwithstanding, several interviewees were of the opinion 
that there is little public participation in bioethics and genetics matters in Kenya, with 
discussions tending to be confined to certain circles. 141 In South Africa, the mechanisms 
are in place for people to make comments on impending regulations or legislation. 142 It is 
mostly activist groups that take advantage of these, however, rather than the public at 
large. 143 The problem is that public understanding of ethics and genetics is low. '" At the 
time of fieldwork, a recent survey had shown that South Africans were "woefully ignorant" 
about biotechnology. 145 One geneticist commented that "they wouldn't know what to 
ask. 046 
To address this situation, the Department of Science and Technology in South Africa runs 
a Public Understanding of Biotechnology programme, which engages in a wide range of 
activities, such as drama presentations, exhibitions, science fairs and supporting schools' 
curricula. 147 The African Genome Education Initiative also has a mandate to increase 
public knowledge about genetics. 148 Some Kenyan interviewees intimated that public 
education would be useful in their country too, to demystify the research process and 
enable people to engage with ethics and genetics issues. "" Two organisations work in 
this area. The African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum endeavours to provide credible, 
balanced and up-to-date information on biotechnology, while Biosafety News, a 
newspaper and website, aims to act as a bridge between scientists and the general 
public. 150 With regard to the declarations, a representative from the latter said, At the 
moment, even if we carried something like that on our 'paper, I think people would be like, 
140 Ministry of Health, Kenya National Guidelines for Research and Development of HIV/AIDS Vaccines, vii. 141 Interviews with K 01, K 02, K_1 4, K_1 8. K-1 9, K_21 and K_26. 142 Interviews with SA 04, SA 10, SA 15, SA 16, SA 24, SA 29 and SA 33. 143 Interviews with SA 10, SA 16, SA 21, SA 27 and SA 33. 44 Interviews with SA 21, SA 27, SÄ 30 and SA 33. 146 Interviews with SA 26 (quoted) and SA 29. 146 Interview with SA 27. 147 Interviews with SA 26 and SA 29. 148 Interview with SA 11. 149 Interviews with K_1 7, K_1 9 and K--25. 150 Interviews with K_1 0 and K_1 4 respectively. 
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Whoa, what is this? ' I can tell you that for sure. nt51 (What actually constitutes informed 
public participation in decision-making is discussed further in Chapter 7. ) 
It is important to take note of these low levels of input-into the declarations directly and 
into genetics and bioethics policy generally-for two reasons. Firstly, the declarations 
themselves call for broader education and engagement around genetics and bioethics. 152 
Secondly, if the declarations are to be respected and implemented, they will need a wider 
support base than was evident during their negotiation. This was recognised by 
participants in the IGE meetings for the UDBHR in 2005 from both countries. The chief 
Kenyan delegate thought it necessary to share the declarations beyond those few who 
had attended the international negotiations. "Otherwise, " he remarked, "we go to those 
meetings, we keep quiet, that's the end of it. " At the time of fieldwork, he was planning to 
hold a meeting to raise awareness about the declaration and to discuss how It might be 
domesticated, to which he would invite "the experts, the communities and interested 
parties. "153 His South African counterpart likewise commented that the declaration's 
principles needed to be promoted among the general public: 
We all have a responsibility to ensure-not just as scientists, but as members of 
the general public-that this sort of best practice is part and parcel of the very core 
of our moral values. It doesn't matter that you only try to aspire to these when 
you're doing genetic research, it should be core principles and perhaps we should 
have some education around it. 
In order to achieve this, she said, the Department of Science and Technology and the 
Department of Health would have to work in partnership with the Department of Education 
(which had commissioned her participation in the UNESCO negotiations) at national and 
provincial levels, within an overall structural framework (see 6.3.2.2). The expertise of 
"someone well-versed in South African law" would also be required, to give guidance on 
how the declaration's articles could best be implemented "at a general public level. "t54 A 
member of the Department of Science and Technology outlined how the potential impact 
15' Interview with K 14. 152 The relevant articles are: UDHGHR, articles 20,21 and 23; IDHGD, articles 6 (a), 23 (a) and 24; and 
UDBHR, articles 18 (2 and 3), 19 (d), 22 (1) and 23 (1). 153 Interview with K_01. 154 Interview with SA 23. 
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of the declarations on South African biotechnology policy had already been lessened, 
because these connections had not been made earlier. He said: 
Bioethics is obviously a key issue in growing a biotechnology sector, so It's very 
important. It probably would have been useful if, at an early stage, we could have 
grappled with these things and taken them on board. Not that we haven't, but 
we've now developed our own thinking... well, almost in the absence of the 
UNESCO documents. "' 
For these endeavours to bear fruit, the Kenyan and South African National Commissions 
for UNESCO and their associates will have to find ways to overcome the difficulties 
previously faced in garnering wide input into genetics and bioethics policy, namely poor 
communications within government, reluctance among scientists to take time out from 
their core research and teaching activities and low public understanding of the issues at 
hand. Some responses from interviewees hint at how they might succeed in this. A long- 
standing member of a Kenyan ethics committee, making a general comment, described 
what could be achieved by engaging with government: "Our policy-makers here are fairly 
open, yes, they are quite open to new ideas. But as I say, you just need to empower them 
with the information, they need to know what you are talking about. "', 6 (Chapter 6 
discusses sensitisation further; see 6.3.2.1. ) With regard to scientists, two interviewees 
suggested that they would be more inclined to contribute to an initiative if they could see 
that the people behind it were serious and that it was going to translate into concrete 
outputs. 157 In terms of the general public, a member of the Africa Genome Education 
Initiative said that the declarations are important as a "global signpost, " but that people 
must be given the opportunity to recognise this. 158 Implementation and dissemination of 
155 Interview with SA_26. His colleague, by contrast, thought that the three declarations as a suite were good 
documents and that there was still time for them to contribute to the "enabling legislative framework" that the 
National Biotechnology Strategy calls for, where there were still gaps in South Africa's legislation or 
regulations. (Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, "A National Biotechnology Strategy for 
South Africa, " 50. ) The gaps he referred to, however, were in issues such as stem cell research, to which 
there are no references in the UNESCO declarations and, moreover, were to be covered In forthcoming 
national regulation; see 6.3.2.2. (Interview with SA 31. ) Iss Interview with K_19. 157 Interviews with K 03 and SA 27. K_03 made this comment in a personal capacity; SA 27 said this was 
how most South African scientists felt towards getting involved in policy-making. 158 Interview with SA 11. 
155 
the declarations are discussed further in Chapter 6; Chapter 7 examines how networking 
around the declarations might be improved. 
5.2.3 Implications for the GGI 
Doubts about the expertise of the delegates who had represented their countries at 
international level and the lack of opportunities to feed into what negotiating positions 
those delegates should have taken resulted in some interviewees in Kenya and South 
Africa having little time for the UNESCO declarations. This would suggest that legitimacy 
springs as much from the manner in which an organisation makes its decisions as from 
whether or not these are made by states. Might the proposed GGI be more successful 
than UNESCO in selecting representatives and generating input from a wide variety of 
stakeholders, thus fostering legitimacy through strong leadership and inclusive 
membership as planned? 
With regard to leadership, TJCB wrote in 2004 (as quoted previously in Chapter 2): 
We are now in the process of bringing together some of the best creative minds 
from these fields [industry, academia, civil society, government] to begin the 
dialogue and to learn from their experiences so that any decision-making will come 
from the bottom up. 159 
As shown at 5.1.5.1, however, none of the participants in this study were among these 
"creative minds, " nor had several of them even heard of the proposed network, despite the 
fact that they represent a cross-section of southern expertise in different aspects of 
genetics and bioethics. 160 This would imply that the GGI, should it be established, might 
face the same legitimacy problems as UNESCO, its selection processes also lacking 
transparency. Some participants stressed that exactly who would be involved would be a 
vital factor in the GGI's legitimacy. One welcomed the engagement with different sectors, 
158 Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 6. 160 Those from South Africa cannot have seen TJCB's December 2005 invitation for comments and 
expressions of interest on the proposed GGI in the journal Science and Public Policy, which read, "Let the 
dialogue begin. " (Dowdeswell, Daar and Singer, "Getting Governance into Genomics, " 498. ) 
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but nevertheless said that who was representing these would be significant. 16' Another 
saw the multisectoral approach as providing a "richness in input, " but only if the NGOs 
included were made up of "people from the ground. "'62 
In terms of wider input, TJCB intends that the proposed GGI would "exchange the politics 
of polarisation with a truly participatory process, " thereby facilitating global dialogue. Its 
aims include the provision of a discussion forum between the public and experts. ' What 
form this would take is not articulated, although the internet-based Africa Genome Policy 
Forum (AGPF), convened after TJCB's 2002 course on genomics policy (see 2.3.4.3), 
perhaps sets a precedent. Four of those in Kenya who had attended the course were 
interviewed. The first reported that no-one from the African Centre for Technology 
Studies, the course co-host, was still a member of the AGPF. '14 A second was no longer 
active on the forum because he did not have the time to be so. Both he and the third 
course participant said that contributions to the forum had slowed down greatly since its 
inception. 165 The fourth, on being asked about the AGPF, quipped, "Is that thing still 
alive? "166 The failure of the AGPF does not bode well for TJCB's plans for the GGI (or for 
Rischard's `electronic town meetings'). One geneticist, pondering how the network might 
work in practice, asked, "Should it be internet based? Is that disempowering because only 
certain people can afford access to internet facilities? "'67 The realities of internet access in 
Africa are discussed further in the next chapter. 
5.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that within UNESCO's Bioethics Programme, relations between 
North and South and between state and non-state actors are ostensibly equal or at least 
161 Interview, with SA 24. 162 Interview with SA--1 7. 163 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 132,136,138 and 139. 164 Interview with K 24. Iss Interviews with K 10 and K_1 1 respectively. 167 Interview with K i2. 167 Interview with K-05. 
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balanced at international level. The organisation has put in place rules and procedures to 
ensure that voices from all states, along with experts and stakeholders in genetics and 
bioethics, have had the opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, representation from 
developing countries has been disproportionately low at intergovernmental meetings and 
the ultimate power held by states has created something of a two-tier system of decision- 
making between them and non-state experts. At national level, in both Kenya and South 
Africa the legitimacy of the UNESCO declarations has been tarnished by people's 
perceptions that they were drafted in an unrepresentative and unaccountable manner. 
Although both countries had a presence at formal negotiations, if there was insufficient 
societal input into what their delegates were to take to the table, whether the people of 
Kenya and South Africa truly had a voice in these international deliberations is open to 
question. With regard to the proposed GG1, it would appear that few stakeholders in 
genetics and bioethics from the South (or at least from Kenya and South Africa) have 
been asked to join the network and that the plans for public participation may be beset by 
logistical hurdles, thus it may face similar legitimacy problems to UNESCO. How the 
problems of both organisations might be addressed is explored in Chapter 7. First, 
however, Chapter 6 examines the extent to which the UNESCO declarations are being 
implemented and enforced and whether the GGI would be likely to achieve its proposed 
goals, should it be established. 
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CHAPTER 6 NORMS. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Chapter 5 examined issues of representation, legitimacy and accountability in the 
elaboration of UNESCO's declarations on genetics and bioethics and in the proposed 
Global Genomics Initiative. It showed that whether the declarations are perceived to have 
been negotiated in an expert, fair and democratic manner could have a profound effect on 
the likelihood of their being adopted. So too could the nature of the norms, rules and 
principles contained therein and the mechanisms put in place to promote them. This 
chapter examines the content and strength of the UNESCO norms and the organisation's 
efforts to ensure they will be realised. It analyses the extent to which member states, 
particularly Kenya and South Africa, are implementing the declarations within their laws, 
regulations and policies and in what specific areas they might need support and guidance. 
Whether the norms and aims of the proposed GGI might be complementary to these 
endeavours is also discussed. 
6.1 NORMS 
Chapter 3 outlined two different categories of norms, namely those that govern decision- 
making procedures and those that prescribe rules and actions around particular issues. 
This section looks at the second kind, procedural norms having been examined in the 
previous chapter (in terms of which actors should be involved in deliberations and in what 
capacity). Specifically, it considers the prescriptive but non-binding norms on genetics and 
bioethics found within the three UNESCO declarations. It also ponders what the nature of 
the norms to be articulated by the GGI might be, should the network be established. 
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6.1.1 Norms in the UNESCO declarations 
Although not explicitly articulated within the declarations themselves, UNESCO views the 
articles they promulgate as norms: "A declaration, although of a non-binding character, 
constitutes a standard-setting instrument in Itself and therefore sets forth norms that 
States commit themselves to implement even if the term does not specifically figure in the 
text. "' The following sub-sections look at why UNESCO chose the declaratory and thus 
non-binding format for its instruments on genetics and bioethics, how states came to 
agree on the norms these instruments embody and what power, if any, lies behind the 
norms to ensure that states adhere to them. As shown at 2.3.4.1, the declarations 
elucidate norms on recognised bioethical principles such as autonomy and informed 
consent. They also contain several articles addressing issues pertinent to genetic and 
biomedical research in developing countries, including the transborder movement of 
samples and data; vulnerability; community engagement; the relevance of research to 
participants; benefit sharing; and genetics and ethics capacity building. (6.3.2 focuses on 
these issues, in the Kenyan and South African contexts. ) 
6.1.1.1 Non-binding norms 
For each UNESCO instrument, a decision had to be made as to what form it should take. 
The reasons given for the choice of a declaratory rather than conventional format were 
very similar in all three cases (and not uncommon among international institutions): firstly, 
states would be more likely to agree to non-binding norms; secondly, declarations are 
generally adopted more quickly than conventions; and thirdly, greater flexibility might be 
' UNESCO, "Information Meeting with IGBC on the Progress of the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal 
Norms on Bioethics, " 4. The term 'norm' has been deliberately avoided in the case of the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR, 2005), which was originally to be called Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics. The earlier title was seen to create confusion about the nature of the proposed 
document, stemming from the different types of norms recognised in international law: from the binding norms 
derived from treaties and conventions, to the non-binding norms of instruments such as declarations, to 
'programme norms', which "are not lines of conduct but programmes of action. " (Ibid. ) 
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beneficial in the rapidly changing fields of genetics and bioethics. For the UDHGHR 
(1997), the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) decided: 
An instrument not requiring ratification, accession or acceptance, is likely to be 
adopted more quickly than a formal agreement, whereas the binding nature of a 
convention could well discourage certain States from committing themselves in so 
complex and changeable an area. 2 
For the IDHGD (2003), it was thought that a declaratory instrument would not only 
facilitate consensus during the negotiation period, but also "allow for adaptations in a 
domain where the variety of situations covered, and the complexity of the subject, is 
constantly evolving with new scientific discoveries. "3 For the UDBHR (2005), the IBC 
again argued that a declaration would have the "greatest possible impact, " because it 
"would be better adapted to a constantly changing environment and would enable a 
broader consensus among Member States to be achieved rapidly. "4 
The views of a Kenyan official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chime with this reasoning. 
He corroborated that states are more likely to agree to declarations than conventions. As 
Kenya would not be legally bound by a declaration, he said, it would not be too worried if 
not all its requirements were met during negotiations. 5 With regard to speed, the drafting 
process for each declaration was indeed relatively quick. The UDHGHR (1997) took only 
four years to finalise and the UDBHR (2005) less than two years. 6 The advantages of 
declarations over conventions in terms of adoption and speed carry a pay-off when it 
2 UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 79. 3 UNESCO, "UNESCO Adopts International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, " 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php-URL ID=16742&URL DO=DO_TOPIC&URL SECTION-201. htmi 
accessed 21 June 2007). 
UNESCO, "Report of the Third Session of the IGBC, " 7-8. 
6 
Interview with K 30. 6 UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1; UNESCO, 
"Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Progress Report January 2005, " PowerPoint 
presentation available at 
http: /portal. unesco. org/shs/en/file download. php/50523d754289e00aad6d1699Od576e22Bioethics+Declaratl 
on(jan. 2005). ppt (accessed 9 July 2007). The speed with which the UDBHR was drafted was at the expense 
of a better document, in the opinion of one attendee at the IGE meetings. (Interview with UK 02. ) Similarly, 
the two years the Bioethics Programme was given to elaborate the declaration had been "completely 
unrealistic, " according to a member of the secretariat, although it had responded by making the process much 
more intensive than for the previous declarations. (Interview with F_011. ) A sense of urgency did not permeate 
the January 2005 IGBC and IBC meetings, however. They did not start on time and coffee and lunch breaks 
lasted longer than stipulated in the programme. During negotiations the IGBC chair made several pleas for 
brevity, describing the quick and efficient discussion of one section of the declaration as a "demi-miracle 
(IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, personal observations. ) 
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comes to the persuasive force of their norms and the rate at which they are implemented, 
however (see 6.1.1.3). The argument for declaratory instruments on the grounds of 
flexibility is less defensible, as illustrated below. 
6 . 1.1.2 Norm content 
Apart from the reasons outlined above, declaratory instruments were also considered 
appropriate because states would be able to interpret them as they saw fit within their 
national contexts. As identified in Chapter 2, UNESCO's aim has been to elaborate 
universal norms that take account of the different traditions of its member states. 
Accordingly, the UDHGHR (1997) is intended to "transcend different cultural, political and 
religious sensitivities, "7 whilst for the IDHGD (2003), "the declaratory form of the 
instrument was chosen for its appropriateness in the elaboration of principles that States 
can interpret taking into account their legal systems and different cultural, economic and 
social circumstances. " The General Conference commissioned a balanced approach to 
the drafting of the UDBHR (2005), judging that universal standards were needed In 
bioethics, but that these should be set "in the spirit of cultural pluralism inherent In 
bioethics"9 (italics added). 
In order that these mandates be fulfilled, the declarations contain only general principles, 
to which all states were able to agree without conceding their cultural and political 
particularities. 10 Thus they are more in keeping with Young's observations about the 
messy process of regime negotiation than with Victor et als on non-binding agreements 
' UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 28. During the 
drafting of the declaration Alastair Iles averred that it would be "constrained in its vision and transformative 
potential, " because of the need to accommodate "vast cultural and political diversity. " (Iles, "The Human 
Genome Project, " 43. ) 
8 UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data: Final Report, " 3. 9 Resolution 24. UNESCO, "Volume 1: Resolutions, " Records of the General Conference, 32nd Session, 
Paris, 29 September to 17 October 2003,32 C/Resolutions (Paris: 2004), 47. 
10 Roberto Andomo, a member of the IBC during the drafting of the UDBHR, writes of the declaration, 
"Regardless of the weaknesses inherent to this kind of instrument, the very fact that virtually all states reached 
an agreement in this sensitive area is in itself a major achievement. " (Andorno, "Global Bioethics at 
UNESCO, " 150. ) 
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encapsulating less compromised standards than binding ones (see 3.5.3). Articles are 
more or less specific depending on the issue concerned. Some appear reasonably 
detailed. All three declarations, for example, lay out guidelines for authorisation for 
research with persons without the capacity to consent" and the IDHGD (2003) and 
UDBHR (2005) offer concrete suggestions as to what benefit sharing might actually entail, 
such as provision of new diagnostics and drugs or capacity building in data collection and 
research. 12 Even so, these are minimal in comparison with the equivalent sections of the 
CIOMS (Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences) International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (2002), which run to 
several paragraphs. 13 
Other articles in the declarations use vague or non-committal language and some 
controversial issues were avoided altogether. 14 A significant feature of the UDHGHR 
(1997) is that it says of the human genome, in a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of 
humanity" (article 1). Although UNESCO considered this conceptually innovative, the 
stronger formulation "common heritage of humanity" was used in earlier drafts, a 
recognised term in international law (as applied to the sea and outer space, for example) 
and the one adopted by the Human Genome Organisation. Noelle Lenoir, then president 
of the IBC, described the application of this legal term to the human species as "the main 
originality" of the draft declaration. 15 Member states made the change, concerned that the 
" UDHGHR, article 5e; IDHGD, articles 8b and c; UDBHR, article 7. The stipulations of the declaration on 
human genetic data (IDHGD, 2003) are less detailed than those of the other two declarations in this regard, 
perhaps because of the potentially smaller risk associated with the collection of genetic samples or information 
than with other forms of biomedical research. 'Z IDHGD, article 19; UDBHR, article 15. 13 CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, guidelines 9 
and 15 (research with those without the capacity to consent) and 7,10 and 21 (benefit sharing). Ruth Macklin 
sees the UDBHR (2005) as striking the right balance between brevity and "a rehearsal of mere pieties. * She 
acknowledges that it is not as detailed as the CIOMS guidelines, but compares it favourably with the 
Declaration of Helsinki in terms of ground covered. (Macklin, "Yet Another Guideline? " 248. ) 14 Several commentators have criticised the declarations for being vague and indeterminate. (Harmon, "The 
Significance of UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome & Human Rights; 33; Taylor, 
"Globalization and Biotechnology, " 510; Abbing, "International Declaration on Human Genetic Data", 93; 
Landman and Schüklenk, "From the Editors, " iv; Williams, "UNESCO's Proposed Declaration -A Bland Compromise, " 213; Benatar, 'he Trouble with Universal Declarations, " 221. ) Some IBC members have 
framed the declarations' generality more positively, as a necessary step in reaching an international 
consensus from which states can draw in making more firm regulations. (Andomo, "Biomedicine and 
International Human Rights Law, " 960; Butler (verbally quoting Lenoir), "Ethics Treaty to Target Genome 
Implications, " 369. ) 
15 Lenoir, "Bioethics and UNESCO, " 12-22. 
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idea of "common heritage" could be misconstrued to justify the appropriation of human 
genetic sequences for commercial purposes. 16 Relatedly, they added an article on 
commercialisation just before the declaration was adopted: "The human genome in its 
natural state shall not give rise to financial gains" (article 4). " While this would appear to 
guard against gene patenting, the phrase "in its natural state" renders the article 
ambiguous. "Given that the ethical and legal problem is raised precisely by the patenting 
of human DNA sequences in something other than its natural form, " writes Roberto 
Andorno, "... the Declaration gives the impression of having eluded the real problem. w18 
Elke-Henner Kluge makes a similar criticism, arguing that the article could be interpreted 
to justify gene patenting on the grounds that this concerns only parts of the human 
genome, which if separated from "their contextual DNA" would not be In their natural 
state. 19 (Issues around patenting, with their ensuing implications for benefit sharing, also 
arose during the negotiations for the IDHGD (2003), resulting in the compromises 
described at 5.1.1.2. ) 
There were a number of issues during the drafting of the UDBHR (2005) that proved 
difficult or impossible to resolve. Group IV (Asian) and Group I (Western European and 
other) states were at odds over whether the declaration should extend to the biosphere or 
be limited to humans2° and a definition of the term 'bioethics' had to be dropped because 
consensus on wording and scope could not be reached. 1 Of most relevance to research 
ethics was the furore over an article on risk assessment; states were unable to agree 
whether or not it should incorporate the precautionary principle. The eventual resolution 
at the June IGE session epitomises many regime negotiations: "The meeting decided to 
is Andorno, "Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues, " 107. 18 Knoppers, "Status, Sale and Patenting of Human Genetic Material, " 24. t8 Andorno, "Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues, " 111. 19 Kluge, "Patenting Human Genes, " 124. 
20 The debate concerning the scope of the declaration, in terms of how far it should address the biosphere and 
environmental issues, pervades the copious UNESCO documentation concerning the UDBHR cited In this 
thesis. 
21 UNESCO, "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Final Report, " 2-3. 22 The precautionary principle can be defined as follows: "Precaution-the 'precautionary principle' or 
'precautionary approach'-is a response to uncertainty, in the face of risks to health or the environment. In 
general, it involves acting to avoid serious or irreversible potential harm, despite lack of scientific certainty as 
to the likelihood, magnitude, or causation of that harm. " (The Precautionary Principle Project, 'hat Is the 
Precautionary Principle? " www. pprinciple. net/the. _precautionary-principle. 
html, accessed 2 November 2007. ) 
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retain the article by amending it in such a way as to formulate a general principle without 
going into detail. P, 23 Hence the article's rather nebulous wording: 
Appropriate assessment and adequate management of risk related to medicine, 
life sciences and associated technologies should be promoted24 
as compared with draft formulations, for example: 
When scientific evidence of serious or irreversible damage to public health or 
human welfare or the environment is not sufficient, provisional, adequate and 
proportionate measures shall be taken in a timely manner. Such measures shall 
be based on the best scientific knowledge available and on procedures that are 
specially designed for evaluating the ethical issues at stake. These measures 
should be carried out in accordance with the principles set out in this Declaration 
and with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. 25 
It seems, then, that the 'lowest common denominator' effect could not be avoided in this 
case, despite the non-binding nature of the declaration. 
How controversial issues in bioethics might be included in the text also proved 
irresolvable. Thus no mention is made of gene therapy or stem cell research, for Instance. 
Instead, general and procedural principles are intended to provide a basis for the search 
for common positions" on issues for which no such position could be found in specific 
terms. 26 The ! BC tried to make provision for these issues to figure in future revisions to the 
declaration, with the following clauses: 
31 (c) Five years after its adoption and thereafter on a periodical basis, UNESCO 
shall take appropriate measures to examine the Declaration in the light of scientific 
and technological development and, if necessary, to ensure its revision, in 
accordance with UNESCO's statutory procedures 
and 
23 UNESCO, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 7. 24 UDBHR, article 20. 25 UNESCO, "Elaboration of the Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Fourth Outline of a Text, " 
SHS/EST/04/CIB-Gred-2/4 Rev. 3 (Paris: 15 December 2004), 8 (article 23). 
26 UNESCO, "Second Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on Universal 
Norms on Bioethics, " 1. 
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31 (d) With respect to the principles set forth herein, this Declaration could be 
further developed through international instruments adopted by the General 
Conference of UNESCO, in accordance with UNESCO's statutory procedures. 27 
The governmental representatives removed the clauses at their June 2005 IGE meeting, 
however, considering them inappropriate 28 Thus it appears that the declaration will be 
less flexible in a "constantly changing environment" than the IBC initially hoped. 
6.1.1.3 The strength of non-binding norms 
Although the declarations, by definition, cannot be binding, what states might seemingly 
be obligated to do was still of concern during negotiations. There was substantial debate 
during the drafting of both the IDHGD (2003) and the UDBHR (2005) over whether states 
'shall' or 'should' implement their principles. At the IDHGD IGE meeting, the participants 
agreed that insofar as possible the word 'shall' would be replaced by 'should' or by 'may' 
in the text of the preliminary draft. "2' For the UDBHR, some states felt that 'shall' could be 
used as an indication of moral commitment, without compromising the non-binding nature 
of the text, whilst others were adamant that only the conditional form was appropriate 
within a declaration (except in regard to actions prescribed for UNESCO). 30 A more 
specific example concerns the free flow and sharing of scientific and technological 
knowledge. An article in the draft UDBHR asserting that states should "make every effort 
to guarantee" these was softened so that they should merely "encourage" them, after 
several members of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC) objected to the 
27 UNESCO, "Elaboration of the Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Fourth Outline; 10. The 
Director-General of UNESCO and Justice Kirby, chair of the UDBHR's drafting group, both remarked at the 
January 2005 IGBC and IBC meetings that consensus on the more controversial Issues might be possible In 
the future and therefore the draft declaration made provision for this. (IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 
January 2005, personal observations. ) 
UNESCO, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 7-8. 29 Only in relation to the IBC and IGBC was 'shall' retained. (UNESCO, "Meeting of Government Experts: Final 
Report, " 4. ) 
30 Interview with UK 01; UNESCO, "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Final Report, " 3. Some states were giving their positions on this 
issue from the second written consultation onwards (October to December 2004). (UNESCO, "Results of the 
Written Consultation on the Third Outline of the Text of a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics (27 
August 2004), " 1,3,7,19,21,24,26,32 and 33. ) 
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stronger formulation at the January 2005 meetings 31 (See also 6.2.3, which considers 
states' objections to reporting requirements. ) 
Members of the Bioethics Programme's secretariat place a high value on the commitment 
of states to the implementation of the declarations that each of the texts articulates. Jan 
Helge Solbakk, chief of the Bioethics Section, in a presentation on the UDBHR, opined 
that this commitment made the declaration "harder than soft law, " in that it differed from a 
document like the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki., Ethical Principles 
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, which can have only moral weight. 32 
Another member of the Programme said in an interview that if the declarations were taken 
up by states in national legislation, they would override all other existing international 
instruments (although he thought this adoption rather unlikely to happen). 33 
The three declarations vary slightly in what is expected of member states in terms of 
compliance. While several articles of the UDHGHR (1997) allude to national law in relation 
to research ethics, confidentiality and reparation for damage, 34 the section on promotion of 
its principles requires states to do this "through education and relevant means" and "all 
appropriate measures" (whatever those might be), rather than through codification per 
se. 35 In the IDHGD (2003) and the UDBHR (2005) the legislative push is stronger: states 
are to "take all appropriate measures, whether of a legislative, administrative or other 
character, " to give effect to the declarations' principles. 38 This stipulation is reinforced in 
the UDBHR, one of its stated aims being to provide a universal framework to guide states 
in formulating legislation, policies or other instruments on bioethics. 37 Two South African 
geneticists said the declarations would need action behind them to move them beyond 
31 UNESCO, "Elaboration of the Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Fourth Outline, " 9 (article 28 
(a); UDBHR, article 24 (1). The states which objected were Canada, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Latvia and the 
United States (IGBC meeting, Paris, 25 January 2005, personal observations. ) 32 Jan Helge Solbakk, "Towards a Global BioPolicy? The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights in Perspective, " keynote speech, BioCentre: Global Perspectives on BioPolicy Symposium 
Series, London, 16 March 2007. Macklin echoes this, seeing the UDBHR's "greatest strength" in its "stature as 
an international declaration issued by a United Nations Organization. " (Macklin, op cit, 244. ) 33 Interview with F 01. 34 UDHGHR, articles 5,7 and 8. 35 Ibid, articles 20 and 22. 36 IDHGD, article 23; UDBHR, article 22. 37 UDBHR, article 2 (a). 
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being merely "a nice statement" or "nice platitudes. "38 One supporter of the declarations 
agreed: "I think that this [the UDBHR] has been a helpful document and now it's just a 
matter of how it filters down to more of a grassroots level "39 (6.3 onwards looks at how far 
this is in fact happening. ) 
In several of its reports concerning the declarations, UNESCO refers to the practice within 
the UN of first adopting a declaration and then following up with a binding instrument at a 
later date (as was the case with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
subsequent covenants on political, social and economic rights). Federico Mayor, former 
Director-General of UNESCO, wrote in the preface to a book on the history of the 
UDHGHR (1997), "Eventually, UNESCO should perhaps, on the basis of a searching 
evaluation of the measures taken and the prevailing situation, take the Initiative once 
again so as to entrench the principles enshrined in the Declaration more firmly in law. "4° In 
reality, the evaluation UNESCO undertook proved less than searching (see 6.2.3). 
Mayor's use of the word 'eventually' and the fact that, ten years after the declaration was 
adopted, there is no hint that a convention might be forthcoming are perhaps Indicative of 
the time delays that can occur within traditional IGOs, as Identified by Rischard 41 A 
member of the Bioethics Programme thought it might be possible to combine the 1997 
and 2003 genetics declarations to form a convention in the future, but said that this would 
depend on the global political climate; for conventions, he observed, "the politics Is much 
heavier. 9942 
38 Interviews with SA 27 and SA 20 respectively. 39 Interview with SA 37. 40 UNESCO, Birth ö1 the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Ill. 41 After three declarations, UNESCO is taking a "normative pause" and instead concentrating on supporting 
the implementation of the declarations at regional and national levels. (UNESCO, "Address by Mr KoTchiro 
Matsuura, Director General of UNESCO, " twelfth session of the IBC, Tokyo, Japan, 15-17 December 2005, 
DG/2005/201,4. ) 
42 Interview with F-01. 
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6.1.2 Duplication of norms 
As articulated in Chapters 2 and 5, the declarations are considered by UNESCO to be 
unique among international bioethics instruments because they have been agreed by 
states. At the June 2005 IGE meeting, the Director-General declared that the UDBHR, 
once adopted, would "close a wide gap at the international level. 43 The declarations' 
intergovernmental origins were not necessarily seen as significant by those In Kenya and 
South Africa who practise bioethics, however, many of whom refer to the Declaration of 
Helsinki and the CIOMS guidelines for international level guidance and thus do not 
perceive there to have been the same "wide gap" as did the Director-General. " 
Particularly with regard to the UDBHR (2005), several people saw what to them was 
simply another international bioethics declaration as unnecessary, or thought that people 
might become confused as to which guidelines (and the norms contained therein) to 
follow. One lamented, 'here is a plethora of different guidelines that people are trying 
hard to get to grips with. " Another, who sits on several research ethics committees 
(RECs), was of the opinion that there are too many "talk-shops" coming up with 
declarations, to the detriment of implementation "on the ground "45 
43 UNESCO, "Second Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " Annex 11,1-2. 44 Professor Henk ten Have of the Bioethics Programme has described the governmental commitment as the 
"innovative dimension" of the bioethics declaration (ten Have, "The Activities of UNESCO in the Area of 
Ethics, " 342. ) The declaration is also considered to go further than existing codes of ethics, because it Is not 
confined to research ethics. (UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Drawing Up of a Declaration 
on Universal Norms for Bioethics, " 6. ) Since this thesis is concerned with research ethics only, however, to 
what degree the declarations go beyond existing codes in this area in particular is of primary Interest. The 
Helsinki declaration and the CIOMS guidelines have been adopted by professional organisations rather than 
UN agencies (although CIOMS is in official relations with WHO). Where the former Is officially directed at 
physicians or researchers, however, the latter, like the UNESCO declarations, are Intended to be used in the 
designing of national policy on biomedical research ethics, particularly in developing countries (World Medical 
Association, Declaration of Helsinki, 1; CIOMS, op cit. ) The Helsinki declaration is generally considered the 
foremost document globally on medical research ethics and, with the CIOMS guidelines, forms the bedrock of 
research ethics in many developing countries. (Carlson, Boyd and Webb, 'he Revision of the Declaration of 
Helsinki, " 695; Fluss, "The Evolution of Research Ethics, " 601; Bhutta, "Ethics in International Health 
Research, " 115. ) The UDBHR is unusual among international instruments in that it notes these non-UN 
documents in its preamble. This is because, during the drafting, bioethicists found it strange that these should 
be excluded from the text. (Comment by Justice Kirby, IGBC meeting, Paris, 25 January 2005, personal 
observation. ) A member of the UNESCO Bioethics Programme, in an Interview in August 2005, acknowledged 
that the Helsinki declaration was better known among scientists and researchers than the UNESCO 
declarations. (Interview with F_01. ) The following scientists and ethics committee members said that their 
institutions refer to the Helsinki declaration and the CIOMS guidelines: K-06. K__07, K_08, K-09, K_17, K_19, 
SA 10, SA 04, SA 14, SA 19, SA_24, SA 30 and SA 35. 45 Interviews with K_06 and SA 17 respectively (both quoted). K-07, K-09, K_1 7, K-28, SA 04, SA 08, 
SA_1 0, SA_1 4, SA 15, SA 20, SA 25, SA 27, SA 33 and SA 35 made similar comments. One person 
opined that although the declarations are useful as a reference point, by and large research ethics committees 
in South Africa are already aware of the principles enshrined in the declarations' articles. (Interview with 
SA 32. ) 
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Other participants were more positive about the declarations. Some thought them 
complementary to pre-existing instruments or that it was useful to be able to draw on 
different perspectives. 46 As an illustration, researchers at the Kilifi KEMRI-Wellcome Trust 
Collaborative Programme in Kenya and the South African National Bioinformatics 
Institute, when faced with a particular ethical problem, will look to synthesise all the 
relevant resources in order to reach the most appropriate solution 47 Some interviewees 
valued the declarations as benchmarks that could be referred to in lobbying for the 
introduction of internationally agreed standards at national level, 48 or like UNESCO saw 
additional guidelines as necessary in an era of new technologies and scientific 
developments. 49 A member of two Kenyan RECs, for example, was particularly interested 
in the genetics declarations, because she thought it likely her committees would have to 
assess a growing number of protocols for research in this area in the future. 10 Several 
welcomed all three declarations as reinforcing and fleshing out important principles of 
social responsibility, benefit sharing and capacity building. 51 
The GG I, should it be established, would, like UNESCO, elaborate norms on genetics and 
bioethics. TJCB's most recent publication (2006) on the proposed network includes 
among the projected aims, `The GGI could also help draft norms and principles for the 
global harmonisation of ethical standards applied to genomic technology research, with 
benefit sharing and risk minimisation. "52 "Global harmonisation" implies that these norms 
would be definitive, yet it seems unlikely that they would be accepted as such unless the 
GGI should develop a profile to rival that of the UN, or indeed the World Medical 
Association or CIOMS. Also implied in this aim is that the GGI would fill a gap in currently 
46 Interviews with SA 06, SA 24, SA 25, SA_26, SA 30, SA 31. " Interviews with I( 07 and §k62. 4'3 K 16 (informal conversation), SA 13, SA 23 and SA_30. Henriette Abbing, writing soon after the adoption 
of the UDHGHR (1997), saw it as having this potential: "The Declaration, in providing a framework which is 
based on general consensus, certainly will support developments in those countries where human rights in 
relation to genetics are not yet sufficiently guaranteed by the law nor applied In practice. It can be called upon 
in case of practices not in line with the principles layed [sic] down in the declaration. ' (Abbing, "New 
Developments in International Health Law, " 157. ) David Benatar has similarly said of the UDBHR, "In favour of 
declarations it might be said that they constitute a rallying cry, an effective political instrument for noble Ideas. " 
ýBenatar, op cit, 223. ) 
9K 10, K 19, K 29 and SA 32. 50 Interview with K_25. 51 Interviews with K 17, K 19, SA 12, SA 24, SA 33 and SA 37. 52 Dowdeswell eta!, "Realising the Promise of Genomics, " 138. 
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existing norms in genetics and bioethics (as espoused by the various bodies already 
mentioned, including UNESCO), by encouraging risk minimisation. What direction this 
might take is perhaps indicated by TJCB's deeming the GGI necessary partly because 
"traditional governance models" focus disproportionately on risk and restriction. 53 The 
UNESCO declarations cannot be charged with any such failing, however; alongside 
ethical procedures, they advocate scientific freedom, capacity building and the promotion 
of science and technology for addressing inequalities of health. 
6.2 INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
The real key to whether UNESCO's declarations or the proposed GG1's norms and 
principles can be successful as instruments of governance will tie in the extent to which 
they are taken up by states and other actors; having formalised norms is only a first step. 
This is illustrated by quotes from two participants. The first said of UNESCO, "Of course, 
the implementation is quite different from the declarations themselves, " whilst the second 
said of the GGI, "Of course, there's one thing with coming up with guidelines and [another] 
people adhering to them. "M The UNESCO Director-General has similarly commented on 
the UDBHR (2005), "Its adoption is just the beginning. To give full life to the Declaration 
and render it effective, the most important part of the work remains to be done. "55 Whilst a 
non-binding instrument will have been more likely than a binding one to foster broad 
agreement during negotiations on what its various principles should be, acceptance at 
national level in terms of implementation will be less certain, precisely because it cannot 
be enforced. This section examines UNESCO's attempts to ensure its member states take 
up the genetics and bioethics declarations and assesses whether the GGI's planned 
activities would be likely to be carried out successfully. Although the declarations might be 
considered "harder than soft law, " it will be shown that implementation activities on the 
53 Ibid, 134. 
54 Interviews with K 29 and SA 19 respectively. 55 UNESCO, "Address by Mr Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, " twelfth session of the IBC, 3. 
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part of UNESCO tend to take a management approach, aimed at encouragement and 
facilitation. This is particularly the case with regard to what the declarations seemingly 
obligate states to do, their non-binding status notwithstanding, such as reporting to 
UNESCO on a regular basis (see 6.2.3). The GGI, should it be established, may have to 
employ similarly gentle tactics. 
6.2.1 Capacity building 
One of UNESCO's foremost activities in promoting the declarations is dissemination, in 
order that they reach as wide an audience as possible. By October 2001, half a million 
copies of the UDHGHR (1997) had been published, in twenty languages. Furthermore, 
over eighty articles on the declaration had been published worldwide and over forty 
television and radio interviews given. The International Society of Bioethics awarded its 
2002 Prize to UNESCO, for its work on the UDHGHR and in bioethics in general. 66 
Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter 5, the declaration does not appear to be widely 
known, at least in Kenya and South Africa. This is also the case for the second 
declaration, the IDHGD (2003). Almost two years after its adoption, many countries were 
not even aware that there is such a declaration. "57 One interviewee, a geneticist, 
suggested that UNESCO publish the declarations in scientific journals, to heighten 
awareness among his community. 58 
UNESCO also disseminates reports by the IBC that give guidance on particular principles 
of the declarations or on contemporary issues in bioethics. A member of the Bioethics 
Programme explained that, because member states sometimes arrive at a formulation for 
an article that is "open to multiple interpretations, " one of the IBC's duties is to work out 
how to go from "the very general level of the principle to much more practical guidelines, 
ss UNESCO, "Bioethics Programme: Priorities and Prospects, " 162 EX/13,6 and 7. 57 Portugal, Israel and Turkey are exceptions, where IBC members have liaised with their National 
Commissions to provide local translations. (Interview with F 01. ) 58 Interview with K_05. 
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how to do it in different countries and cultures. "59 Such reports were welcomed by a 
university lecturer and member of several ethics committees, as she surmised that the 
declarations themselves were probably "very distilled, easily misinterpreted perhaps, 
truncations. " She was unenthused by the IBC's reports on cutting edge technologies, 
however, which she described as "totally irrelevant to the vast majority of the world. n6° 
A South African geneticist echoed these sentiments. 6t The most recent reports examine 
how some of the standards set in the UDBHR (2005) on informed consent and social 
responsibility might be implemented. Draft versions were presented at the fourteenth 
session of the IBC in Nairobi, Kenya, in May 2007.2 The report on informed consent 
(finalised in Kenya) provides explanations of the relevant principles in the UDBHR and 
gives examples of how they might be applied in certain contexts, while the draft report on 
social responsibility outlines issues and initiatives around global health. 63 In the biennium 
2008-2009 the IBC is to continue to work on social responsibility and health and to begin 
to explore issues around article 8 of the UDBHR, on human vulnerability and personal 
integrity. It may also look at neuroethics, genetic testing and traditional medicine and 
biopiracy. " Much of the IBC's current work, then, concerns matters that might be 
considered to be of particular interest to developing countries. All the committees' reports, 
as well as other documentation about UNESCO's ethics programmes, are freely available 
on the UNESCO website. 65 
A third information source provided by UNESCO Is the Global Ethics Observatory 
(GEObs), launched in December 2005.66 GEObs covers the ethics of science and 
technology and the environment as well as bioethics and hosts five web-based databases, 
comprising ethics experts, institutions (including national bioethics committees), teaching 
59 Interview with F_01. co Interview with SA 14. s1 Interview with SA 20. s2 UNESCO, "Fourteenth Session of the International Bioethics Committee, Nairobi, Kenya, 17.19 May 2007: 
Programme, " SHS/EST/CIB-14/07/CONF. 507/INF. 2 (4 May 2007). 
63 UNESCO, "Report of the IBC on Consent" and "Preliminary Draft Report of the IBC Working Group on 
Social Responsibility and Health. " 64 UNESCO, 'Work Programme of IBC for 2008-2009, " SHS/CIB-14/07/CONF. 507/INF. 6 (Paris: 1 June 2007). 
ss See www. unesco. org/bloethics. ss GEObs can be accessed at www. unesco. org/shs/ethics/geobs. It is available in all six official languages of 
UNESCO: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. 
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programmes, legislation or guidelines and codes of conduct. 67 UNESCO believes that 
GEObs will be a "crucial platform" for supporting member states in their ethics activities 68 
People designing new ethics courses might use the education section to seek the advice 
of those with previous experience, for example: "It's a kind of facilitator of contacts among 
different people. "69 Thus GEObs has the potential to become a Slaughter-like information 
network (see 7.6). 
Several South African interviewees welcomed the GEObs initiative, partly because it 
would provide information they did not have access to elsewhere. 7° One ethics lecturer 
asserted, "It would be very useful, absolutely. I certainly don't know of anything like that. "" 
A second thought the education section would help people enrolling in ethics programmes 
to ensure that they were going to be taught by suitably qualified teachers rather than "fly- 
by-night" ethicists (who "waltz in and start teaching ethics without proper training") and 
might also highlight where courses are lacking and thus encourage more funding (this is 
indeed a secondary purpose of the initiative, see 6.2.3). 72 One person who had been 
asked to provide information concerning his institution's interest in the GEObs programme 
was less enthusiastic, however, as this would require devoting considerable time to what 
seemed like a focus on the "bureaucratic organisation" of research ethics, rather than 
scholarly aspects of bioethics, which require more attention. 73 
UNESCO's website headlines, "UNESCO's new Global Ethics Observatory puts ethics 
within everyone's reach. "74 In particular, it is hoped that GEObs will enable people in 
developing countries to access resources such as reports and guidelines quickly. 75 As per 
the consultation on the draft bioethics declaration (see Chapter 5, note 77), there appears 
s' UNESCO, "GEObs: Global Ethics Observatory, " SHS-2006/WS/9/REV (Paris: 2006). 
68 UNESCO, "Global Ethics Observatory (GEObs), " www. unesco. org/shs/ethics/geobs (accessed 22 August 
2007). 
69 Interview with F 01. 70 Interviews with §A 08, SA 10, SA 15, SA 24, SA 35 and SA 37. 71 Interview with SA 14. 72 Interview with SA_16. 73 Interview with SA 09. 
" UNESCO, "UNESCO's new Global Ethics Observatory puts Ethics Within Everyone's Reach, " 
http: /portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL ID=9084&URL_DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html 
5 
accessed 22 June 2007). 
Interview with F-01. 
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to be an assumption that the internet is easily or freely available to all. This is not 
necessarily the case, however, especially in the South. The IBC's own draft report on 
social responsibility and health notes that 80 per cent of the world's population does not 
have access to basic telecommunications technology. 76 One African delegate to the 
January 2005 joint IGBC and IBC sessions described how it had been difficult for him to 
access the relevant documents before the meetings because his office did not have an 
internet connection, which had a detrimental effect on his preparations. " Similarly, a 
Kenyan representative at the April and June IGE meetings explained that his internet 
access was slow and costly. He surmised, "So many people are not even interested to 
know-if you are not directly involved, why should you read about UNESCO? "78 These 
testimonies bear out Chasek and Rajamani's observations concerning the accessibility of 
online documentation to IGO delegates from developing countries. Others in Kenya, also 
connected with UNESCO, viewed new communications technologies more positively, 
however, believing they could facilitate the country's greater involvement in bioethics and 
genetics. A member of the National Commission believed email would enable Kenya to 
assert itself more strongly on the IGBC, whilst in regard to capacity development In 
science and technology, a scientific advisor to the Commission and the Kenyan 
government averred, 'We don't need to build new buildings, we can communicate through 
the internet. n79 
Alongside information dissemination, UNESCO has more active programmes aimed at 
facilitating uptake of the declarations. Firstly, under the auspices of the Bioethics 
Programme, it supports the establishment of national bioethics committees. These 
committees provide a clear point of contact with which the Programme can liaise and are 
seen as intermediary steps towards the long-term goal of state level legislation 80 
According to a report from 2001, committees had then been set up in seven countries, 
including South Africa (although this was not mentioned by a single participant during 
76 UNESCO, "Preliminary Draft Report of the IBC Working Group on Social Responsibility and Health, " 8. " IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, informal conversation. 78 Interview with K_01. 
Interviews with K_16 and K_13 (quoted) respectively. eo Interview with F_011. 
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fieldwork). 81 More recently, this work has continued under a programme entitled Assisting 
Bioethics Committees. In 2007, for example, committees were to be established in Ghana 
and Togo 82 As well as this direct support, the programme distributes guidelines on how to 
set up, run and educate bioethics committees, with a further volume on public outreach 
forthcoming. 83 Some interviewees welcomed these 84 One, who teaches on the southern 
African research ethics training programme SARETI (see 6.3.2.3), described the 
guidelines as "very, very useful, " as for many students their first task on returning to their 
home countries is to form an ethics committee 85 As with the declarations themselves, 
however, some people were ambivalent, because they did not see "a big gap in 
literature. "8e 
UNESCO's second capacity building activity is the Ethics Education Programme (EEP), 
which is developing a pilot programme on how to teach ethics in science and technology 
and a core course on bioethics, based on the principles of the UDBHR. 87 Beyond 
facilitating the fulfilment of the particular articles in the three declarations concerning 
ethics education and training, ' UNESCO hopes that the EEP (with the education section 
of GEObs) will ensure that "future generations of scientists and professionals" learn the 
principles in the declarations, whether or not states develop legislation 89 In 2004-2005 the 
EEP focused on East and Central Europe. In 2006-2007 it was to have concentrated on 
African, Arab and Asian countries, according to the EEP webpage in 2005, but a 
81 UNESCO, "Bioethics Programme, " 162 EX113,6. The other countries were Algeria, We d'Ivoire, Jamaica, 
Morocco, Nepal and Senegal. 
82 UNESCO, "The UNESCO Bioethics Programme: Promotion and Dissemination of the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights and Capacity-building Activities, " presentation at the fourteenth session of the 
IBC, Nairobi, Kenya, 17 to 19 May 2007. 
83 ten Have, op cit, 346; UNESCO, "Guide No. 3: Educating Bioethics Committees, " 
http: //Portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL_ID=l 1327&URL DO=D0 TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html 
accessed 18 September 2007). 
° Interviews with SA 10 and SA-1 5. e5 Interview with SA 24. 86 Interviews with SA 37 (quoted), K_21, SA_17 and SA 35. Some of these interviewees were concerned that 
UNESCO's guidelines would duplicate national and international documents that deal specifically with 
research ethics committees (RECs). As well as RECs, UNESCO's guidelines cover various forms of bioethics 
committees, however, namely policy-making or advisory committees, health professional association 
committees and healthcare or hospital ethics committees. (See UNESCO, "Guide No 1: Establishing Bioethics 
Committees. ") 
87 UNESCO, "Ethics Education Programme (EEP), " httpV/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL ID=6199&URL_DO=DO TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html (accessed 22 June 2007); Solbakk, op cit. 
88 The relevant articles are: UDHGHR, articles 20,21 and 23; IDHGD, articles 6 (a), 23 (a) and 24; and 
UDBHR, articles 1S (2 and 3), 19 (d), 22 (1) and 23 (1). 89 Interview with F-01. 
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subsequent update read, "During 2006-2007 priority has been given to South-East Europe 
and part of the Arab region (Gulf region). i90 Nevertheless, the programme has been active 
in Africa, the following example serving to illustrate how it is developing. In October 2005, 
despite being in the throes of planning for a regional centre for bioethics (see 6.3.2.3), the 
UNESCO Bioethics Chair for Kenya was unaware of the EEP. 91 Less than two years later, 
the EEP ran a pilot teacher training course at his university, where the centre had been 
launched a few months earlier. 2 Interviewees were mixed in their reception of the EEP. 
Some thought that, because there were already several initiatives in ethics, UNESCO 
would have to find a niche. The head of a research institute In Kenya commented, "Every 
organisation seems to be organising capacity building in ethics, which you can't say is a 
bad thing, but I just wonder how much of it is duplicated, how high quality some of it Is and 
how well coordinated everything is. "93 Perhaps UNESCO has found its niche by focusing 
on the training of university ethics teachers (as the participant quoted above In regard to 
GEObs intimated was necessary) rather than REC members, at whom most ethics 
courses are aimed. (Note, however, that the possible duplication of initiatives 
notwithstanding, several interviewees identified a need for more training for RECs In both 
Kenya and South Africa; see 6.3.2.3. ) 
The third activity is awareness-raising about ethics among the general public, with a view 
to ensuring that civil society engages with policy-makers and experts in ethical debate 
around science and technology. This is done primarily through the "Ethics Around the 
World" conferences mentioned at 5.1.2.2, organised by the Division of the Ethics of 
Science and Technology in conjunction with UNESCO National Commissions and field 
offices, as well as academic and research institutions. The conferences have a specific 
purpose to stimulate debate at national and regional levels and thus focus on topics of 
90 UNESCO, "Ethics Education Programme (EEP), " http: //portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php- 
URL ID=6199&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html (accessed 26 August 2005 and 18 
September 2007). 
a' Interview with K 01. 92 UNESCO, "Ethics Education Programme: Ethics Teacher Training Course, " 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL ID=9448&URL DO=D0 TOPIC&URL SECTION-201. html 
accessed 20 June 2007). 
33 Interviews with K_07 (quoted) and SA 24. 
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relevance to the host country. 94 If successful they could perhaps help to alleviate the type 
of public understanding of science and ethics problems highlighted in 5.2.2. 
The three declarations call for capacity building in genetics and science and technology as 
well as in bioethics. Whereas the Bioethics Programme and the Division of the Ethics of 
Science and Technology within which it sits actively promote ethics, they do not have the 
expertise or remit to do the same for genetics. A member of the Programme explained 
that it does not emphasise genetics because of the "division of labour" within UNESCO; 
basic and life sciences are the mandate of the Science rather than the Social and Human 
Sciences sector. 95 The Science sector does not appear to be actively promoting the 
scientific side of the declarations, however. One interviewee, who works with the sector on 
capacity building in science and technology in Nigeria, had not come across the 
declarations, for instance 96 This perhaps points to the need for greater collaboration 
within UNESCO. 
In line with Young's estimation of IGO resources, the Bioethics Programme's ambitions for 
encouraging implementation of the declarations may be somewhat curtailed by funding 
limitations. During the biennial period 2004-2005, for example, out of UNESCO's USD 610 
million budget for its regular programme, the amount devoted to "ethics of science and 
technology, with emphasis on bioethics" was just over USD 3.25 million. As the "principal 
priority" of the Social and Human Sciences Major Programme, this represented 26 per 
cent of the amount dedicated to activities (excluding cross-cutting projects), compared to 
15.3 per cent in the previous biennium 97 For 2006-07 funding for both the major 
programme and the ethics section was slightly reduced, although ethics remained the 
principal priority and its percentage share rose to 30 per cent 98 To give some idea of how 
these figures might translate into practical outcomes, in a 2004 document the foundation 
94 ten Have, op cit, 347. 95 Interview with F 01. ° Interview with I(04. °7 UNESCO, "32C/5: Approved Programme and Budget 2004-2005, " (Paris: 2004), 13-14 and 147. 
98 UNESCO, "33C/5: Approved Programme and Budget 2006-2007, " (Paris: 2006), xiii-xiv and 123-124. 
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and running costs of GEObs over three years were projected at nearly USD 3.4 million 
(hence funding from external sources was being sought) 99 
It might be that the GGI, if established, could complement UNESCO's capacity building 
efforts. The proposed network's aims in terms of biotechnological capacity building are 
strikingly similar to those articulated in the relevant articles of the UNESCO declarations, 
as shown in 2.3.4.3. If UNESCO does not have the capacity to promote the fulfilment of 
these articles, the GGI might provide a means, particularly as another of its aims would be 
to explore "alternative financing options. i10° Through its projected broad membership, the 
GGI might also enable UNESCO to reach a wider audience in its awareness-raising 
efforts, given that to "raise public awareness and understanding" was one of TJCB's 
original objectives in suggesting the network. 101 Whether such a partnership is likely is 
explored further below. 
6.2.2 Duplication of activities 
Chapter 3 described how, in an ad hoc international system, the mandates and 
programmes of IGOs have a tendency to overlap. This tendency has been mitigated to 
some extent in bioethics and genetics through the formation of the United Nations Inter- 
Agency Committee on Bioethics. The committee was initiated by UNESCO, expressly to 
avoid duplication and promote information exchange among its membership, which is 
made up of mainly UN agencies but also, at UNESCO's suggestion, other relevant 
regional and international IGOs. 102 According to the Director-General of UNESCO, this 
99 UNESCO, "Social and Human Sciences: Guide to Partnerships, " 53. This document was seeking to attract funding partnerships for various projects. 10° Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138. 'o' Ibid. 
102 Interview with F 01; UNESCO, "Report of the Third Session of the IGBC, " 9-10. The UN members Include 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Labour Organization, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization and WHO. The non-UN associate 
members include the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization and the 
International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. (Ibid, 9. ) Abbing recommended this kind of 
coordination in an article on the UDHGHR (1997) and similar texts: "Several international organisations are 
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action has confirmed the organisation's role as a "catalyst for international cooperation" in 
the field of bioethics. 103 One interviewee, a member of the SARETI training programme, 
described why this type of cooperation is needed, given the proliferation of ethics 
initiatives: 
I think there are quite a lot of parallel activities going on globally-not maybe all as 
wide in scope as the UNESCO one, but, for example, working with UNAIDS and 
WHO and the EU-and there seem to be lots of parallel initiatives to set up 
guidelines, to create networks, to create inventories. And I suppose initially it's 
going to be a good thing, but ideally one day some of them should be collapsed, 
because it's obviously quite expensive. But I think the good thing is that ethical 
issues in research generally are suddenly being quite substantially funded and I 
think that's quite important and especially in developing country related stuff. 104 
Perhaps the UN agency with which UNESCO's bioethics and genetics activities might be 
seen to overlap the most is the World Health Organization. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
WHO produced an influential report in 2002 entitled Genomics and World Health (after 
UNESCO's 1997 declaration on the human genome had been adopted and during the 
negotiations for the 2003 human genetic data declaration). This described WHO as In a 
position to adopt a crucial leadership role in bioethics, " one duty of which would be to 
"exercise its normative function for setting standards and guidelines and harmonization of 
procedures, " partly through helping member states to regulate genomics. 105 WHO has 
indeed been active in bioethics and genetics, through its Ethics and Health Initiative, 
launched in October 2002. The Initiative's planned work for 2005 to 2006 included 
capacity building with member states in research ethics review, promoting collaboration 
between national bioethics bodies and looking at ethical and cultural issues in human 
genetics and genomics. 106 While all these activities would seem to duplicate to a large 
involved with the same subject [legal and ethical issues in genetics and transplantation medicine]. From a 
point of view of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency it would be more fruitful if international discussions 
could be centered around a particular subject, rather than being framed according to the statutory mandate of 
an international organisation. Bringing together the various international organisations involved to discuss on 
equal footing a topical issue avoids a shattering of the debate, and guarantees an Integrated approach of all 
aspects involved through the input of the particular focus of each single organisation involved. " (Abbing, "New 
Developments in International Health Law, " 155. ) 
103 UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Execution of the Programme Adopted by the General 
Conference, " 39. 
104 Interview with SA 15. los WHO, Genomics and World Health, 8 and 10-11. 106 This was the latest information on the initiative available on the WHO website as of August 2007. 
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degree the work that UNESCO has been doing, some of them have in fact been carried 
out in partnership by the two organisations and it is the Initiative that represents WHO on 
the Inter-Agency Committee, which played an active role in the elaboration of the UDBHR 
(see 5.1.2.2). 107 This belies the claims of some of those writing in the Developing World 
Bioethics special issue on the UDBHR that, in promulgating the declaration, UNESCO 
was encroaching on the mandate of WHO108; rather, the organisations' programmes 
appear to have been mutually reinforcing, as per Young's observations on international 
institutions. 
Given the pronounced coherence between the aims of UNESCO and the proposed GGI, 
particularly in terms of genetics capacity building and awareness raising, collaboration 
between UNESCO and TJCB might be expected. This does not appear to have occurred, 
however. TJCB barely mentions the UNESCO declarations in its publications on the GGI, 
although in the final paper, drawing on Slaughter's work, it recognised that "networks can 
exist alongside more traditional international organisations. "109 The UNESCO Bioethics 
Programme would welcome the opportunity to be involved in the proposed network, as 
this would represent a marriage between "political initiative" and "practical expertise. ""° 
That this cooperative model might be possible was also articulated by a Kenyan 
interviewee who had had previous contact with TJCB. She envisaged UNESCO providing 
the necessary political platform for the domestication of norms and the GGI garnering a 
wider audience: "Given intergovernmental processes have their limitations in getting out to 
civil society and private actors, the Toronto initiative [GGIJ might well reach more the 
107 UNESCO, WHO and the Council of Europe contributed to meetings on bioethics and research ethics in 
Cyprus and Lithuania in May 2004. (WHO, "Ethics and Health 2005/2006: Programme of Work, " 1,2,3,4 and 
6. 
1 See Landman and SchOklenk, op cit, iii and Williams, op cit, 212. ten Have has responded in a SciDevNet 
article that the journal's contributors were perhaps not au fait with how UN agencies work. Andorno has written 
a paper directly answering the Developing World Bioethics criticisms, in which he highlights the work of the 
Inter-Agency Committee, defends UNESCO's activities in bioethics on account of its educational, scientific 
and cultural mandate and describes how the work of UNESCO and WHO can "perfectly coexist, " because 
UNESCO tends to elaborate general norms, whereas WHO produces more technically focused guidance. 
(Priya Shetty (quoting ten Have), "UNESCO Guidance on Ethics and Human Rights Slammed, " SciDevNet (6 
September 2005), www. scidev. net/News/index. cfm? fuseaction=readNews&itemid=2337&lan (accessed 16 
September 2005; Andorno, "Global Bioethics at UNESCO, " 151-152. ) 'os Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138. References to the UDHGHR have been found in two of TJCB's publications 
on the GGI: Acharya et al, Genomics and Global Health, 41 and Thorsteinsdbttir et a/, "Genomics Knowledge. * 
110 Interview with F_01. Note that in 2004 UNESCO awarded its biennial Avicenna Prize for Ethics in Science 
to Abdallah Daar, i -key proponent of the GGI. (ten Have, op cit, 348. ) 
181 
unreachables. ""' Echoing Young, a second participant who had connections with TJCB 
thought that an element of competition or overlap between the two initiatives (and indeed 
others) was not necessarily counter-productive and could serve to stimulate progress and 
eventually lead to greater cooperation. 1' Others expressed reservations about the 
proposed GGI, because of the potential overlap with existing programmes such as those 
of UNESCO and WHO. Particularly in the South, resources are limited and people have 
many calls upon their time, thus they do not want to become involved in several projects 
offering more or less the same things. ' 13 
6.2.3 Enforcement 
UNESCO pursues the programme of encouragement outlined in 6.2.1 because it does not 
have the power to compel its member states to adopt the declarations. Lenoir's words on 
the draft UDHGHR (1997) illustrate the limitations: "The idea of the IBC is to propose a 
Declaration which could serve as a reference, a pattern or a source of inspiration to the 
States willing to adopt legislation on bioethics""4 (italics added). A member of the 
Bioethics Programme lamented that the organisation is blamed by some for the lack of 
implementation of the declarations, when in fact it "cannot do much more than what the 
member states allow us to do. "' 15 As this section shows, there has been a reluctance 
among states to even self-report to UNESCO on their genetics and bioethics activities. " 
Early in the formulation of the UDHGHR (1997), it was decided that if the declaration was 
to have a "real impact" a follow-up mechanism would be needed (that is, a system of 
111 Interview with K 18. 112 Interview with SA 09. 113 Interviews with K 07, K-1 6, SA 08, SA-1 2 and SA 30. 114 Lenoir, "Bioethics and UNESCO, " 12-22. 45 Interview with F_01. 16 Allyn Taylor argued in 1999 that the lack of a formal supervisory mechanism for the UDHGHR (1997) was 
of "significant concern. " He recommended that self-reporting by states on their implementation of the 
declaration be combined with fact-finding and review by an independent body, predicting that the "growing 
sense of urgency" on the need for international cooperation on genetics might serve to "soften national 
opposition to substantial organizational supervision under a voluntary auditing process. " The negotiations for 
the UDBHR (2005) would suggest otherwise. (Taylor, op cit, 480,513,527 and 531. ) 
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implementation review or SIR; see 3.5.3). ' 17 The implementation guidelines thus 
stipulated that an evaluation should be carried out five years after the adoption of the 
declaration. ' 18 The IDHGD (2003) similarly suggests that states should submit reports to 
the IBC and IGBC on their implementation of the declaration and the IBC's early 
recommendations on what became the UDBHR (2005) were that it should include a 
similar proviso. "9 Whereas the 2002 evaluation of the UDHGHR duly took place in the 
form of a questionnaire, the proposals for the two later declarations met with resistance 
from member states (contrary to the trend identified by Victor et al, that states are 
becoming more favourably disposed to SIRs). At the January 2005 IGBC and IBC 
meetings (which discussed possible implementation guidelines for the IDHGD as well as 
the text of the draft UDBHR), several government representatives felt that reporting 
mechanisms were inappropriate to non-binding instruments, as did those attending the 
IGE meeting in June 2005.120 According to a member of the Bioethics Programme, the 
reaction of member states to the IBC's initial suggestion that the UDBHR should specify 
biennial reports was, 'Well, that's out of the question. 121 
This lack of a reporting mechanism for both the IDHGD (2003) and UDBHR (2005) would 
seem to render them weaker instruments than their predecessor. In reality, however, it 
makes little difference, because the 2002 evaluation exercise on the UDHGHR (1997), 
like many SIRs, was something of a failure (despite being deemed an "essential 
ingredient" of UNESCO's bioethics work by the Director-General). 1 More than 2000 
questionnaires were sent to states, IGOs, NGOs, national ethics committees, universities 
and academic institutions, the private sector and prominent individuals. Since only 100 or 
"' UNESCO, Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 38. 18 UNESCO, "The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: From Theory to 
Practice, " 10. 
"s IDHGD, article 25; UNESCO, "Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument or 
Bioethics, " 12. 
120The states most vocal in their opposition to periodic reporting were the United States, Canada, Germany 
and India. (IGBC and IBC meetings, Paris, 24 to 28 January 2005, personal observations; UNESCO, "Second 
Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 8. ) 12' Interview with F 01. '22 UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on Action to be Taken in the Light of the Round Table of 
Ministers of Science on Bioethics (22-23 October 2001), " 2. 
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so questionnaires were returned, however, the results were of limited significance. 123 The 
Bioethics Programme representative felt that the process was too time-consuming, given 
the poor response rate. He described how as a secretariat they are in something of a no- 
win situation: "They [member states] don't want to be compelled to report on what they do. 
At the same time they're always asking us, 'How is the declaration impacting the member 
states? '" He hopes that GEObs will enable them to gather information on the 
implementation of the declaration independently of political processes and thus in a way 
that is non-threatening to member states. 124 
There is very little in the publications on the proposed GGI to indicate at whom its norms 
and principles would be aimed and how these might be upheld. Perhaps TJCB hopes that 
the states 'underpinning' the network would enact legislation. This begs the question, what 
would differentiate the GG I's norms from international declarations? It Is not clear that the 
network would be in a better position to ensure compliance than its UN-based counterpart, 
unless its broader membership would mutually enjoin and support adherence. Although its 
structure would be based partly on Rischard's GIN model, there is no mention of 'naming- 
and-shaming' renegade actors. Perhaps, like UNESCO and Slaughter, it would be mainly 
concerned with positive measures such as capacity building (see 3.5.3). 
This section has examined UNESCO's efforts to ensure that member states take up its 
declarations on genetics and bioethics, as well as the likelihood of the proposed GGI 
upholding its norms and achieving its aims. The next section turns to the national level, to 
see whether these efforts are paying dividends. 
123 UNESCO, "Report of the Third Session of the IGBC, " 8-9. 
124 Interview with F_01. 
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6.3 NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
As demonstrated in 6.1.1.3, all three UNESCO declarations require states to take "all 
appropriate measures" to effect their principles at national level. 6.3.1 assesses how far 
the member states in general have fulfilled this role, while 6.3.2 looks at the specific cases 
of Kenya and South Africa. The latter highlights where the two countries are implementing 
certain principles particularly well and thus could provide examples of good practice for 
other states, as well as areas in which they need further guidance or support, which 
UNESCO or the GGI might be able to provide. 
6.3.1 Adoption by member states 
If the UNESCO declarations are not to "remain paperwork, " as non-binding instruments 
they must be effected by states. 125 Precisely because they are non-binding, however, 
there is no obligation on states to do so. That declarations can only persuade rather than 
compel states to modify their laws was reiterated by an official at the Kenyan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. A South African ethicist likewise said that as "merely declarations" the 
UNESCO instruments serve to "remind governments of their responsibility "126 The 
UDHGHR (1997), as the oldest of the three, might be expected to have been enacted to 
the greatest degree. In this regard, at a Round Table at the 2001 UNESCO General 
Conference, 53 ministers of science (or their equivalents) made the following statement: 
In conclusion, we, the participating and represented ministers of science: 
(i) undertake to participate actively in the promotion of the principles set out in the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights and in its 
implementation, in particular by drawing inspiration from it in the formulation of our 
legislation or regulations, and by considering possible extensions to the 
Declaration when it is evaluated in 2002-2003.127 
125 ten Have, op cit, 343. 126 Interviews with K_30 and SA 37 (quoted) respectively. "Z' UNESCO, "Bioethics: International Implications, " 12. 
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Since very few countries responded to the evaluation, as demonstrated in 6.2.3, it is 
difficult to measure whether they have fulfilled this undertaking (the claim of the 2003 
IDHGD notwithstanding, that its predecessor had received "firm support" internationally 
and had been adopted by member states within their legislation, regulations or ethical 
codes128). The IBC's 2001 paper on solidarity between developed and developing 
countries reported a paucity of efforts to fulfil articles 17 to 19 of the declaration, on 
disease research, knowledge sharing and capacity building: "States rapidly recognized the 
implications of the new scientific advances, but they have not always been so prompt in 
undertaking projects of solidarity and international co-operation as set out in the Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. "129 
Lack of information from member states is not the only obstacle in assessing how far the 
declarations are being implemented at national level. Even when states enact legislation, 
it is difficult to measure how far this is a direct response to the declarations. A member of 
the Bioethics Programme averred that it is whether the declarations are being adhered to 
that is important, not whether this is being done deliberately or not: "Even if we don't know 
if it's post- or propter- the declarations, it is just what we want, because UNESCO is 
making the declarations to have more policies in the area of genetics, whether or not it's 
our initiation of the whole process "130 If it is not the declarations that are inspiring 
regulatory innovations, however, it can be questioned whether they are really filling a gap 
as UNESCO claims. 
Some states may be taking up the declarations' principles selectively, or putting their own 
interpretations on them. Such adaptability could be seen as a weakness or a strength. 131 
'ZB IDHGD, Preamble. 
'29 UNESCO, "Report of the IBC on Solidarity and International Co-operation between Developed and 
Developing Countries concerning the Human Genome, " 14. 130 Interview with F_01. 13' Harmon writes of the UDHGHR (1997), By its frequent deference to domestic lawmakers, It fails to provide 
a universal response that will guard against piecemeal legislation and a 'race to the bottom'. " (Harmon, op cit, 
37. ) A geneticist in South Africa similarly commented on the declarations, "They seem to take the way out 
always of talking of the regulations in the individual countries or the laws of the individual countries and so on. 
So it can only be an advisory sort of document and I think that's fine, but it would seem as though they don't 
have any teeth. * (Interview with SA_18) Andomo, by contrast, believes that to impose a comprehensive legal 
framework on countries with differing sociocultural backgrounds would be both impossible and unfair. 
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UNESCO, for its part, endorses national contextualisation. In a paper outlining all 
UNESCO's bioethics activities, Henk ten Have, head of the Division of the Ethics of 
Science and Technology, writes with regard to the UDBHR's articles on consent and 
social responsibility: "As principles they are universally adopted, but in practice their 
application must be tailored in multiple ways to accommodate different types of research 
and health care, categories of patients and problems, and cultural settings and 
traditions. n132 Participants in Kenya and South Africa saw contextualisation as important if 
the declarations are to be adopted effectively. A scientist who advises both UNESCO and 
the Kenyan government believed it would be "dangerous" to adopt the declarations 
without translating them into "what is happening locally. n133 Several others said that 
universal principles should not be embraced unthinkingly; working out their practical 
application in particular contexts is often the most challenging aspect of implementing 
international instruments. " One long-standing ethics committee member went further, 
believing there to be too much variation between countries for universal norms to be 
useful. He asserted, "I believe strongly that national, local ethics guidelines are the things 
to folloW. 035 
6.3.2 Adoption in Kenya and South Africa 
Both Kenya and South Africa are upholding the UNESCO declarations to a greater or 
lesser extent, according to their regulatory frameworks for genetics and bioethics. This 
section outlines the situation in each country in turn, before looking at areas where they 
might benefit from guidance or support. Interestingly, although the two national 
frameworks are quite different, the challenges highlighted by interviewees from both 
(Andomo, "Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law, " 962. ) Echoing Victor et al, Christian Byk sees 
the UDHGHR's non-binding flexibility in a positive light: "It facilitates adhesion to the Declaration by those 
states which have difficulty satisfying the implementation of the principles, but which intend to go further that 
way. " y. " (Byk, "A Map to a New Treasure Island, " 237. ) 
ten Have, op cit, 342-343. 133 Interview with K 13. 134 Interviews with K15, K_26, SA_10, SA_17, SA_ 24 and SA 25. '3s Interview with SA-1 9. 
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countries are very similar. As mentioned in Chapter 2, both Kenya and South Africa 
adopted national guidelines on bioethics in 2004, Guidelines for Ethical Conduct of 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya and Ethics in Health Research: 
Principles, Structures and Processes respectively. 136 As might be expected, these 
documents articulate well-established bloethical principles such as informed consent, 
autonomy, privacy and confidentiality and the need for risk/benefit analyses. They also 
deal to some degree with several of the issues discussed in Chapter 2 around the ethical 
dilemmas generated by genetics and research in developing country contexts. In this they 
draw mainly on the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS 
guidelines, but seemingly not at all on the UNESCO declarations. 13' 
6.3 2.1 Kenya 
The regulatory framework for bioethics in Kenya is far from clear. Under the 1979 Science 
and Technology Act, the National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) is to 
advise the government on "all matters related to research. " It has ultimate control over 
what research takes place in Kenya and the power to ensure it is conducted ethically. 
Some of these powers are devolved to institutional ethics committees, such as that of the 
Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI). The 2004 ethical guidelines named above 
(produced by NCST) describe this system as "weak with many loopholes. "'38 A member of 
the Council explained that ethics were not a major concern when the Science and 
Technology Act was promulgated and thus do not feature prominently within it. At the time 
136 Both countries also have more specific guidelines, on HIVIAIDS vaccines and clinical trials. These are the 
Kenya National Guidelines for Research and Development of HIV/AIDS Vaccines (2005), the Guidelines on 
Ethics for Medical Research: HIV Preventive Vaccine Research (produced by the Medical Research Council 
of South Africa and adopted as national guidelines) and the Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of 
Clinical Trials in Human Participants in South Africa. Like their more general counterparts, these guidelines 
have sections on standard ethical principles and issues pertinent to developing countries. This thesis draws 
Predominantly on the more general guidelines, however. 37 NCST, Guidelines for Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya, 19; 
Department of Health, EthicsinHealthResearch, 55; interviews with K 15, K_17, K_1 9, K_21, SA 24 and 
SA 35. Note that the NCST guidelines reference the 1993 version of the CIOMS guidelines rather than the 
more recent 2002 version. The UNESCO declarations are not listed among the references for either 
document. 
138 NCST, op cit, 2. 
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of fieldwork, NCST had been pushing for many years for the Act to be updated to include 
current ethics issues, but as several acts were awaiting amendment this was likely to take 
some time. 139 The KEMRI ethics committee has gone one step further and recommended 
a "stand alone" act for biomedical research involving humans, seeing the Science and 
Technology Act as too generalised. 140 The KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme at Kilifi was using the NCST guidelines at the time of interview, but was 
assuming these were still in draft, having not heard otherwise. On being asked whether 
the guidelines were legally binding, one member of the Programme commented that this 
"would be quite a useful thing to know. "141 
Relatedly, the fieldwork revealed some ambiguity as to the status and purpose of certain 
ethics committees in Kenya. Most interviewees agreed that, in practice, the KEMRI 
committee functioned as a national ethics committee. '42 Indeed, the KEMRI website 
reads, "The Committee is accepted by the Ministry of Health as a National Ethical Review 
Committee. "143 It seems strange, then, that this same ministry has also set up its own 
ethics committee. In January 2001, following recommendations in the National Health 
Sector Strategic Plan, it established a Health Standards and Regulatory Services 
Department to, among other things, "provide the priority medical research agenda" and 
"review medical research protocols in Kenya. "144 As noted in 2001 by Daniel arap Moi, 
then president of Kenya, this new department's mandate included the launch of a national 
ethics committee. 145 The National Medical Research, Ethics and Traditional Medicine 
Committee was duly created in 2002, ostensibly including KEMRI and NCST among its 
139 Interview with K_21. 140 Interview with K_1 9. "' Interviews with K 06 (quoted), K07 and K 09. 12 It seems that the KEMRI committee, as one of the institutional committees to which NCST has devolved 
some of its duties, reviews protocols that do not fall under any of the other NCST approved committees and 
thus to all intents and purposes has become a national ethical review committee (that Is, it does not review 
only research carried out within KEMRI). (Interviews with K_07, K_15, K_19, K_21, K_22 and K-25. ) 13 KEMRI, "Scientific and Technical Committees, " 
www. kemri. org/Scientific%20and%2OTechnical%20committee. htm (accessed 23 November 2007). 144 Ministry of Health, "First National Congress on Quality Improvement in Health Care, Medical Research and 
Traditional Medicine, " 1-2 (quoted); interview with K 27. 
145 Ministry of Health, "First National Congress, " 7. 
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membership. "" On the relationship between this new committee and the KEMRI 
committee, a member of the latter said: 
The Ministry of Health wanted to start their own. It would be a year ago, we 
all met together, the Director of Medical Services and some visitors from the 
Walter Reed and they said that they wanted to start their own. But, 
notwithstanding, we decided we would not wait for them. If they started their 
own, that's fine and they'd tell us how we would relate to them. But we 
consider ourselves the National Ethical Review Committee. 147 
She also explained that, as a consequence of the proliferation of committees, it is possible 
that some research goes unapproved, because people can plead, "I got confused, I didn't 
know where to go, so I decided not to go anywhere. ""8 A 2003 Ministry of Health report 
similarly acknowledged that stakeholders needed to be educated on the relationships 
between its new committee, KEMRI and NCST. 149 
Despite the profusion of committees described above, in October 2005 the National 
Commission for UNESCO, with the Bioethics Chair, was looking to form a National 
Bioethics Committee. 150 Their rationale was the same as that behind the Bioethics 
Programme's Assisting Bioethics Committees initiative (see 6.2.1): they would start with a 
committee and perhaps push for a bill "later on. x151(Interestingly, however, the Chair was 
unaware of UNESCO's guidelines on how to set up just such a committee. ) A member of 
the Commission did not think the new committee would overlap with Kenya's pre-existing 
ones because it would engage primarily in sensitising people about bioethics and the 
three UNESCO declarations in particular, rather than ethical review. He said, "I don't think 
there's any other committee that is doing that. " Furthermore, it would include among its 
membership representatives from the relevant government bodies. 152 Not everyone was 
convinced, however. A member of NCST welcomed the idea of working with UNESCO to 
"" Ministry of Health, "Second National Congress on Quality Improvement in Health Care, Medical Research 
and Traditional Medicine. " 
147 Interview with K 17. "Walter Reed" refers to USAMRU-K, the Kenyan branch of the US-based Walter Reed 
Army Institute of Research. 148 Ibid. 
149 Ministry of Health, "Second National Congress. " 150 Interviews with K01 and K__1 6. 151 Interview with K 01. 152 Interview with K 16. 
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promote knowledge sharing and capacity building, but thought that a new committee was 
unnecessary. 
153 
Whereas there appear to be two parallel systems for ethical review in Kenya, there is little 
regulation targeted at human genetic research. The 2004 Guidelines for Ethical Conduct 
of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya do not cover genetic 
research specifically. At the time of fieldwork, Kenya was awaiting the adoption of a 
Biosafety Bill, which was first promulgated in 2003 and focuses on agricultural 
biotechnology. ' Interviewees could see neither the Bill being expanded to cover human 
genetics, nor a separate bill on the human side being drawn up in the near future. 155 Thus 
it would appear that the two genetics declarations, the UDHGHR (1997) and the IDHGD 
(2003), are unlikely to be adopted into Kenyan legislation. There is perhaps a need for 
regulation in this area, however, particularly on who should own and profit from human 
samples and data, in the wake of scandals in the recent past. 158 
Those connected with UNESCO explained why it might be a long time before the 
declarations are adopted into Kenyan law. A member of the National Commission for 
UNESCO outlined the difficulties of first raising the necessary political will: "How are you 
going to sell it to your country? How do you advise? Do you wait until there's a problem, 
then you say, 'Okay, let's refer to... '. Or do you need to sensitise people in advance? "'57 
Even if this was achieved, the legislative process is a slow one, involving negotiations 
between several ministries. It can also be somewhat capricious. The scientist quoted 
above who advises both UNESCO and the government warned that if the desk officer 
153 Interview with K 21. 154 As of August 2007, the Bill was about to be passed, although it still faced opposition from peasant farmers 
and critics of genetically modified organisms. (ASNS Kenya Correspondent, "Kenya's Biosafety Bill Faces 
Opposition, " and Leakey Sonkoyo, "Kenya Parliamentarians Could Pass Biosafety Bill, " Africa Science News 
Service (21 August 2007). 
Iss Interviews with K 01, K 13, K_1 8 and K 21. 156 Ownership issues were raised by the Kenyan delegation at the January 2005 IGBC and IBC meetings in 
Paris (personal observation). One interviewee described issues around ownership of genetic data as 
"complex, " particularly in terms of commercial interests and feeding back to communities (K_05). Another said 
that community leaders had recently been raising the ownership question (K_09). Several Kenyan participants 
gave examples of research projects that were considered to have collected human genetic samples in an 
unethical manner (K_0 1, K__1 0, K_1 1, K 12 and K 17). These examples did not include any of the projects 
visited for the purposes of this thesis. 157 Interview with K_1 6. 
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assigned the portfolio for adoption of a declaration is a "middle of the roader, " nothing 
might happen for several years. '" Also, as pointed out by the National Commission 
representative, if the government changes, sensitisation of ministers has to begin all over 
again. 159 In spite of such difficulties, the Commission believes the sensitisation of policy- 
makers worth pursuing, it being one of the reasons behind the establishment of the 
regional bioethics centre (see 6.3.2.3). 
6.3.2.2 South Africa 
The South African bioethics framework is somewhat more coordinated than the Kenyan 
one. According to the National Health Act (2003), implemented by the Department of 
Health, a National Health Research Ethics Council is to carry out a variety of tasks, 
including writing guidelines for research ethics committees (RECs) and setting norms and 
standards for research with humans; disciplining those found to be in violation of these 
guidelines or norms; registering and auditing RECs and adjudicating complaints about 
them; and advising the national and provincial departments of health on issues in 
research ethics. 160 In fact, the guidelines and norms, the Ethics in Health Research: 
Principles, Structures and Processes (2004) mentioned above, were written by an interim 
committee. This committee subsequently disbanded and, at the time of fieldwork in early 
2006, the permanent council had not yet been appointed (an invitation for nominations 
had been issued). 16' This meant that for a few years there was no national body 
overseeing bioethics, although accreditation of RECs (both public and private) was 
ongoing. It seems that the ethical guidelines are to be supported by formal statutes, as in 
February 2007 the Department of Health invited comment on proposed regulations 
158 Interview with K 13. K_16 also said that the rate of legislation in Kenya had been slow, thus the system 
was clogged with pending bills. Iss Interview with K_16. 160 Clause 72 (6). Republic of South Africa, National Health Act, 74. 
161 Government Gazette, "Invitation to interested parties to nominate persons for appointment to the National 
Health Research Ethics Council, " No 304 (24 February 2006), 81-82. 
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relating to research on human subjects, an adjunct to the National Health Act. These 
regulations articulate the principles outlined in the guidelines in a shortened form. t62 
The 2004 ethical guidelines contain chapters on human genetic research and the use of 
human samples that mirror many of the articles of the IDGHD (2003). The chapter on 
human genetic research recognises that individuals share genes with relatives and other 
members of the population and may be subject to genetic discrimination or stigmatisation. 
It stipulates, "Researchers should consider the social and cultural significance of their 
research, especially in the areas of complex socially significant characteristics and the 
genetic characteristics of collectivities. "' In addition, in January 2007 the government 
invited comment on proposed "Regulations regarding the use of human DNA, RNA, 
cultured cells, stem cells, blastomeres, polar bodies, embryos, embryonic tissue and small 
tissue biopsies for diagnostic testing, health research and therapeutics, " another adjunct 
to the National Health Act. 164 These, together with the ethical guidelines, give 
comprehensive instruction on the collection, processing, storage and use of human 
genetic data. The proposed regulations relating to research on human subjects also 
contain a chapter on genetic research. Despite the synergies, the UNESCO genetics 
declarations do not appear to have inspired the human genetics chapter of the ethical 
guidelines, as they are not cited in the guidelines' list of key international texts. 165 In the 
case of the proposed regulations regarding DNA, RNA and other human samples, what 
the influence of the declarations has been is unclear. One member of the team that 
drafted the regulations was unfamiliar with the UNESCO instruments, whilst another said 
162 Government Gazette, "Regulations relating to research on human subjects, " No 135 (23 February 2007), 
10-16. Comments were to be submitted by 23 April 2007. As of August 2007 the regulations did not appear to 
have been adopted. 163 Department of Health, op cit, 42-45. Collectivities are "groups distinguished by: common beliefs, values, 
social structures and other features that identify them as a separate group; customary collective decision- 
making according to tradition and beliefs; the custom of leaders expressing a collective view; members of the 
collectivity being aware of common activities and common interests. " (Ibid, 28. ) 164 Government Gazette, "Regulations regarding the use of human DNA, RNA, cultured cells, stem cells, 
blastomeres, polar bodies, embryos, embryonic tissue and small tissue biopsies for diagnostic testing, health 
research and therapeutics, " No 7 (5 January 2007), 3-11. 
165 As the guidelines were published in 2004, it is possible that the chapter on genetic research had already 
been drafted when the IDHGD was adopted in October 2003. 
193 
that the 1997 and 2003 declarations had "definitely assisted the writing of the regulations 
for the genetics that's going to come through soon. ""' 
The proposed regulations on DNA, RNA and other human samples state that intellectual 
property rights shall apply to all forms of genetic research, except stem cell research. 1 , 
Several participants supported the idea of genetic information as a public good, 
particularly as developing countries do not have the capacity to do substantial genome 
sequencing themselves (although one scientist said that in practice some researchers 
prefer to put their findings in the public domain only at the end of a study, to coincide with 
publications168). They saw it as important to protect the ideas and products that are the 
result of research on this information, however, to stimulate innovation. 189 Finding the right 
balance between propagation and protection is something that the proposed GGI might 
assist with, one of TJCB's stated aims for the network being that "the GGI could examine 
different models of intellectual property protection to optimise social utility while 
maintaining necessary incentives for discovery. "'70 
As well as the regulations for genetic research that fall under the National Health Act, 
South Africa has a National Biotechnology Strategy (2001), administered by the 
Department for Science and Technology. "' The strategy includes a National 
Biotechnology Advisory Committee, which was in the final stages of composition at the 
time of fieldwork. The proposed function of the Committee was to advise the Minister of 
Science and Technology on the progress of biotechnology development In South Africa, 
particularly in terms of innovation and commercialisation, but also ethics and legislation. 
Initially a separate bioethics committee was also planned, but after consultation with the 
South African Medical Research Council, the Department of Health and experts In the 
iss Interviews with SA 04 and SA 17 (quoted) respectively. 167 Government Gazette, "Regulations regarding the use of human DNA, RNA etcetera, * 10. 'seInterview with SA_07. Iss Interviews with SA_26, SA_27, SA_32 and SA 33. 10 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138. "' See Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, °A National Biotechnology Strategy for South 
Africa., (The Department split into the Department of Arts and Culture and the Department of Science and 
Technology in 2002. ) 
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field (including a member of the Interim National Health Research Ethics Committee), it 
was decided that this would only duplicate existing initiatives. Instead, the advisory 
committee would include ethicists among its members, to keep it informed of relevant 
bioethics issues or developments. ' 72 
There may yet be another national level bioethics body formed. On returning from the IGE 
meeting in June 2005, the chief South African representative recommended in her report 
to the National Commission for UNESCO that the country should have a central 
committee to deal with ethics. This committee would engage with the various RECs 
around the country, to bring them under one 'umbrella' within a virtual structure. National 
guidelines would "serve as a framing document that's a 'one-stop shop' for anyone 
wanting to apply to ethics committees to conduct research, " thus ensuring that people 
would be following the same rules, whether they were based within a university, an NGO 
or any other institution. Thus the committee's mandate would be very similar to that of the 
National Health Research Ethics Council. Perhaps the two initiatives could be 
complementary, however, as the portal would also facilitate "iivewire discussion" and 
house a panel of experts who could give insights into various issues pertaining to human 
rights and bioethics. Whether these recommendations will be taken up is open to 
question; they had not been at the time of interview in April 2006. The IGE representative 
said, "The translation post the declaration has been absolutely pathetic and somebody 
needs to drive it in a forceful sort of way. And I don't believe that the infrastructure is there 
for that to happen. "' 73 Thus the active community that Young sees as necessary to 
stimulate regime implementation appears to be lacking in South Africa. 
172 Interviews with SA_28 and SA 31. 173 Interview with SA 23. 
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6.3.23 Areas needing guidance or support 
Fieldwork participants identified certain interconnected issues, relevant to both genetic 
research and research with human subjects more broadly, which are particularly pertinent 
to Kenya and South Africa. These can be categorised as: protection of research subjects; 
health development, capacity building and benefit sharing; and ethical review capacity. 
This section describes how these issues are being dealt with or otherwise by the two 
countries. As the UNESCO declarations contain norms on how such issues can or should 
be addressed, it may be that the organisation's Bioethics Programme could offer guidance 
or support in these areas as part of its ongoing follow-up activities (the relevant articles 
are indicated for each of the sub-sections below). Some of the activities planned for the 
GGI may also be relevant. 
Protection of research subjects14 
Both Kenya and South Africa decided that national bioethics guidelines were needed 
partly in order to protect poor and marginalised people from being exploited by 
unscrupulous researchers. Both sets duly give specific instructions concerning vulnerable 
groups such as pregnant women and prisoners. 15 Several people saw such provisions as 
necessary to prevent vulnerable people from being subjected to undue Inducement to take 
part in research projects of no relevance to them. 17e Ethics committees In both countries 
take particular care that projects which involve research into Africa's "treasure store" of 
diseases or evolutionary significant DNA are not exploitative, ' 77 although some Kenyan 
NGO representatives expressed concern about vulnerable people being asked to give 
blood samples, for example, without being adequately informed of their rights. 17e 
174 On vulnerability see UDHGHR, article 17 and UDBHR, article 8; on cultural diversity and pluralism, 
UDBHR, article 12; and on community engagement, UDBHR, article 6 (3). 15 NCST, op cit, 2,10 and 11-14; Department of Health, op cit, Preamble, 24-25,27-28 and 30. 16 Interviews with K 25, Ski 2, SA 19, SA 30 and SA 32. 177 Interviews with k-1 7 (quoted) and SA_04. 18 Interviews with K 10 and K 11. 
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One means to guard against exploitation is to engage with the communities within which it 
is hoped that research will take place. Both the Kenyan and South African guidelines call 
on researchers to be aware of and respect the cultural traditions of the communities in 
which they wish to conduct research and to liaise with and seek permission from their 
leaders where appropriate. '79 Researchers, ethicists, policy-makers, NGO representatives 
and those with commercial interests alike saw this type of interaction as tremendously 
important, partly because of the culture in many African societies that decisions should be 
"ratified communally, " often by chiefs. 180 Almost as many expressed reservations about 
the ethos of community consent and engagement, however, because defining who or 
what 'the community' actually is and who should be representing it is very difficult. Said 
one participant, "I think it sounds very nice, but i don't know how one does it. Often it's lip 
service, because I mean the problem even before that is, what is the community, where 
do you find it? i181 Another considered that the UDBHR (2005), to be of use, would have to 
deal with these subtleties. 182 it simply states, however, that for a research project on a 
group or community, agreement from representatives may be sought, in addition to that of 
individual participants (article 6). 
It seems that guidance on the intricacies of community engagement are lacking, so this 
might be a ripe subject for follow-up by the UNESCO Bioethics Programme in the form of 
an IBC report or a training course. '83 One participant suggested that guidelines on 
`community preparedness', which goes beyond community consent to see what 
community members think about a proposed research project and what they might want 
from it, would be useful. 'M This is in fact a practice that the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust 
Collaborative Programme at Kilifi, Kenya, has spent several years developing, such that 
19 NCST, op cit, 11 and 14; Department of Health, op cit, 25 and 28. 160 Interviews with K 08 (quoted), K 01, K 02, K 04, K 05, K06, K_09, K_1 9, K_20, K_25, SA 02, SA_04, 
SA 12, SA 13, SA 15, SA 21, SA 30, SA 32 and SA 37. 181 Interview with S4_1 6. Those who expressed a similar view were K03, K07, K08, K11, K 18, SA_10, 
SA_19, SA 33 and SA 35. 182 Interview with K-077. 183 Note that TJCB, under the Grand Challenges in Global Health programme, has recently brought out a 
series of papers on ethical, social and cultural issues in doing research in developing countries, which analyse 
in depth what makes for good practice in community engagement. Thus any IBC report would have to 
complement these. (The four papers, by Abdallah Daar, Peter Singer and colleagues, appear In PLoS 
Medicine 4 (9) (September 2007): 1440-1459. ) 
184 Interview with SA 24. 
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communities are involved in the planning of research, in order to ensure it is performed in 
ways appropriate to the local context. t85 At the time of fieldwork, it had recently set up a 
network of community representatives from a wide range of backgrounds (some of whom 
were possibly to join the Programme's Consent Committee), through an exhaustive two- 
year recruitment process that might perhaps provide a model for other research centres or 
projects. 186 
Health development, capacity building and benefit sharing187 
The Kenyan and South African guidelines require research to be relevant not only to study 
populations but also to each country as a whole, by addressing "health needs" and "broad 
health and development needs" respectively. 188 The South African guidelines deem it 
necessary for multinational collaborative research to be linked to capacity building in 
healthcare and economic and educational empowerment in the host country and embrace 
the social responsibility ethos thus: 
With recognition of the role of social conditions in shaping the world, and how 
privileged people view the world and themselves, comes the realisation that 
research cannot be considered in isolation. Medical research, health care, 
conditions of life around the world and how humans flourish may seem disparate, 
but all are interdependent. 189 
Several participants agreed that research should address the health and development 
needs of the country in which it is to be conducted. '9° This is something that RECs In both 
countries consider when reviewing protocols. 191 A member of the KEMRI committee 
explained that they are not trying to limit basic research, but would like to see this 
1e5 Interview with I( 06. 186 Interviews with K_06, K_09 and K_23. The Consent Committee reviews procedures for obtaining Informed 
consent. 187 On social responsibility see UDHGHR, articles 12 (b) and 17 and UDBHR, articles 14 and 21 (3); on benefit 
sharing, UDHGHR, articles 12 (a) and 19 (a, iii), IDHGD, article 19 and UDBHR, articles 15 and 21 (4); and on 
scientific and technological capacity building, UDHGHR, articles 18 to 20, IDHGD, articles 18 (a and b), 19 
av and vi), 23 and 24 and UDBHR, articles 15 (1, e and f), 22 (1) and 24 (2). 
NCST, op cit, 13 and 16; Department of Health, op cit, 3. 189 Department of Health, op cit, 7. That the guidelines should include this ethos is perhaps not surprising, 
given that Solomon Benatar was on the editorial team. In fact, this passage is almost Identical to one from his 
2001 commentary in the journal Bioethics, "Justice and Medical Research: A Global Perspective" (337; 
previously quoted at 2.1.3). 90 Interviews with K_07, K_08, K_14, K__17, K_19, K_25, SA 08, SA 09, SA 17, SA 19, SA 21, SA 32 and 
SA_37. 
19' Interviews with K_1 7 and SA 19. 
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integrated with social aspects: "We would like people to write more practical protocols w192 
Similarly, the Biotechnology Regional Innovation Centres (BRICs) that fall under the South 
African National Biotechnology Strategy are not to invest in "purely white elephant science 
development, " but in strategic basic research that addresses national priorities. "" Through 
such measures South Africa is embracing what the social responsibility article of the 
UDBHR (2005) deems to be a "central purpose" of government, the promotion of health 
and social development. 194 
Some participants did not think health and social development should be a requirement of 
research, as this could limit basic or innovative research that might have massive long- 
term but serendipitous benefits. 195 Others thought that there might be more effective 
means to address poverty than "high-flying scientific studies. "'" Two people questioned 
the practical applicability of the social responsibility principle. The first, a scientist and 
ethicist, wondered how far the responsibility extends, given the enormous challenges 
poverty in the developing world presents: 
The needs, in developing countries, are of such a nature, you can't provide it all. 
And if you don't research, you're also not going to bring something better. So this 
is a major, major debate. I mean, I have a conflict in my own mind: to what extent 
do I have responsibility? 197 
The second, a member of an ethics committee in South Africa, approached the problem 
from a different angle. He said that while his committee was conscious that projects ought 
to have social value, in reality it would be difficult to reject one that did not, as this would 
mean turning down funding for the university. 198 These are perhaps issues that could be 
addressed in the IBC's report on social responsibility and health. '" 
192 Interview with ! <17. 193 Interview with SA 26. 194 UDBHR, article 14. 195 Interviews with K 09, SA 12 and SA_20. 196 Interview with SA 03. SA 18 made a similar comment, although he also said that genetic research might 
be useful in the long term, in the hunt for effective vaccines, for example. 187 Interview with SA 24. 196 Interview with SA710. 199 As of January 2008, the report was in draft form. 
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The principle of benefit sharing, like social responsibility, is applied to both specific 
communities and the wider national contexts in the Kenyan and South African guidelines, 
particularly in terms of health services and products? °° RECs in both countries, when 
reviewing protocols, try to assess the extent to which participants will benefit from a 
research project20t Several interviewees thought it important that communities taking part 
in research should benefit in some way. 202 One prominent South African bioethicist said: 
The question is whether research is ethical if the people and communities who are 
the subjects of research have not benefited from improvements in their health or 
their healthcare. If they have not benefited then I am sceptical of how ethical it is to 
do research in those places. "203 
As with social responsibility, however, some people raised issues with regard to the 
complexities of actually implementing benefit sharing, in terms of making commitments to 
provide for communities before the results of research are known and determining exactly 
who should benefit and for how long. 204 These are difficult issues for ethics committees to 
adjudicate. 206 
Aside from health services and products, benefit sharing can take the form of capacity 
building for research. The Kenyan guidelines stipulate that externally sponsored 
collaborative research should develop research capacity in Kenya. 206 There is relatively 
little of this type of research taking place in either Kenya or South Africa, however. 
Geneticists in both countries lamented the fact that, because developing countries are 
perceived as not having the capacity to deliver, funding for research tends to flow to 
northern institutions. 07 One commented, "I think there is a lot of talk of goodwill, but they 
have been slow. "208 There is also insufficient local funding for research. 20 
200 NCST, op cit, 5 and 16; Department of Health, op cit, 3,7 and 9. 201 Interviews with K 25, Ski o, Ski 9 and SA 35. 202 Interviews with k--1 0. A 14, K_1 8, SA 04, SA 12, Ski 3, Ski 7. Ski 9. SA 25 and SA 33. 203 Interview with SA_09. 204 Interviews with K 05, Ski 6, SA_21, SA 27 and SA 35. 205 Interviews with Ski 0, S&_1 5 and SA 35. Zoe NCST, op cit, 16. 207 Interviews with K 05 and SA 27. 208 Interview with K-1 3. 209 Interviews with K_05, K_10, K_1 4 and SA_27. 
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Participants generally acknowledged that research capacity building requires the support 
of developed countries, but had firm ideas about what form that support should take 210 
Firstly, capacity building programmes should be designed with the input of African 
scientists and policy-makers. One researcher said, "Let the initiative come from our side... 
If it comes from the other side, the success will be a little bit lower, because it is as if 
something is brought in P9211 Secondly, programmes should ideally represent long-term 
investment, in terms of training, infrastructure and salaried posts, rather than "travel and 
tourism money, " whereby people are sent abroad for a few months' training. 212 Ethics 
committees prefer a project to train people to analyse data in-country where possible, 
rather than to ship samples abroad. 213 'Brain drain' is an ongoing problem. Even if African 
scientists train in the South, many are likely to develop their careers in northern 
institutions. 214 
These are issues that both UNESCO and the proposed GGI, if established, will have to 
address, as capacity building is promoted in all three declarations and would be a major 
feature of the GG I's activities. One example of good practice that they might wish to draw 
upon is again that of the Kilifi KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme. Capacity 
building is its raison d'etre. Rather than following past models that saw "grateful African 
institutions" being invited to join northern-led projects, the centre falls under KEMRI 
management. The long-term vision, stretching over 25 years, is to build up a "cadre of 
international research leaders" from Kenya and the East Africa region. To achieve this, the 
centre alms to develop research facilities of international standing and ensure sufficient 
funding to provide attractive career paths for scientists wishing to stay in Kenya. 215 The 
South African National Bioinformatics Institute has a similar vision, its "key underpinning" 
being its aim to bring Africans to a competitive level in bioinformatics 216 
210 Interviews with K_07, K 16, SA 26, SA 27 and SA 34. 21 Interviews with C01 (quoted), K_07 and K_13. 
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Interview with SA 27. Z'3 Interviews with K_17, K_21, K-25, SA_19, SA 21 and SA 30. 214 Interviews with 1_05, K_10, SA 20, SA 26, SA 28 and SA 34. 216 Interviews with K_05 and K-07 (quoted). Z Interview with SA 02. 
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Ethical review capacitl" 
RECs in both Kenya and South Africa have diverse memberships, as stipulated in both 
the UNESCO declarations and the two sets of national guidelines218 Several interviewees 
highlighted deficiencies in capacity, however, in terms of training and funding. Kenya 
needs more people with expertise in research ethics, not only to constitute new 
committees but also to relieve those who sit on existing ones, which are undertrained and 
overburdened. 219 At the time of fieldwork, there were no suitable courses in East Africa, so 
people were having to travel to South Africa if they wished to undergo such training ° It is 
not only REC members who require instruction, but also scientists and students; several 
people commented that Kenya does not have sufficient university courses in research 
ethics. Should this change, the standard of applications for ethical review might improve. 
(The pilot training course for university ethics teachers held in Kenya in 2007, under 
UNESCO's Ethics Education Programme, would seem a promising development in this 
regard; see 6.2.1. ) One participant made a similar comment about South Africa, although 
it has more university courses than Kenya 22' 
The courses in South Africa that Kenyan REC members have attended are run by 
SARETI and IRENSA, both sponsored by Fogarty International. 222 Fogarty's rationale is to 
build capacity for ethical review that is appropriate to the local context. Attendees are 
primarily members of RECs from Kenya, South Africa and other countries in the sub- 
Saharan region, but also number scientists, journalists, government officials and people 
from private sector companies. The aim is to have a good balance of working disciplines, 
genders and ethnic backgrounds. 223 SARETI runs a Masters programme, whilst IRENSA 
offers a postgraduate diploma and shorter courses, the latter catering for 75 REC 
Z" The relevant articles are: UDHGHR, articles 5 (d), 16,19 (a, i), 20 and 23; IDHGD, article 6 (b and c), 23 
ýa0 and 24; and UDBHR, articles 19 (a), 20,21 (2) and 22. ' 
15Interviews 
with K06, K-09, K_1 7, SA-1 0 and SA_1 9; NCST, op cit, 16-19; Department of Health, op cit, 
. 21e Interviews with K 21, K 25 and K 27. 220 Interviews with k--1 7 and K 21. 221 Interviews with k-0 1, K--027, K 03, K_17, K 19, K 21 and SA_1 7. 222 IRENSA is the International Research Ethics Network for Southern Africa, based at the University of Cape 
Town. SARETI is the South African Research Ethics Training Initiative and is run by a collaborative 
partnership between the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Pretoria and Johns Hopkins University. 23 Interviews with SA 09 and SA-1 5. 
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members a year. 224 Although this is impressive, a member of the SARETI teaching staff 
identified a gap in that neither these programmes nor others teach African philosophical 
perspectives on ethics. She said, `The one thing that I think is lacking in all these training 
programmes is that we don't often access African philosophers... because there is 
definitely a clear distinction between African philosophy and Western philosophy and I 
think that needs its space s, 22,5 A member of the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative 
Programme at Kilifi detected a similar Western bias. She expressed the hope that, 
through the Programme (perhaps in conjunction with SARETI), people in Kenya and 
Africa as a whole might become more engaged in ethical debates and so progress from 
trying to make guidelines produced in the North work in their settings to taking the "slightly 
more challenging stance" of developing "new ideas about what the guidelines should 
be. "226 
Beyond training, another area in which RECs in Kenya and South Africa need support is 
the monitoring of research projects once they have been approved. One prominent 
Kenyan ethics committee had only recently carried out its first on-the-spot inspection at 
the time of fieldwork in November 2005. Prevented by financial constraints from 
conducting such inspections more frequently, committees in both countries generally rely 
on reports from investigators and word of mouth. This was described as "passive 
monitoring" by members of two South African RECs. 227 Another interviewee said that, in 
general, committees are inadequately funded: 
Even though thousands of millions of dollars are spent on research every year, the 
support that ethics committees receive for their evaluation of research is relatively 
skimpy. Scholars and professionals are expected to work on those committees in 
their spare time, as though it's work not worthy of any remuneration. In my view 
much lip service is paid to ethics, with inadequate commitment to providing the 
resources required to support the onerous work that needs to be done. 228 
224 SARETI Newsletter: March 2007; www. irensa. org (accessed 29 August 2007). 225 Interview with SA_24. 228 Interview with K_09. 227 Interviews with K17, K 19, K_25, SA 10 (quoted), SA 14, Ski 7 (quoted) and SA-1 9. 228 Interview with SA 09. 
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It might be that through the attendance of policy-makers at courses run by SARETI, 
IRENSA and the newly formed regional bioethics centre in Kenya (see below), the need 
for increased funding for ethics committees will be recognised. This is also a pertinent 
issue for the proposed GG I, as any expansion of genetic research in developing countries 
will have to be matched by increased capacity for ethical review. 
As previously mentioned, the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO has established a 
regional bioethics centre, having recognised that the country did not have the facilities to 
implement the articles in the UDHGHR (1997) and the IDHGD (2003) concerning ethics 
education . 
229 Having been approved at the 2005 General Conference, the "Regional 
Centre for Documentation and Research on Bioethics" at Egerton University, Kenya, was 
inaugurated in May 2007 by the Director-General of UNESCO. 230 The plans for the Centre 
were welcomed by interviewees from the KEMRI ethics committee and the National 
Council for Science and Technology, who saw it as a good opportunity for information 
sharing 23t The Centre's remit extends beyond research ethics, its ultimate aim being to 
increase understanding of what bioethics means among as many policy-makers, 
stakeholders and citizens as possible. 232 In August 2008 it will host a conference on 
"Bioethical Perspectives and Practices in Research, Medicine, Life Sciences and Related 
Technologies in sub-Saharan Africa. " Thus the Centre, promoted by the UNESCO 
National Commission and the Bioethics Chair, would appear to represent the kernel of an 
active community around the declarations in Kenya, of the type that Young has observed 
in other regimes. 
229 Interviews with K 01, K-1 3 and K 16. 230 UNESCO, "Next session of International Bioethics Committee to be Held in Kenya from 17 to 19 May, " 
httpJ/portal. unesco. org/en/ev. php-URLID=37777&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html 
(accessed 25 May 2007). The draft resolution on the Centre (33 C/DR. 53) was approved by the General 
Conference as an amendment to the Draft Programme and Budget for 2006-2007 (33 C/5). (UNESCO, 
"Volume 1: Resolutions, " Records of the General Conference, 33rd Session, Paris, 3 to 21 October 2005,33 
C/Resolutions (Paris: 2005), 193. ) 
2. 
3' Interviews with K 17, K 19 and K_20 232 Interview with K_1 3. 
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6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that, despite the substantial efforts of UNESCO to promote its 
three declarations on genetics and bioethics and the norms contained therein among 
policy-makers, experts and the general public, direct uptake by member states (as far as 
this can be measured) has been poor. This is partly because the declarations are non- 
binding instruments and thus carry no obligations on sovereign states. It is also because, 
in some instances, states already have adequate policies in place. In Kenya and South 
Africa, several of the general ethical principles in the declarations are being implemented 
almost by default, reflecting their similarities to those contained within instruments such as 
the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS guidelines, on which national level legislation 
and regulation are often based. 
For those states which have not yet established bioethics systems, the declarations may 
galvanise them into doing so, or at least this is what UNESCO hopes. The example of 
Kenya and its slow movement towards legislation specifically on human genetic research 
would indicate that the commitment by governments enshrined in the declarations is not 
felt to be a particularly pressing one, however. It may be that the added value of the 
declarations lies more in the capacity building initiatives they have spawned than in the 
documents themselves. To this end, UNESCO may want to investigate how it could help 
Kenya, South Africa and perhaps other countries address specific issues in more detail 
than can be captured within the general principles of the declarations, such as how to 
engage appropriately with communities, ensure long-term capacity building and effectively 
monitor research projects. 
Member states of UNESCO have shown more interest in the drafting of the declarations 
than in their implementation, reflecting the compromise attached to non-binding 
instruments. The proposed GGI seems to be facing a similar problem. Despite TJCB's 
insistence on urgency, there appears to have been little progress towards forming a 
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network since its bringing together of "creative minds" in 2004.233 Thus actual 
implementation has proved harder and slower than the planning process. A South African 
interviewee said of the UDHGHR (1997), "I think it would have had more of an impact if it 
was a convention, but then we'd probably still be in negotiations fifteen years later... So I 
think it's probably the best that could be done at the time. "234 Chapter 7 asks whether, in a 
world of sovereign states, a more effective governance system for genetics and bioethics 
might be possible. 
233 Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 6. 234 Interview with SA 37. 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION 
Bioethics and genetics stretch beyond national borders in several ways. Multi-centre 
research projects are increasingly common and require a coordinated system of ethical 
review. Tissue samples and genetic data frequently traverse national boundaries. The 
human genome has been designated the 'heritage of humanity' and should thus be of 
benefit to all. Inequalities of health are considered a global injustice, perhaps to be partly 
addressed through closing the 'genomics divide'. ' Such issues are unlikely to be dealt with 
effectively at national level only, hence the efforts of UNESCO to provide an international 
framework for their governance. These efforts, embodied in three declarations on genetics 
and bioethics, illustrate many of the characteristics commonly witnessed in international 
institutions, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6. The declarations saw unequal relations 
between North and South in their negotiation and a lack of input from non-state actors, 
which has subsequently affected their perceived legitimacy. As far as it can be measured, 
their implementation at national level, direct or indirect, has been ambivalent at best. This 
chapter explores whether these problems could be addressed within the UNESCO 
framework, or whether a new mode of global governance is needed, perhaps in the form 
of the Global Genomics Initiative. It begins with a brief overview of the 
approaches to global governance introduced in Chapter 3, before discussing the issues 
raised in Chapters 5 and 6 on a thematic basis. 
------------ 1 Although a few interviewees thought genetic research could be a distraction from more basic and effective 
means of addressing inequalities of health (SA 03, SA 09 and SA 20), many more believed such research 
worth pursuing, because of its long-term potential to produce treatments or cures for the diseases of the South (K_08, K_1 1, K_25, K_26, SA 21, SA 27, SA 30 and SA_32). Two interviewees from South Africa 
commented that it should not divert resources from meeting basic needs in the here and now, but that the two 
approaches could be complementary (SA 37 and SA 18). Some of the Kenyan participants remarked that the 
connection between genetics and development, in terms of the opportunity to alleviate poverty through better health, had not been made by the public at large (K 04, K_08, K_1 4 and K-25). 
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7.1 THEORY REVISITED 
Regime theory provides insights into how and why international agreement is reached on 
a given issue, within formal or informal settings. States are usually the principal members 
of international regimes (as for the UNESCO declarations), although other actors are also 
often involved in both decision-making on norms and their subsequent implementation. 
Overlapping mandates among organisations are not uncommon, due to the ad hoc nature 
of the international system. Power differentials, between strong and weak states and 
between state and non-state actors, can affect the outcome of an institution's 
deliberations. Agreements frequently represent compromise positions rather than 
coherent policy design and may be couched in ambiguous terms. Where non-binding 
norms are chosen over binding ones, the standards set may be relatively high but their 
implementation will be harder to ensure. Suggestions for increasing the efficacy of 
regimes as instruments of global governance include encouraging greater civil society 
participation, improving reporting mechanisms and finding more funding for 
implementation activities. 
Global policy networks, government networks and cosmopolitan democracy have been 
proposed as potential means to improve on current global governance mechanisms such 
as regimes. Global issues networks (GINs), the brainchild of Jean-Frangois Rischard, 
would deal with various global problems as single issues. Each network would include 
representatives from governments, civil society and industry as equal partners, all of 
whom would act as 'global citizens' to ensure fair decision-making. Broader input would 
also be sought, through the internet. The main activities of the networks would be the 
formulation of norms and standards applicable to all stakeholders in the issue at hand and 
the subsequent 'naming-and-shaming' of those who failed to comply? 
2 These ideas are articulated most comprehensively in Rischard's book, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them. 
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Governance through government networks, championed by Anne-Marie Slaughter, would 
see government officials becoming the prime actors in the international arena. Each would 
liaise with their counterparts across national borders and in supranational institutions, to 
effect global governance. Horizontal networks would involve only domestic government 
officials (although they might be hosted by an international organisation); vertical networks 
would include officials from supranational institutions to which sovereignty had been 
delegated. The networks would be formed around particular issues, their memberships 
comprising relevant governmental departments and units rather than unitary states. Their 
main aim would be to support and encourage government officials in the performance of 
their duties, national or international. 3 
Cosmopolitan democracy, as espoused by David Held and Daniele Archibugi, would 
regulate at global level those issues that extend beyond national borders, within an 
overarching system of multilayered governance based on the cosmopolitan values of 
individualism, universalism and impartiality. This system would seek to ensure that all 
those significantly affected by a given issue had the opportunity to participate in decision- 
making around it, as members of communities defined by common interest and need 
rather than geographical boundaries. Human rights would be upheld irrespective of state 
sovereignty, as a global assembly would embed universal norms and standards and 
intervene directly should governments or other bodies fail to abide by them. 4 
7.2 RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH 
The three UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics constitute a formal regime, in 
that they encapsulate norms and principles emanating from the decision-making 
procedures of an intergovernmental organisation and its member states. Drawing on the 
3 See Slaughter's book, A New World Order. 4 See, inter alia, Global Covenant by Held and "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review" by Archibugi. 
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work of UNDP on global public goods, Held argues that relations between states are often 
unequal in such regimes, despite formal parity, because developed countries are able to 
send larger and more expert delegations to meetings than are developing ones. 5 This was 
indeed the case during the negotiations for the UNESCO declarations. Although 
procedures were followed scrupulously in terms of giving all countries equal voice and 
vote, delegates from the North were both more numerous and more experienced than 
those from the South (see 5.1.1.2). Participation programmes, issue-based networks, 
government networks and cosmopolitan democracy have all been put forward as means 
to address such failings in the current international system. Might they enable developing 
countries to attain true parity with developed ones, within or without intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs)? 
Held's blueprints for cosmopolitan democracy include new or existing regional governance 
structures, the decisions of which would be "recognized and accepted as legitimate 
independent sources of regional and international regulation. "e The negotiations for the 
UDBHR (2005) demonstrated how collaborations within and between regions of the South 
afforded them a platform from which to demand an article on social responsibility (see 
5.1.1.2). These collaborations formed around a special issue, as recommended by 
Chasek and Rajamani in the UNDP study, but maintained the power of a broad coalition. 
This is perhaps why they were successful, although this came at the expense of some 
national interests, as in the case of Kenya. Had these groupings had the backing of, say, 
legitimised regional parliaments, their position might have been even stronger. In turn, 
they might also have faced stiffer opposition from the European countries, had these 
presented a united front through the European Union or Council of Europe. 
On another tack, regional bodies could host international deliberations on a rotational 
basis. UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee has already adopted a similar 
practice, regularly holding sessions outside Paris headquarters (as in May 2007, when it 
5 Held, Global Covenant, 95-96. 6 Ibid, 112. 
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met in Nairobi, Kenya); perhaps this could be extended to include formal negotiations. 
This would seem fairer than the system employed for the drafting of the three UNESCO 
declarations, whereby representatives from poorer countries generally had to travel further 
and therefore at greater expense than their developed country counterparts in order to 
attend negotiations. An alternative would be to help low income countries meet the travel 
costs of their delegations, perhaps through a participation fund as suggested by UNDP 
(see 3.5.2), but an organisation like UNESCO would require a substantial injection of 
funding to be able to offer such assistance. Moreover, neither subsidised travel nor 
rotating venues would address the problem of unequal levels of expertise among states, 
although UNESCO's capacity building programmes might do (see 6.2.1). 
Rischard posits that IGOs, with their "global membership, " could facilitate the recruitment 
of representatives from developing countries as members of nascent networks, who might 
otherwise be left out. 7 Might the proposed GGI call on UNESCO to help bolster its planned 
southern base, which some interviewees saw as key to its legitimacy (see 5.1.5.1)? 8 
UNESCO does have a reasonable record of working with developing countries and 
listening to their perspectives, as manifested in the evolution of the social responsibility 
article. The problem, however, is that it cannot guarantee how far those at the negotiating 
table actually represent their constituents. As revealed by the fieldwork data, there are 
many people in Kenya and South Africa across the sectors from which TJCB anticipates 
recruiting members-government, industry, civil society and academia who had neither 
heard of the declarations nor been involved in their drafting. Thus the GGI could not rely 
on UNESCO to engage leaders from the South; rather it would need to reach those at 
national level whom its formal counterpart has not. These findings have broader 
implications, too, in that Rischard may have attached too much importance to IGOs as 
membership facilitators in his GIN proposals. 
7 Rischard, High Noon, 189. 8 Reinicke avers that it is essential that representatives from the developing world be included in global policy 
networks: The mere fagade of inclusiveness may prove their fatal weakness... The inclusion of less powerful 
yet important groups from the developing world is critical not just for designing policies but even more so for 
implementing them. " (Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web, " 55-56. ) 
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Slaughter acknowledges a criticism sometimes levelled at existing government networks: 
that their lack of "representation rules, voting rules, and elaborate negotiating procedures" 
can result in the deliberate exclusion of weak states .9 Although the formal procedures of 
IGOs cannot guarantee equality among states, they do offer some form of protection to 
the interests of weaker members. Is this something TJCB should consider if it is to ensure 
the proposed GGI is southern-led? As it is hoping to avoid such procedures, deeming 
them unnecessarily bureaucratic and unwieldy, its challenge is to find alternative 
safeguards. Slaughter's recommendations in this regard (broader policy networks, greater 
visibility and so on; see 3.5.1) do not seem to deal with the fundamental problem of 
differences in negotiating power between states. More pertinent is her suggested meta- 
level norm of 'global deliberative equality', under which any government official who met 
specific criteria would be entitled to join a given network and to listen and be heard within 
it. Capacity building programmes (similar perhaps to those of UNESCO) would help those 
from poorer states meet these criteria. ` It is open to doubt whether this norm, particularly 
without the backing of formal rules, would suffice to ensure southern voices in the GGI 
received their due attention, however (see also 7.5). h1 
7.3 RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
Non-state actors played a part in the various drafting stages of the UNESCO declarations, 
through written and verbal consultations, but it was government representatives who 
made the final decisions, as would be expected in a state-centric regime. At national level, 
as premised in the previous section, many of those in Kenya and South Africa who might 
be considered experts in genetics or bioethics were not asked to feed into their country's 
9 Slaughter, A New World Order, 28. 10 lbid, 247 and 259. " Antonio Franceschet has commented that the foundational norm of 'global deliberative equality' may not be 
strong enough to address global inequality, poverty and power imbalance. Nor does he see capacity building 
and sharing of best practices as sufficient to "confront the implications of current power asymmetries among 
states and societies. " Hence his assessment that Slaughter's book "tends to reinforce a model of global 
governance that is heavily stacked in favor of the powerful and privileged. " (Franceschet, "A New World Order, " 530. ) 
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negotiating position, let alone to join a delegation. The problem for these states, then, 
seems to have lain in their incapability (financial or otherwise) to harness expertise, as 
much as a lack of expertise per se. This is noteworthy, because if the declarations are 
adopted at national level as intended, it will be the scientists and ethicists in both the 
public and private sectors who will be primarily responsible for applying the resultant laws, 
regulations or policies in their everyday pursuits. Their input might have helped to ensure 
workable norms, as per Victor et a! s observations about 'implementation expertise' during 
negotiations facilitating better agreements. It might also have triggered the formation of a 
community committed to fostering the declarations, an important element in the success 
of regimes according to Young. The wariness of scientists in Kenya and South Africa of 
becoming involved in policy endeavours corroborates Victor et als analysis that this does 
not always follow, however. 
Slaughter uses a similar argument in favour of government networks: agreements within 
these networks would be directly implemented by those government officials who had 
negotiated them. 12 For this to work, the officials would have to be government employees 
from a relevant department or ministry, rather than diplomatic attaches or persons from 
other sectors appointed to represent their governments on a one-off basis, as was often 
the case at meetings on the UNESCO declarations. 13 Slaughter sees government officials 
as prime repositories of expertise: 
What better source on how to run a securities system, regulate commercial banks, 
protect the environment, pursue different types of criminals, safeguard human rights 
or foster business competition than networks of government officials from around 
the world charged with precisely those functions? 14 
Were such officials to be selected for the proposed GG I, might its norms fair better than 
UNESCO's? In terms of adoption into national systems, the answer would likely be yes, 
given the lack of knowledge and subsequent implementation of the declarations by 
members of, for example, South Africa's Department of Science and Technology (see 
12 Slaughter, op cit, 263. 13 See, for example, the lists of participants attending intergovernmental meetings of experts aimed at 
finalising the IDHGD (2003) and UDBHR (2005). 14 Slaughter, op cit, 178. 
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5.2.2). In terms of legitimacy, however, this would depend on whether the officials were 
indeed considered the best sources on how to regulate genetics and bioethics by those 
likely to be affected by the norms, or had at least sought their advice. Thus the GGI, to 
garner legitimacy through being underpinned by states as planned, would have to ensure 
its government members appeared both competent and accessible. As Chapters 5 and 6 
illustrated, the legitimacy and accountability of governments' international activities are not 
inherent, but are compromised by long or broken chains of delegation and 
communication, running within and between different departments and ministries and from 
the executive to the populace. These problems cast doubts on Slaughter's assumption 
that her new world order of governance through government networks would ensure 
"bottom up" decision-making, with constituents able to hold officials to account for their 
actions at both national and global levels. Slaughter acknowledges that government 
networks in their present format are not always particularly visible and makes several 
suggestions as to how this might be improved, including greater interaction with other 
sectors. 15 
How far other sectors should play a role in global decision-making lies at the crux of the 
different approaches to global governance under discussion. In a world order of 
government networks, all those affected by an issue would have a right to participate, but 
this would be through government representatives. Thus governance through government 
networks would resemble state-centric regimes, in that ultimate decisions would lie in the 
hands of government officials, albeit often those more closely connected with the issue at 
hand than many of those who attend IGO deliberations. Slaughter's suggestion that these 
networks should engage systematically with their counterparts in the corporate and civil 
society sectors would help them to avoid some of the problems UNESCO has 
encountered in terms of visibility, especially if this was expanded to include scientists and 
ethicists (specifically with regard to genetics and bioethics), as per the proposed GGI. 16 In 
essence, however, the hierarchy between state and non-state actors would not be 
15 lbid, 28-29 and 257. 18 [bid, 225. 
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diminished and thus could be a source of tension, as it has been in UNESCO at both 
international and national levels (see 5.1.3 and 5.2.2). By contrast, regimes as public 
spheres, issue-based networks and cosmopolitan democracy have been put forward as 
possible means to encourage not just a greater but also a more equal involvement of non- 
state actors than is seen in traditional governance mechanisms. This in turn carries 
potential complications. How can everyone be included in the decision-making process 
without it becoming unwieldy? " If the people to be included are restricted to only those 
with a legitimate claim to a stake in a given issue, how is this to be adjudicated? 
According to Samhat, international institutions have already opened their deliberations to 
non-state actors to a significant degree, directly and through documentation. UNESCO 
has ostensibly done both, most of its meetings being held in public and recorded in the 
public domain, but many stakeholders in genetics and bioethics in Kenya and South Africa 
remained unaware of the organisation's activities in their field. Issue-based networks, 
such as those elaborated by Rischard, would be expected to improve on the 
representativeness of IGOs, by involving government, corporate and civil society actors in 
an equal partnership. With the addition of academics, 18 the plans for the GGI were 
originally based on this model. This proved popular with several interviewees in Kenya 
and South Africa, who saw inclusion of different sectors as a source of legitimacy. As in 
GINs, membership would be based on knowledge and expertise, a favourable option 
given the importance that having the 'right' people involved in an initiative appears to bear 
(see 5.1.5.3). How this expertise would be assessed and selected thus becomes a 
pertinent question. In 2004 TJCB claimed to be bringing together "some of the best 
"This has been identified as a problem in some existing global policy networks: "Although the degree of 
inclusion of stakeholders is critical to a network's legitimacy, large numbers of participants may result in 
sizable, sometimes prohibitive, transaction costs. " (Benner, Reinicke and Witte, "Global Public Policy 
Networks, " 21. ) 
1e While Rischard claims that GINs would be non-hierarchical, he recommends that they should have separate 
advisory panels of scientists. This separation would be in order to maintain scientific independence, but in 
reality would re-create the two-tier system seen in UNESCO, whereby the committee of experts, the 
International Bioethics Committee, is not involved in final decision-making. It seems strange to treat scientists 
differently from other non-state actors, namely private sector and civil society representatives, rather than 
expect them, like the other groups, to act as 'global citizens' (see 7.4). The GGI proposals do Include 
academics among the network membership (except in the final 2006 publication). The data in this thesis would 
suggest that scientists should be incorporated into the GGI (if established) as full-blown members, as they 
have "hands-on" experience that others lack and would be intimately involved in enacting the network's norms 
and activities. 
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creative minds" from the various sectors, to set the agenda and goals of the fledgling 
network. 19 Held's criticism of Rischard's GIN model--that it fails to clarify how the range of 
people to be involved would be decided-could also be levelled at TJCB, as it has not 
articulated on what grounds these creative minds were being chosen. ° Rischard claims 
that because GINs would not enact legislation (and thus not act like a state), issues of 
democratic representation would lose their cogency. 21 Representation becomes, if 
anything, a more cogent issue in such networks, however; the raison d'etre of the GGI, for 
example, would lie in its being more truly representative of a diverse range of 
stakeholders than traditional IGOs. 
Some of those interviewed in Kenya and South Africa were concerned not only that 
bioethics and genetics experts had not had input into the draft UNESCO declarations, but 
also that those who might be affected by their provisions, such as potentially vulnerable 
research subjects, had not been consulted either (see 5.1.2.2). Regimes as public 
spheres, issue-based networks and cosmopolitan democracy provide different solutions 
as to how broader participation can be ensured fairly and effectively. GINs would be open 
to "all interested parties, " but the size of these potentially vast constituencies would be 
mitigated by each GIN addressing a sharply delineated problem. Regimes, under 
Samhat and Ellis' schemata, would be similarly framed to include all those affected by a 
specific issue, through the conduit of civil society organisations. For cross-cutting issues 
like genetics and bioethics, specificity could prove problematic, as related problems or 
root causes might not get dealt with. In terms of closing the 'genomics divide', for 
example, even if vaccines against endemic diseases were to be discovered as a result of 
technological capacity building in developing countries, these might have little impact if the 
health infrastructure necessary for their administration did not improve in tandem. Thus 
19 Acharya et al, "Better Global Governance to Promote Genomics for Development, " 6; Acharya et al, 
Genomics and Global Health, 43-44. 20 Held, Global Covenant, 107. 
21 Rischard, op cit, 188. 22 Ibid, 170 and 174. 
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Rischard's suggestion of a twenty-first GIN for coordination purposes would be imperative 
to the efficacy of his model as a means to solving global problems 23 
Cosmopolitan democracy takes an alternative approach to the inclusion of all interested 
parties, as only those significantly affected by a given issue (in terms of life chances and 
expectancy) would be invited to participate in decision-making around it, as a'community 
of fate'. 24 Without sharp delineations between issues, however, determining who falls 
within this category for genetics and bioethics could prove difficult, given that the 
UDHGHR (1997) declares the human genome the 'heritage of humanity' and TJCB labels 
genomics a'global public good'. Speculatively, genetic and biomedical research has the 
potential to affect the life expectancy and life chances of everyone on the planet. 
Furthermore, Held's critique of GINs, outlined above, could equally be applied to his 
model of cosmopolitan democracy, as he does not make clear who would set the 
'significantly affected' criteria, or who would arbitrate whether people had met them. The 
GGI, if established, would have to address such issues, as one of its aims would be to 
encourage equitable participation, from concerned citizens as well as the various 
stakeholders: 'The GGI would represent a dedicated effort to hear all voices in the 
genomics debate. Participation rooted in the right to be involved would be essential for 
building consensus and avoiding knee-jerk reactions to the technologyi25 (italics added). 
In short, how and by whom the "right to be involved" should be adjudicated would need to 
be determined. 
Rischard and Held suggest possible mechanisms through which the voices of those 
interested in or significantly affected by a given issue could be heard. During the 'norm- 
producing phase', GINs would be broadened beyond the multisectoral partnerships into a 
"virtual public space" (through 'electronic town meetings' or ETMs), with the intention of 
23 Ibid, 190-191. 
24 Held, Global Covenant, 98-100 and 107. 25 Dowdeswell et al, "Realising the Promise of Genomics, " 138; Acharya et al, Genomics and Global Health, 
43. 
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shortening the distance between decision-makers and the general public. 26 The precedent 
set by UNESCO is not encouraging in this regard. Despite the drafting process for the 
UDBHR (2005) being open to "the greatest possible number" through the UNESCO 
website, 27 there appear to have been significant gaps between decision-makers and 
stakeholders even (ethicists, scientists and those from government departments not 
directly connected with the organisation), let alone the wider public. Moreover, ETMs 
might be biased towards the North, given the internet access problems of some people in 
developing countries (see 6.2.1). 
Cosmopolitan democracy would comprise "an overarching network of democratic public 
fora, " from the local to the global, through which people could engage in decision-making, 
either directly or indirectly. The fora would include diverse public spheres (see 7.5) and 
general referenda at regional or global levels. The latter would not poll everyone, but 
rather only those considered to be significantly affected by the issue at hand; a cross- 
section of society; national policy-makers and legislators; or a combination of these 
groups 28 Held does not say how or by whom the referenda would be conducted. If they 
were to be internet-based they might face the same problems as ETMs; if responsibility 
fell to IGOs like UNESCO these would require increased budgets to be able to run such 
activities efficiently on a grand scale. 
Chapter 5 highlighted two elements that would be key to global polling through either 
ETMs or general referenda being carried out successfully. The first would be a good 
marketing strategy, the second sufficient incentive to take part. People would need to be 
aware of their opportunities for input and to believe that the initiative providing them had 
the wherewithal to make a real difference. In this sense, those interested or significantly 
affected would be self-selecting. At the partnership as well as the broader level, there is 
an assumption on the part of Rischard and Held as authors and the TJCB team as would- 
26 Rischard, op cit, 174 and 182. Z' UNESCO, "Report by the Director-General on the Drawing up of a Declaration on Universal Norms for 
Bioethics, " 1 and 7. (See also Chapter 5, note 77. ) 28 Held, Global Covenant, 113. 
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be practitioners that those outside government have the time and inclination to become 
involved in governance. The quick dissolution of the Africa Genome Policy Forum 
provides an example of how difficult it can be to maintain an initiative, even among 
stakeholders in a given issue (see 5.2.3). As mentioned above, scientists in particular are 
often cautious of committing themselves to pursuits outside their core research and 
teaching activities, their apparent enthusiasm for a GGI-like network notwithstanding. 
7.4 OVERLAP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
The proposed GGI, in order to make a real difference, would have to offer something 
existing global initiatives in genetics and bioethics do not, or else it would simply 
perpetuate a common problem in the international system, that of overlapping mandates 
among different bodies. Its proposed aims are in fact very similar to those of UNESCO's 
Bioethics Programme, in terms of capacity building, knowledge sharing and public 
engagement. Worse, it would also seek to produce definitive ethical norms for "genomic 
technology research . n29 Given the seeming lack of communication 
between TJCB and 
UNESCO, this produces an arena ripe for the duplication of activities and purportedly 
universal standards (see 6.1.2 and 6.2.2). Perhaps to mitigate such worries, in its final 
publication on the GGI (2006), TJCB recognised the continuing significance of IGOs. 30 Do 
the networked governance or cosmopolitan democracy approaches offer any means by 
which the GGI could add to UNESCO's efforts without encroaching on them? 
Networked governance, as espoused by Rischard and Slaughter, would see issue-based 
or government networks working with IGOs, to a certain degree. To address urgent global 
problems with the requisite alacrity, GINs would have to capitalise on the resources and 
experience residing in existing institutions. Rischard envisages IGOs facilitating the 
membership selection process (as described above) and funding the implementation of 
29 Dowdeswell eta!, op cit, 138. 30 Ibid. 
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any recommendations the GINs might make. 31 Whether this is realistic is debatable, given 
that IGOs often lack sufficient backing for their own activities. As shown in Chapter 6, for 
instance, UNESCO's pool of funding under the Bioethics Programme is limited, thus it 
seems unlikely it would be able to support the GGI financially. Rather, the GGI might be in 
a position to assist UNESCO, if it succeeded in securing "alternative financing options" as 
per its aims. 32 These alternative funders would in all likelihood be based in the North, thus 
they would have to act as 'global citizens' (see 7.5) in order for the goal of a southern-led 
network to remain uncompromised. 33 Another suggestion that Rischard makes with regard 
to IGOs-which it might be pertinent for the proposed GGI to follow, given the proliferation 
of norms around genetics and bioethics-is that GINs could encourage compliance with 
existing treaties (or perhaps declarations), "if some useful ones are to hand. "34 If the 
UNESCO declarations are indeed considered to be of some use, if the GGI was to 
promote the norms contained therein rather than formulate its own, this might render the 
relationship between the two initiatives one of cohesion rather than confusion. 
In the international system as it operates now, IGOs can generate government networks 
or vice versa, according to Slaughter. Treaties and agreements trigger the formation of 
government networks as an "inevitable part" of their implementation, or IGOs evolve in 
support of horizontal government networks (that is, networks of national officials). 35 In the 
new world order Slaughter envisages, IGOs would play something of a secondary role 
within horizontal networks (vertical networks, which would grant IGOs greater power, are 
discussed in 7.6): 
Imagine a global governance system principally composed of horizontal 
government networks of counterpart national officials, working on their own behalf 
or to implement formal international obligations... Many, if not most, of the 
international organizations dotting this landscape, regardless of form or title, are in 
substance largely facilitative "information agencies"; their job is to collect, distill, 
s' Rischard, op cit, 170,172 and 185. 32 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138. 33 Reinicke notes that governments or IGOs often provide the seed money to set up a global policy network, 
but that in the long term funding from various sources is necessary to facilitate consensus building and 
preserve credibility. (Reinicke, op cit, 55. ) 4 Rischard, op cit, 176. 35 Slaughter, op cit, 153. 
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and disseminate information needed by network participants and to help the 
networks coordinate their work. 36 
Both Rischard and Slaughter, then, see IGOs playing a chiefly facilitative role relative to 
their networks. With regard to UNESCO and the proposed GGI, if UNESCO was to act as 
facilitator, where would this leave the GGI in terms of being overall coordinator of a 
"network of networks" ? 37 UNESCO, like other IGOs, conducts many activities beyond 
simply information collection and dissemination, such as the Ethics Education Programme 
(see 6.2.1). There would appear to be no valid reason why it or its sister agencies should 
drop such activities, if they are meeting a need. It may be, however, that UNESCO could 
draw on the government network framework to promote stronger implementation of its 
declarations among member states. Government officials came together to draft the three 
declarations, but there have been no equivalent gatherings to discuss how well or 
otherwise these are being implemented now they have been adopted. A network of 
government officials formed around the declarations might induce greater peer pressure 
on states to adopt the said instruments, while at the same time providing them with a 
source of mutual support to do so (7.6 discusses the soft power of horizontal networks 
further). Perhaps the GGI could provide the required space and incentive for networking 
between states, especially if it took on the norms promulgated in the UNESCO 
declarations rather than drawing up its own. 
Should the GGI be formed not as a single entity but as one of Rischard's twenty GINs or 
part of Slaughter's lattice of countless government networks, there would be room for 
duplication within these frameworks as well as between them and more traditional IGOs. 
As shown in the previous section, Rischard's twenty-first GIN would be necessary to 
prevent overlap between GINs addressing specific but cross-cutting issues such as 
poverty, infectious disease and migration (three of his twenty problems38). If there were 
36 Ibid, 164-165. 
37 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 138. 13 Rischard, op cit, 66. 
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myriad government networks addressing these types of issues, officials might consider it 
an inefficient use of their limited time to become involved in more than a few of them. 
Held's "overarching network of democratic public fora" might face similar problems. 
Traditional IGOs would have a place in cosmopolitan democracy, among a wide range of 
other decision-making bodies, from the local to the global. 39 (Those with social mandates 
would be particularly welcome, a qualification that UNESCO meets by virtue of the 
UDBHR's social responsibility article. ) Without some overall coordination mechanism, 
such as a global government, would there not be a danger of the confusion of 
responsibility Held has identified in the current international system simply being 
perpetuated? By way of example, an 'array of fora 940 for genetics and bioethics 
governance is emerging, comprising UNESCO and the proposed GGI (along with other 
international organisations such as WHO, HUGO, the World Medical Association and 
CIOMS), regional bodies such as NEPAD and national and local ethics committees and 
community engagement mechanisms. The resulting proliferation of ethical guidelines at all 
levels has proved confusing for some practitioners, although a perceived need to comply 
with international standards as laid out in the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS 
guidelines has provided a catalyst for the strengthening of national systems in Kenya and 
South Africa. UNESCO has attempted to mitigate the overlap at international level by 
establishing the UN Inter-Agency Committee on Bioethics (see 6.2.2). As this committee 
is open to non-UN bodies, it may be a forum through which UNESCO, the proposed GGI 
and other organisations could coordinate their programmes and thus provide mutual 
reinforcement, in line with Young's positive views on different institutions having similar 
mandates. 
39 Held, Global Covenant, 109 and 112. 40 ibid, 115. 
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7.5 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 
The GGI might distinguish itself from existing genetics and bioethics initiatives if it could 
avoid the 'lowest common denominator' phenomenon that afflicts many international 
regimes. Agreement on the UNESCO declarations' universal principles, for example, was 
only possible for uncontroversial issues and then only within a general and non-binding 
format. For the UDBHR (2005), decisions on difficult issues such as stem cell research 
were postponed until a change in the international political climate should render 
agreement possible (see 6.1.1). TJCB envisages the GGI having greater success, placing 
high hopes in the proposed network's capacity for consensus building: 
Imagine a collaborative and inclusive network of industry leaders, academics, 
concerned citizens, representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and governmental officials, with particular emphasis on developing world 
representation. Imagine such a network sharing information globally and across 
sectors, facilitating informed decision-making that would help close the imminent 
genomic divide. It would provide a common forum for these players to discuss their 
goals and needs, and create an environment where consensus could be built to 
address policy needs. 1 
It is hard to imagine, however, that a network encompassing diverse interests and 
priorities could reach a higher quality consensus-in terms of less compromised, more 
effective decisions-than UNESCO has managed with its more circumscribed 
membership, particularly within a quicker timeframe. TJCB puts great faith in the GGI's 
proposed informal structure in this regard, which it believes would render the network 
neutral, flexible, agile, unbureaucratic and non-hierarchical. In assuming that this "loose 
collaboration" would yield inclusivity and so allow poor states to take a lead role (perhaps 
under a norm akin to Slaughter's 'global deliberative equality'), it ignores the potential for 
power differentials to come to the fore when not constrained by procedural formalities 42 
41 Dowdeswell, Daar and Singer, "Getting Governance into Genomics, " 497. 42 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 139-140. Benner, Reinicke and Witte see the need to reach consensus within 
global public policy networks as potentially leading to "lowest common denominator" rather than high quality 
policy outcomes. At the same time, they advocate informality and an insistence on consensus as a means to 
give weak actors a voice, in the form of "decision blockades and veto positions. " (Benner, Reinicke and Witte, 
op cit, 21. ) This seems a rather negative solution to unequal power relations. If the GGI adopted this method it 
would rarely reach a decision, particularly within the fast timeframe demanded. Reinicke, in an earlier paper, 
highlighted the time-consuming nature of this type of deliberation: "The value of a consensus-building network 
rests not on its ability to offer quick solutions, but on its creation of an environment that enables parties in 
conflict to reach an eventual agreement. " (Reinicke, op cit, 47. ) 
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Furthermore, the plans are lacking in detail. TJCB gives no indication of how often or by 
what means the GGI would meet. If it is to be a virtual network, some actors in the South 
may struggle to discharge fully their designated leadership role, due to indifferent internet 
access. 
Do the different governance models carry recommendations on how the high quality 
consensus sought from the proposed GGI might be attained? Regimes as public spheres 
and GINs would have multisectoral memberships and thus could generate the same doubt 
as that levelled at the GGI concerning the potential to propagate consensus. Within GINs, 
Rischard proposes that each sectoral representative, on pain of expulsion under a'code 
of conduct', should have to act as a'global citizen' rather than defend their own interests. 
To this end, a GIN would make a constant appeal to specific, universal values that "are a 
prerequisite to the solution of the global issue at hand. "43 Unfortunately, Rischard does not 
articulate how these values would be decided upon, but instead seems to assume they 
exist a priori. As the UNESCO declarations exemplify, what constitutes a universal value 
is contested and unlikely to be specific. Hence a GIN's discussions, if to be dictated by 
such values, could not proceed with urgency if these first had to be negotiated and agreed 
upon. 
Like Samhat and Ellis, Held uses the concept of the public sphere. He suggests that a 
cosmopolitan polity could embrace an ethos similar to that of global citizenship, in order to 
arrive at collective judgements. A diverse range of public spheres would enable informed 
participation and deliberation, guided by the `test of impartiality'. Held writes, "Being 
impartial here means being open to, reasoning from, and assessing all points of view 
(especially those of people in urgent need); it does not mean simply following the precepts 
of self-interest. "" Whether the test was being appropriately applied would be judged 
according to various conditions, such as freedom from the possibility of one member 
imposing on another and the acceptability of outcomes to all, irrespective of present or 
43 Rischard, op cit, 174. 44 Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 176. 
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future social positions. 45 These criteria could perhaps be usefully employed by the GGI in 
its pursuit of consensus. In reality, however, impartial and informed participation is difficult 
to guarantee, particularly among the broader public, whom the GGI would seek to engage. 
This has been the case in Kenya and South Africa, where those who might be significantly 
affected by decisions in genetics and bioethics (in vulnerable communities, for example) 
have little knowledge of these subjects. To address this, South Africa's Public 
Understanding of Biotechnology programme aims to inform citizens about biotechnology, 
so that they can participate in policy-making in this area. The programme tries to be 
neutral in the information that it gives, highlighting arguments both for and against 
biotechnology. Finding the right balance has proved difficult, particularly in terms of 
assessing how best to offset what might be biased information given out by interest 
groups. 46 Moreover, the deeper question remains, who is qualified to judge what is 
balanced information? 
Slaughter takes a different tack to Rischard and Held, submitting that variations in values 
could be accommodated in a global governance framework under the principle of 
'legitimate difference', which "enshrines pluralism. "" TJCB appears to have taken this 
'constitutional norm' on board, along with that of subsidiarity, as in its latest publication on 
the GGI it suggests that the proposed network should ensure states are given the 
opportunity to "prioritise their own health goals. "48In an area such as genetics, where 
research projects are increasingly conducted transnationally, the application of these 
principles could prove difficult. At a more practical level, Slaughter advocates discussion 
and argument, developed in a positive, trust building manner over time, as a means to 
achieve "reasoned consensus. " These developments are more likely, she says, in 
45 Held, Global Covenant, 109-110. 
ae Interviews with SA 27 and SA 29. The Kenya-based African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum has a 
similar mandate (interview with K_10), although its name would suggest otherwise. " Slaughter, op cit, 249. Legitimate difference, global deliberative equality and subsidiarity are three of the five 
'constitutional norms' that Slaughter suggests could direct how members of government networks should treat 
each other. She writes, "At the loftiest level, these principles could be understood as part of a global 
transgovernmental constitution-overarching values to steer the operation of government networks. " It seems 
rather inconsistent on her part to promote "overarching values" while at the same time endorsing pluralism. 
Would a country be able to opt out of parts of the transgovernmental constitution under the principle of 
legitimate difference? Perhaps Slaughter views her constitutional norms to be of a sufficiently universal nature 
that no divergence from them would be legitimate. (Ibid, 260. ) 48 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 140. 
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networks where membership is based on common professional standards and ethics, or 
'network norms', than in fora characterised by interest-based bargaining, such as regime 
negotiations 49 In this respect, informality may be a boon, as illustrated by the following 
example. During the drafting of the UDBHR in 2005, the chairman, Pablo Sader, arranged 
an extramural meeting, at which he requested that participants refrain from taking 
positions and instead engage in open discussion. This helped enable consensus at the 
subsequent intergovernmental meeting of experts, even on the previously fractious topic 
of social responsibility 50 Similarly, a multisectoral membership, while perhaps rendering 
consensus less likely, would also make it that much more precious. Several interviewees 
welcomed the proposed GGI as a venue for ripe discussion, precisely because of its 
anticipated mixed membership (although a few were sceptical, saying that there were 
enough 'talk-shops' already51). This would indicate that broader policy networks, of which 
government networks would form the backbone, are an important aspect of Slaughter's 
model. 
7.6 IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Agreements in regime settings are often non-binding, as states are more likely to accede 
to a document if they know that ultimately they cannot be bound by its contents or 
sanctioned for not upholding them. The UNESCO declarations fall within this category. 
Each was adopted "by acclamation" by member states at its designated General 
Conference (see 2.3.3.1), but subsequent implementation at national level, as far as can 
be ascertained, has been poor. The relative impunity of states and other actors within the 
current international system is one of the reasons why networked governance and 
49 Slaughter, op cit, 27 and 203-204. so Chairman Sader also produced a 'non paper' on how outstanding issues might be addressed, which he 
subsequently distributed to member states. See UNESCO, "Informal meeting with Permanent Delegations 
Organized by the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (category II) Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics" and the 'non paper and letters from Mr Sader to the 
permanent delegations of UNESCO before and after the May meeting, available at: UNESCO, "Different 
Stages in the Elaboration of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, " 
httpV/portal. unesco. org/shs/en/ev. php-URL_ID=3850&URL_DO=D0 TOPIC&URL SECTION=201. html 
accessed 20 August 2007). 
Interviews with SA-1 0 and SA 17 
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cosmopolitan democracy have been proffered as alternatives. It is therefore appropriate to 
ask, would these models derive greater adherence to norms than existing governance 
mechanisms, if realised? Each would recognise sovereignty, although Slaughter and Held 
tender new understandings of the concept. Slaughter advocates what she terms 
'disaggregated sovereignty', whereby individual government institutions would be 
responsible for fulfilling international obligations. She also suggests that, for some issues, 
enforcement power should be ceded to supranational organisations, within vertical 
government networks. 52 Could this be a solution to UNESCO's difficulties in ensuring that 
its declarations are implemented effectively? Would governments be more willing to see 
the declarations become binding conventions if these were to be applied only to particular 
departments or ministries, the risk of being labelled a pariah in the event of non- 
adherence thereby being lessened greatly? 
Held advocates a qualified sovereignty, to be conferred on those countries that safeguard 
human rights and democracy, such that states would no longer be "ontologically 
privileged. "53 The UNESCO declarations are based on universal human rights, as 
eponymised in two of them, the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Accordingly, they 
give human rights and dignity precedence over national or cultural considerations. Since 
they are non-binding, however, they furnish no means to enforce these limitations. 
Archibugi proffers a vision of cosmopolitan democracy under which coercive power would 
be shared between government and meta-governmental institutions. M Such a brokerage 
would license UNESCO to enforce its declarations as human rights instruments. The 
concession of sovereignty would be greater than under Slaughter's proposals, however, 
as it would be made within a global polity designed to address an integrated security and 
human rights agenda, rather than a disaggregated vertical network. With regard to 
genetics and bioethics, it seems unlikely that states would agree to surrender sovereignty 
52 Slaughter, op cit, 268-269 and 20. 53 Held, Global Covenant, 119 and From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, " 168. 54 Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 454. 
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under any circumstances, disaggregated or otherwise, as evidenced by their reluctance to 
allow any committal clauses even within the non-binding UNESCO instruments (see 
6.1.1.3). 
Through its integrated agenda, cosmopolitan democracy might enable broader issues 
around genetics and bioethics (such as inequalities of health) to be dealt with in a 
harmonised fashion, which global networks as single issue solutions would struggle to do. 
Held proposes a direct action assembly, made up of "all states and agencies, " to tackle 
pressing global problems. He explains, "Its task would be to lay down, in framework- 
setting law, the standards and institutions required to embed the rule of law, democratic 
principles, and the minimum conditions for human agency to flourish. " If lower levels of 
governance could or would not meet these standards and conditions, thus failing to 
protect people in urgent need, direct intervention would be justified. 55 Non-adherence by 
one state could potentially affect everyone, given that the assembly would be dealing with 
global problems. Thus law-abiding states might agree to such a system for the same 
reason that they sometimes join international regimes: it might be in their rational self- 
interest to do. Using similar arguments to Benatar (see Chapter 3, note 59), one 
interviewee articulated why such a long-term view might be necessary, particularly on the 
part of developed countries: 
If the developed world, so-called, doesn't take this challenge [inequalities between 
North and South] seriously, then there won't be much of a world for any of us. So I 
don't see it as an option for the developed world to help or aid-in whatever ways 
practical-the developing world, it's rather a necessity... So until the wealthy in the 
world realise that it's in their own interest to reach out to the developing world, 
56 there won't be the world that we would all like to see. 
Another described why a broad approach to genetics and bioethics would be beneficial: 
"But the solution is not just providing genomics capability, there are much greater issues... 
So we could have fantastic genomics capabilities in Africa and it would have no meaning 
55 Held, Global Covenant, 110. Held admits that agreement on how the global assembly should be formed and 
run would be "difficult, to say the least" and would have to be reached through consensus building with 
stakeholders: "states, IGOs, INGOs, citizen groups and social movements. " (Ibid, 110-111. ) 56 Interview with SA 18. 
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to Africa. "57 This is in direct contrast to TJCB, which has a broad vision to address the 
inequalities of health that could lead to "social confrontation, " but focuses on advances in 
genetics as the channel through which to achieve this. 58 
Until such time as states agree to relinquish at a global level a part or the whole of their 
sovereignty, are there means by which the present system could be rendered more 
effective in ensuring norm adherence? Victor et al advocate systems of implementation 
review (SIRs) as a means to encourage states to honour their non-binding commitments. 
Precisely because the declarations are non-binding, however, member states of UNESCO 
have seen even self-reporting requirements as something of an impertinence. It remains 
to be seen whether the unofficial collection of implementation data through the Global 
Ethics Observatory (GEObs) will be more successful, as UNESCO hopes. After the poor 
response to the evaluation exercise for the UDHGHR (1997), the Bioethics Programme 
has chosen to concentrate its limited resources on a management approach to effecting 
implementation. This seems a sensible ploy, given that the various capacity building 
programmes-GEOBs, Assisting Bioethics Committees and the Ethics Education 
Programme-were generally well received by interviewees in Kenya and South Africa, 
with the caveat that they should complement rather than duplicate other initiatives. 
Within their issue-based and government network frameworks, Rischard and Slaughter 
suggest various forms of soft and hard power to encourage implementation. GINs would 
rely on soft power only, 'naming-and-shaming' those failing to meet the standards laid 
down during the 'norm-producing phase'. Rischard claims that employing norms in 
combination with such "reputational effects" would produce results more quickly and 
effectively than do binding treaties and conventions and the rules and sanctions that go 
with them. 59 Although TJCB's publications draw heavily on Rischard's work, there is no 
indication within them that the proposed GGI would adopt this mechanism to induce 
57 Interview with SA 26. se Dowdeswell eta!, op cit, 140. 59 Rischard, op cit, 170 and 178. 
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compliance with its norms (indeed how the norms would be enforced is not addressed at 
all). From the history of the UNESCO declarations, it would seem that there could be no 
good argument for its doing so, given the emphasis on urgency. The declarations, as sets 
of non-binding norms, were indeed negotiated in a relatively short timeframe, but their 
impact in terms of reputational effects may take far longer to come to fruition. Despite 
being the first bioethics instruments to be adopted by an intergovernmental body, they are 
usurped in the international arena by longer-standing texts. As an illustration, ethics 
training programmes in South Africa are more likely to teach the Declaration of Helsinki 
and the CIOMS guidelines than the UNESCO declarations. 60 It will thus take time for the 
UDBHR (2005), for instance, to become a "normative reference" or a "reference text.. . for 
all the stakeholders concerned, " as intended by UNESCO's Intergovernmental Bioethics 
Committee (IGBC) and the April 2005 meeting of government experts respectively. 6' This 
example shows how it could take several years for the naming of an actor as being in 
breach of GGI or GIN norms to equate to the shaming of their reputation. One interviewee 
articulated this in a developing country context: "In the West I see that name and shame 
working, but out here, if people don't even know what it's about, then there's no shame. "62 
Furthermore, it is not only the legitimacy of the norms that must be entrenched, but also 
that of their purveyors. UNESCO's claim that it is the organisation best suited to standard- 
setting in bioethics has been questioned, even though it is an established UN agency. 
How much more would a newly formed GGI or GIN have to work to ensure its "moral 
authority"? 63 
Rischard's 'naming-and-shaming' mechanism makes no provision for those actors who 
desire to reach the required standards, but lack the capacity to do so (apart from the 
ETMs engaging in best practice exchange"). By contrast, Slaughter, like management 
regime theorists, places great emphasis on capacity, to the extent that "the core 
60 Interviews with SA 15 and SA 16. 61 UNESCO, "Report of the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC), " 8 and "First 
Intergovemmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " 3. 62 Interview with K 18. 63 Rischard, op cit, 178. 64 Ibid. 
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characteristic of sovereignty, " in its disaggregated form, "would shift from autonomy from 
outside interference to the capacity to participate in transgovernmental networks of all 
types. "65 While, like Rischard, she sees prestige as a valuable incentive for states to 
conform to network norms, she suggests that government networks (horizontal and 
vertical) could offer willing states technical assistance to meet these norms, rather than 
name and shame them for not doing so. She classes this type of assistance as hard 
power, but unlike the more usual sanctions it is of a positive form-66 Slaughter's vision 
appears somewhat blinkered in that she focuses almost entirely on capacity building 
designed and led by developed countries s' As indicated in Chapter 6, the most 
favourable kind of capacity building is that which is planned in response to local needs, 
identified by those on the ground (see 6.3.2.3). Relatedly, some interviewees in South 
Africa said that the North must not impose its norms and practices on the South and 
should be prepared to see knowledge sharing as a two-way process. 68 Should it be 
established, the GGI would have to take such messages on board in order to make a real 
impact in the South and thus fulfil what would be its ultimate aim, to close the 'genomics 
divide'. 
Horizontal government networks would apply soft as well as hard power, again in positive 
form, in the form of information provision, socialisation, persuasion and discussion. In the 
current international system it is in fact UNESCO that is employing these methods in the 
genetics and bioethics fields, through projects such as GEObs and the "Ethics Around the 
World" regional conferences (see 6.2.1). Would a network of government institutions be 
more successful than UNESCO in using soft power to encourage adherence to norms? It 
might be that government officials could exert peer pressure on their counterparts from 
other countries more effectively than UNESCO by enhancing the socialisation of norms, 
85 Slaughter, op cit, 34. (See Chapter 3, note 195 for critiques of this stance on sovereignty. ) " Ibid, 168. 
67 Ibid, 19 and 229. 68 Interviews with SA 16, SA 18 and SA 24. Slaughter does acknowledge that knowledge could flow from 
South to North, but within an overall framework that hints at condescension: 'Where possibilities of genuine 
learning exist, representatives of even the world's most powerful nations are likely to be surprised by what 
they do not know or have not thought of... successful mentoring can often produce students who turn the 
tables on their teachers. " ([bid, 229-230. ) 
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as Slaughter would suggest (and thus a government network built around the declarations 
may be a way forward, as discussed in 7.4). 69 In terms of efficiency, however, it would 
seem sensible to coordinate activities through a central hub. The GEObs database, for 
example, provides a simple means for government institutions and officials from different 
states to initiate contact if they so wish, which is surely a better system than them all 
having to find each other in an ad hoc manner. This in effect renders UNESCO a 
horizontal network host. 70 
One of the forms of information sharing that Slaughter, like Rischard, recommends is the 
compilation of codes and best practices, which members of government networks could 
then adapt to local circumstances. " Again, this is a function of the GEObs database. 
What is interesting is that Slaughter advocates pluralism, while UNESCO embraces 
universalism, yet both have come up with essentially the same methodology for enacting 
these. This raises the question, how far can universal norms be contextualised before 
they lose all potency? Or, in other words, at what point do they become plural? Relatedly, 
Slaughter also endorses an affirmative norm of friction and constructive ambiguity. "72 
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that ambiguity is neither affirmative nor constructive in 
some circumstances, however; at both international and national levels, having to choose 
between several sets of guidelines or rules promulgated by various disparate bodies can 
be confusing and counter-productive (although some interviewees found the mix of 
perspectives useful). 
69 Ibid, 3. 
70 It is worth noting that Slaughter and UNESCO have a slightly different take on the soft power of a tool such 
as GEObs. Slaughter predicts that one of the merits of a network having a common website in order to make it 
more visible would be that government officials would know that they were under scrutiny. (lbid, 237. ) For 
UNESCO, however, one of the advantages of the GEObs database is that it can collect information about how 
states are implementing its declarations without appearing to be officially monitoring them (see 6.2.3). 71 Ibid, 249-250. 
72 Ibid, 254. 
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7.7 NATIONAL LEVEL INEFFICIENCIES 
Slaughter, like some regime theorists, criticises the international relations discipline for 
seeing states as single units in the international arena and thus ignoring what happens at 
domestic level. 73 Among the governance approaches examined in this chapter, it is issue- 
based networks that fall most completely into this trap. Although explicitly global, GINs 
would ultimately rely on states to implement their norms within national legislation (just as 
the UNESCO declarations do) and Rischard assumes that states would have the capacity 
to do this. Cosmopolitan democracy does not presume national governance capacity, but 
does require it. Genetics and bioethics, as global issues, would be subject to the laws and 
standards laid out by the direct action assembly. In a context such as a research project 
conducted within a single community or country, however, these laws and standards 
would be applied at a lower level, under the principle of 'inclusiveness and subsidiarity'74; 
hence Held and Archibugi's model of multilayered democratic governance, comprising 
accountable, responsive and effective politics at local to global levels. 75 Some states 
might struggle to meet these requirements, because of national level inefficiencies. The 
Kenyan bioethics system, for example, suffers from poor communications within and 
between different government ministries (see 6.3.2.1). Cosmopolitan democracy does not 
articulate how such problems are to be overcome. 76 
Slaughter recognises that sufficient capacity at national level would be needed to meet the 
requirements of global governance under her new world order and, what is more, makes 
concrete suggestions as to how this could be achieved (see 7.6). She does not see states 
as unitary actors, but rather as disaggregated into separate institutions and 
73 (bid, 12-13. 
74 Held, Global Covenant, 110-111. 75 (bid, 102 and 113; Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, " 209. 76 Various commentators note that cosmopolitan democracy does not pay sufficient attention to national level 
governance. Scheuermau observes that Held and Archibugi have little to say about how legislation produced 
by a global assembly would be fleshed out at local and national levels, while Wolf and David Mepham assert 
that the problems of the developing world are attributable as much to poor governments and economic 
policies as to transnational influences. (Scheuerman, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Rule of Law, " 449; 
Wolf, "The Case for Optimism, " 40; Mepham, "The Far Side of Globalisation, " 60. ) 
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departments. 77 In Kenya, as indicated above, the government is disaggregated in that 
communications have been poor between its different ministries working in related areas, 
namely health, education and science and technology. This makes for an inefficient 
governance system at national level. It also implies that one of Slaughter's justifications 
for government networks over the global policy networks tendered by Rischard and 
others, that within governments it is clear who is exercising power on whose behalf, is not 
valid in all cases. 78 
As outlined in the previous section, under Slaughter's notion of 'disaggregated 
sovereignty' government units would have discrete mandates to meet international legal 
obligations. For issues such as genetics and bioethics, which touch on several themes, it 
might not be obvious which units should be meeting which obligations. Particularly given 
Slaughter's advocacy of pluralism, this could result in different government departments 
applying, in diverse ways, various international standards to the same broad issue. Thus 
networking at national level between the disaggregated units would be essential, in order 
to avoid such confusion. Such networking would also enable states to garner input from all 
relevant departments when deciding upon negotiating positions, as recommended by 
Chasek and Rajamani and might help IGOs to locate and engage with the right national 
bodies on a given issue, as Young deems necessary. Slaughter seems to believe this 
coordination would be straightforward, commenting only briefly, "Regulators of all kinds, 
from health to education to the environment, would conduct their own foreign relations, 
subject to some kind of domestic interagency process that accepted this phenomenon but 
nevertheless attempted to aggregate interests. " As the Kenyan case demonstrates, 
however, the existence or efficacy of such a "domestic interagency process" should not be 
presumed. 
7' Slaughter, op cit, 5. 
Ibid, 4. 
79 Ibid. 232. 
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7.8 SUMMARY 
This discussion has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the regime, networked 
governance and cosmopolitan democracy approaches to global governance, in specific 
relation to the UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics and the proposed GGI. 
The final chapter considers the wider implications of these findings for effective global 
governance as a means to solving global problems, as well as what the future might hold 
for the governance of genetics and bioethics. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We must move towards the democratization of health built upon both altruism and 
self-interest to empower global citizens with the basic knowledge, the voice and 
participation in health decision-making, and the norms and institutions that are 
able to advance the ideal and the praxis of the indivisibility of global health. t 
Through the lens of international relations theory, this thesis has examined actual and 
potential mechanisms for the governance of human genetic and biomedical research at 
global level, as espoused through ethical norms housed within international institutions. 
Some commentators, such as those at TJCB, see the fruits of this research as 
instrumental in addressing inequalities in global health. Others, like Benatar, consider 
these inequalities to be symptomatic of wider divisions between North and South, which 
will require a paradigm shift in the way the world is governed if they are to be bridged. 
This paradigm shift would see members of an informed global public involved in both 
national and international governance mechanisms to a far greater degree than is 
currently the case. The thesis has shown that, in the governance of genetics and 
bioethics, who is involved in decision-making has an impact not only on the content of any 
regulatory or policy outcomes, but also on whether these are perceived as legitimate. This 
in turn has a considerable impact on whether they can be implemented effectively. In this 
chapter the wider implications of these findings for global governance are explored, as are 
the means by which effective governance of genetics and bioethics might be pursued. The 
chapter ends with some recommendations for further research. 
8.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The three UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics are in several respects classic 
exemplars of a formal international regime. Their negotiation demonstrated unequal power 
between both developed and developing countries and state and non-state actors. 
1 Chen and Berlinguer, "Health Inequity in a Globalizing World, " 27-28. 
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Opinions among participants were diverse as to which issues should be addressed and in 
what manner, such that agreement was only possible at a general level, on mostly 
uncontroversial aspects of genetics and bioethics. The subsequent implementation of the 
declarations has been slow and rather piecemeal, as might be expected of non-binding 
norms. Furthermore, UNESCO's mandate overlaps somewhat with those of other 
institutions. As the organisation is seen by some as a relative newcomer to bioethics, this 
could have a detrimental effect on its perceived legitimacy. 
At a broader level, these problems are typical of the weaknesses in the international 
system observed by international relations scholars. They invite the question, how might 
this situation be improved? Any answer would have to address several points: what power 
and influence state and non-state actors should have, both expert and lay; how everyone 
can be included who should be; what the optimum balance is between formality and 
informality; how duplication can be avoided but complementarity strengthened; how norms 
can be upheld, particularly should state sovereignty be maintained; and the extent to 
which those norms should be universal. The proposed solutions examined in this thesis- 
reformed regimes, issue- and government-based global networks and cosmopolitan 
democracy-differ in the nature and adequacy of their approaches to these issues, as 
discussed below. In all this it is important to recognise, however, that any new forms of 
global governance would not replace older ones but would have to be integrated with 
them, as the structures and norms of the latter will not disappear. Thus UNESCO and 
other IGOs will surely have a major role to play in the global governance of the future. 
8.1.1 Deliberation 
How to include everyone who should be involved in global governance without the system 
becoming unwieldy is a big challenge. As demonstrated by the UNESCO declarations, 
when state representatives are given prominence over other stakeholders, tensions can 
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arise if the former are perceived by the latter to be insufficiently expert in the issue at 
hand, with ensuing implications for the legitimacy of the endeavour. If non-state actors are 
to be engaged on an equal footing, however, how is their "right to be involved" (to quote 
TJCB in reference to its proposed GGI network) to be assessed? Drawing from the 
example of research ethics, it seems that the nature of expertise is contested, as is who 
among government, civil society, industry and academia should be a judge of this. Despite 
this, the general opinion across all these sectors in Kenya and South Africa was that a 
range of experiences and knowledge are needed in decision-making. 
Consensus within a multisectoral environment may perhaps seem more improbable than 
in an organisation with a more circumscribed membership, but this also makes it that 
much more precious if achieved. Informal discussions are less likely to descend into 
interest-based bargaining than formal negotiations. It might be harder for all voices to be 
heard than within formal settings, however, as rules and procedures do provide a 
moderate safeguard against unequal power relations (as illustrated by UNESCO). New 
forms of networked governance would rely on members adhering to principles, such as 
global citizenship and global deliberative equality, according to a 'code of conduct' or 
'constitutional norms', which in turn would render that membership a largely self-selected 
group. Similarly, cosmopolitan democracy would apply the 'test of impartiality'. Such 
reliance on internal measures would raise questions of external accountability, which the 
UNESCO declarations demonstrate is difficult to achieve even when sought after; that is, 
despite the organisation's efforts to be open and transparent (in effect a public sphere), it 
is still seen by some actors as quite the opposite. Thus both actual and perceived 
accountability are important to the efficacy of global governance. 
New or revised models of governance, as proposed by Young, Samhat, Ellis, Rischard, 
Slaughter, Held and Archibugi, among others, all look at some level beyond a limited 
number of stakeholders contributing to decision-making, to the inclusion of the wider 
2 Dowdeswell et al, "Realising the Promise of Genomics, " 138. 
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public. If this is considered appropriate, the question becomes-at a practical level- 
whether it can be achieved, particularly in a world of unequal access to communications 
technologies. Those most significantly affected by global problems such as inequalities of 
health are usually the poor and vulnerable, who often have the least access to the means 
to participate in debate, precisely because they are poor and vulnerable. Garnering their 
informed participation may also be problematic if, despite being significantly affected by a 
given issue, they know little about it, other than in experiential terms. Where people are 
both informed and connected, they may nevertheless fail to become engaged, if 
opportunities for input are not marketed sufficiently. 
8.1.2 Coordination 
Connectedness between institutions is important to the efficacy of global governance. If 
uncoordinated, overlaps in both norms and functions can be unhelpful. A proliferation of 
purportedly universal norms is confusing for practitioners, as has been the case in 
bioethics. This is an important consideration for those who would promote 'norm 
production' as an activity of innovative global governance mechanisms, as new norms are 
unlikely to have sufficient kudos to supersede existing ones, whatever the nature of the 
initiative or organisation from which they have emanated. That UNESCO's declarations 
are unique in bioethics because they are the first to have been agreed by governments 
does not appear to be as significant a claim as the organisation might hope, for instance. 
Even if norms produced by a multisectoral initiative were considered to have greater 
legitimacy, they would still be coming into a crowded arena (hence some interviewees 
were wary of more 'talk-shops'). The consolidation rather than proliferation of norms would 
therefore seem important. 
Duplication of functions can also be problematic, if one organisation is seen to be 
encroaching on another's turf. New initiatives must either find a niche in which they can 
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carry out important activities not undertaken by older organisations, or else coordinate 
with their predecessors to ensure that programmes are complementary, such that what is 
different about the new initiative is used in support of the old one. Slaughter's model of 
networked governance is perhaps more compatible with IGOs than Rischard's in this 
regard. Although both authors' networks would embrace existing international obligations, 
a government network built around instruments such as the UNESCO declarations might 
be expected to be more effective than an issue-based network telling its more traditional 
counterparts to "get their act together. "3 
Coordination, then, is imperative. This is not only the case between old and new 
governance systems, but also within them. For single issue regimes and networks, 
whether state- or government-centred or with a multisectoral membership, should they fail 
to make connections with counterpart bodies working on related issues, solutions will not 
be holistic. If a broader approach looks to multilayered governance, as would 
cosmopolitan democracy, coordination between layers will be equally necessary, to avoid 
a similar confusion of norms and functions as observed in the present international 
system. At the global level, the direct action assembly envisaged for cosmopolitan 
democracy would in effect roll all Rischard's single issue networks into one, with its 
mandate to address all pressing global problems. What would be lost in terms of speed 
and expertise would thus be gained in a more comprehensive (and concomitantly more 
ambitious) approach to problem-solving. 
8.1.3 Implementation 
The direct action assembly would require states to potentially relinquish their sovereignty, 
in that it would be sanctioned to intervene in the event of non-adherence to its framework 
laws. Such an arrangement seems unlikely to be realised in the current international 
9 Rischard, High Noon, 176-177. 
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political climate. Krasner stated in 1983, "Of all the actors in the system, states are the 
least likely to be swayed by appeals to transcend sovereignty. "4 This still rings true today, 
at least with regard to genetics and bioethics. The alternatives to dispensing with 
sovereignty are to encourage adherence to norms through hard and soft forms of power. It 
would seem that positive management is more effective than negative enforcement in this 
respect, or at least that negative power needs to be backed up with capacity building if it Is 
actually to provoke change in those states that are willing but unable to comply with 
norms. Building up both reputational effects and capacity for implementation takes time, 
thus these forms of power need space to develop, the urgency of some global issues 
notwithstanding. 
Whether states have the capacity to implement norms lies partly in the efficiency of 
national governments. Slaughter's 'disaggregated state' is a useful conceptual tool, as It 
allows for an unpeeling of the national layer, which is too often ignored in International 
relations theory. At the practical level, however, governments need to respond to global 
problems in an integrated rather than disaggregated manner, particularly those problems 
that are cross-cutting (which most are). Like regimes, government and issue-based global 
networks and cosmopolitan democracy would all rely on competent governance at the 
national level to be effective. This would require capacity and coordination, within and 
between not only government departments but also those actors in academia, civil society 
and the private sector responsible for applying a given set of norms in their everyday lives. 
Absent such coordination and the national level simply mirrors the overlapping mandates 
seen among initiatives at international level, as illustrated by Kenya and South Africa. 
The thesis has touched on the issue of universalism versus pluralism, but in doing so has 
prompted more questions than conclusions. Firstly, how far can the process of 
contextualisation be taken before 'universal' norms become pluralised? Even where an 
efficient national system can be assumed, if internationally agreed norms are to be 
4 Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism, " 367. 
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effective at this level they must be couched in general terms that leave sufficient room for 
interpretation, so that different social and cultural traditions can be accommodated. The 
UNESCO declarations on genetics and bioethics are a case in point. Should their 
adaptability be regarded positively, as the means by which intergovernmental consensus 
became possible, or negatively, as a dilution of their norms' potential potency? Secondly, 
to what extent are definitive norms even desirable? As highlighted above, a proliferation of 
norms can be confusing for practitioners, thus consolidation would seem a rational path to 
follow. Some people prefer to have different sets of norms to draw on and amalgamate, 
however, in order to determine the most appropriate response to whatever matter they 
happen to be grappling with. In turn, the notion that norms can be chosen between in this 
manner may in itself be problematic. How can the need for consolidation in order to avoid 
confusion be balanced with the need for diversity in order to prevent a 'dictatorship of 
norms'? The answer could be for norms to be subject to periodic review, thereby enabling 
new circumstances and issues to be taken into account. Whether this would be seen to 
compromise their moral authority would depend on whether norms are believed to derive 
from a priori values or to be in a constant state of evolution. 
8.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR GENETICS AND BIOETHICS GOVERNANCE 
Chairman Sader, at the June 2005 meeting of government experts charged with finalising 
the draft UDBHR, made the following statement: 
A bioethics-related event makes the international headlines nearly every week. It is 
a difficult topic. As we have all seen, there have been deep divisions in other 
meetings on specific bioethics issues. There are points of divergence within 
individual countries too. For this reason, it is doubly important for us to give a clear 
signal that we are capable of reaching agreement on important issues. If we do so, 
the declaration will be proof that multilateralism works, and that will be a boon to 
our Organization. 5 
5 UNESCO, "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts: Final Report, " Annex III, 1. 
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TJCB, in its final publication on the proposed GGI, wrote: 
The global public goods characteristics of genomics knowledge inevitably raise 
issues about access to this emerging resource. This will surely test our skills in the 
evolution and management of international relations, foreign policy, regulation and 
intellectual property rights. 6 (italics added) 
Do the UNESCO declarations indeed prove that multilateralism works and thus enhance 
the legitimacy of their parent organisation? The answer to this question, as shown in 8.1, 
is at best only a qualified yes. Could the GGI, if established, represent a sufficiently fresh 
take on international relations that the problems faced by UNESCO might be avoided, 
thus harnessing the potential advantages of genetic research for all those who stand to 
benefit from them? 
Despite TJCB's emphasis on the urgency with which the 'genomics divide' must be 
closed, after four years its plans for the GGI network (as an entity') have not yet come to 
fruition and perhaps never will do. Fieldwork in Kenya and South Africa in late 2005 and 
early 2006 showed that such a network could prove popular among stakeholders in 
genetics and bioethics, however. To reiterate a point made in Chapter 7, TJCB's final 
publication on the GGI acknowledged that the proposed network would have to work 
alongside existing organisations. If the GGI could be built around the UNESCO 
declarations, rather than parallel to them, this might facilitate their implementation and 
avoid unnecessary duplication of both norms and functions. Combining the formal 
structure of UNESCO with that of a more informal network in this way would encourage 
high quality discussion within a framework of procedural fairness, thus mitigating the 
potential for interest-based bargaining and unequal power relations. (The latter might be 
further abated if measures could be taken to encourage developing countries to play a 
greater role in deliberations; see 7.2 for suggestions. ) The inclusion of those non-state 
actors who might put the declarations' norms into practice, such as geneticists, ethicists 
6 Dowdeswell et al, op cit, 135. 7 Some of the activities of TJCB are akin to those proposed for the GGI. A specific network entitled 'Global Genomics Initiative' has not been established, however. Possible reasons why this is the case are discussed in more detail in the recommendations for further research (see 8.3). 
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and representatives from civil society and industry, would be crucial to the legitimacy of 
such an endeavour. This could be effected should the network attract a diverse 
membership, as originally intended. As a united force, UNESCO and the GGI could help 
to address some of the genetics and bioethics issues highlighted in 6.3.2, namely 
intellectual property rights, community engagement, social responsibility, benefit sharing 
and capacity building. Their capacity in this regard would depend significantly on the 
extent of their funding. 
It might be that government officials who are or have been connected with the UNESCO 
Bioethics Programme, through representing their countries at negotiations or other 
activities, could work to bring this diverse membership on board. This would have the 
added bonus of improving relations between state and non-state actors at national level 
(as 5.2.2 demonstrated is necessary in Kenya and South Africa). It would also be 
essential for these officials to liaise with their counterparts in related areas of government 
(perhaps health, research, technology, innovation or education), to prevent an 
uncoordinated implementation of the declarations around genetic and biomedical 
research. More broadly, in order for other aspects of the declarations (which have been 
beyond the scope of this thesis) to also be taken up coherently, it would be necessary for 
those concerned with research to cooperate with those in the medical and environmental 
sectors. What this describes is in fact something akin to cosmopolitan democracy's 'array 
of fora', with points of communication and coordination within and between layers and 
issues. Some commentators have dismissed this ambitious project as being too long-term 
to be of use, which if true would mean such a system could prove unachievable. On the 
other hand, if a multilayered network on genetics and biomedical research ethics could be 
successfully convened around the UNESCO declarations and subsequently start to make 
connections with those working in related areas, this might constitute one of Archibugi's 
"little steps forward" on the road to cosmopolitan democracy .8 
8 Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics, " 465-666. 
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8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis has been necessarily limited in its scope by what can realistically be achieved 
within the time and funding constraints of a doctoral project. There are several ways in 
which further research on the issues raised within it could be pursued, empirically and 
theoretically. Why the GGI has not been established as planned, for instance, is worthy of 
investigation. It may be that TJCB decided that such a network was not needed after all, 
given the already existing global initiatives on genetics and bioethics, or that it met with 
resistance from those who see genomics as a distraction from the root causes of 
inequalities of health, or that funding and resources were insufficient. These suggestions 
are merely speculative, however. To determine whether they are correct, or to uncover 
other possible explanations, there are a number of avenues of inquiry that could be 
explored. These would begin at TJCB itself, but could also include its funders or others 
known to have connections with the centre, such as those at GRaPH-Int (see below). 
Failed networks can be difficult to investigate, because of an understandable reluctance 
on the part of those involved to revisit what went wrong. The subsequent lack of research 
on this aspect of networks would make the GGI a particularly interesting study, if it proved 
possible. 9 The results might have implications beyond genetics and bioethics, if the GGI's 
failure to develop proved to be because of flaws in the networked governance model 
adopted rather than factors connected with the particular context. In this regard it might be 
helpful to examine other networks and projects in related areas, both science- and policy- 
based, such as the Human Epigenome Project, the Genographic Project, MalariaGEN and 
GRaPH-Int. These aim, respectively, to identify and catalogue common epigenetic 
markers in the human genome, to gather genetic samples from indigenous peoples, to 
analyse variable susceptibility to malaria across human genetic populations and to 
promote public health genomics. 10 
------------- 
Yanacopulos, "Researching Transnational Advocacy Networks, " 48-49. t0 See www. epigenome. org, www3. nationalgeographic. com/genographic, www. malariagen. net and 
www. graphint. org. 
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With regard to the declarations, Kenya and South Africa are but two of the 190 odd 
member states of UNESCO, hence any judgement as to how international norms translate 
to the national level can only be extrapolated to a limited degree. It would thus be 
enormously profitable to conduct similar field-based analyses in other countries, 
developing and developed. With particular reference to Africa, further research could 
explore whether the experiences of other states in negotiating and implementing the 
declarations have been similar or otherwise to those of Kenya and South Africa. Those 
states with different philosophical and political backgrounds, in the francophone and 
lusophone regions, for example, may have had quite different experiences, with possible 
implications for the universality of norms. The thesis has taken a primarily pragmatic angle 
on this issue, in terms of how purportedly universal principles are contextualised at 
national level. It has not come to a conclusion on the point at which these principles, as a 
"foundation for humanity's response to the ever-increasing dilemmas and controversies 
that science and technology present for humankind, " are in fact pluralised, if there is 
variation in how they are applied. " Deeper reflection on the nature of universality in this 
context would require the input of trained bioethicists and philosophers. This highlights, 
then, the need for a cross-disciplinary approach to the analysis of international bioethics 
instruments. 
In terms of approaches to global governance, the thesis has highlighted several issues 
worthy of further consideration. Concerning the relative influence of developed and 
developing countries in international fora, how equal participation can be encouraged, in 
terms of attendance, size, and expertise of delegations, needs to be examined. At a 
broader level, the power differentials often observed during negotiations are symptomatic 
of wider inequalities, which ultimately need to be eradicated rather than mitigated. The 
role of experts and interest groups in international deliberations is also subject to ongoing 
debate. What contribution they should make relative to democratically elected officials or 
government appointed representatives, on what grounds they should be selected as 
11 UDBHR, Preamble. 
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legitimate voices and by whom these decisions should be made are all hard questions, 
particularly for broad-ranging, global problems. The solutions may lie partly in multilayered 
governance, but this carries its own dilemmas, such as whether a lattice or array of fora 
can be managed coherently and how new forms of governance can be integrated with old 
ones. Finally, the thesis corroborates what some regime theorists have been arguing for 
decades, that more research in domestic spheres is required. Specifically, the extent to 
which networks at the national level might enable international instruments to be 
implemented more effectively, particularly those concerning cross-cutting issues, should 
be explored further. In this project it has been possible to begin to investigate these 
themes through particular approaches to global governance, partly because the plans for 
one of the mechanisms under investigation, the proposed GGI, are based on the 
networked governance models of Rischard and Slaughter. Scholars should take note 
when international relations theories are applied in this manner by those outside the field, 
as such instances provide `real-life' test cases. 
8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
If the potential of human genetic and biomedical research to reduce inequalities of health 
between North and South is to be fully realised, how this research is governed at both 
international and national levels must improve within a broader context of global change, 
such that everyone can enjoy their full political, social and economic rights, regardless of 
where they live. It is hoped that this thesis' theoretical and empirical contributions to 
knowledge about global governance will be of some small use to the people engaged In 
various ways in determining the best means to achieve this change: firstly, those involved 
in genetics and bioethics in Kenya and South Africa; secondly, those at UNESCO, TJCB 
and other relevant international bodies; and thirdly, those dedicated to progressing both 
explanatory and normative approaches to global governance within the field of 
international relations. 
247 
REFERENCES 
Abbing, Henriette DC Roscam. "International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. " 
European Journal of Health Law 11 (2004): 93-107. 
Abbing, Henriette DC Roscam. "New Developments in International Health Law. " 
European Journal of Health Law 5 (1998): 155-169. 
Acharya, Tara, Abdallah S Daar, Elizabeth Dowdeswell and Peter A Singer. "Better Global 
Governance to Promote Genomics for Development. " (2004) Available at 
www. utoronto. ca/jcb/genomics/documents/CGI-paper. pdf (accessed 26 April 2005). 
Acharya, Tara, Abdallah S Daar, Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Peter A Singer and Halla 
Thorsteinsdöttir. Genomics and Global Health: A Report of the Genomics Working Group 
of the Science and Technology Task Force of the United Nations Millennium Project. Joint 
Centre for Bioethics, 2004. 
Ad Hoc Committee of the National Council of Science and Technology and Kenya National Academy of Sciences. "National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Development 
in Kenya: Background Situation and Policy Recommendations. " A Report to the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology, Government of Kenya. April 2004. 
African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development. "Africa's Science and 
Technology Consolidated Plan of Action. " August 2005. 
African Union. "Extraordinary Conference of the African Ministers Council on Science and 
Technology (AMCOST), 20-24 November 2006, Cairo, Egypt: Report of the Meeting of the 
Ministers. " EXT/AU/MIN/ST/Rpt. (II). 
Anderlik, Mary R and Mark A Rothstein. "Privacy and Confidentiality of Genetic 
Information: What Rules for the New Science? " Annual Review of Genomics and Human 
Genetics 2 (2001): 401-433. 
Anderson, Kenneth. "Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global 
Governance Through Global Government Networks. " Harvard Law Review 118 (4) (2005): 
1255-1312. 
Andorno, Roberto. "Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law: In Search of a Global Consensus. " Bulletin of the World Health Organization 80 (12) (2002): 959-963. 
Andorno, Roberto. "Global Bioethics at UNESCO: In Defence of the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights. " Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (2007): 150-154. 
Andorno, Roberto. "Seeking Common Ground on Genetic Issues: The UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome. " In Society and Genetic Information: Codes and Laws in the Genetic Era, edited by Judit Sändor. Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2003. 
Andrews, Lori B. "Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights. " Nature Reviews Genetics 3 (October 2002): 803-808. 
Archibugi, Daniele. "Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review. " European Journal of International Relations 10 (3) (2004): 437-473. 
Archibugi, Daniele. "Demos and Cosmopolis. " New Left Review 13 (Jan-Feb 2002): 24-38. 
248 
Archibugi, Daniele. "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy. " In Re-Imagining Political 
Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, edited by Daniele Archibugi, David Held 
and Martin Kohler. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
Beauchamp, Tom L. "Principlism and its Alleged Competitors. " In Bioethics, edited by John 
Harris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Benatar, David. "The Trouble with Universal Declarations. " Developing World Bioethics 5 
(3) (2005): 220-224. 
Benatar, Solomon R and Peter A Singer. "A New Look at International Research Ethics. * 
British Medical Journal321 (2000): 824-826. 
Benatar, Solomon R. "Bioethics: Power and Injustice: IAB Presidential Address. " Bioethics 
17 (5-6) (2003): 387-398. 
Benatar, Solomon R. "Commentary: Justice and Medical Research: A Global Perspective". 
Bioethics 15 (4) (2001): 334-340. 
Benatar, Solomon R. "Global Disparities in Health and Human Rights: A Critical 
Commentary. " American Journal of Public Health 88 (2) (1998): 295-300. 
Benatar, Solomon R. "Human Rights in the Biotechnology Era I. " BMC International Health 
and Human Rights 2 (3) (2002). 
Benatar, Solomon R. "Moral Imagination: The Missing Component in Global Health. " PloS 
Medicine 2 (12) (2005): 1207-1210. 
Benatar, Solomon R. `Towards Progress in Resolving Dilemmas in International Research 
Ethics. " Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32 (Winter 2004): 574-582. 
Benatar, SR. "Reflections and Recommendations on Research Ethics in Developing 
Countries. " Social Science and Medicine 54 (2002): 1131-1141. 
Benner, Thornsten, Wolfgang H Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte. "Global Public Policy 
Networks: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead. " Brookings Review21 (2) (2003): 18- 
21. 
Benner, Thornsten, Wolfgang H Reinicke and Jan Martin Witte. "Multisectoral Networks In 
Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability. " Government and 
Opposition 39 (2) (2004): 191-210. 
Berkowitz, Peter. "Laws of Nations. " Policy Review 30 (April & May 2005): 71-80. 
Berlinguer, Giovanni. "Bioethics, Health, and Inequality. " The Lancet 364 (18 September 
2004): 1086-1091. 
Bhutta, Zulfiqar Ahmed. "Ethics in International Health Research: A Perspective from the 
Developing World. " Bulletin of the World Health Organization 80 (2) (2002): 114-120. 
Bohman, James. "From Demos to Demo!: Democracy across Borders. " Ratio Juris 18 (3) 
(2005): 293-314. 
Buchanan, Allan and Robert Keohane. "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. " Ethics & International Affairs 20 (4) (2006): 405-437. 
249 
Bull, Hedley. "Society and Anarchy in International Relations. " In Hedley Bull on 
International Society, edited and introduced by Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000. (Originally published in Diplomatic Investigations, 
edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966. ) 
Butler, Declan. "Ethics Treaty to Target Genome Implications. " Nature 371 (29 September 
2004): 369. 
Byk, Christian. "A Map to a New Treasure Island: The Human Genome and the Concept of 
Common Heritage. " Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23 (3) (1998): 234-246. 
Caporaso, James A. 'Toward a Sociology of International Institutions: Comments on the 
Articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jönsson. " International Social Science Journal45 
(November 1993): 479-489. 
Carbone, Maurizio. "Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? The Policy Dimension 
of a Contested Concept. " Global Governance 13 (2007): 179-198. 
Carlson, Robert V, Kenneth M Boyd and David J Webb. "The Revision of the Declaration 
of Helsinki: Past, Present and Future. " British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 57 (6) 
(2004): 695-713. 
Chandler, David. "New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique of State 
Sovereignty. " Political Studies 51 (2003): 332-349. 
Chasek, Pamela and Lavanya Rajamani. "Steps Toward Enhanced Parity: Negotiating 
Capacity and Strategies of Developing Countries. " In Providing Global Public Goods: 
Managing Globalization, edited by Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven, and 
Ronald U Mendoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Available at 
www. oxfordscholarship. com (accessed 10 October 2007). 
Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. "Regime Architecture: Elements and 
Principles. " In Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, edited 
by Janne E Nolan. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994. 
Chen, Lincoln C and Giovanni Berlinguer. "Health Inequity in a Globalizing World-O In 
Challenging Inequities in Health: From Ethics to Action, edited by Timothy Evans, 
Margaret Whitehead, Finn Diderichsen and Abbas Bhuiya. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Oxford University Press Inc, 2001. Available at 
www. fas. harvard. edu/-acgei/Publications/Chen/LCC_Health_Equity_Glob. pdf (accessed 
20 November 2007). 
Chima, Sylvester C. "Regulation of Biomedical Research in Africa. " British Medical Journal 
332 (8 April 2006): 848-851. 
Chinkin, Christine. "Normative Development in the International Legal System. " In 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System, edited by Dinah Shelton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Chirac, Pierre and Els Torreele. "Global Framework on Essential Health R&D. " The Lancet 367 (May 13 2006): 1560-1561. 
Chokshi, Dave A and Dominic P Kwiatkowski. "Ethical Challenges of Genomic Epidemiology in Developing Countries. " Genomics, Society and Policy 1 (1) (2005): 1-15. 
Cleveland, Harlan. "Solving World Problems in 20 Years. " The Futurist 37 (3) (2003): 60- 
62. 
250 
Cochran, Molly. "A Democratic Critique of Cosmopolitan Democracy: Pragmatism from the 
Bottom-Up. " European Journal of International Relations 8 (4) (2002): 517-548. 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. Geneva: 2002. 
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. "Governance and Democratization. " In Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James N Rosenau and Ernst- 
Otto Czempiel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992., 
Dahl, Richard. "Pending Resolution: The Question of Who Owns DNA. " Environmental 
Health Perspectives 109 (1) (January 2001): A 30-A 33. 
de Senarclens, Pierre. "Governance and the Crisis in the International Mechanisms of 
Regulation. " International Social Science Journal 50 (March 1998): 91-104. 
de Senarclens, Pierre. "Regime Theory and the Study of International Organizations" 
International Social Science Journal 45 (November 1993): 453-462. 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Republic of South Africa. "A 
National Biotechnology Strategy for South Africa. " June 2001. 
Department of Health, Republic of South Africa. Ethics in Health Research: Principles, 
Structures and Processes. 2004. Available at 
www. doh. gov. za/docs/factsheets/guidelines/ethnics/ (accessed 17 November 2006). 
Department of Science and Technology, Republic of South Africa. Biotechnology 
Innovation: A Snapshot of Biotechnology in South Africa up to 2004. Pretoria: February 
2006. 
Desai, Meghnad. "Social Democracy as World Panacea? A Comment on David Held. * In 
Debating Globalization, edited by Anthony Barnett, David Held and Caspar Henderson. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005. 
Dougherty, James E and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International 
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 4th edition. United States: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc, 1996. 
Dowdeswell, Elizabeth, Abdallah Daar and Peter Singer. "Bridging the Genomics Divide. " 
Global Governance 9 (2003): 1-6. 
Dowdeswell, Elizabeth, Abdallah S Daar and Peter A Singer. "Getting Governance into 
Genomics. " Science & Public Policy 32 (6) (2005): 497-498. 
Dowdeswell, Elizabeth, Abdallah S Daar, Tara Acharya and Peter A Singer. "Realising the 
Promise of Genomics: Exploring Governance. " International Journal of Biotechnology 8 
(1/2) (2006): 132-141. 
Duguet, AM. "Genetic Research: Between Freedom in Research and the Patient's Rights. " 
European Journal of Health Law 8 (2001): 203-206. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. "Building Theories from Case Study Research. " Academyof 
Management Review 14 (4) (1989): 532-550. 
Ellis, Jaye. "International Regimes and the Legitimacy of Rules: A Discourse-Ethical Approach. " Alternatives 27 (2002): 273-300. 
251 
Emmanuel, Ezekiel J, David Wendler, Jack Killen and Christine Grady. "What Makes 
Clinical Research in Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical Research. " 
The Journal of Infectious Diseases 189 (2004): 230-237. 
Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. " 
In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and 
Beth A Simmons. London: Sage, 2002. 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. " International Organization 52 (4) (1998): 887-917. 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics. " Annual Review of Political 
Science 4 (2001): 391-416. 
Fluss, Sev S. "The Evolution of Research Ethics: The Current International Configuration. " 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32 (4) (2004): 596-603. 
Franceschet, Antonio. "A New World Order. " Ethics & International Affairs 20 (4) (2006): 
529-530. 
Genest, Marc A. "Realism and the Problem of Peaceful Change. " Perspectives on Political Science 23 (2) (1994): 70-78. 
Gevers, Sjef. "Medical Research Involving Human Subjects: Towards an International Legal Framework? " European Journal of Health Law 8 (4) (2001): 293-298. 
Giallourakis, Cosmas, Charlotte Henson, Michael Reich, Xiaohui Xie and Vamsl K Mootha. 
"Disease Gene Discovery Through Integrative Genomics. " Annual Review of Genomics 
and Human Genetics 6 (2005): 381-406. 
Godard, Beatrice, Jörg Schmidtke, Jean-Jacques Cassiman and S6golene Aym6. "Data Storage and DNA Banking for Biomedical Research: Informed Consent, Confidentiality, 
Quality Issues, Ownership, Return of Benefits. A Professional Perspective. * European Journal of Human Genetics 22 (Supplement 2) (2003): S88-S122. 
Goodin, Robert E. "Globalizing Justice. " in Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance, 
edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. Cambridge: Polity, 2003. 
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. " In Controversies in International Relations Theory: 
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, edited by Charles W Kegley, Jr. New York: St Martin's Press, 1995. 
Haas, Peter M. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and international Policy Coordination. " International Organization 46 (1) (1992): 1-35. 
Haggard, Stephan and Beth A Simmons. "Theories of International Regimes. * International Organization 41 (3) (Summer 1987): 491-517. 
Hammersley, Martyn. 'Theoretical Sampling. " In The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods, edited by Victor Jupp. London: Sage, 2006. 
Harding, Jamie. "Grounded Theory. " In The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods. 
Harmon, Shawn H E. 'The Significance of UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome & Human Rights. " SCRIPT-ed2 (1) (2005): 18-38. Available at 
www. law. ed. ac. uklahrb/script-ed/vol2-1/harmon. asp (accessed 24 October 2006). 
252 
Harris, John. "Introduction: The Scope and Importance of Bioethics. " In Bioethics, edited 
by John Harris. 
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. "Interests, Power, Knowledge: 
The Study of International Regimes. " Mershon International Studies Review40 (1996): 
177-228. 
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. Theories of International 
Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. 
Held, David. "Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective. " Government and Opposition 39 (2) (2004): 365-391. 
Held, David. "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism. " In Taming Globalization. 
Held, David. Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington 
Consensus. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 
Held, David. "Law of State, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty. " Legal Theory 8 
(1) (2002): 1-44. 
Held, David. "Ref raming Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reformi" New Political 
Economy 11 (2) (June 2006): 157-176. 
High-Level African Panel on Modern Biotechnology. Freedom to Innovate: Biotechnology in Africa's Development. August 2007. Available at 
www. nepadst. org/doclibrary/Pdfs/biotech-africarep--2007. pdf (accessed 12 February 
2008). 
Holm, Soren. "Not Just Autonomy: The Principles of American Biomedical Ethics. " In Bioethics, edited by John Harris. 
Holsti, Ole R. "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers. " In Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the 
Neoliberal Challenge, edited by Charles W Kegley, Jr. New York: St Martin's Press, 1995. 
Hopgood, Stephen. "Socialising IR. " GSC Quarterly 10 (Fall 2003): 1-8. Available at 
www. ssrc. org/programs/gsc/publications/quarterlyl0/hopgood. pdf (accessed 3 January 
2007). 
HUGO Ethics Committee. Statement on Human Genomic Databases. December 2002. 
Hurrell, Andrew. "Norms and Ethics in International Relations. " in Handbook of International Relations. 
Iles, Alastair T. "The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights 
Framework. " Harvard Human Rights Journal 9 (Spring 1996): 27-60. 
Isaakidis, Petros, George H Swingler, Elizabeth Pienaar, Jimmy Volmink and John PA loannidis. "Relation Between Burden of Disease and Randomised Evidence in sub- Saharan Africa: Survey of Research. " British Medical Journal 324 (23 March 2002): 1-5. 
Juergensen, Arnd. "Looking Ahead: Visions of the Transition to a Sustainable Society. " Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 23 (3) (June 2003): 201-208. 
253 
Kass, Nancy E, Adnan Ali Hyder, Ademola Ajuwon, John Appiah-Poku, Nicola Barsdorf, 
Dya Eldin Elsayed, Mantoa Mokhachane, Bavon Mupenda, Paul Ndebele, Godwin Ndossi, 
Bornwell Sikayeto, Godfrey Tangwa and Paulina Tindana. "The Structure and Function of 
Research Ethics Committees in Africa: A Case Study. " PloS Medicine 4 (1) (January 
2007): 26-31. 
Kaul, Inge and Michael Faust. "Global Public Goods and Health: Taking the Agenda 
Forward. " Bulletin of the World Health Organization 79 (9) 2001: 869-874. 
Kaul, Inge, Pedro Conceigdo, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U Mendoza. "Overview: Why 
do Global Public Goods Matter Today? ' and 'How to Improve the Provision of Global 
Public Goods'. " In Providing Global Public Goods. 
Kegley, Charles W, Jr. "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An 
Introduction. " In Controversies in International Relations Theory. 
Keohane, Robert O. "Accountability in World Politics. " Scandinavian Political Studies 29 
(2) (2006): 75-87. 
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Keohane, Robert O. "Global Governance and Democratic Accountability. " In Taming 
Globalization. 
Keohane, Robert O. "International Institutions: Two Approaches. " International Studies 
Quarterly 32 (4) (1988): 379-396. 
Kluge, Eike-Henner W. "Patenting Human Genes: When Economic Interests Trumps Logic 
and Ethics. " Health Care Analysis 11 (2) (June 2003): 119-130. 
Knoppers, Bartha Maria and Ruth Chadwick. "Human Genetic Research: Emerging Trends in Ethics. " Nature Reviews Genetics 6 (January 2005): 75-79. 
Knoppers, Bartha Maria. "Genetic Information and the Family: Are We Our Brother's 
Keeper? " Trends in Biotechnology 20 (2) (2002): 85-86. 
Knoppers, Bartha Maria. "Status, Sale and Patenting of Human Genetic Material: An 
International Survey. " Nature Genetics 22 (May 1999): 23-26. 
Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias. "Globalization and the Challenge to Governance. " In Taming Globalization. 
Konrad, Monica. "Norms, Values and Trans-Cultural Medical Ethics. " In . 
The Ethical 
Aspects of Biomedical Research in Developing Countries: Proceedings of the Round 
Table Debate, Brussels, October ist, 2002. A report published by the Secretariat of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission. February 2003. 
Krasner, Stephen D. "Regimes and the Limits of Realism. " In International Regimes, 
edited by Stephen D Krasner. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983. 
Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. " In International Regimes. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie. "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State. " International Organization 40 (4) (Autumn 1986): 753-775. 
254 
Kratchowil, Friedrich. "Contract and Regimes: Do Issue Specificity and Variations of 
Formality Matter? " In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by Volker 
Rittberger (with the assistance of Peter Mayer). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 'The Force of Prescriptions. " International Organization 38 (4) 
(1984): 685-708. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. Rules Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
Kwiatkowski, D. "Genetics. " In Manson's Tropical Diseases, ' 21st edition, edited by Gordon 
C Cook and Alimuddin I Zumla. Edinburgh: Saunders Ltd, 2002. Available at 
". gmap. net/oxford/publications/98. pdf (accessed 23 November 2007). ' 
Kwiatkowski, D. "Science, Medicine, and the Future: Susceptibility to Infection. " British Medical Journal 321 (October 28,2000): 10611-1065., 
Landman, Willem and Udo Schüklenk. "From the Editors. " Developing World Bioethics 5 
(3) (2005): iii-vi. 
Langrish, John. "Case Studies as a Biological Research Process. " Design Studies 14 (4) (October 1993): 357-364. 
Laurie, Graeme T. "Challenging Medical-Legal Norms. " The Journal of Legal Medicine 22 (2001): 1-54. 
Lenoir, Noelle. "Bioethics and UNESCO: How the Organization Deals with this Essential Issue for the United Nations System. " In Protection of the Human Genome and Scientific Responsibility, edited by Michio Okamoto, Norio Fujiki and Darryl RJ Macer. Eubios Ethics Institute, 1996. Available at www. eubios. info/MURSE/MURSNL. htm (accessed 17 August 2007). 
Lupel, Adam. "Tasks of a Global Civil Society: Held, Habermas and Democratic Legitimacy beyond the Nation-State. " Globalization 2 (1) (2005): 117-133. 
Lynch, Mark. "Globalization and International Democracy. " International Studies Review2 (3) (2000): 91-101. 
Macklin, Ruth. "Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection. " Bioethics 17 (5-6) (2003): 472- 486. 
Macklin, Ruth. "Yet Another Guideline? The UNESCO Draft Declaration. " Developing 
World Bioethics 5 (3) (2005): 244-250. 
Marchetti, Raffaele. "Global Governance or World Federalism? A Cosmopolitan Dispute 
on Institutional Models. " Global Society 20 (3) (2006): 287-305. 
Martin, Lisa L and Beth A Simmons. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. " International Organization 52 (4) (Autumn 1998): 729-757. 
Mepham, David. "The Far Side of Globalisation: David Held's Missing Links. ' In Debating Globalization. 
Metcalfe, Judith, Mark Hirst and Robert Saunders (with contributions from Jon Turney and Adam Hedgecoe). An Introduction to the Human Genome. Oxford: The Open University, 2001. 
255 
Milner, Helen. "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses. " World Politics 44 (April 1992): 466-496. 
Ministry of Health, Republic of Kenya. "First National Congress on Quality Improvement In 
Health Care, Medical Research and Traditional Medicine: Final Congress Report. " Held In 
Nairobi, 19-23 November 2001. 
Ministry of Health, Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Guidelines for Research and Development of HIV/AIDS Vaccines. Nairobi: 2005. 
Ministry of Health, Republic of Kenya. "Second National Congress on Quality Improvement in Health Care, Medical Research and Traditional Medicine: Summary Report. " Held In Nairobi, 24-28 November 2003. Available at 
httpi/216.239.59.104/search? q=cache: 37xBauyAYIsJ: dsrs. org/summary. pdf+nmret+%2B kenya&hI=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=2 (accessed 23 May 2006). 
Mukherjee, Chandan and Marc Wuyts. "Thinking with Quantitative Data. " In Finding Out Fast: Investigative Skills for Policy and Development, edited by Alan Thomas, Joanna Chataway and Marc Wuyts. London: Sage, 1998. , 
National Council for Science and Technology, Republic of Kenya. Guidelines for Ethical Conduct of Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects in Kenya. NCST No 45. 
Nairobi: 2004. 
Nayar, Baldev Raj. "Regimes, Power, and International Aviation. " International Organization 49 (1) (1995): 139-170. "Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics. "The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries: A Guide to the Report. " r .' 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries. London: 2002. 
Nye, Joseph S, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2004. 
O'Neill, Onora. "The Dark Side of Human Rights. " International Affairs 81 (2) (2005): 427- 439. 
Ogundiran, Temidayo O. "Africa Must Come on Board the Genomics Bandwagon-" Genomics, Society and Policy 1 (3) (2005): 66-77. 
Perju, Vlad F. "Comparative Constitutionalism and the Making of A New World Order. " Constellations 12 (4) (2005): 464-486. 
Peterson, MJ. "International Organizations and the Implementation of Environmental Regimes. " In Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, 
edited by Oran R Young. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997. 
Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. " In International Organization 42 (3) (Summer 1998): 427-460. 
Raustiala Kal and David G Victor. "Conclusions. " in The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, edited by David G Victor, Kai Raustiala and Eugene B Skolnikoff. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998. 
256 
Raustiala, Kai. "Governance in World Affairs. " The American Journal of International Law 
94 (4) (October 2000): 803-807. 
Reilly, Philip R. "Public Concern About Genetics. " Annual Review of Genomics and 
Human Genetics 1 (2000): 485-506. 
Reinicke, Wolfgang H. "Global Public Policy. ". Foreign Affairs 76 (6) (November/December 
1997): 127-138. 
Reinicke, Wolfgang H. "The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks. 0 
Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999-2000): 44-57. 
Republic of South Africa. National Health Act, 2004. No 61 of 2003. Government Gazette 
469 (23 July 2004): 1-94. 
Rischard, Jean-Frangois. High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve 
Them. New York: Basic Books, 2002. 
Rischard, Jean-Frangois. "High Noon: We Need New Approaches to Global Problem- 
solving, Fast. " Journal of International Economic Law 4 (September 2001): 507-525. 
Robson, Alex. "A Public Good is Not Just Something Which is'Good for the Public': The 
Abuse of Economic Terminology in Public Debate. " IPA Review 59 (2) (2007): 39-40. 
Rosenau, James N. "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics. " In Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James N Rosenau 
and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Rosenau, James N. "Thinking Theory Thoroughly. " In International Relations Theory: 
Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 2nd edition, edited by Paul R Viotti and Mark V Kauppi. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993. 
Rubin, Herbert J and Irene S Rubin. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd 
edition. London: Sage, 2005. 
Ruggie, John Gerard. "Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection. * In Taming Globalization 
Samhat, Nayef H and Rodger A Payne. "Regimes, Public Spheres and Global Democracy: Towards the Transformation of Political Community. " Global Society 17 (3) (July 2003): 273-295. 
Samhat, Nayef H. "International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy. " The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (Winter/Spring 2005): 179- 
Samhat, Nayef H. "International Regimes as a Pragmatic Institutional Form. " (Draft) Paper presented to the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada (March 16 2004). 
Scheuermau William E. "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Rule of Law. " Ratio Juris 15 (4) (2002): 439-457. 
Schmidt, Charles W. "Charting the Map of Life. " Environmental Health Perspectives 109 (1) (2001): A 25-A 29. 
Schmitz, Hans Peter and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Human Rights. " In Handbook of International Relations. 
257 
Schwandt, Thomas A. Qualitative Inquiry. A Dictionary of Terms. London: Sage, 1997. 
Scully, Malcolm. "A Network of Global Solutions. " Chronicle of Higher Education 49 (3) 
(2002): B13. 
Shelton, Dinah. "Editor's Concluding Note: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the 
International Legal System. " In Commitment and Compliance. 
Shelton, Dinah. "Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of 'Soft Law'. " In 
Commitment and Compliance. 
Simmons, Beth A and Lisa L Martin. "International Organizations and Institutions. " In 
Handbook of International Relations. 
Singer, Peter A and Abdallah S Daar. "Harnessing Genomics and Biotechnology to 
Improve Global Health Equity. " Science 294 (5 October 2001): 87-89. 
Singer, Peter A and Solomon R Benatar. "Beyond Helsinki: A Vision for Global Health 
Ethics. " British Medical Journal322 (31 March 2001): 747-748. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie and Thomas N Hale. "A Covenant to Make Global Governance 
Work. " In Debating Globalization. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2004. 
Smith, Alyna C, John Mugabe, Peter A Singer and Abdallah Daar. "'Harnessing Genomics 
to Improve Health in Africa' - An Executive Course to Support Genomics Policy. " Health Research Policy and Systems 3 (2) (2005). 
Smith, Richard D. "Global Public Goods and Health. " Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization 81 (7) (2003): 475. 
Smith, Richard D and Landis MacKellar. "Global Public Goods and the Global Agenda: 
Problems, Priorities and Potential. " Globalization and Health 3 (9) (2007). 
Smith, Richard D, Halla Thorsteinsdöttir, Abdallah S Daar, E Richard Gold and Peter A 
Singer. "Genomics Knowledge and Equity: A Global Public Goods Perspective of the 
Patent System. " Bulletin of the World Health Organization 82 (5) (2004): 385-389. 
Smouts, Marie-Claude. "Some Thoughts on International Organizations and Theories of 
Regulation. " International Social Science Journal 45 (November 1993): 443-451. 
South African Medical Research Council. Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research: 
Reproductive Biology and Genetic Research (Book 2). 2002 to 2005. 
Sreenivasan, Gopal and Solomon R Benatar. "Challenges for Global Health in the 21st 
Century: Some Upstream Considerations. " Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (2006): 
3-11. 
Stake, Robert E. The Art of Case Study Research. London: Sage, 1995. 
Stokke, Olav Schram. "Regimes as Governance Systems. " In Global Governance, edited 
by Oran R Young. 
Strange, Susan. "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis. " In International 
Regimes. 
258 
Taylor, Allyn L. "Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy 
to Advance Human Rights and Public Health. " American Journal of Law and Medicine 25 
(1999): 479-541. 
ten Have, Henk. "The Activities of UNESCO in the Area of Ethics. " Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 16 (4) (2006): 333-351. 
Thomas, Alan. "Challenging Cases. " In Finding Out Fast. 
Thorsteinsdöttir, Halla, Abdallah S Daar, Richard D Smith and Peter A Singer. 
"Genomics-A Global Public Good? " The Lancet 361 (15 March 2003): 891-892. 
Thorsteinsdöttir, Halla, Abdallah S Daar, Richard D Smith and Peter A Singer. "Genomics 
Knowledge. " In Global Public Goods for Health -A Reading Companion. Available at 
www. who. int/trade/distance_learning/gpgh/en/index. html (accessed 14 December 2007). 
Turner, Leigh. "Personal View: Bioethics Needs to Rethink Its Agenda. " British Medical 
Journal 328 (2004): 175. 
Turner, Leigh. "Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the 'Common 
Morality' Presumption in Bioethics. " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3) (2003): 193- 
218. 
UN Millennium Project Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation 2005. 
Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development. London: Earthscan, 2005. 
UNESCO. "Bioethics: International Implications. " Proceedings of the Round Table of 
Ministers of Science, Paris, 22-23 October 2001. SHS/BIO-MINSC/03/1.2003. 
UNESCO. "Bioethics Programme: Priorities and Prospects. " 31 C/55. Paris: 17 October 
2001. 
UNESCO. "Bioethics Programme: Priorities and Prospects. " 162 EX/i 3. Paris: 23 August 
2001. 
UNESCO. Birth of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. 
France: 1999. 
UNESCO. "Eleventh Session: International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC). " 
SHS/EST/04/CIB-11/CONF. 504/2. Paris: 6 January 2005. 
UNESCO. "Extraordinary Session of the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO 
(IBC): 'Towards a Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics'. " SHS/EST/04/CIB- 
EXTR/1. Paris: 12 July 2004. 
UNESCO. "Fifth Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics. " SHS/EST/04/CIB-Gred-5/2. Paris: 15 November 2004. 
UNESCO. "First Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Final Report. " SHS/EST/05/CONFF. 203/5. 
Paris: 6 April 2005. 
UNESCO. "First Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics. " SHS/EST/04/CIB-Gred-1/1. Paris: 24 May 2004. 
UNESCO. "Guide No 1: Establishing Bioethics Committees. " Paris: 2005. 
259 
UNESCO. "Human Genetic Data: Preliminary Study of the IBC on their Collection, 
Processing, Storage and Use. " SHS-503/01/CIB-8/3 (Rev. 2). Paris: 15 May 2002. 
UNESCO. "Information Meeting with IGBC on the Progress of the Elaboration of a 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Final Report. " SHS/EST/04/CIGB-Inf. /1. 
Paris: 15 November 2004. 
UNESCO. International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. 2003. 
UNESCO. "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data: Final Report. " 
SHS/EST/03/CONF. 203/6. Paris: 21 July 2003. 
UNESCO. "Meeting of Government Experts Responsible for Finalizing the Draft 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data: Summary of the International 
Consultation on the Revised Outline of the International Declaration on Human Genetic 
Data (22 January 2003). " SHS/EST/03/CONF. 203/5. Paris: 6 June 2003. 
UNESCO. "Preliminary Draft Report of the IBC Working Group on Social Responsibility 
and Health. " SHS/EST/CIB-1 4/07/CONF. 507/2. Paris: 18 April 2007. 
UNESCO. "Public Hearings Day on Human Genetic Data: Final Report. " SHS/EST/CIB- 
Gred/5/03/1. Paris: 5 May 2003. 
UNESCO. "Report by the Director-General on Action to be Taken in the Light of the Round 
Table of Ministers of Science on Bioethics (22-23 October 2001). " 164 EX/15. Paris: 10 
April 2002. 
UNESCO. "Report by the Director-General on the Drawing Up of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics. " 170 EX/9. Paris: 20 August 2004. 
UNESCO. "Report by the Director-General on the Drawing Up of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms for Bioethics. " 171 EX113. Paris: 9 March 2005. 
UNESCO. "Report by the Director-General on the Execution of the Programme Adopted 
by the General Conference. " 172 EX/4. Paris: 19 August 2005. 
UNESCO. "Report by the Director-General on the Execution of the Programme Adopted 
by the General Conference: UNESCO's Participation in the Eighth Ordinary Session of the 
Conference of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 29-30 
January 2007. " 176 EX/INF. 10. Paris: 28 March 2007. 
UNESCO. "Report by the Director-General on the Work of the International Bioethics 
Committee (IBC) and of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC). " 32 
C/REP/13. Paris: 27 August 2003. 
UNESCO. "Report of the IBC on Solidarity and International Co-operation between 
Developed and Developing Countries concerning the Human Genome. " BIO-7/00/GT-2/3 
(Rev. 1). Paris: 6 April 2001. 
UNESCO. "Report of the IBC on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on 
Bioethics. " SHS/EST/02/CIB-9/5 (Rev. 3). Paris: 13 June 2003. 
UNESCO. "Report of the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO on Consent. " 
SHS/EST/CIB-1 3/06/CONF. 505/2 Rev. 2. Paris: 19 May 2007. 
UNESCO. "Report of the Second Session of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee 
(IGBC). " Held at UNESCO House, Paris, 14-16 May 2001. 
260 
UNESCO. "Report of the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee 
(IGBC). " SHS/EST/03/CIGB-3/2. Paris: 30 October 2003. 
UNESCO. "Results of the Written Consultation on the Third Outline of the Text of a 
Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics (27 August 2004). " SHS-2005/WS/1 5. Paris: 
10 January 2005. 
UNESCO. "Second Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration 
on Universal Norms on Bioethics. " SHS/EST/04/CIB-Gred-2/3. Paris: 2 July 2004. 
UNESCO. "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at 
Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Compilation of Proposed 
Amendments Submitted by Member States. " SHS/EST/05/CONG. 204/5. Paris: 6 June 
2005. 
UNESCO. "Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at 
Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics: Final Report. " 
SHS/EST/05/CONF. 204/6. Paris: 27 July 2005. 
UNESCO. "Sixth Meeting of the IBC Drafting Group for the Elaboration of a Declaration on 
Universal Norms on Bioethics. " SHS/EST/04/CIB-Gred-6/3. Paris: 14 January 2005. 
UNESCO. "Social and Human Sciences: Guide to Partnerships. " SHS-2004/WS/18. Paris: 
2004. 
UNESCO. "Social and Human Sciences: Strategies and Actions. " SHS-2004/WS/19. 
Paris: 2004. 
UNESCO. "The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: From 
Theory to Practice. " 3 February 2000. 
UNESCO. "Thirteenth Session of the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (IBC): 
Report. " SHS/EST/CIB-13/06/CONF. 505/5. Paris: 2 February 2007. 
UNESCO. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. 2005. 
UNESCO. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. 1997. 
Urbinati, Nadia. "Can Cosmopolitical Democracy Be Democratic? " In Debating 
Cosmopolitics, edited by Daniele Archibugi. Verso: London, 2003. 
van den Anker, Christian. "Institutional Implications of Global Justice as Impartiality: 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. " Global Society 20 (3) (2006): 267-285. 
Varmus, Harold. "Building a Global Culture of Science. " The Lancet 360 (Supplement, 
December 2002): sl-s4. 
Victor, David G, Kal Raustiala and Eugene B Skolnikoff. "Introduction and Overview. " In 
The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments. 
Vogler, John. The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd, 1995. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. " In Controversies in 
International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, edited by Charles 
W Kegley, Jr. New York: St Martin's Press, 1995. 
261 
Wapner, Paul. "Governance in Global Civil Society. " in Global Governance, edited by Oran 
R Young. 
Whitman, Jim. "Global Dynamics and the Limits of Global Governance. " Global Society 17 
(3) (2003): 253-272. 
Williams, John R. "UNESCO's Proposed Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights -A Bland Compromise. " Developing World Bioethics 5 (3) (2005): 211-224. 
Wolf, Martin. "The Case for Optimism: A Response. " In Debating Globalization. 
Wolinsky, Howard. "Bioethics for the World. " EMBO reports 7 (4) (2006): 354-358. 
Woodward, David and Richard D Smith. "Global Public Goods and Health: Concepts and 
Issues. " In Global Public Goods for Health. 
World Health Organization. Genomics and World Health: Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Health Research. Geneva: 2002. 
World Health Organization. "Genomics and World Health: Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Health Research: Report by the Secretariat. " EB113/13.27 November 
2003. 
World Medical Association. Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical 
Research Involving Human Subjects. 2004. 
Yanacopulos, Helen. "Researching Transnational Advocacy Networks: Methods and 
Challenges for Development. " In Negotiating Boundaries and Borders: Qualitative 
Methodology and Development Research, edited by Matt Smith. The Netherlands: JAI 
Press, 2007. 
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3'd edition. London: Sage, 
2003. 
Young, Oran R. Governance in World Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Young, Oran R. International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and 
the Environment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
Young, Oran R. "Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs. " In Global Governance, 
edited by Oran R Young. 
Zacher, Mark W, with Brent A Sutton. Governing Global Networks: International Regimes 
for Transportation and Communications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
262 
APPENDIX 1: CITED ARTICLES FROM THE THREE UNESCO DECLARATIONS 
The declarations can be viewed in full at www. unesco. org/bioethics. 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
11 November 1997 
Article 1 
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, 
as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is 
the heritage of humanity. 
Article 4 
The human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to financial gains. 
Article 5 
(a) Research, treatment or diagnosis affecting an individual's genome shall be undertaken 
only after rigorous and prior assessment of the potential risks and benefits pertaining 
thereto and in accordance with any other requirement of national law. 
(d) In the case of research, protocols shall, in addition, be submitted for prior review in 
accordance with relevant national and international research standards or guidelines. 
(e) If according to the law a person does not have the capacity to consent, research 
affecting his or her genome may only be carried out for his or her direct health benefit, 
subject to the authorization and the protective conditions prescribed by law. Research 
which does not have an expected direct health benefit may only be undertaken by way of 
exception, with the utmost restraint, exposing the person only to a minimal risk and 
minimal burden and if the research is intended to contribute to the health benefit of other 
persons in the same age category or with the same genetic condition, subject to the 
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conditions prescribed by law, and provided such research is compatible with the 
protection of the individual's human rights. 
Article 7 
Genetic data associated with an identifiable person and stored or processed for the 
purposes of research or any other purpose must be held confidential in the conditions set 
by law. 
Article 8 
Every individual shall have the right, according to international and national law, to just 
reparation for any damage sustained as a direct and determining result of an intervention 
affecting his or her genome. 
Article 12 
(a) Benefits from advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human 
genome, shall be made available to all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of 
each individual. 
(b) Freedom of research, which is necessary for the progress of knowledge, is part of 
freedom of thought. The applications of research, including applications in biology, 
genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall seek to offer relief from 
suffering and improve the health of individuals and humankind as a whole. 
Article 16 
States should recognize the value of promoting, at various levels, as appropriate, the 
establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees to assess 
the ethical, legal and social issues raised by research on the human genome and its 
applications. 
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Article 17 
States should respect and promote the practice of solidarity towards individuals, families 
and population groups who are particularly vulnerable to or affected by disease or 
disability of a genetic character. They should foster, inter alia, research on the 
identification, prevention and treatment of genetically based and genetically influenced 
diseases, in particular rare as well as endemic diseases which affect large numbers of the 
world's population. 
Article 18 
States should make every effort, with due and appropriate regard for the principles set out 
in this Declaration, to continue fostering the international dissemination of scientific 
knowledge concerning the human genome, human diversity and genetic research and, in 
that regard, to foster scientific and cultural co-operation, particularly between 
industrialized and developing countries. 
Article 19 
(a) In the framework of international co-operation with developing countries, states should 
seek to encourage measures enabling: 
(i) assessment of the risks and benefits pertaining to research on the human 
genome to be carried out and abuse to be prevented; 
(ii) the capacity of developing countries to carry out research on human biology 
and genetics, taking into consideration their specific problems, to be developed 
and strengthened; 
(iii) developing countries to benefit from the achievements of scientific and 
technological research so that their use in favour of economic and social progress 
can be to the benefit of all; 
(iv) the free exchange of scientific knowledge and information in the areas of 
biology, genetics and medicine to be promoted. 
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(b) Relevant international organizations should support and promote the initiatives taken 
by states for the above-mentioned purposes. 
Article 20 
States should take appropriate measures to promote the principles set out in the 
Declaration, through education and relevant means, inter alia through the conduct of 
research and training in interdisciplinary fields and through the promotion of education in 
bioethics, at all levels, in particular for those responsible for science policies. 
Article 21 
States should take appropriate measures to encourage other forms of research, training 
and information dissemination conducive to raising the awareness of society and all of its 
members of their responsibilities regarding the fundamental issues relating to the defence 
of human dignity which may be raised by research in biology, in genetics and in medicine, 
and its applications. They should also undertake to facilitate on this subject an open 
international discussion, ensuring the free expression of various sociocultural, religious 
and philosophical opinions. 
Article 22 
States should make every effort to promote the principles set out in this Declaration and 
should, by means of all appropriate measures, promote their implementation. 
Article 23 
States should take appropriate measures to promote, through education, training and 
information dissemination, respect for the above-mentioned principles and to foster their 
recognition and effective application. States should also encourage exchanges and 
networks among independent ethics committees, as they are established, to foster full 
collaboration. 
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International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
16 October 2003 
Article 6 
(a) It is ethically imperative that human genetic data and human proteomic data be 
collected, processed, used and stored on the basis of transparent and ethically acceptable 
procedures. States should endeavour to involve society at large in the decision-making 
process concerning broad policies for the collection, processing, use and storage of 
human genetic data and human proteomic data and the evaluation of their management, 
in particular in the case of population-based genetic studies. This decision-making 
process, which may benefit from international experience, should ensure the free 
expression of various viewpoints. 
(b) Independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees should be promoted and 
established at national, regional, local or institutional levels, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights. Where appropriate, ethics committees at national level should be consulted with 
regard to the establishment of standards, regulations and guidelines for the collection, 
processing, use and storage of human genetic data, human proteomic data and biological 
samples. They should also be consulted concerning matters where there is no domestic 
law. Ethics committees at institutional or local levels should be consulted with regard to 
their application to specific research projects. 
(c) When the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data, human 
proteomic data or biological samples are carried out in two or more States, the ethics 
committees in the States concerned, where appropriate, should be consulted and the 
review of these questions at the appropriate level should be based on the principles set 
out in this Declaration and on the ethical and legal standards adopted by the States 
concerned. 
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Article 8 
(b) When, in accordance with domestic law, a person is incapable of giving informed 
consent, authorization should be obtained from the legal representative, in accordance 
with domestic law. The legal representative should have regard to the best interest of the 
person concerned. 
(c) An adult not able to consent should as far as possible take part in the authorization 
procedure. The opinion of a minor should be taken into consideration as an increasingly 
determining factor in proportion to age and degree of maturity. 
Article 18 
(a) States should regulate, in accordance with their domestic law and international 
agreements, the cross-border flow of human genetic data, human proteomic data and 
biological samples so as to foster international medical and scientific cooperation and 
ensure fair access to these data. Such a system should seek to ensure that the receiving 
party provides adequate protection in accordance with the principles set out in this 
Declaration. 
(b) States should make every effort, with due and appropriate regard for the principles set 
out in this Declaration, to continue fostering the international dissemination of scientific 
knowledge concerning human genetic data and human proteomic data and, in that regard, 
to foster scientific and cultural cooperation, particularly between industrialized and 
developing countries. 
(c) Researchers should endeavour to establish cooperative relationships, based on 
mutual respect with regard to scientific and ethical matters and, subject to the provisions 
of Article 14, should encourage the free circulation of human genetic data and human 
proteomic data in order to foster the sharing of scientific knowledge, provided that the 
principles set out in this Declaration are observed by the parties concerned. To this end, 
they should also endeavour to publish in due course the results of their research. 
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Article 19 - Sharing of benefits 
(a) In accordance with domestic law or policy and international agreements, benefits 
resulting from the use of human genetic data, human proteomic data or biological samples 
collected for medical and scientific research should be shared with the society as a whole 
and the international community. In giving effect to this principle, benefits may take any of 
the following forms: 
(i) special assistance to the persons and groups that have taken part in the 
research; 
(ii) access to medical care; 
(iii) provision of new diagnostics, facilities for new treatments or drugs stemming 
from the research; 
(iv) support for health services; 
(v) capacity-building facilities for research purposes; 
(vi) development and strengthening of the capacity of developing countries to 
collect and process human genetic data, taking into consideration their specific 
problems; 
(vii) any other form consistent with the principles set out in this Declaration. 
(b) Limitations in this respect could be provided by domestic law and international 
agreements. 
Article 23 
(a) States should take all appropriate measures, whether of a legislative, administrative or 
other character, to give effect to the principles set out in this Declaration, in accordance 
with the international law of human rights. Such measures should be supported by action 
in the sphere of education, training and public information. 
(b) In the framework of international cooperation, States should endeavour to enter into 
bilateral and multilateral agreements enabling developing countries to build up their 
capacity to participate in generating and sharing scientific knowledge concerning human 
genetic data and the related know-how. 
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Article 24 
In order to promote the principles set out in this Declaration, States should endeavour to 
foster all forms of ethics education and training at all levels as well as to encourage 
information and knowledge dissemination programmes about human genetic data. These 
measures should aim at specific audiences, in particular researchers and members of 
ethics committees, or be addressed to the public at large. In this regard, States should 
encourage the participation of international and regional intergovernmental organizations 
and international, regional and national non-governmental organizations in this 
endeavour. 
Article 25 
The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) and the Intergovernmental Bioethics 
Committee (IGBC) shall contribute to the implementation of this Declaration and the 
dissemination of the principles set out therein. On a collaborative basis, the two 
Committees should be responsible for its monitoring and for the evaluation of its 
implementation, inter alia, on the basis of reports provided by States. The two Committees 
should be responsible in particular for the formulation of any opinion or proposal likely to 
further the effectiveness of this Declaration. They should make recommendations in 
accordance with UNESCO's statutory procedures, addressed to the General Conference. 
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Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
19 October 2005 
Article 2 
The aims of this Declaration are: 
(a) to provide a universal framework of principles and procedures to guide States in the 
formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of bioethics; 
Article 6 
3. In appropriate cases of research carried out on a group of persons or a community, 
additional agreement of the legal representatives of the group or community concerned 
may be sought. In no case should a collective community agreement or the consent of a 
community leader or other authority substitute for an individual's informed consent. 
Article 7 
In accordance with domestic law, special protection is to be given to persons who do not 
have the capacity to consent: 
(a) authorization for research and medical practice should be obtained in accordance with 
the best interest of the person concerned and in accordance with domestic law. However, 
the person concerned should be involved to the greatest extent possible in the decision- 
making process of consent, as well as that of withdrawing consent; 
(b) research should only be carried out for his or her direct health benefit, subject to the 
authorization and the protective conditions prescribed by law, and if there is no research 
alternative of comparable effectiveness with research participants able to consent. 
Research which does not have potential direct health benefit should only be undertaken 
by way of exception, with the utmost restraint, exposing the person only to a minimal risk 
and minimal burden and, if the research is expected to contribute to the health benefit of 
other persons in the same category, subject to the conditions prescribed by law and 
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compatible with the protection of the individual's human rights. Refusal of such persons to 
take part in research should be respected. 
Article 8 
In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated 
technologies, human vulnerability should be taken into account. Individuals and groups of 
special vulnerability should be protected and the personal integrity of such individuals 
respected. 
Article 12 
The importance of cultural diversity and pluralism should be given due regard. However, 
such considerations are not to be invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, nor upon the principles set out in this Declaration, nor to limit 
their scope. 
Article 14 
1. The promotion of health and social development for their people is a central purpose of 
governments that all sectors of society share. 
2. Taking into account that the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is 
one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, 
political belief, economic or social condition, progress in science and technology should 
advance: 
(a) access to quality health care and essential medicines, especially for the health 
of women and children, because health is essential to life itself and must be 
considered to be a social and human good; 
(b) access to adequate nutrition and water; 
(c) improvement of living conditions and the environment; 
(d) elimination of the marginalization and the exclusion of persons on the basis of 
any grounds; 
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(e) reduction of poverty and illiteracy. 
Article 15 
1. Benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be shared 
with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with 
developing countries. In giving effect to this principle, benefits may take any of the 
following forms: 
(a) special and sustainable assistance to, and acknowledgement of, the persons 
and groups that have taken part in the research; 
(b) access to quality health care; 
(c) provision of new diagnostic and therapeutic modalities or products stemming 
from research; 
(d) support for health services; 
(e) access to scientific and technological knowledge; 
(f) capacity-building facilities for research purposes; 
(g) other forms of benefit consistent with the principles set out in this Declaration. 
2. Benefits should not constitute improper inducements to participate in research. 
Article 18 
2. Persons and professionals concerned and society as a whole should be engaged in 
dialogue on a regular basis. 
3. Opportunities for informed pluralistic public debate, seeking the expression of all 
relevant opinions, should be promoted. 
Article 19 
Independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees should be established, 
promoted and supported at the appropriate level in order to: 
(a) assess the relevant ethical, legal, scientific and social issues related to research 
projects involving human beings; 
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(d) foster debate, education and public awareness of, and engagement in, bioethics. 
Article 20 
Appropriate assessment and adequate management of risk related to medicine, life 
sciences and associated technologies should be promoted. 
Article 21 
2. When research is undertaken or otherwise pursued in one or more States (the host 
State(s)) and funded by a source in another State, such research should be the object of 
an appropriate level of ethical review in the host State(s) and the State in which the funder 
is located. This review should be based on ethical and legal standards that are consistent 
with the principles set out in this Declaration. 
3. Transnational health research should be responsive to the needs of host countries, and 
the importance of research contributing to the alleviation of urgent global health problems 
should be recognized. 
4. When negotiating a research agreement, terms for collaboration and agreement on the 
benefits of research should be established with equal participation by those party to the 
negotiation. 
Article 22 
1. States should take all appropriate measures, whether of a legislative, administrative or 
other character, to give effect to the principles set out in this Declaration in accordance 
with international human rights law. Such measures should be supported by action in the 
spheres of education, training and public information. 
2. States should encourage the establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and 
pluralist ethics committees, as set out in Article 19. 
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Article 23 
1. In order to promote the principles set out in this Declaration and to achieve a better 
understanding of the ethical implications of scientific and technological developments, in 
particular for young people, States should endeavour to foster bioethics education and 
training at all levels as well as to encourage information and knowledge dissemination 
programmes about bioethics. 
Article 24 
1. States should foster international dissemination of scientific information and encourage 
the free flow and sharing of scientific and technological knowledge. 
2. Within the framework of international cooperation, States should promote cultural and 
scientific cooperation and enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements enabling 
developing countries to build up their capacity to participate in generating and sharing 
scientific knowledge, the related know-how and the benefits thereof. 
Article 25 
1. UNESCO shall promote and disseminate the principles set out in this Declaration. In 
doing so, UNESCO should seek the help and assistance of the Intergovernmental 
Bioethics Committee (IGBC) and the International Bioethics Committee (IBC). 
2. UNESCO shall reaffirm its commitment to dealing with bioethics and to promoting 
collaboration between IGBC and IBC. 
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEWS 
The descriptions vary in specificity according to the degree of anonymity requested by 
each participant. Where some codes appear missing, either they were not assigned or no 
data from the interviews have been used. 
Code Location and date Description or affiliation 
K-01 Nairobi, 4.10.05 Kenyan representative at the UNESCO IGE 
meetings, April and June 2005 
K_02 Nairobi, 5.10.05 Social and Human Sciences Committee of the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO 
K_03 Nairobi, 5.10.05 As above 
K-04 Nairobi, 6.10.05 African Technology Policy Studies 
K-05 Kilifi, 11.10.05 KEMRI-Welcome Trust Collaborative Programme 
K-06 Kilifi, 11.10.05 As above 
K 07 Kilifi, 11.10.05 As above 
K 08 Kilifi, 11.10.05 As above 
K-09 Kilifi, 12.10.05 As above 
K--1 0 Nairobi, 13.10.05 African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum 
K-1 I Nairobi, 19.10.05 Inter Region Economic Network 
K 12 Nairobi, 12.10.05 Attendee at the 2002 
TJCB-African Centre for 
Technology Studies genomics policy course 
K-1 3 Nairobi, 24.10.05 Natural Sciences Committee of the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO 
K-1 4 Nairobi, 26.10.05 Biosafety News 
K_1 5 Nairobi, 31.10.05 World Health Organization, Kenya office 
K_1 6 Nairobi, 1.11.05 Kenya National Commission for UNESCO 
K 17 Nairobi, 2.11.05 Member of a research ethics committee 
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Code Location and date Description or affiliation 
K_1 8 Nairobi, 3.11.05 Advisor on national biosafety policy 
K_1 9 Nairobi, 3.11.05 Member of a research ethics committee 
K-20 Nairobi, 7.11.05 Kenya National Biosafety Committee 
K 21 Nairobi, 5.10.05 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
K-22 Nairobi, 7.10.05 African Technology Policy Studies 
K_23 KWfi, 12.10.05 KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme 
K 24 Nairobi, 14.10.05 Africa Centre for Technology Studies 
K 25 Nairobi, 25.10.05 Member of two research ethics committees 
K_26 Nairobi, 25.10.05 Geneticist at a university 
K 27 Nairobi, 1.11.05 Ministry of Health 
K_29 Nairobi, 21.11.05 Geneticist at a research institute 
K-30 Nairobi, 8.11.05 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
SA 02 Cape Town, 28.3.06 South African National Bioinformatics Institute 
SA 03 Cape Town, 28.3.06 Geneticist at a university 
SA 04 Cape Town, 29.3.06 Division of 
Human Genetics, University of Cape 
Town 
SA 06 Cape Town, 30.3.06 
Senior member of a commercial genetics 
company 
SA 07 Cape Town, 30.3.06 South African National Bioinformatics Institute 
SA 08 Stellenbosch, 31.3.06 
Centre for Applied Ethics, University of 
Stellenbosch 
SA 09 Cape Town, 3.4.06 
international Research Ethics Network for 
Southern Africa (IRENSA) 
SA 10 Cape Town, 10.4.06 Member of a research ethics committee 
SA-1 1 Cape Town, 10.4.06 Africa Genome Education Institute 
SA_12 Durban, 5.4.06 Centre for HIV/AIDS Networking 
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Code Location and date Description or affiliation 
SA 13 Durban, 7.4.06 LIFEIab 
SA 14 Pietermaritzburg, 6.4.06 
School of Philosophy and Ethics, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
SA 15 Pietermaritzburg, 6.4.06 
South African Research Ethics Training Initiative 
(SARETI) 
SA-1 6 Johannesburg, 10.4.06 Bioethics Division, University of the Witwatersrand 
SA_17 Unspecified 
An academic in a senior position in bioethics at a 
health sciences faculty 
SA-1 8 Johannesburg, 10.4.06 Geneticist at a university 
SA-1 9 Johannesburg, 12.4.06 
Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical), 
University of the Witwatersrand 
SA 20 Johannesburg, 12.4.06 Geneticist at a university 
SA_21 Johannesburg, 13.4.06 As above 
SA 23 Johannesburg, 13.4.06 
South African representative at the UNESCO IGE 
meeting, June 2005 
SA 24 Pretoria, 24.4.06 
Geneticist, research ethics committee member 
and ethics lecturer 
SA 25 Pretoria, 19.4.06 Senior member of an independent ethics institute 
SA 26 Pretoria, 20.4.06 Department of Science and Technology 
SA 27 Pretoria, 20.4.06 Geneticist at a research institute 
SA 28 Pretoria, 21.4.06 Advisor on national innovation policy 
SA 29 Pretoria, 21.4.06 
Public Understanding of Biotechnology 
programme 
SA 30 Pretoria, 25.4.06 Geneticist at a university 
SA 31 Pretoria, 25.4.06 Department of Science and Technology 
SA 32 Pretoria, 1.5.06 Advisor on national innovation policy 
SA 33 Pretoria, 26.4.06 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
SA 34 Pretoria, 28.4.06 National Research Foundation 
SA 35 Pretoria, 2.5.06 
Faculty of Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Pretoria 
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Code Location and date Description or affiliation 
SA 37 By telephone, 11.7.06 Center for the AIDS Programme of Research 
in 
South Africa 
UK 01 By telephone, 5.9.05 
Attendee at the UNESCO IGE meetings, April and 
June 2005 
UK 02 London, 30.11.05 As above 
F-0 1 Paris, 29.8.05 UNESCO Bioethics Programme secretariat 
F 02 Paris, 30.8.05 
Attendee at the UNESCO IGE meetings, April and 
June 2005 
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